The Social Integration of Demobilised Soldiers in Contemporary South Africa*

Jacklyn Cock
Member of the Military Research Group and Associate Professor of Sociology,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

*A shortened version of a paper presented at a Military Research Group seminar in Johannesburg in June 1993

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 12, 1993



INTRODUCTION

Between 1976 and 1990 many young South Africans considered themselves to be soldiers fighting a 'war'. Thousands of these young people have been scarred by their experiences of violent conflict in the townships, Angola or Namibia. An important task now is to heal these wounds of war and integrate all our young people into a common society with a core set of shared values and a sense of shared purpose.

Two integrating and democratising measures are essential for this healing process: a demobilisation policy and a merging of our multiple armies into a single integrated defence force.

The argument in this paper for these measures is grounded in information derived from a variety of primary and secondary sources including a needs survey of a sample of 180 recently returned MK cadres; in depth interviews with 40 key informants - members of the various armies as well as defence and security analysts; a literature review and archival research.

We have powerful models in our own history to support these policy proposals. At the time of the formation of the Union Defence Force it was agreed that, in the interests of white unity, the integration should involve equal numbers from the opposing British and Boer forces in both rank and file and command structures. We also have a powerful model in our own history of the state's assumption of responsibility for its soldiers. Many of the principles and benefits allocated to demobilised volunteers from the Union Defence Force after World War 11 are relevant to us today; just as it was announced in 1944, we need a Soldiers Charter.

An informal demobilisation process is presently underway in South Africa. This is evident in two different armies. Firstly, in the thousands of retrenchments that are occurring as part of the restructuring of the SADF, and secondly in the return of thousands of MK cadres from camps in Uganda and Tanzania as part of the United Nations repatriation of exiles programme.

However the conditions under which these two categories of soldiers are returning to civilian life is dramatically different. Those 6 000 people retrenched from the Permanent Force of the SADF have been given generous benefits including pensions and gratuities. Approximately 5 000 people from MK camps have returned to South Africa as 'unarmed civilians' since the suspension of armed struggle and the unbanning of the ANC and have not received anything like this scale of assistance. Most have obtained only limited help from the National Co-ordinating Committee for the Repatriation of South African Exiles (NCCR) as part of the 17 000 returning exiles it has assisted to date. There will be a formal demobilisation process at some time in the future when a new defence force is formed, but in the immediate term in the interests of both political stability and morality these differences require redress.

There are two strong reasons why demobilised soldiers should be targeted as a special group deserving preferential treatment:

The social and material needs of MK returnees. Survey results show that the majority are unemployed, young and eager to continue their disrupted education.

The potential of discontented demobilised soldiers for destabilisation whether through political or criminal activities. The likelihood of ex-combatants becoming increasingly involved in such activities increases with time if their material needs are not met. Discontented demobilised soldiers represent a considerable security threat as evidenced by the experience of Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria and the current situation in Mozambique. In the southern African region as a whole,' A serious danger is that groups of guerrillas or ex-soldiers will feel let down and disappointed by the lack of employment opportunities and that they will use their military training and guns to go their own way.' (Baynham, 1992:24)

A demobilisation package which included MK soldiers would be a symbolic act of reconciliation and erode the demeaning sense of being viewed as 'guerrillas not soldiers' reported by some of the Zimbabwe ex-combatants. It would also imply some material recognitition of the genuine hardship endured by many MK soldiers. These past hardships as well as their current problems emerged clearly from a study of ex-combatants.

PROFILE OF A SAMPLE OF MK SOLDIERS


A questionnaire was administered to a sample of 180 MK people who had recently returned to South Africa. The largest single category (90) had returned to South Africa in 1991. Of the others, 16 returned before 1990; 12 in 1990; 62 in 1992 and one during 1993.

MK 'returnees' are not a homogeneous group. There are considerable differences in age, educational level, social class, rural or urban background, skills, physical ability and both personal and political aspirations. Overall the sample was characterised by the following features:
  1. Most were young; 134 (74,4%) of those surveyed were aged 35 or below.

    TABLE 1: AGE RANGE
    16-20
    9
    21-25
    18
    26-30
    52
    31-35
    55
    36-40
    28
    41-45
    9
    46-55
    9

  2. All reported having experienced severe hardship in exile, imprisonment, and in military camps.
  3. The majority had spend a considerable amount of time out of South Africa.
    TABLE 2: PERIOD OF EXILE

    0-5 yrs
    42
    6-10 yrs
    67
    11-15 yrs
    58
    16-20 yrs
    8
    20 plus
    5

  4. Most reported that their time away was hard. Asked what was most difficult many informants mentioned 'homesickness', physical illnesses like malaria, poor health services in the camps and insecurity. Their words are reported below verbatim as far as possible, to avoid the tendency of survey research to reduce the pathos of individual stories to a set of faceless statistics.

    'There was the constant fear of death at the hands of SA agents'.

    'The hardest was the fact that I had left my children behind and I worried about their welfare a lot... I realised that for my children and everybody I must help to win freedom for my country. But these worries haunted me until I came back.'

    'The worst thing was missing my parents and fearing that I would die or they would die before we met again.'

    'I was often ill and homesick and the health facilities were very poor. I regretted leaving the country and worried a lot about dying in a strange country far from home'.

    Several informants experienced traumatising incidents of violence:

    'It was very painful. Two of my comrades died in an ambush and I escaped.'

    'The worst thing was seeing members of my unit killed in an ambush and my feeling of helplessness.'

    A total of 43 of the 180 MK returnees surveyed had also experienced the deprivations of imprisonment in South Africa in the years before the unbanning of the ANC.

    TABLE 3: PERIOD OF IMPRISONEMENT
    1 yr or less
    13
    2-5 yrs
    19
    6-10 yrs
    10
    11-15 yrs
    3
    16-20 yrs
    2

  5. One of those interviewed was MK cadre Mthetheleli Mncube who was sentenced to death and spent seven years on 'death row' before his release. Prison conditions generally, but those on death row particularly, are appalling.
  6. All 180 surveyed had suffered some disruption to their education but their level of educational attainment was surprisingly high. Over half the sample (51,7%) had completed at least Standard 9.

    T    ABLE 4: HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL STANDARD ATTAINED

    Std 6 and below
    33
    Std 7
    24
    Std 8
    30
    Std 9
    43
    Std 10
    50

  7. A number had other technical or academic qualifications; eleven had university degree courses; five had a completed degree and 42 had a diploma of some kind. A large number (64) are presently studying. For many this is by correspondence, e.g. a security supervision course with Damelin, or a BA through UNISA. Several are presently studying at Kangwane Work Study Centre.

