The South African Armed Forces, the Future and the Potential Role of the International Community

Dr Jakkie Cilliers
Co-director, Institute for Defence Policy

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 11, 1993

INTRODUCTION

The imminent institution of a Transitional Executive Authority implies shared political control over the Security Forces, particularly the SADF. This, and the commitment to a firm election date, are collectively held to be the point at which power is shared between, and passes from, a fading old political system to a rampant new one.

This view allows for the consideration of two issues which until recently, were only spoken about furtively. The first is the potential role of the international community in the establishment of an '... impartial, accountable, effective and legitimate defence force for a democratic South Africa.'1 In other words, in the adaptation of the South African military in support of the settlement process. The second issue is the resumption of normal military relations between a post-settlement South Africa and the international community. But why would a country, or the wider international community, assist in the transformation of the South African military? What purpose could such assistance serve?

The first section below outlines the nature of the changes and challenges facing the South African military. This is followed by a brief description of the purpose and nature of international assistance and the possible role of a select number of foreign countries. The paper concludes with the view that the adaptation of the military should commence as soon as possible and that the complexity of the process demands coordination and a strategic policy perspective, as opposed to a tactical political perspective.

THE EXTENT OF THE CHALLENGE

A range of challenges face the South African military as the country moves through a fundamental social transformation. Unfortunately the emotive content of the debate on the integration of the SADF and the various guerrilla armies, such as MK, is a serious source of distraction in the development of this debate. This distraction is unfortunate and potentially dangerous, for decisions that will be taken in accordance with short-term political expediency will inevitably have longer term effects, as the section below will illustrate.

THE CRUCIAL ISSUE - ROLES AND TASKS

The starting point for a discussion of the challenges facing the South African military is the division of responsibilities between the military and the police and the respective roles of these forces, including that of any paramilitary Peacekeeping Force.2 The choices made with regard to the respective roles will, on the one hand, affect the culture and ethos of the military. They will also impact upon the organisation, equipment, training, deployment, logistic systems and equipment procurement of the forces since structure follows strategy.

The fact is that defence expenditure is set to continue to decline, and is reducing the ability of the SADF to deal with its different roles and tasks as effectively as it has done in the past. From a high of 4,3% of GDP in 1989 to 2,6% in 1993, the target level set for defence spending by the end of this decade is 2% of GDP.3 Massive cuts have already occurred, especially considering the fact that the South African GDP has actually shrunk during this period. This reduction in resources is already beginning to curtail the assistance that the SADF could provide to other government departments such as Law and Order and National Health.

Only a concerted effort and deliberate political action to channel the declining flow of resources in a specific direction will save the South African military from a slow run-down and obsolescence of its present conventional forces and equipment. Equipment and even doctrines are increasingly ill-suited to the new realities of a changed internal, regional and international situation. Such a development would also impact upon the capacity of South Africa to act as a regional source of stability, with consequences far beyond its borders.

At a general level, one of three roles could predominate. The first is continued support of the South African Police in internal law-enforcement duties on a semi-permanent basis. This is at present a role that is accounting for an increasing proportion of the decreasing resources available to the SADF, particularly the SA Army. The deployment of the military in support of the police provides some justification for the allocation of funds to the armed forces from the national budget.4 However, it invariably tends to involve the military in socio-economic issues, thereby politicising it. It places severe stress on an organisation trained and dedicated to use maximum as opposed to minimum force.

The second and diametrically opposed role is the designation of the military as a stand-by 'rapid deployment'-type force dedicated to crisis-control and the classic function of defence of the territorial integrity of the country. According to its proponents, this would require more flexible and versatile forces, implying higher standards of training and more sophisticated equipment. It would allow the military to move 'out of the townships and back to the barracks'. Such a development would also allow the military to exploit its capacity to provide training and other assistance to the armed forces of neighbouring countries as part of a regional security pact. It would also more readily enable it to designate forces for, and participate in, international peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. However, the present dependence of the S.A. Police on the military would require additional strengthening of the police or the creation of an independent para-military force to assist the police in crowd control and dealing with mass violence (i.e., a Peacekeeping Force).

