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A South African Peacekeeping Force
Is it Practicable?
BACKGROUND
As its special name implies, the idea of a South African Peacekeeping Force is distinct from that of a blue-beret International Peacekeeping Force. The South African Force was originally proposed by the churches (particularly Bishop Stanley Mogoba). More recently it has been taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights and has subsequently become part of the ANC's negotiation position. Until recently the Government was at best ambivalent about the idea. The creation of a Peacekeeping Force has now been suggested by the Technical Committee on Violence in its Fourth Report to the multiparty negotiation forum at the World Trade Centre. This recommendation reads as follows
The Committee proposes the establishment of an independent peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its functions thereafter should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, should be constituted in such a way as to have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.
The requirement for a South African Peacekeeping Force arose from the following considerations:
- the legitimacy crisis confronting the SA Police and SADF in the townships, the level of distrust and mistrust of these forces at a political level, and therefore the requirement for a non-partisan force in the run-up to elections;
- the fact that such a force will not be provided by the international community;
- as a compromise, obviating the requirement for full multi-party control of the Security Forces (the SADF in particular) by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC);
- as either an alternative to or as a preparatory step towards the direct integration of forces, thereby obviating the requirement for immediate integration.
The consensus that appears to be developing between the major negotiating parties on the question of a Peacekeeping Force appears to be based on short-term political expediency rather than on a deliberate, strategic vision. Should a decision be taken to establish such a Force, it should be done on the clear understanding that South Africans are establishing a third permanent component in their formal security structures, i.e. one apart from the police and military.
In this document an attempt is made to quantify, in broad terms, the proposal by the Technical Committee on Violence to establish a South African Peacekeeping Force. The subject is discussed in terms of the following headings:
- size requirement;
- estimated costs;
- time schedule/training; and
- sources of personnel.
The article concludes with some suggestions regarding alternative or additional steps.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
THE ESTIMATED SIZE OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE
According to the proposal by the Technical Committee on Violence, the Peacekeeping Force is to be the primary peacekeeping force for the elections, that is, the SA Police should play a secondary role. As a minimum the Peacekeeping Force should replace the SADF during this time. Vide the view of the Technical Committee on Violence that '... various armies play no role in the election process, unlike the various police forces which will be required to fulfill ongoing law and order functions.' (par. 5.2.2)
The SADF normally has about 7 000 men deployed in support of the SA Police, although this number may be increased through call-ups, temporary re-deployment of units from elsewhere, and so on, when the need arises.
Some simple guidelines are required in calculating the required size of a Peacekeeping Force.
- To keep one man on the ground for 24 hr's, you need at least 3 people, each working 8 hour shifts. If you want to do this for some months, you probably need 4 persons since you have to cater for rest, recuperation, sickness, retraining, leave, etc. Although persons can work double shifts for a short period, it is not practical for any length of time.
- Since the Peacekeeping Force would be a separate organisation, a considerable additional 'tail' will be added to the operational deployable manpower, i.e., persons to deal with logistics, personnel administration, general administration, finances, command and control, etc. (Admittedly the logistics for this operation are fairly simple.) At a rough estimate, to keep one person on the ground around the clock for some months, you probably need a total of about 5 people in the system. Bear in mind that the SADF (and the SA Police) has existing logistic-, command and control-, technical maintenance-, computerized pay-, and personnel systems already in place, either through the commando system, group headquarters or command headquarters, or police stations in the case of the SA Police. These are nationwide systems, replete with stores, etc.
- The 7 000 SADF personnel which are deployed in the townships at any one time does not, therefore, include any 'additional' logistic tail. It can theoretically keep about 2 330 soldiers (7 000 divided by 3) deployed around the clock. To keep 2 330 persons on the ground as part of a new organisation, would require five times the 2 330, or about 11 650.
To get the SADF out of the townships then, would require a Peacekeeping Force of roughly 12 000 persons strong.
There is a concerted fear that violence will increase in the run-up to elections as political competition intensifies and as political tensions rise. As a result it could be argued that the requirement for the deployment of forces will increase rather than decrease. To illustrate:
- Should the total force (of 12 000) be deployed in a township of 3 million residents for one month, there will be fewer than one Peace Keeper per 1 000 residents.
- Given the estimate of 7 000 ballot boxes at the time of elections, this does not equate to even one Peace Keeper per ballot box.
These considerations suggest that, a Peacekeeping Force of 12 000 strong would be inadequate to deal with escalating violence in the absence of the SADF. There is little prospect of such a force taking over the primary responsibility for stability in the run-up to elections from the SA Police, or of it replacing the SADF.