    Many are anxious for further education and skills training

    A large number, 116 (64,4%) of those surveyed would like to continue their formal education and go back to school or to technical college or university. Their reasons showed a wide range of interests and aspirations:

    'When I came back I wanted to go to university but I couldn't get in because I didn't have a matric.

    'I want to first finish my matric and then go to a technicon. I want to be an electrician. It has always been my dream. I always fiddle with people's fridges, stoves and irons, etc. I want to learn to do it professionally.'

    Several key informants emphasised how most young people disrupted their education when they joined MK and consequently lack marketable skills.

    'There were three distinct groups of young people who went for military training. The '76 generation; the '81\2 generation and the post '84 category. The formal educational level of the first was much higher than those of subsequent groups. They are especially in need of access to education.'
  8. The vast majority of the 180 MK returnees surveyed is unemployed. Clearly this is apart of a wider problem with about four million of our ten million potentially economically active population currently unemployed, but MK cadres' lack of both marketable skills and work experience make them a particularly vulnerable social category.

    Only 35 (19,4%) of the 180 surveyed were in full-time employment - mostly in SACP, ANC and MK structures. Only 9 were employed in mainstream organisations. These included an insurance salesman earning R450 a week and a security guard earning R900 a month. Their job aspirations were low:

    'I would like any job as long as it will help me to survive and contribute at home'.

    Many described desperate efforts to obtain any kind of employment:

    'I have tried to find a job but I have failed because I have low education, no skills and no experience of any job in civilian life.'

    Some expressed resentment about their employment status:

    'I am not educated like other comrades. It is frustrating, especially for us who have been loyal members of MK. Others chose to go to school. We chose to fight. We suffered and are still suffering.'
  9. Many MK returnees are living in poverty, a condition obviously shared by the 18 million of our people who are estimated to be living below the poverty datum line.

    The great majority 175 (97,2%) reported that money was a problem in their lives. Many expressed resentment towards those who appear to be comfortably off and had not sacrificed for the liberation struggle.

    'I am very bitter... what makes it worse is to see people who have never gone to exile, some of whom never even cared about the ANC or were interested in the revolution but today they are holding jobs in the organisation and are driving smart cars. At the same time those of us who have fought for the liberation have to start from scratch.'

    Since their return most MK returnees have had to rely heavily on the support of their families for food and accommodation. The combination of unemployment, unfulfilled expectations and dependence on relatives has generated a good deal of family tensions. Many referred to their desire to support their dependents and articulated a sense of being a burden to their relatives. One 30 year old who had lost his leg in a land mine explosion described himself as a 'terrible inconvenience to my family'    .

    'Something must be done before we have to find our own way of surviving which will be embarrassing to the ANC'.

    'I live on begging. I drink and smoke. People are tired of buying me these things. They used to do it freely when I arrived back... Now they run away every time they see me. They know that I am going to ask for a smoke or a drink. I have overheard some complaining that they did not send me into exile, so I should not become their burden. Only my sisters care. How long will they care for an old man (38 years) like me? I do not know; I am scared'.

    Many young men expressed a desire to be independent and contribute to the maintenance of their families.

    'Money is a big problem. I need money to be a responsible brother, and uncle and father...People think that when you are from exile you have lots of money.'

    Some looked to the ANC to provide them with jobs and money and expressed a resentment that they were not doing so:

    'The ANC have stopped giving us money. How do they expect us to live? They do not care how we live or where we live. They only cared when they sent us to infiltrate the country. They must look after our needs now.'

    A large number, 165 (91,6%) of those surveyed, had obtained some financial assistance from the NCCR or the ANC but only 100 (55,5%) had obtained amounts of R4 000 or more. The money was usually paid in installments but often involved large amounts of cash. No financial advice was provided.

    The money was often spent on family maintenance. For example,

    'I gave the money I received from the NCCR to my sister. It was too little because she does everything for me. The rest went towards my children. I couldn't stand seeing them dirty and uncared for. I nearly killed their mother when I first saw them.'
  10. The majority, 104 (57,7%) of the 180 surveyed were single.

    TABLE 5: MARITAL STATUS

    Married
    61
    Single
    104
    Divorced
    2
    Separated
    11
    Widowed
    2

  11. However three quarters had children or other dependents.

    TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHILDREN OR OTHER DEPENDENTS
    1-3
    99
    4-7
    34
    8-10
    1

  12. Dependents often included aged parents. e.g. a father of 79 years in one case and, in another, a mother of 92 years.
  13. Many of those surveyed reported problems with accommodation. Only 20 (11,1%) were staying in their own homes. The vast majority were living with relatives often in very overcrowded conditions which generated family tensions. One 26 year old lived with his mother and seven other people in a two roomed house in Orlando East; another 27 year old was living with 10 persons in a house with three rooms; another lived with 14 other people in a six roomed house.

    Only 12 (6,6%) reported that they were happy with their living arrangements.

    'No the house is small and we are many and my older brother always fights with me. He is an Inkhatha member.'

    'My sister-in-law makes it clear that I am a burden on them.'
  14. The majority of those surveyed, 130 (72,2%) reported that they suffered from personal problems either of an emotional, physical or social kind.

    (i) Health Problems - these included: severe insomnia - a 25 year old woman said, 'I sleep very badly and sometimes wake up screaming or crying. This started in the camps after our camp was bombarded.' Asthma was frequently cited; also arthritis, epilepsy, migraines, dizzy spells and hypertension.

    (ii) Emotional and social problems - depression and drinking were frequently cited.

    'I am an emotional wreck. I have twice come close to committing suicide. I stopped because of my children but I am useless - to them and to myself.'

    One of the most alarming aspects of the research was the finding that only 20 (11,1%) reported receiving any help from anyone with these problems. One informant mentioned the MK ex-combatants association which for the past year has tried to provide assistance with small business development, but with extremely limited resources. The only other sources of help mentioned were visits to clinics or doctors but this was often not done because of factors such as:

    (i) A lack of resources.

    'I was advised by a doctor to go for psychiatric treatment but I have no money for that.'

    'I have emotional problems but I can't afford to go to a psychologist.'

    (ii) Professional pride.

    'I am a soldier. I must overcome my problems by myself. I will fight them with every inch at my disposal.'

    (iii) Fear

    'I have bad health but I am afraid to go to the clinic. The nurses say that exiles have AIDS.'