The third role, somewhere between the extremes of the other two, is for the South African military to concentrate on border protection. Given the refugee problem, cross-border drug trade, massive small-arms trafficking and the instability in many of South Africa's neighbours, border security is bound to move steadily up the political and security agenda. Eventually it will confront both politicians and the Security Forces with difficult choices in regard to dealing with refugees and illegal aliens. Such a function may already be the only viable option left to the South African Navy which has suffered severe attrition of its resources in the last two decades.

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT ISSUES

An end to white conscription and the introduction of either a draft or an all-volunteer system of military manpower procurement is one area which will also be affected by any shift in the primary focus of the military in the future. Conscription presently serves to feed the mobilisation forces comprising the Citizen Force and Commando's. The end of white conscription could, therefore, severely affect the composition, ethos and perhaps the very existence of many Citizen Force and Commando units. This development would weaken the regimental system as it has developed in South Africa. Britain has been particularly successful in using the regimental system as a focus for full-time and part-time military matters. In that country pride in the regiment and loyalty to the unit transcend issues of national military politics to a surprising extent. In the broader scheme of things the political interests of the British military have been trivialised.

Without adequate attention to some type of bridging system between the phasing out of white conscription and a new or changed cadre of mobilisation manpower, South Africa could find itself denuded of an emergency resources of trained and ready forces. The country would, as a result, be ill-equipped to deal with extreme contingencies, either internally or externally.

While the end of white conscription will inevitably and dramatically change the racial composition of the greater part of the South African military, the senior cadre of officers and NCO's will undoubtedly still be predominantly white (and in the case of the Army, Afrikaans). Admittedly the integration of the command structures of the TBVC armed forces into the SADF would go some degree towards moderating this situation. At the same time it would not be more than a small step towards establishing some degree of balance in terms of the racial and ethnic composition of the South African armed forces. A major effort will therefore have to be made by the SADF, which has the monopoly of training institutions and skills, to effect meaningful (as opposed to symbolic) affirmative action programmes. This could take various forms, ranging from dedicated training courses, to international assistance.

Another urgent issue relates to demobilisation. South Africa cannot afford, nor does it need all of the armed forces which will result from the amalgamation of the various guerrilla armies, the SADF and the TBVC armed forces. It is only if the military retain and perhaps even increase the extent of their support function to the police that any increase in the numbers of the South African standing military forces (as opposed to the reserve forces) could be justified. Consequently the authorities should be very selective in integrating persons into the military who will inevitably have to be demobilised. In effect, the demobilisation of members of the various armed forces should occur directly from these forces, prior to any amalgamation or integration.

The integration of military forces, particularly those of the ANC, into a single national defence force, is a political requirement. However, while MK numbers, for example, have probably doubled since February 1990, and the armed forces of the TBVC countries have apparently also been swelled by new recruits, the SADF has retrenched close on 7 000 Permanent Force members due to the declining defence budget. This figure represents roughly 18% of the total cadre. While further retrenchments from the SADF are probably inevitable, the greatest numbers in any demobilisation will probably come from within the ranks of the armed forces of the TBVC countries and the guerrilla armies. Given the perilous state of the national economy, emotions running high in a time of political change, and the severe disruption that such retrenchment has had on the individuals concerned, there exists among them serious potential for disruption.

The need is for well thought out and integrated demobilisation programmes which should commence as early as possible.

CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OTHER ISSUES

The re-establishment and entrenchment of true civilian and political control over the military is yet another issue. It includes the need to divest the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces of their present reliance upon military men in uniform for functions which do not require any specific military-related skill or discipline. These range from policy studies and aspects of logistics, to finances and even personnel administration. The establishment of clear, transparent civilian control and military accountability would also play a major role in reducing the fears of South Africa's neighbours, thereby easing the reintegration of South Africa and its military into the region.