It is important to bear in mind that the SADF has a massive reserve system (Citizen Force and Commandos) which it can call upon to bolster its numbers within a matter of days in the event of a crisis. This will not be the case with a Peacekeeping Force. All that it could do is shift resources from one area to another.
In a press statement dated 19 June 1993, the ANC calls for a Peacekeeping Force of 10 000 strong. If the ANC want a force of 10 000 men deployed at any one time, the size of the total Peacekeeping Force would be 50 000 (10 000 multiplied by 5). If the figure of 10 000 represents the total size of the Peacekeeping Force, it would provide only around 2 000 (10 000 divided by 5) persons on the ground around the clock. The latter would perhaps be able to take over all law and order duties in one or two of the larger townships in the PWV area.
AN ESTIMATE OF COSTS
The table below provides some indication of the costs involved in establishing such a force for one year. Very conservatively, it assumes a total Peacekeeping Force 20 000 strong, of whom 16 000 are 'troopies' and 4 000 administrators, commanders, etc.
The establishment of a Peacekeeping Force to replace the SADF presently deployed would, therefore, conservatively cost R1 bn. This budget is for one year. It does not cover severance pay, and/or demobilisation/recruitment costs.
There are two potential sources of funding. Monies could be transferred from the budgets of the SADF and SA Police or foreign funding could be sought. The latter could be in the form of grants or loans.
COST ESTIMATE FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCE: ONE YEAR
SER. NO
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DESCRIPTION
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UNIT COST
(R)
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NUMBER
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SUB-TOTAL
(R)
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REMARKS
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1
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Basic salary of majority
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1,500.00
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16,000
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288,000,000.00
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2
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Average salary of rest
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4,000.00
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4,000
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192,000,000.00
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leadership, admin, logistics
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3
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Basic equipment of each pers
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4,000.00
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15,000
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60,000,000.00
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4
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Vehicles, radios, etc.
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50,000,000.00
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4
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200,000,000.00
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R50 mil per 1000 men
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5
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Running costs
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R25 pp/day/365 days
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20,000
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176,000,000.00
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Water, lights, food. Excl. base costs. Use SADF bases.
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6
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Training costs
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10,000,000.00
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2
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20,000,000.00
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Two cycles
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TOTAL
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937,000,000.00
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NOTES TO TABLE:
A minimum educational level of standard 8 has been assumed (since members may be required to appear in court, etc.). Further, it has been assumed that remuneration for a Peace Keeper would be somewhere between that of a conscript and the salary of a private sector security guard. This implies an average salary of roughly R1 500 per month.
Other costs are those relating to clothing, weapons, vehicles, radio's, riot control gear, tents, water, food, etc. It would cost at least R4 000 per person to equip each of the 20 000 with personal items plus weapons, protective apparel, etc. for one year.
Training is divided into two cycles, each costing R10 million. This is an educated guess.
Even given these costs, if the Peacekeeping Force work under conditions of employment similar to that of a policeman or soldier, there will be some open-ended costs not included in the table such as medical aid, paid leave, danger pay/special allowance, personal insurance, perhaps overtime, possibly pension provisions
TIME SCHEDULE AND TRAINING
If elections do indeed occur by the end of April 1994, ten months remain. Allow a month for slippage before the wheels are set in motion to start with the establishment of the Peacekeeping Force.For the SA Police and the SADF, who are used to such duties, a period of at least an additional month can be expected before training of such a force commences. The Peacekeeping Force may then use the existing facilities, equipment, etc. of the SADF and/or SA Police.
In order to avoid a 'kitskonstabel' problem (as a result of inadequate and inappropriate training) an estimated basic training period lasting at least 3 months and covering areas such as conflict resolution, crowd control, dispersion, patrols, mediation skills, basic law, discipline, weapons training, etc., would be required. This would only be possible if the recruits already possessed at least a modicum of military knowledge and skills, i.e. they are drawn from existing organisations. In this case additional 'confidence building' time and effort will be required.
The first group of trained Peace Keepers (10 000 strong) could be on the street in about 5-6 months from now (December 1993 to January 1994), and the second three months later. Theoretically the SADF could withdraw from the townships after the first group is deployed, sometime early in 1994, the level of violence allowing. Whether this would in fact happen and whether such training is possible in this short period of time, is, of course, not at all certain. Bear in mind that the SADF annual intake of white conscripts is only slightly more than double the figure of 10 000, at around 24 000.
An additional constraint is that of providing comprehensive junior leadership training in such a short period of time. Such training would require at least 6 months.