    Thirty informants declined to elaborate on the types of problems they faced.

    Many are clearly grappling with disappointment and failed expectations. They expected to return to South Africa as heroes and have found only poverty and loneliness. There seems to be a common feeling among MK returnees that their hardships in exile are either not understood or not appreciated.     'We had a very tough time in the camps and in the bushes. People don't always remember that.'

    Conversely there is the 'returning hero syndrome' which generates its own stresses. As has been reported in Namibia, many exiles, including ex-combatants, have been welcomed back by their families and the community as returning heroes who had helped to liberate the country. This status is linked to a set of expectations about the future that, with the return of family members from exile, the family fortunes would improve. 'Everyone in my family expects me to buy them a leather jacket'    . A lack of resources to meet these expectations generates considerable stress among returned exiles generally.

    These replies illustrate the powerful need for psychological services for ex-soldiers. Although no informant used the phrase, it is suspected that many of them are suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): 'The psychological complex of 'war trauma' (PTSD) seems to centre specifically around the following features: severe survival guilt and self punishment; episodes of severe rage and violent impulses toward what may be indiscriminate targets; psychic numbing; alienation from one's own feelings; doubts about whether one can ever love or trust someone else again; and pessimism about the very nature of love and life itself'    . (Sandler, 1989: 81). Many of the MK returnees report one or more of these features. However PTSD has not been sufficiently recognised in SA; very little has been written on the topic and there are no rehabilitation programmes designed to address the psychological problems of ex-soldiers.

    Many ex-soldiers from all sides in South Africa suffer from this debilitating psychological illness and its emotionally crippling effects. The consequences are damaging not only for the individuals in question but for their wives and families. Ex-soldiers in the United States have been linked to the rising incidence of wife battery and domestic violence. A wider social consequence of war trauma is that emotionally damaged, traumatised ex-soldiers may provide ideal killing machines for some of the more extreme political groupings which are threatening the current peace process in South Africa. It is in this sense that they also threaten the stability of social life. Some of those ex-soldiers participating in criminal activities could be suffering from PTSD, as is the pattern in other societies.

    However it is important that the contents of any demobilisation package do not reinforce negative stereotypes. An example is the resentment on the part of ex-combatants in contemporary Zimbabwe due to the emphasis placed on their rehabilitation. Rather, the leadership, organisational abilities and experience, of officers particularly, should be emphasised as uniquely valuable for reconstruction.
  15. There are signs of a growing demoralisation and alienation among returned MK soldiers. A recent headline stated 'MK rebellion simmers'. The article read 'Rumblings of discontent in the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe have 'the potential to explode' admits the armed wing's former chief of staff Chris Hani in an interview. Current MK chief Siphiwe Nyanda echoed this, saying he is surprised more of his disgruntled men have not turned to lawlessness.' (The Weekly Mail, November 13 1992)

    In December 1992 there was a protest by 27 returned MK soldiers in the ANC's headquarters at Shell House in protest at lack of rations and accommodation (as reported in The Star, December 5 1992). According to an MK official:     'Some MK people staged a sit-in last week. The problem is that there is no repatriation money for them. The UNHCR budgeted for a year; it underestimated the difficulties involved in the process of repatriation. A lot of those delayed are MK people.'

    A number of informants reported feeling disillusioned.

    'There was a lot of romance in MK. MK people went out with dreams. They thought they'd come back in camouflage uniforms, marching through the streets of Pretoria with their heads held high... But there was no romance in exile - just demoralisation. These people are now disillusioned. In MK there is a very dangerous mix of disillusion and demoralisation.
  16. As with most returned exiles, many MK returnees reported feeling a sense of disorientation upon their return to South Africa. The physical repatriation of exiles has been fairly successful in terms of their transport, accommodation on arrival and return to their communities. However the inability to find employment and to re-integrate themselves fully into the complexities of South African society has generated considerable psychological and emotional stress.

    'When I returned I felt utterly disoriented and had no one to explain basic things such as how one finds a telephone number in a telephone book or how one opens an account. I feel the need for psychological counselling even now.

    Many require assistance with social integration into a complex cash economy. For many MK and ANC members in exile everything was provided in the form of rations and - in Lusaka at least - cadres handled only very small amounts of money.

    'Life in MK did little to equip men and women to face the responsibilities of family, managing money, work, and a routine existence... In exile everything was provided; everything was taken care of; you didn't even see money. Every week we were given vegetables and meat and rice and sugar. In Lusaka people got a stipend of 14 kwacha a month (about R14) only.

    The experience of exile sometimes generated a dependency. Certain individuals seem to expect the ANC to find them jobs and housing.
  17. Most (167 or 92,7%) of those surveyed belonged to organisations usually of a political nature such as the ANC and SACP. A total of 68 (37,7%) said they belonged to a church.

    However the sample of MK returnees surveyed reported very limited access to assistance. Since their return most have had to rely heavily on the support of their families for food, accommodation and cash. The combination of dependence on relatives, unemployment and unfulfilled expectations has generated considerable family tensions.

    Only two organisations were reported as sources of help:

    (i) The Ex-Combatants Association run by three MK people from MHQ who try to alleviate some of the immediate problems through the provision of loans, advice about training etc.

    (ii) The NCCR (National Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees) which has done important work providing many returnees with: reception at the airport; housing (initially in reception centres); a payment of R4 000 spread over 6 months; counselling; para-legal work; the provision of bursaries and a limited amount of job placement.

    However there was a good deal of confusion in the initial stages of the scheme. According to a repatriation official:

    'The ANC gave some individuals extra money. Sometimes this was as much as R2 500; it was given to individuals as they got off the plane. On a few occasions people got drunk and had nothing the next morning.
  18. Leisure time activities cited by those surveyed included physical training, reading, listening to music, 'helping in my street committee', 'being with my family,' drinking, watching TV, visiting friends, watching and playing soccer, going to the movies, sewing and 'stealing'.

    'Stealing is my hobby. What can I do? At least it provides me with some money though it is very dangerous and risky.'

    'All my time is free. I think and think and think. I just feel like shooting everybody. I am not even allowed to do gardening at home. It could help my frustration. That is why I drink too much. One day they will wake up and find me dead.'
  19. All those surveyed believed that there should be provision for soldiers at the end of a war. All stated that special arrangements for MK people should be made by the present regime or a future democratic government.

    'Soldiers should be mobilised for the reconstruction of the country that has been victim to the ravages of war'.