There are a number of additional questions to be resolved. One of them relates to the future of the South African arms industry and the amount of money that a future Government may be prepared to spend on an indigenous arms manufacturing capability for strategic considerations. The ending of the international arms embargo and opening up of the international arms supplier and export market to South Africa is a second. Yet another is the future of the cadet system which is still part of white, state-funded school education. Greater transparency will also be required regarding both defence policy issues, arms procurement and the use of public monies. And then there is South Africa's regional defence posture and relations with its neighbours.

In summary, what is required is a changed military - eventually in terms of mission, equipment, organisation, size, accountability and personnel. A changed military ethos is going to be the greatest challenge, however. There can be no question of blind obedience or the misuse of authority as has been the case within the SADF under a National Party government. Nor is there room for military intervention in politics as has occurred in all four nominally independent homelands (the TBVC countries). Nor is there place for the highly politicised party-army culture of an organisation such as MK. And it is from these disparate groupings that we will have to build for the future.

All of these problems could benefit from the experience of other countries.

WHY SHOULD FOREIGN COUNTRIES ASSIST SOUTH AFRICA?

There is a deep and genuine desire on the part of many countries to assist where possible in the transition to an enduring and prosperous democracy in South Africa. Assistance in transforming the South African military is a key part of this process and should be aimed at promoting stability and security in South Africa and in the region. It is the key which, when turned, makes the transition finally and fully irreversible.

Such foreign assistance is, of course, presently constrained by national and international legislation. Effectively all developed countries are prohibited from co-operating with the South African security establishment and most developing countries lack the professional and other resources to help, even if they wanted to. That such legal restrictions are open to fairly wide interpretation is well illustrated by the assistance presently provided by a number of countries, including Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and some Scandinavian countries, in transforming the South African Police. Direct military to military training is, of course, unambiguous and would require the repeal or amendment of national and international prohibitions in this regard. Such action would follow political developments in South Africa and not precede them.

For some countries the potential sale of arms in a severely depressed international market may be an additional motivating factor. Less positively, foreign countries would wish to avert large scale influxes of expatriates. For Britain, the prospect of between 800 000 and 1 000 000 British passport holders hammering at consulate doors in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town seeking to flee to the United Kingdom is an unattractive one. This apart from the historical, cultural and emotional ties between Britain and South Africa and British investment in the country.

The strategic question regarding the motivation for such assistance runs deeper, however. It relates to how a country such as the United States, Britain, France, or Germany, views the role of a regional power. Is South Africa viewed as a likely source of regional stability with a calming effect in a volatile region? Or is there a feeling that a strong South Africa, with professional and effective armed forces, including an indigenous defence industry, is a hindrance or even a threat to regional stability and sustainable development?

It has often been remarked that if sub-Saharan Africa is to survive, politically and economically, it would be because of regional co-operative ventures built up around three countries, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. Building from these countries outwards ever-widening areas of stability and security could be an objective. The extent to which such a 'building block' approach would be supported by the international community is a crucial question. It could possibly imply the support of South African 'big brother politics' by the international community at the expense of smaller, less powerful states.

Do our potential benefactors want, rather, to influence the integration process between the SADF and the various other armed forces and in the process create a weak, faction-ridden, obsolete defence force? Would they prefer one that will not interfere nor threaten the interests of other countries in the region?

I raise this question in response to the obvious ambivalence of intentions and policies that many developed countries have in private when contemplating an ANC-dominated government in South Africa. Their trepidations go beyond consideration of the past 'friends' of the ANC, such as Gaddafi and Castro. They are part and parcel of the growing division between North and South in an increasingly unequal world.

Many influential persons in the ANC appear to have clear ambitions for South Africa to assume a leading position in a 'South', ranged against 'the North'. This is not a prospect relished by developed countries given South Africa's past nuclear weapons capabilities, category 1 status in terms of ballistic missile delivery systems and sophisticated armaments manufacturing industry. In the corridors of power of the leading developed countries, these 'realist or pragmatic' concerns have a tendency to outweigh considerations relating to sustainable development and regional stability.