SOURCES OF PERONNEL
In the interests of balance and legitimacy, the Peacekeeping Force is proposed as a multi-party body. It would be made up of members of various organisations. This would require a considerable additional period of negotiation to reach agreement on the criteria, selection, confidence building, and possibly conversion training of prospective members prior to integration. Allowing indiscriminate recruitment into a Peacekeeping Force would be counter-productive.
The following potential sources of recruits exist: the SADF, MK, TBVC armed forces, SA Police (including the Internal Stability Division), police forces of the homelands, persons that have previously served in any of these organisations, community marshals, members of Self-Defence Units and new recruits (persons that have not previously served in any of the forces listed but meet the minimum entry requirements).
Still, the nature of the task expected of the Peacekeeping Force is police- rather than military-orientated. The most obvious practical building block around which such a force could be structured would be the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police. Whether this is politically acceptable is, of course, another matter. Should the Internal Stability Unit not be incorporated into the Peacekeeping Force, considerable care would have to be taken regarding command and control liaison between these two forces.
Another problem is that of excising the appropriate chunks of the respective budgets of the original mother organisation (bar those of the guerrilla armies, of course) and lumping this together. Alternatively the mother organisations could continue paying their people. Those members of the SADF who are transferred to the Peacekeeping Force, for example, could remain on the payroll of the SADF.
The major practical problem would, however, be that of leadership. Without a clear longer term career prospect, people of calibre and skill will not join a Peacekeeping Force. While junior leadership could possibly be trained within a period of six months, more advanced leadership skills would be difficult to obtain except from the Security Forces and former members of these Forces. Once again the political acceptability of such a choice may be problematic.
THE ALTERNATIVES
Given the political will and substantial foreign assistance the hurdles discussed above can be overcome. At the same time, however, even the best short-term solution will be very expensive, complex, messy and time-consuming. The implications in terms of service regulations are considerable. Since the Peacekeeping Force would have to have powers of arrest, and so on, the Force would have to be formally constituted through an act of parliament, or form part of the existing Security Forces. At present the latter appears the more feasible.
The combined effect of these complications would mean a drawn-out process lasting considerably longer than planned. Even after all of these efforts, the SADF will still be in the townships, since the Peacekeeping Force would not be of sufficient strength, and would have no reserve of manpower to deal with crises. In addition the Peacekeeping Force would probably be deployable only under supervision.
Security costs money. It is never cheap. There can be little doubt that the creation of a Peacekeeping Force will cost considerably more money than the use of the existing Security Forces.
At the same time, the present deployment of the SADF and SA Police is unacceptable to parties such as the ANC and PAC under the existing circumstances. The degree of mistrust with which these organisations are viewed, both by large sections of the community, as well as at a political level, clearly requires dramatic steps.
The preceding analysis indicates that there is little chance of establishing a South African Peacekeeping Force in good time large enough and of sufficient training without substantial assistance, probably from the international community. There are some doubts as to whether such levels of assistance are obtainable at such short notice - and whether the international community would be prepared to assist in this matter at all. Without necessarily replacing a future South African Peacekeeping Force, it may be more practical to:
- Establish full and complete multi-party control over the Security Forces by the Sub-Councils of Defence and Law and Order of the Transitional Executive Council. This would make parties such as the ANC co-responsible for law and order whilst removing the Security Forces from the party-political struggle;
- Insert international monitors into the command and control structures of those SADF forces deployed in support of law and order duties and the SA Police. These persons should have a monitoring function only, and report to the National Peace Accord structures.
Should it be decided to establish a Peacekeeping Force, the following recommendations are made:
- Minimum entry standards have to be laid down regarding age for rank, educational, physical and other requirements. This may exclude large sections of the guerilla armies. What will happen to them?
- Persons wishing to join the Force should resign from their present organisation or positions, and join the Force. In this process some provision for the transfer of benefits to the Force could be made.
- International funding and training assistance should be sought prior to embarking on this venture.
- The Peacekeeping Force should be built up around the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police and it should be built up fairly slowly and deliberately.
Most important of all, a Peacekeeping Force should be constituted as a permanent organisation and not as a temporary, stop-gap force.
CONCLUSION
While this paper does not represent a comprehensive investigation of the feasibility of the Peacekeeping Force, it is intended to stimulate debate about the practical requirements and long-term implications of the establishment of such a force. The paper is not a rejection of the notion of a Peacekeeping Force, either. However, the expectation that such a force be the primary peacekeeping force during the elections does not seem reasonable. Similarly, the limited objective implied in the report of the Technical Committee on violence, that the Peacekeeping Force replace the SADF in the townships, also appears unrealistic.
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