    'They must be looked after. Remember these are people who have been trained to kill. If they get frustrated they are going to take SA down with them.'

    'There must be a demobilisation scheme to ensure that they are properly integrated and can be part of civilian society. If this is not done they may resort to crime and have serious adjustment problems. Many of them in other countries have become bandits.'

    A number were sensitive to the potentially divisive effects demobilisation benefits could have:     'Generally our people who never went into exile should not feel we are getting preferential treatment as they also sacrificed. Benefits should not be general but according to need.'

    Several recommended that benefits should be given to all ANC members. Special arrangements should be made     'Not only for MK but for all ANC since we were all involved in politico-military struggle.'

    'Benefits must be for all ANC who were in exile and in the underground. If for MK only these will cause divisions... even those non-MK they were suffering like MK'.

    The contents of demobilisation benefits that were recommended varied widely and included pensions, land and loans, preferential employment, but educational opportunities were most frequently emphasised.

    A large number (81 or 45%) believe that these benefits should be applicable to all soldiers.

    'Yes because they also served the government to the best of their abilities. While we fought to liberate our country they too thought they were doing their best to save the government which they thought was legitimate.'

    'Yes, the SADF should be treated as human beings. And anyway if they had known the truth about the policy they fought so hard to defend I do not believe that they would have done it.'

    'Yes, if one is a soldier loyal to a particular movement, be it reactionary or not, one must be catered for especially in a new democratic SA. We are all soldiers no matter which side we fought for.'

    Others disagreed:

    'Some SADF like Malan should not get anything because they are criminals.'

    'No, many SADF have killed our people and they can't be 'thanked' for that through a demobilisation package'.

    'Most SADF soldiers are university graduates and don't need more education at the state's expense.'

    'No, the SADF have had their share. They received lots of favours while we were fighting in the bush. They were travelling in cars and planes while we were crossing deserts on foot.'

    'No, most of the SADF people are covered. They live in big expensive houses that are government subsidised; their children are in good schools. MK soldiers have to start life afresh.'
  20. The opinions of those surveyed on the formation of a future defence force varied widely. Almost all emphasised the need for a totally new defence force to be created. Most believed in a sequence that involved disbanding all the existing armies and then an international force supervising the selection of individual applications.

    'All armies should disband. An independent commission should be set up to receive applications. They then screen these and organise retraining for those accepted. Training should be done by an independent force.'

    'All the existing armies should be dissolved. The UN should monitor the transition and begin processing applicants for the new army. All those accepted should start retraining which must be done by an independent force.'

    A number emphasised the need for affirmative action.     'All the current armies should be disbanded. Let a new one be formed by each one applying. But there should be affirmative action for MK soldiers.'

    One informant emphasised that affirmative action should apply particularly to MK women.     'Women are always behind. This has to be corrected in a new army.'

    A number suggested that MK should be the centre of the new defence force:     'The SADF must be totally disbanded and the new army formed around MK as the core.'

    A number emphasised the need for retraining which should involve all soldiers     'so that they have a common understanding and set of military skills'.
  21. The majority, 131 or 72,7% of the 180 surveyed, want to be part of a future defence force. Most of those who answered in the affirmative framed their answers in idealistic terms. Altogether three categories of reasons were advanced:

    (i) Ideological commitment - usually involving the desire to defend political gains in a future South Africa. The themes of personal 'sacrifice' and 'service' were often articulated:

    'For my comrades who fell in battle I have to ensure that what they fought and died for is defended.'

    'I was part of destroying the old apartheid state. I want to be part of an army that builds the new SA and protects democracy.'

    A 48 year old man said,     'Yes, my whole adult life has been in armed forces. I know and love nothing else. I sacrificed my life for freedom and I want to reap the gains by protecting what I fought for.'

    'To defend our country we will need soldiers with high moral dedication like us in MK.'

    (ii) Pride in the profession of soldiering and the opportunity to utilise military training:

    'Yes, I am a soldier. I want to be a professional soldier proudly defending my country... I have spent many lonely years moving from country to country, crossing rivers and eating anything from grass to snakes trying to liberate South Africa. Nobody has sat down to listen to my pain and suffering in exile... I have done all this to liberate my country. I am a soldier.'

    'Yes, I am a trained soldier; I have no other qualifications. Also I have been part of the first process of liberating my country; I would like to complete the whole circle.'

    (iii) Pragmatic reasons involving job security:

    'It is my best chance of getting a job.'

    Three quarters of the 14 women MK returnees surveyed choose a career in a future defence force.

    'I love the army and there are very few women who do. I have given my life for the army. There is nothing else that I know.'

    'I have always lived for MK. I sacrificed and lost a lot. I cannot not be part of the defence of all I fought for. I also want to ensure that women are part of the new armed force.'

    Those who answered in the negative said:

    'I see my future role in political work, I'm not interested in a military career.'

    'I am not interested in being a professional soldier. War is lousy. We were forced into it. The army is a wasteful, non-productive institution. In a new South Africa we can do without an army because we do not have a threat from any country. I despise war.'

    Five said they would prefer to serve in a legitimate South African police force. Two were undecided and two informants gave qualified answers:

    'It depends what the army looks like. If it has some old SADF soldiers I don't join.'

    'If MK is absorbed into the SADF I would not like to serve in a future defence force'.

    The implication of the high proportion of MK returnees surveyed who want to be part of a future defence force is that the construction of a legitimate and representative force should proceed as a matter of urgency. It also implies that only a limited number of ex-combatants would apply for demobilisation benefits.

    In the immediate term the vulnerability of MK returnees is amplified by the fact that along with other 'returnees' many MK soldiers have been subject to harassment by the state. MK spokesman, Calvin Khan has stated, 'We know that the government and elements within the security forces have identified MK as a very serious threat, and they have gone out on active campaigns not only of disinformation, but they have killed our people, they continue arresting, torturing, detaining, abducting our people, assassinating MK comrades'. (Cited in Africa South and East     March, 1993)

    Many of the problems reported above are shared by the 'returnees', the broader category of people returning from exile. An estimated 4 000 MK cadres returned to the country as part of 17 000 returning exiles following the September 1991 Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the South African government on the voluntary repatriation and re-integration of South African returnees    . In terms of this agreement an exile is any South African refugee and/or political exile who returns voluntarily as an unarmed civilian under the terms and arrangements of this memorandum.