South Africans will have to decide for themselves what the true intentions of various countries and the wider international community are. From a South African perspective any assistance in helping to build the basis for a modern, effective defence force as a basis for regional stability within an appropriate regional defence organisation would be both appropriate and welcome.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA

A SENSITIVE AND BLANCED APPROACH

Foreign military assistance to South Africa is an issue fraught with national and professional pride on the side of the present Government and the SADF. In addition, challenges of high-handedness and accusations of a neo-colonialism of a special kind come from black nationalists on the other side. A degree of sensitivity and prudence will therefore be required from all parties concerned, particularly since South Africa has a military with considerable international standing and justified self-esteem. The fact that this standing is not shared by large sections of the South African populace is, of course, equally well known, and one of the reasons for the involvement of the international community.

Equally important to such a sensitive and cautious approach is that of impartiality and balance. While MK and to a lesser extent the TBVC armed forces have the greater need for training, there is also a requirement for specific skills and military education within the SADF. As a result, and in the interests of building confidence (and breaking up any possible political factions), joint and collective training schemes and systems should be instituted wherever possible.

PURPOSE

Foreign assistance could serve a number of purposes. In some areas it would make up the deficit in skills that developed in the SADF during international isolation. These areas include those of all-arms combined doctrine where there has been a degree of stagnation discernible for several years. Training methods and approaches have been changing in the leading Western countries. So too have more fundamental considerations regarding the utility of armed action and the ethos of soldiering within a democracy. The impact of developments regarding human rights and the 'rules of war' upon military action has also prompted changes not yet felt in South Africa.

For its part the members of the present SADF could make some contribution to the professional debate on military doctrine based on its considerable operational experience. The ability of the SADF to sustain itself logistically over long distances within a guerrilla threat environment may prove to be a valuable source of reference for peacekeeping operations. There is a pragmatic requirement to restore the professional image of the SADF soldier when he contemplates the future, for even an ANC-dominated government will largely be dependent upon the loyalty and skills of the present cadre of SADF leaders.

Foreign military assistance could also provide or help in the provision of unbiased conversion training, particularly for an organisation such as MK, steeped in outmoded Soviet doctrines and inappropriate guerrilla warfare techniques, as well as for the TBVC armed forces whose training has been in counter-insurgency operations rather than in conventional warfare. Should the onus be on the SADF to play a leading role in the provision of conversion and additional training, the international community could serve as an independent source of verification. While few ANC members would contemplate simply subscribing MK to SADF training courses, international supervision and vetting of conversion training could be a important area of assistance. It could also serve to strengthen affirmative action programmes by providing specific additional training programmes where appropriate. Finally it could set a foundation for regional co-operation based on an organisation such as NATO. In this case joint training for officers of the armed forces in southern Africa would build regional stability and co-operation.

Foreign training assistance would serve to re-integrate the South African military of the future into the international community of armed forces serving established democracies. Such re-integration would have a number of beneficial side-effects, most important of which relates to the transfer of a broad military ethos. South Africa did, of course, participate in such courses in the past and her return would present few professional problems.

Foreign military training assistance can readily be divided into two categories. These are training in South Africa (in situ) and assistance in the country concerned (foreign training).

FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMMES

The training of South Africans in a foreign country is expensive and would generally be more suited to smaller groups of more senior- or specialised technical personnel. For example, while the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office does allocate a limited amount of money for the participation of foreign military officers for training in the UK at the expense of the British taxpayer, such support would not easily apply to South Africa which is generally considered wealthy enough to pay its own way.5

As a rule of thumb few countries have dedicated or separate foreign training courses. Most include the foreign students in their existing courses, together with their own nationals.

Foreign students on British courses are common. Presently, a total of some 72 foreign officers (of which 24 are from countries outside NATO) join the basic officer training course at Sandhurst annually. Forty-eight more (of which 24 are from countries outside of NATO) are trained at the Army Staff College in Camberley. At a place such as the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, the most senior military course in Britain, 38 out of 78 students are foreigners.

