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Challenges and Prospects for the SA Defence Industry
Equipping the Armed Forces for the Future*
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I intend to focus on the structural aspects of a future defence force and examine the factors which determine its primary role, size and shape - and the way it is equipped.
Historically, the South African society has been characterised by a diversity of political, economic and social interests and aspirations. This diversity differs from equally complex situations in the rest of the world. This pattern provides the basis of polarisation and conflict with regard to the allocation of national resources, privileges, priorities and command positions in society.
Although the political instability in neighbouring countries such as Angola and Mozambique continues to have a negative influence in the whole of Southern Africa, the potential of a conventional threat is diminishing and is currently almost non-existent. However, nobody would argue forcibly against the national requirements of having either armed forces or for that matter a supporting defence industry.
Internally, however, the situation has worsened considerably since 1990 due to the high intensity of political violence and the sharp increase in criminal offences. The continued use of the SA Defence Force in support of the SA Police, should be seen against the background of a country in socio-political transition. Every effort will be made in the future to remove the military from this involvement as soon as is practically possible. In the meantime, the resources of the SA Defence Force will remain at the disposal of the SA Police until such time as the endemic cycle of violence has been broken.
NATIONAL PRIORITIES VS DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS : THE UNENDING DEBATE
The SA Defence Force should project a credible conventional deterrent ability as an African regional force by means of strategically defensive, yet tactically offensive pro-active mobile defence in order to avoid conventional military conflict in the RSA. In practice, the SA Defence Force prefers to engage and defeat enemy forces outside the borders of the RSA, since combat on its own territory is unacceptable for political, psychological and economical reasons.
The strategic requirement to project a viable deterrent is of course not the only determinant which has an influence on the defence posture, size and shape of the Defence Force. Other functional requirements, which tend to reinforce the requirement for a viable deterrent, include the following :
- Command, control, communications and intelligence systems to facilitate the control of operations.
- A flexible manpower system, comprising a full-time professional core, as well as sufficient, adequately trained part-time reservists.
- Flexibly sized, multi-role combat-ready rapid deployment forces, which can be deployed to threatened areas by land, sea or air.
- Force multipliers, the best available technology within financial means, multi-purpose weapon systems and equipment, as well as adequate, effective logistical and medical support.
- An adequate and balanced support infrastructure, including equipment, finance and realistic reserves, based on operational and contingency plans.
The most obvious question is naturally : how much money should we spend on defence? Whereas the functional aspects (such as the threat perception) often tend to demand ever-increasing finances, there are other equally demanding socio-political considerations. The government has, in pursuit of its reform initiatives, redefined its national priorities. South Africa presently spends about 2,6% of the GDP on its military, considerably below the world average and down from a level of 4,2% in 1989 - but still short of the precondition of 2% laid down by the IMF and the World Bank.
There have been considerable reductions in defence expenditure in South Africa over the past four years. The effect of this has been quite dramatic in terms of the reduction in combat force levels of the South African Air Force and Navy. The effects were also passed on to the armament industry. The SA Army has also absorbed its fair share of the financial cut-backs, but had to do so with regard to its capital expenditure, whilst maintaining almost combat manpower force-levels in support of the SA Police.
The rapid down-sizing of the SA Defence Force over the past four years has created a structural imbalance as far as its budget is concerned. Whilst being forced to maintain much of its operating expenses in support of the SA Police, the cut-backs on capital expenditure could have serious consequences in the medium to long term. If South Africa is still to have effective armed forces by the year 2010, it is essential that most of its major equipment problems be addressed over the next ten years, in order to have the necessary programmes running in time to produce the equipment in useful numbers from the year 2010 onwards.
But as the SA Defence Force faces up to radical restructuring, so does the armaments industry. The country must maintain a strong, if smaller, defence force to meet unexpected challenges. It must also have a resource strategy - centered around a robust defence technology and industrial base - to support this force and its military strategy.
It is my considered opinion that the nation needs a long-term defence technology and industrial strategy for identifying and maintaining the critical facilities, technological know-how, and people to develop future weapons systems and to provide a core for regenerating defence industrial capabilities, should the need arise.
Having said this, I acknowledge the fact that the issue of the role and arming of the future defence force should be a public debate, and that it forms part of the political debate on socio-economic priorities.
The creation of arms production programmes in developing countries, such as the RSA, has been associated with a variety of conflicting motives and expectations. The first group of these are military and political in nature. In a great number of developing countries, the drive to be self-sufficient and to reduce the dependence on decision-making in highly industrialized countries has led to domestic arms production. The possession of strong armed forces supplied with locally produced arms is considered an attribute of political independence. A perception of threat - actual or potential - from neighbouring countries can also precipitate the move towards domestic arms production.
A second set of arguments in favour of domestic, third-world arms production is economic in nature. The world-wide transfer of arms has accelerated during the past decade, but simultaneously fewer arms have been supplied under "military assistance" programmes while more arms have been delivered on commercial terms. As a result, more countries have been importing arms at increased cost. Developing countries believe that they can reduce these costs - and particularly save foreign exchange - by substituting domestic arms production for arms imports. It is also argued that arms production programmes might contribute to the civilian economy indirectly by improving the skills of the manpower engaged in arms production and by increasing the productivity of the work force.