    'The returning exiles included planeloads of MK people. But there was a lot of confusion about identity... In theory MK were included in the repatriation process but they were not a priority group. And overall the programme has not been very successful... Many MK people returned with illnesses like malaria and suffering from stress... some were upset that they weren't getting soldiers' disability grants'.

    This paper maintains that MK returnees should be identified as a priority group on the grounds of their disrupted education and lack of access to alternative educational opportunities which many other exiles had either in prison or exile. Unlike many other exiles MK cadres did not acquire any skills marketable in civilian life. Thus they are not equipped to compete on the civilian labour market.

    The second line of argument for demobilised soldiers to be targeted as a priority group policy concerns their potential for destabilisation. Their skills in the instruments of violence make them a potentially disruptive social category. Altogether as a social category they contain an explosive mix of elements - marginalisation, poverty, alienation and unemployment.

    Finally, this is a defining, or what William Zartman calls a 'ripe moment' in South African history. In order to address the future we have to understand the past. An important aspect of this past is the widespread perception that we are emerging from a period of 'war'. A state has to take responsibility for its soldiers after a war. This recognition would be at the core of a demobilisation policy or Soldier's Charter     in South Africa.

PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A DEMOBILISATION POLICY

  1. The demobilisation benefits should involve the SADF retrenchment packages with two additions: access to skills training and counselling. These two additions are both aimed at capacity building and acknowledge that we lack the resources to establish people for life. This package of demobilisation benefits would seem to be the only basis for protection of the interests of SADF personnel while being fair to other combatants.
  2. Unlike the demobilisation programme in South Africa after World War 11, benefits should be direct and administered through as simple a structure as possible.
  3. It should be made very clear that the benefits are not a form of compensation. The legacy of war in the shape of trauma and dislocation was felt more widely than among soldiers. And, as was stated by the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation in 1944, 'there are some things incapable of compensation'.
  4. As was the case with the 1944 demobilisation programme, benefits should be undifferentiated according to the type of military service or exposure to combat. As was the case in the Second World War, in South Africa between 1976 and 1990 there was no common experience of war.
  5. As in 1944, demobilisation should be undertaken as part of a general policy of demilitarisation and social transformation.
  6. As in 1944, policy should be based on extensive wide-ranging social research which identifies individual needs and aspirations. This data is necessary to provide for individual treatment of each demobilised soldier.
  7. There should be a strong emphasis on psychological counselling to address the problem of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. It was shown above that many ex-soldiers suffer from this debilitating psychological illness and their needs are not being addressed.
  8. It must be acknowledged that demobilisation is a dangerous political issue. Dissatisfaction and disillusion with demobilisation policies after World Wars 1 and 11 contributed to the defeat of Smuts's South African Party in 1924 and helped to create the climate of discontent which led to the defeat of the United Party in 1948. A new government in South Africa should take heed of this historical experience.
  9. As illustrated by the disorder of the current demobilisation process in Mozambique the process of demobilisation must be tightly disciplined, promptly enforced and carefully controlled.
  10. There must be a heavy emphasis on communicating the nature and reasons for a demobilisation policy so as to avoid unrealistic expectations, disillusion and resentment.
  11. The principle of transparency should be paramount.
  12. An independent board should oversee the integration and formal demobilisation process.
  13. The scheme should be managed by a small institution made up of civil servants and high ranking soldiers. This institution will be responsible for compiling lists of the military personnel who have been or who are to be demobilised and establishing a data base on them. The army should employ a number of full time resettlement officers (as in the UK).
  14. South African veterans organisations should be extensively consulted. The role of the American Legion in the formulation of the GI. Bill demonstrates that veterans organisations can play a useful role.
  15. The policy should be conceptualised as an aspect of healing and reconciliation. As has been recognised in contemporary Zimbabwe, there is a need for healing at the end of a war. (Reynolds, 1990; Ranger, 1992)
  16. Respectful, co-operative relationships are essential; there should be a tolerance of diversity; different forms of military experience and training must be respected so as to avoid different categories of soldiers feeling demeaned as some did in Zimbabwe in the process of integration. In some communities in South Africa, as in Zimbabwe and the US after the Vietnam war, demobilised soldiers have acquired a stigmatised identity. The demobilisation programme needs to operate in a social atmosphere in which the hardships undergone by MK are recognised, their training and experience is respected and MK soldiers are not stigmatised as bandits.
  17. The considerable experience which the British armed forces have in the resettlement and retraining of service personnel should be drawn on. About 300 000 men and women are employed in the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom and in an average year about 30 000 servicemen and women leave. All are eligible for some form of resettlement assistance, if only the provision of advice and information. Personnel who have completed an engagement of five years or longer, who account for about half the total number of leavers, are generally eligible for the full range of resettlement provision. This includes the option of four weeks pre-release training. The experience of other armed forces should also be studied.
  18. The demobilisation programme should not involve segregated training for ex-combatants when the ultimate goal is their effective integration into civilian society. Those projects elsewhere in southern Africa - such as the Development Brigades in Namibia - which have social integration as their goal but involve a segregated form of training have run into problems.
  19. The demobilisation programme should take place in three phases:

    The first phase should be applied under the Transitional Executive Council. It refers exclusively to those MK returnees who have been subject to an 'informal demobilisation' and have returned to South Africa - many as part of the UN's repatriation of exiles programme. Returnees among this category of repatriated exiles between the ages of 18 - 35 years need to be identified as a priority group for immediate capacity building through access to skills training and to psychological counselling.

    * Access to skills training. These educational benefits should take the form of strictly administered bursaries. Technical and academic institutions should be encouraged to consider demobilised soldiers a priority category and, along with categories such as mature-age exemption students, to give them special dispensation for admission.

    * Psychological counselling. This is crucial for all those who have been involved in violent conflict.

    This first phase of demobilisation benefits should be linked to a general expansion of the resources invested in the repatriation of exiles programme. This process should extend beyond the mere physical translocation of exiles to a comprehensive programme of reintegration. The three priority features of this programme should be to upgrade skills amongst returnees; job placement schemes; and counselling to assist with the bewildering experience of return.

    The second phase involves a formal demobilisation and should be implemented at the time of the formation of a new defence force under an interim government. At this point there should be a balanced, symmetrical integration of the armies linked to political forces which have committed themselves to the negotiation process; this could number between 50 and 60 000 personnel (40 000 SADF PF; 10 000 MK; 10 000 homeland armies).