The United States provides other examples of foreign training. The US distinguishes between its International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Sales Training (FMST) programmes. IMET is described as '... a program which brings military personnel - officer and enlisted - to the U.S. to take courses designed primarily for U.S. military personnel. IMET gives foreign students exposure to U.S. military professionalism within the context of American life and culture.'6 It concentrates on professional military education at senior and intermediate U.S. service schools such as war colleges and command and staff colleges. Through IMET, which runs an annual budget of roughly $42 million, between four and five thousand foreign students from 107 countries are trained in the US each year. A particularly noteworthy feature of the IMET programme is that one of its stated purposes is 'to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.'7 IMET is a grant programme, that is, it is financed by the American taxpayer. Once again South Africa would probably find it difficult to qualify for IMET programmes.

FMST training more frequently involves the technical training associated with specific defense equipment purchases. Its annual budget is roughly five times larger than that of IMET. FMST training is financed either with military assistance funds or national funds (i.e., paid for by the foreign country).8 Needless to say, the USA would be delighted to involve a post-settlement South Africa in both arms purchases and FMST training.

Foreign training assistance can, of course, also be done much more cheaply on a student exchange basis. For example an American lieutenant-colonel may attend the South African staff course in Pretoria and, in exchange, a South African officer could attend the American course in the United States. At present there does not appear to be substantive differences in the standard of staff training provided in these two countries.

There can be little doubt that the resumption of foreign military training will contribute to the creation of accountable, effective and legitimate armed forces for South Africa. The primary constraint is that of cost. Only a few candidates would, therefore, be able to attend courses overseas and the competition for such an opportunity would be keen.

IN SITU TRAINING ASSISTANCE

In situ training, i.e. foreign training assistance provided in South Africa, may take a number of forms. These range from attaching an instructor to an existing military training institution such as the Army College, to monitoring and evaluating South African military training where required. It may be the provision of complete training teams, or in the form of joint exercises. An example of the latter would be the annual mid-year joint training session between two American parachute companies and the Botswana Defence Force in the Shone training area.

Generally in situ training assistance, as opposed to foreign training, lends itself particularly well to larger numbers of students. The use of local training facilities and instructors makes it more effective in the transfer of skills and knowledge. Such training is also a cheaper way of learning from the foreign community than sending persons overseas.

Given the legitimacy problem faced by the SADF, in situ monitoring and validation of South African training could play a vital role in South Africa at an early stage after the institution of a Transitional Executive Council. In preparing for the integration of various armed forces there is a clear requirement for conversion training (from a guerrilla army to a conventional army) and additional training (to address any deficit of skills and problems relating to ethos). A need for such training will remain after integration. However, it has also been made clear to South Africa that when it comes to military, para-military and police forces, the international community is prepared to assist, but that South Africans will have to train South Africans.

In situ training and assistance is not new to southern Africa. Britain has been particularly active in the region through its so-called British Military Assistance Training Teams (BMATT). However, there is little requirement in South Africa for dedicated logistic training, junior leader training or even command and staff training typical of BMATT training. In fact, South Africa may find itself in this training role in the region in the not too distant future.9

THE REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE AT AN EXPERT POLICY LEVEL

The requirement for assistance at an expert policy level does not relate only to direct military-to-military expertise and information, but for help in a much wider process involving academics, bureaucrats and politicians outside the formal military structures. In the same manner that South Africans are grappling with their constitutional future, and in the process legitimising and defining their particular requirements, South Africans need to debate among themselves issues relating to defence policy.

Policy level foreign assistance is clear and fairly simple. It is also less constrained by progress in the broader settlement process. Essentially, it involves the limited participation of non-government analysts and experts in the internal debate in South Africa. A particular advantage of these programmes is that they are not necessarily reliant upon military assistance funding since such assistance impacts upon the democratisation process rather than upon military security issues in the normal sense of the term.