The extent to which the production of arms in developing countries is possible will depend on the answers to the following broad questions :
- How diversified is the country's industry; is there already a competent industrial base with skilled manpower and a minimum level of research and development facilities available?
- Can production costs (given the small production runs) be kept low; are there possibilities of exports of arms produced; to what extent will the financial resources of the country be allocated to install these production facilities?
- Who controls production technology; can access to know-how, licenses, patents, etc., be secured by the country, or are arms producers in industrialized countries or their governments reluctant to cooperate; if suppliers are willing to provide technology, at what financial and political cost to the recipient; does the capacity for indigenous development and production exist?
BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
Much has been said and written about narrow and outdated conceptions of security, portrayed principally, if not exclusively, in military terms. The SA Defence Force has, in fact, long ago recognised the broader concept of security, admitting that military security is only one of several dimensions. Barry Buzan1 maintains that security is concerned with 'the pursuit of freedom from threat'. In the international content, security 'is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity'.
For many years security in Southern Africa was widely defined in almost exclusively military terms. Now that the region may be entering a new era with an absence of major inter-state armed conflicts, many people expect that security (psychological freedom of fear) is about to descend on the region. Unfortunately, this view is still commonly based on a narrow militarized interpretation of security.
The combined effects of political insecurity (for example emanating from ethnic divisions), economic insecurity (e.g. reduced economic aid to Third World countries, low productivity, etc.), social insecurity (migration in large numbers across borders, language and cultural conflicts) and environmental insecurity (droughts and desertification) may well increase general insecurity in Southern Africa as a regional security complex.
Buzan2 states that the reality of security interdependence is unavoidable. The security of any one state in Southern Africa may therefore be related to if not critically dependent on the security of at least some of its immediate neighbours. Deon Geldenhuys (RAU)3 is of the opinion that most states in the world - more so those in the Third World - simply cannot meet all their security needs from their own resources.
The notion of a security complex thus focuses attention on the security interdependence of the countries of Southern Africa. The existence of a security complex does not, however, tell one how the countries involved should formally structure their relations to promote their common security.
It is a matter for these future governments to consider whether relationships should be formalised in inter-governmental organisations, or not. They could, of course, devise a charter for regional cooperation and understanding, which should include the aspects of military security.
South Africa is the de facto regional leader in Southern Africa. Assuming that South Africa would in future still be the major power in the region, the country could hardly avoid playing a major role in ensuring security in Southern Africa. Given the domestic pre-occupations, Geldenhuys4 suggests that South Africa would have neither the energy nor the resources to conduct an ambitious foreign policy. In practice, South Africa would in the years ahead have to strike a balance between over-extension and under-involvement in the affairs of Southern Africa. There are clearly risks attached to either of the two extremes.
THE SADF DURING THE TRANSITION
South Africa is preparing for a new democratic constitution. If a transitional government is to succeed as it must, mutual confidence building is of primary importance at all levels in relation to law and order.
Understandably, many in government and the SADF find it difficult to contemplate actually sharing power and responsibility in the short or even medium term. As far as we (in the SADF) are concerned, the mechanisms and the personnel to operate them are already in place and the chain of command and control is clear. We have our acknowledged professional ethics and standards. Correspondingly, the ANC and its para-military wing MK, while expecting to exercise power when a new constitution is in place, are wary of having to share authority on an ad hoc basis with a much larger established organisation.
The growing emphasis on expedient practicalities to promote early accommodation of disparate forces could have serious implications for the long term development of a national defence force having to attract widespread loyalty and respect. The immediate problem remains how to legitimise the defence force in the eyes of the majority and control other paramilitary forces in the country.
Given the existing citizen force structure, and assuming constitutional bias towards regionalism, one could integrate existing units as they stand into the existing territorial commands of the SA Army. This could apply to the TBVC forces and to MK, but it would inevitably prompt claims from other groups including the AWB, which is organised on military lines, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which is not.
Incorporation of units into the SADF in a loose working arrangement, unless very sensitively handled and unequivocally supported by political leaders, could easily lead to a defence force divided in loyalty to political groupings rather than to the government. History could repeat itself.
Alternatives to integration on a unit basis are much more complicated. One side (ANC) will regard standards as capable of being applied in order to discriminate against particular groups, while the existing professionals (SADF) will perceive, with some justification, the process as a qualitative threat.
In the longer term, the size and composition of the defence force will be determined strictly by defence and national security criteria. In the short term I expect political considerations, notably reassuring potentially disaffected personnel on all sides, to be dominant.
Besides the inevitable process of social fusion, the question of integrating the infra-structure and major equipment of TBVC defence forces arises. Compatibility, standardization and military doctrine are important considerations, but will on all accounts not produce insurmountable problems.
THE PRESENT STATE OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT
The SADF has become quite adept in the art of prolonging the onset of equipment obsolescence. But there are distinct limits to what can be done in this regard, and there are premiums to be paid in terms of opportunity costs.