    The force levels of this new defence force will be informed by a realistic threat analysis and could be forced to straddle the gap between social and defence needs. At this point there should be a formal demobilisation - of those soldiers who are not selected for incorporation - as well as those who choose (for whatever reason) not to be part of a future defence force. It should involve standard benefits as laid out by the present SADF retrenchment package with the addition of educational benefits for those 35 years and under and access to psychological counselling.

    In terms of the SADF provisions there should also be pensions for older soldiers (what Charles Tilly has called 'a golden parachute'). According to a senior MK official: 'it is the older MK people, the 1961 generation, the Luthuli detachment, who are really desperate now.'

    (iii) Some years on this should be followed by the third phase of the demobilisation process as part of a drastic reduction in force levels and general demilitarisation process. (Cock, 1993)
  20. The content of the second stage of the demobilisation package to be implemented at the time of integration could be based on that of the present retrenchment package of the SADF with the addition of access to education and skills training and psychological counselling. This seems the only basis which protects the interests of SADF and homeland army personnel while other combatants are treated fairly.

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE - DEMOBILISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In recent years a number of African countries including Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, post-independence Mozambique, Chad, Zaire, Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe have attempted various demobilisation strategies. While there is very little published material available on these strategies (Roberts interview 1992), the following generalisations may be made about the problems and programmes of demobilisation elsewhere in southern Africa.
  1. The demobilisation issue is clearly linked to integration of multiple armies; to the problem of forming a unified defence force.
  2. This process requires effective international monitoring and supervision. The success of the Zimbabwe programme has been largely attributed to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (Rice, 1990). The current hostilities in Angola may be partly attributed to the weak international monitoring presence of 450 people. By contrast the UN has authorised 7 500 troops to monitor the current demobilisation in Mozambique.
  3. Throughout the region demobilised soldiers have faced serious problems of adjustment and experienced alienation, marginalisation, unemployment and poverty. For example it has been estimated that in Zimbabwe of the 100 000 combatants of the three armed forces (the Rhodesian army, ZANLA and ZIPRA) at the time of independence in 1980, 36 000 were demobilised by 1984. Of these only 16 000 had obtained employment or training in some field by 1985. (Moyo, 1985).
  4. These problems are amplified by the fact that demobilised soldiers in the region have usually returned with high expectations both personally - in relation to government benefits and opportunities - and politically in relation to what the new government can deliver.
  5. Demobilised soldiers in the region sometimes come to have a stigmatised social identity and are linked to the spread of aids and to banditry.
  6. Demobilisation schemes are expensive and funding is a major problem. For example the demobilisation plan presented by the Mozambique government in Paris in December 1991 would have cost more than 100 million dollars (Frieden, 1992). However major donors such as the World Bank, the European Community and Swedish Aid are some of those involved. The World Bank is currently spending some R60 million in Uganda on assisting 23 000 demobilised soldiers to re-integrate into civilian society.
  7. Many of the demobilisation programmes in the region have been problematic. For example the Development Brigades established in Namibia to provide some 16 000 (out of 45 000) ex-combatants with training in agricultural production and construction and short-term employment, have not been very effective. In Zimbabwe the collective co-operatives involved only a small number of ex-combatants and income generated were low (Moyo,1985). They have over 25 000 members including 7 000 ex-combatants but remain the major aspect of the Zimbabwe Project, founded by Judy Todd, rather than a government responsibility. In fact Brickhill has lamented 'the failure of the government to utilise guerrilla expertise in rural development programmes.' (Brickhill, 1992:12)
  8. The pattern in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe is for the dissatisfaction of ex-combatants - in some cases many years after independence - to lead to civil disorder and threats to national security: 'The ways ex-combatants were treated in their desire to return to civilian life has been one of the most controversial issues in post-independence Zimbabwe...' (Oloa, 1991:111)
  9. Demobilisation must be linked to effective disarmament. Phillip van Niekerk has written that 'The big lesson (of Angola) is that, after a civil war, a unified army needs to be created before elections'. (The Weekly Mail, 12 February 1992). However a unified army was formed before the September 1992 elections, but after Unita's defeat there was a mass desertion of Unita soldiers to rejoin Dr Savimbi in Huambo. The Angolan experience demonstrates that demobilisation does not necessarily lead to peace, unless it is linked to effective disarmament. Arms caches were inspected weekly by representatives of the government, UNITA and the UN but this did not prevent weapons seizures by the deserting soldiers.
  10. Demobilisation must be uniformly effected. The current fighting in Angola has also been linked to an uneven demobilisation of the different armies which privileged UNITA over the government forces. The UN has been blamed for the failure 'to demobilise rebels adequately, as evidenced by the speed with which Unita was able to reassemble its forces.' (Africa South and East, April, 1993)
  11. Cash payments - such as that of the R1 200 paid to ex-combatants in Namibia in 1990, or the $15 resettlement allowance paid to Angolan combatants, or the lump sum equivalent of two years salary offered in 1980 in Zimbabwe to encourage voluntary demobilisation, or the planned payment through the Ministry of Finance of Mozambique of monthly 'indemnity salaries' (averaging R20) for six months after demobilisation - 'as a personal incentive to actively reintegrate into economic and social life' - does not solve the problems of social integration.
  12. If not addressed by a new government, the needs of ex-combatants may become a source of considerable political tensions as the case of Zimbabwe illustrates. Zimbabwe also illustrates the dangers of an ethnic dimension to these tensions.
  13. Any demobilisation package must be based on widespread consultation with ex-combatants themselves. Otherwise services such as counselling and rehabilitation may, as in the case of Zimbabwe, be interpreted as further stigmatisation.
  14. Organisations of ex-combatants are often viewed with considerable suspicion by a new government. Again this is illustrated by the case of the War Veterans Association n contemporary Zimbabwe. Krige argues that the war veterans 'pose a potential threat to the legitimacy of a government that itself relies on its war credentials for legitimacy'. (Krige, 1992:24)
  15. The questionnaire administered to almost 16 000 soldiers to be demobilised in Mozambique last year shows that it is possible to obtain detailed information for the socio-economic integration of demobilised members.
Such detailed information was also obtained for the 1944 Soldiers Charter in South Africa. This provides a powerful model from our own history of the state's assumption of responsibility for sections of its soldiers.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE - DEMOBILISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER WORLD WAR 2 - 'NO FORGOTTEN MEN'


On 28th April, 1944, Harry Lawrence announced in the House of Assembly the governments demobilisation plans amounting to a Soldiers Charter. This was a massive task since 'Between 1939 and the end of 1945 a total of 334 224 persons had volunteered for full-time service in the South African land, air and naval forces'. (Martin and Orpen, 1979:346)

The programme was characterised by an extensive administrative infrastructure which included some degree of participation from those most effected. A union-wide network of 325 demobilisation committees was established and some 5 000 voluntary workers sat on these committees.