After the Second World War, Germany developed a comprehensive organisational ethos and military culture known as Innere Führung (moral leadership), characterised by the concept of the soldier as a free individual with all his rights and obligations to his country intact, but in a uniform (Staatsburger in Uniform). This concept offers a coherence of vision and a multitude of checks and balances that are very attractive. It represents a successful attempt by a country with a divisive military history to re-educate and re orientate its armed forces.

The German approach to integrating the military into civilian society is often contrasted with the classic British concept of the 'apolitical' professional military. Much of the present SADF military culture, organisation, doctrine and discipline is derived from the British model. While it could be argued that the constitutional future of South Africa may be moving away from a classical Westminister-type system to something perhaps theoretically closer to that of Germany, much of the British tradition and practice will be retained. One example is the regimental system, another is the existing Military Disciplinary Code and a third is the British ethos of soldiering which has permeated much of the SADF. However, virtually all of the once British-trained colonial armies in Africa promptly removed the elected governments once independence was bestowed. It is very much this poor record of borrowed British-type apolitical military professionalism that is inspiring analysts to look at developments elsewhere. Yet, while the German model mentioned earlier is an attractive alternative and may have contributed to containing German nationalism during the bipolar era it has yet to prove itself in war. The debate continues.

Turning to the US, the American military has particular skills and experience to offer South Africa in terms of equal opportunity and affirmative action programmes. There are many social analysts who argue that the American military is the only truly integrated element of American society - it epitomises the melting pot theory.10 While the American situation in dealing with minorities cannot be equated with the South African situation, the body of military sociological analysis that has accompanied American military development since the Second World War is virtually unparalleled.

Contact with other foreign countries may also be of benefit. The Indian military, despite the deepest social, religious and class distinctions in the broader society, has managed to stay outside of nationalist and party politics. France has extensive experience in Francophone Africa. The Royal Netherland Defence College at the Hague recently presented a 6 week long international staff officers' orientation course. The purpose was to bring together military professionals from the former Warsaw Pact countries to study military in democracy. The course focussed upon international security issues, defence organisation and military leadership in a democratic society.

Of course, none of the would-be benefactor countries considered above can lay claim to a monopoly of wisdom or experience in the transformation of the military. Nor are they lining up in queues outside the offices of MK, the SADF or the armed forces of the TBVC countries, offering training and assistance. South Africans, faced with their own particular situation, will have to decide for themselves on the relative merits of foreign know-how and assistance from various quarters.

TWO CAVEATS

There appear to be two obvious conclusions or pointers that flow from the preceding discussion.

The first is that the transformation of the SADF or the creation of a legitimate national defence force must be addressed in parallel with the broader settlement process. The security structures and practices that are created in this transitional period must be steps towards a desired end-goal rather than ad hoc crisis management. Establishing early multiparty control of the military is one such step. In particular the primacy of the democratic political process over security considerations must be enshrined constitutionally, legally and in practice during the transition. It is also the first step in the process of building a new regional security pact.

The second point is the need for a mechanism for co-ordinating, resolving and directing the extensive adaptation of the military. There is a requirement for the establishment of a single, expert advisory board at the highest level to examine the totality of the challenges facing the South African military, including the potential role of the international community.11 The establishment of an advisory Council of Defence both for the immediate transitional phase as well as thereafter, could play a crucial role in the management of organisational transformation of the SADF. It could make the difference between ad hoc crisis planning and thorough, deliberate progress.

CONCLUSION

The South African situation vis-à-vis the future of its armed forces is clearly not analogous to that of Namibia, Zimbabwe, nor hopefully Angola. There is a balance of power at the national level between the black nationalist forces on the one hand and the civil service, business, and the armed forces, essentially in white hands, on the other. There has not been a prolonged and bloody armed conflict between two opposing military forces as was the case in many neighbouring countries. The requirement for change in the armed forces is derived from the settlement process itself rather than from the balance of military power. It is a political imperative and not a professional military matter.