To a certain extent the arms embargo precluded the alternative of replacing major equipment at the end of its useful life-cycle. Military planners more often than not had no other option but to extend the operational life-cycles of most weapon systems. Some of their efforts also made good economic and technological sense. The update of the Dakota is a good example.
However, no one will deny the fact that South Africa's defence force could face block-obsolescence of its major equipment by the turn of the century. There are a few exceptions, such as the intended replacement of the Harvard by 1995.
Most noteworthy in respect of this problem is the SA Navy, which has no real "blue water" capability, and must replace its strike craft and its submarines by the end of this decade if it is to remain a viable conventional force.
The SAAF has no modern long-distance maritime patrol aircraft to service the 3 000 km coastline, and its Mirage fleet of F-1's and Cheetahs have had more than their fair share of updates. Budget cuts prevented the acquisition of a modern combat helicopter, such as the locally developed Rooivalk.
The SA Army should obviously plan to replace its Ratel infantry combat vehicle and Olifant battle tank over the next decade or two, and acquire suitable air defence systems should it wish to continue projecting a viable deterrent in the longer term.
The message is clear: quite considerable amounts of equipment will have to be purchased over the next decade and a half.
PLOTTING THE CHANGES : A SYNTHESIS OF CONSIDERATIONS
I have briefly discussed various determinants of the size, shape and equipment needs of a future defence force. It should be evident at this stage that strategic decisions will be concerned with creating and maintaining a balance between different, often opposing and constantly changing factors. The product should be a dynamic (changing) synthesis of considerations. Finding the right mind and pleasing the majority of constituents will test the limits of reality.
It would be presumptuous of me to suggest the ideal combination for the future. However, it might be useful to indicate the departures from the present status quo, as seen from my point of view.
- National Priorities
I expect the defence budget to absorb further "pummeling" in the short to medium term, and to be further reduced in relative terms, i.e. to ± 2% of the GDP. Unless further retrenchments are made and other running costs are reduced, capital expenditure will again bear the brunt of this financial onslaught. Unfortunately, over the same time span, the expected social fusion of the SADF and other para-military forces is expected to take place. The question of who will be retrenched and when, will surely become a highly sensitive and emotional issue. The result? Reduced capital expenditure in the short to medium term. This will inevitably delay much needed replacement programmes until the first decade of the next century. Further distortions of the defence budget are therefore inevitable.
- Threat Perceptions and a Viable Deterrent
In the absence of a conventional threat (at least in the short to medium term) the size and shape of the defence force would be determined to a large extent by what military planners feel constitutes a viable deterrent and what is affordable. According to many seasoned soldiers who fought bloody battles over the last few decades, the SADF has already been reduced to a critical mass (or even below) in many operational aspects. But the broadened concept of security and the growing interdependence of countries in Southern Africa, call for new operational approaches. I believe that the concept of a rapid deployment force which comprises elements of all the arms of service, would constitute an affordable and viable conventional deterrent. Here one would probably put a higher premium on aspects such as speed of deployment, accurate and sustainable fire power and survivability than on sheer mass of the force. Naturally, one would expect to gain the competitive edge by technological superiority in relative terms, rather than in absolute terms. Force multipliers come in different guises, but the ability to sustain and conduct operations with effective logistical and medical support, as well as competent command, control, communications and intelligence, will certainly carry the day.
- Resource Requirements and the Military Industry
The SADF will need to replace most of its major equipment over the next decade and a half, or face a massive reduction in its capabilities. I expect military staff requirements to reflect increased versatility (military role) in role application but requiring relatively smaller production runs. (The SAAF is replacing Harvards with fewer Pilatus trainers.) Although strategic and economic considerations would still favour products with a high domestic content, one would expect the entrepreneurial responsibility to shift from the government to the private sector. The local military industry will have to compete and cooperate with foreign competition on all aspects of performance, value and cost. To achieve economies of scale the industry would have to sell its products on the world market as well. In many cases the marketing sources would be enhanced (even guaranteed) by endorsement from the SADF. The G5-gun is a good example in this respect. The SADF and the South African military industry will have to make sound business decisions. This includes taking business risks - but not entirely at the expense of the tax payer! The honeymoon is over.
- The Human Factors
The human factor will have to be taken into account over the transitional time continuum when making equipment choices and decisions. Hi-tech equipment demands correspondingly high skills from operators and military leaders alike. In addition, the harsh physical environment of the African battlefield should be taken into account. During the transitional phase the SADF will be subjected to a very demanding social restructuring programme. Consequently, the choice of equipment should be compatible with the general skills level of a manpower component in metamorphosis.
CONCLUSION
I have merely touched upon some of the aspects which should be considered by military and industrial planners for equipping a future defence force. One thing is certain: all participants should share to a large degree a common vision for the future. I believe a future defence force will play a vital part in creating a safe and prosperous country to live in. I believe that the local industry in general but the military industry in particular, will actively support this force as an instrument of peace and social adjustment.
REFERENCES
- Barry Buzan, North-South Security in the early Twenty-first Century, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Vancouver, March 1991.
- Ibid.
- Deon Geldenhuys, The Role of a New South Africa in Regional Security, Paper published by RISCT, London, 1991.
- Ibid.
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