Benefits were differentiated according to length of service, race and gender; and not according to military rank or type of military activity or exposure to danger. The ex-volunteer soldier was entitled to:
  1. Gratuities. According to the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, Harry Lawrence, in the House of Assembly in 1944, the government is 'aware of the honourable tradition of paying a war gratuity as a token recognition of the nation's appreciation to the volunteers who have served it faithfully in time of war.' (Hansard, 1944, col.6062) Yet, the amount of the gratuity involved gross discrimination. It amounted to £1,10s for each completed month of service in the case of European male volunteers; 15s for each completed month of service for European female volunteers; 10s for Coloured volunteers and 5s for Native volunteers. According to Gibbs, 'the white volunteer who had been away for several years was paid about £18 per year of service, while a black volunteer was paid a mere £3 per year of service, which is a sixth of that paid to his white compatriot.' (Gibbs, 1990: 25)
  2. Civilian clothing and cash allowances of £15 to Europeans; £9 to Coloureds and 'each native will receive specified articles of civilian clothing and a cash allowance of £2.'
  3. A preferential employment policy: 'The right to employment was considered a corner-stone of the whole demobilisation scheme.' (Gibbs, 1990:26)
  4. Transport expenses of family and effects. Rail warrants were provided for travel to the place of employment.
  5. Access to vocational and technical training at technical colleges and universities. The agricultural colleges at Cedara in Natal and at Potchefstroom in the Transvaal were reserved exclusively for providing training for returned volunteers.
  6. A financial assistance scheme 'provided for special measures to enable an ex-volunteer to adjust himself to civilian life in the form of loans which were interest free for 5 years of £1,250 or grants of up to £250. Ex-volunteer students at university were eligible for a total grant of £250. The money could only be used to pay for specific items such as university or technical training fees, for the purchase of a house or farm, for tools or machinery, furniture and motor vehicles, and each application had to be dealt with by the Executive of the Directorate, before being granted. '
  7. Housing.
  8. Agricultural land: 'The Lands Department has schemes for those who wish to farm but who have not the necessary capital and need state assistance to buy. There are established Land Settlement Acts under which land will be allotted to returned soldiers'. There were 1 500 - 2 000 holdings available as closer settlements and 1 000 individual farms available in all parts of the union. (Leaflet, Demobilisation. Reinstatement of the volunteer, p. 26)
  9. War pensions were paid to 'a volunteer who is disabled or to his dependents if he is killed or dies.' The 1944 War Pensions Act was described as 'one of the most liberal in the world'. (Army Education Section, 1945:86)

    These benefits were rationalised by government appeals to notions of 'honour' and 'patriotism': 'We have set out to provide, as far as it is humanly possible, a policy of social insurance for those men and women who have been willing to serve South Africa in her need. For many the help we shall be able to offer may be incommensurate with their sacrifices. There are some things incapable of compensation. And patriotism is above nicely calculated monetary evaluation.' (Hansard    , vol 49, 1944)

    The United Party government was also pursuing what it saw to be its political interests. The Minister said in parliament, 'If I gauge public opinion correctly in this country, then it may well be said that the manner in which the government tackles this task will be the acid test of its ability to retain public support.' (Hansard    , vol 49, 1944)

    The demobilisation policy must be located within the wider context of social transformation. 'In seeking to solve the problems of demobilisation, the government and its critics repeatedly stressed the importance of addressing the housing crisis, unemployment and poverty in general.'     (Gibbs, 1990:11)

    Overall the policy privileged a special social category. The outcome was that the white South African male enjoyed a system of social security and range of opportunities which did not exist for other social groups. As CGibbs has argued the demobilisation scheme 'was neither neutral nor fair in its conception and application'. (Gibbs, 1990:19) The discrimination was against women as well as against 'coloured' and African volunteer soldiers. Bertha Solomon pointed out in parliament that the gratuity payments indicated that 'the country is only half as grateful to the women volunteers as it is to the men'. (Hansard    , vol 49, 1944, cols 6650 -6651).

    The policy was based on extensive social investigation. Questionnaires were sent both to volunteers and employers and a total of 119 355 men and 13 883 women completed them. (Gibbs, 1990:27) But it was not well administered and took 5 years to implement. The benefits and procedures were complicated and cumbersome and created confusion and disappointment. It was also extremely expensive. The cost was in the order of £60 500 000. (Gibbs, 1990:40)

    It was claimed that the policy was a success. 'The promise has been carried out: there have been no forgotten men. South Africa's demobilisation scheme, probably the best in the world, has re-instated nearly 300 000 ex-volunteers in civilian life.' (Sunday Times, 2 January 1949) '...gradually thousands of servicemen, some of whom had never before earned a living except in uniform, were placed in a position to support themselves in useful occupations in peacetime commerce and industry, as farmers or in the civil service, or in any capacity suited to their individual talents'    . (Martin and Orpen, 1979:356) The programme was favourably compared with that after World War 1.

    However the 1944 policy also caused dissatisfaction and social tensions. For instance there were tensions between those who volunteered and those who did not. In the Public Service 'there was a considerable amount of ill-feeling between returned soldiers and their fellow employees who had not 'joined up'.'     (Gibbs, 1990:58) In fact the policy contributed in some measure to the defeat of the United Party in 1948.

    Demobilisation was part of the process of demilitarisation of the economy and society. Commenting on the total involvement of the nation in the war J.H. Hofmeyer said, 'This war is a people's war if ever there has been one.'     (UP Archives. Cited by Gibbs, 1990:1)
The recent violent conflict in South Africa was also defined by many as 'a people's war'. Phillip van Niekerk has posed the question, 'How will the new South Africa remember those who died in Angola and Namibia, fighting to win wars that history will proclaim to have been unjust? Perhaps the SADF has realised its only hope is a neutral commemoration where courage in battle alone will be recognised - where those South Africans who drowned on board the Mendi will be honoured alongside those who perished at Cuito Cuanavale. By finding a way to honour the long-forgotten Mendi, they are finding a way to honour their own wars'. (Weekly Mail, 19 February 1993)