The early part of this article summarised the challenges facing the South African military. At the root of this discussion was the fear that the combined effect of these changes could threaten the organisational integrity of the military. Such a collapse would have serious consequences for the country as well as the region. The section concluded with the view that these changes have to be managed in a coherent, sympathetic and integrated manner.

In the course of this article, various forms of foreign military training assistance to South Africa were discussed. These included the following:

Informal participation in the policy debate on the part of non-partisan 'experts', commencing at an early stage of the political transition.



Military exchange programmes, typically at officer level and/or attendance at foreign training courses, which can only take place once military relations between South Africa and the rest of the world have been normalised.



Foreign military assistance in South Africa to validate local training and support local training efforts where required.



In situ training - the secondment of military officers and defence policy experts to various South African training institutions.



Dedicated training teams to manage training in particular areas, such as conversion training for MK.

Two areas were not discussed. The first is financial and training assistance with the creation of a Peacekeeping Force. The second is assistance with the demobilisation process.

Progress in respect of the various forms of assistance which were discussed obviously depends upon the progress that is made with negotiations and, as part thereof, the re-establishment of formal military accreditation.

The final section of the paper proposed that the transformation of the armed forces should proceed in parallel with the broader settlement process and that an expert advisory Council of Defence should be established to provide non-partisan guidance and ensure a long term policy perspective.

REFERENCES

This paraphrases the `single, overriding objective that should guide all proposals regarding armed formations in the country' of the Technical Committee on Violence at the constitutional negotiations, Report Number Four of the Technical Committee on Violence: 2 June 1993, p. 4



As has now been proposed to the Multiparty Negotiations by the technical committee on violence. See Report Number Four of the Technical Committee on Violence: 2 June 1993, p. 6



Lt. Gen. P. Steyn, Challenges and Prospects for the SA Defence Industry, paper delivered at a conference on the commercialization of the defence industry in Pretoria, 22-23 April 1993, reprinted elsewhere in this issue.



For a view opposed to such an option see J.K. Cilliers, Soldiers are NOT policemen, in Prospects, vol. 1, no. 4, December 1992.



South Africa had a single slot on this course until the sixties. The total subsidy committed by HMG in 1989/90 in southern Africa amounted to about £7,6m, almost all of this being met by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's UK Military Training Assistance Scheme. The Office also funded the provision of non-lethal military equipment, mostly vehicles and radios, to Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In 1989/90 the value of this amounted to £1,8m.



S.C. Manolas & L.J. Samelson, The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress, in The DISAM Journal, Spring 1990, p. 1



Ibid., p. 3. In terms of Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The other two objectives are to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; and to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defence articles and defence services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to the self-reliance of such countries.



Ibid., p. 24



The accompanying table presents the size of the BMATT commitment in the region in May 1993.



COUNTRY	SIZE	RANK	REMARKS
Lesotho	3 officers	Lt Col
Swaziland	4 officers	Lt Col
Namibia	5 officers 1 civilian		down from 52
Zimbabwe	50-52 in Harare and Nyanga	Brig, advisor to Zim Army Cmdr	down from 80, includes 3 RAF officers
Botswana	only short term trg assistance		annual joint mil exercise at coy level
Mozambique	Training conducted by BMATT at Nyanga in Zim

* In most instances the rank held is an acting one, with the substantive rank one below



See, for example, H. Dietz, et al. (ed's), Ethnicity, Integration and the Military, Boulder, Westview, 1991.



See, for example J.K. Cilliers & P.B. Mertz, Concept and Role of Armed Forces and Political Control of Defence in a Democratic South Africa, in issue no 8 of the South African Defence Review, pp. 16-20 ; J.K. Cilliers, Two keys to restoring trust in the armed forces, in Prospects, vol. 2, No 1, March/April 1993; and J.K. Cilliers, Demobilisation, Integration and the Sub-Council on Defence, submission to the technical committee on violence and the technical committee on the TEC, 8 June 1993, pp. 3-4.