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DEMOBILISATION


A demobilisation policy in South Africa will face a number of problems of both a practical and contextual kind.
  1. Economic conditions. Postwar prosperity in the USA was crucial to the success of the demobilisation policy there. A crucial question is whether a new government in South Africa will have the financial resources (as well as the political will) to meet the needs of ex-combatants. Furthermore the emphasis in this report on skills training and capacity building will not solve the problem if there are no employment opportunities. Raised expectations could generate political problems if the new state lacks the material resources to meet them.
  2. A lack of social consensus of the kind present in the UK after World War 11 when the Beveridge Report with its notion of the 5 giants - want, disease, idleness, squalor and ignorance - presented a clear blueprint of what soldiers were fighting for. In the UK many of the problems of demobilisation were absorbed into the attack on poverty and the creation of the welfare state.
  3. As in Zimbabwe after the War of Liberation and in South Africa after World War 11, demobilisation benefits could be divisive in a way that could be described as 'the Ulysses syndrome'. The problem is crisply stated by a letter to a Zimbabwe newspaper querying whether it was legitimate for ex-combatants to receive special treatment. During the war in terms of Maoist theory the guerrillas were meant to be 'fish swimming in the waters of the people'. The writer asked if it now acceptable 'for the fish to jump out of the water?' (Ranger, 1992:12)

    If demobilisation benefits are restricted to ex-soldiers this could cause resentment and deepen divisions between them and other categories of people who were active in the liberation struggle. Terance Ranger has written of Zimbabwe, 'ex-guerrillas could not claim to have freed Zimbabwe by themselves'    . (Ranger, 1992:11) Ex-MK cadres would not make this claim but the benefits could be interpreted as privileging them over other 'fighters'.

    In contemporary South Africa there are already tensions between different categories of activists in the liberation struggle and distrust of those thought to have been advancing themselves during the years of apartheid while others were in exile or prison.

    MK cadre, Mehetheleli Mncube, interviewed shortly after his release from 'Death Row' said,     'It (demobilisation benefits) won't be divisive... other ANC people will understand that we have sacrificed a lot.'

    However there was some opposition to the provision of demobilisation benefits for MK cadres from ANC members and sympathisers:

    'They have already received money and had access to bursaries and some assistance with job placement as part of the NCCR repatriation scheme.

    'A demobilisation policy which provides special assistance with integration into civilian life would be elitist in that it would create a privileged group; MK people should not be privileged over other people in our struggle. It would also be divisive. Already there is resentment that the ANC is only looking after those returning from exile and is not looking after loyal activists or ex-prisoners.'

    Another serious problem that could block support for a demobilisation policy involves a stigmatisation of MK    . A negative stereotyping of recently returned MK soldiers is developing among some sections that links them to AIDS and banditry. This stigmatisation seems to be part of a propaganda offensive. However this should be offset by the powerful ideological presence and prestige MK enjoys in the townships.

CONCLUSION


Many MK informants spoke with deep pride.

'The best and the most committed and dedicated of our people went into MK. It takes a particular kind of consciousness to say 'I'm prepared to die'.

'MK people are the cream in terms of courage and commitment'.

This 'commitment' emerged clearly from the survey of MK returnees reported in this paper. In addition their youth (almost three quarters were 35 or below), as well as their level of education (over half having completed at least Standard nine) indicates the high potential of MK returnees to contribute towards the task of national reconstruction.

The core issue in this paper is whether MK and other demobilised soldiers constitute a priority group who face special problems. In Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo presented the problems of ex-combatants as similar to those of youth generally: 'It is not just the ex-combatant - it is the young people who have no jobs... The problem is not for those who carried the gun during the war, it is the problem facing all the young people in this country and therefore, we would like to have only an all embracing answer to this problem.' (Cited by Krige, 1992:23) This paper argues that MK soldiers particularly constitute a special group because of their interrupted education, their lack of access to capital and job experience and their potential for destabilisation.

In addition this paper has argues in very broad terms for a demobilisation package based on the present SADF policy with the addition of educational benefits and access to psychological counselling. The details and costing of such a package remain to be worked out. A demobilisation policy cannot compensate for the inequalities created by 300 years of apartheid. However it is an important step in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction.

Reconciliation also involves the integration of our multiple armies and the creation of a legitimate and representative defence force. The present situation with eight armed formations, each responsible to a different political authority is clearly dangerous. It is arguable that - at least in the short term - the size of the new defence force should be motivated by social rather than defence needs. Unlike the situation in Mozambique where a survey conducted by the Ministry of Defence of almost 16 000 Frelimo soldiers established that the overwhelming majority did not want to remain in the army, here a high number, 131 or 73% of those MK cadres surveyed, want to be part of a future defence force. This emphasis on social needs is also informed by the immense political danger which a compulsory and harsh reduction in numbers would constitute. The fears of soldiers in all the existing armed forces need to be addressed if this political danger is to be contained.

As Mthetheli Mncube said shortly after his release from death row, 'the new South Africa should not be established on the basis of anger, revenge and bitterness. Instead we have to build on a foundation of forgiveness and reconciliation.' A demobilisation policy, linked to the merging of our multiple armies in a representative and legitimate defence force, is a crucial aspect of such reconciliation.

WORKS CITED


S. Baynham, 'From Cold War to Detente. Security and Politico-economic scenarios for southern Africa', pp 19 - 25, South African Defence Review, Issue no 6, 1992.

J. Brickhill, Making Peace with the past. War victims and the work of the Mafela Trust. Paper presented to the Seminar on Religion and War, Uppsala, Sweden, 23 - 28 March 1992.

J. Cock, Colonels and Cadres. War and Gender in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991.

J. Cock, 'Redefining security', Sash, vol. 35, no 3, 1993

'Demobilisation Benefits'. Ministers statement in parliament. Extract from Hansard , vol 49, 28th April, 1944.

J. Frieden, The international support to the Mozambican demobilisation process: political and practical issues, Unpublished discussion paper, 1992.

K. Gibbs, Demobilisation after World War II, UNISA Honours Dissertation January 1990.

N. Krige, The politics of creating national heroes: the search for political legitimacy and national identity. Unpublished paper, 1992.

H.J. Martin and N. Orpen, South Africa at War. South African Forces, World War II. Cape Town: Purcell, 1979.

S. Moyo, The socio-economic status and needs of ex-combatants: the case of Masvingo province, Harare: Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 1985.

T. Ranger, 'Healing the Land', pp 16 - 22 Horizon, October 1992.

T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, London: James Currey, 1985.

S. Rice, The commonwealth initiative in Zimbabwe 1979 -1980: implications for international peacekeeping, PhD thesis Oxford University, 1990.