Special Forces in a Post Settlement South Africa*

Bill Sass

Brigadier Bill Sass
recently retired from the post of Director of Personnel Utilization at the Personnel Division on the staff of Chief of the SADF.

* A paper presented at a public seminar on Military Intelligence and Special Forces - What are the future requirements, hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), 24 June 1993, Constantia Park, Midrand.

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 12, 1993



INTRODUCTION

The settlement process in South Africa has highlighted a number of contentious issues. Amongst these is the future mission and structure of the country's armed forces. Political objectives and emotional responses result in ad hoc proposals on a matter which requires, rather, a clear long-term strategy, which will allow optimum use of limited financial resources and of the existing structures of these forces to develop a compact, modern defence organisation. Sensational media coverage of organisations and operations, which until recently enjoyed secrecy, results in hasty, uninformed and piecemeal policy decisions, greatly influenced by the demands of the media themselves. The leaders of the various groups require, instead, detailed analysis of past developments both here and overseas, in order to achieve the goals and objectives befitting the future South Africa. Instead of being parts of a single integrated military strategy based on facts and detailed consideration, matters such as the integration of private armies, systems of joint control, the composition and future employment of the forces, and the future of the arms industry are being commented on separately and at length by non-experts. One such matter requiring careful attention is the future of the Military Intelligence and special forces organisations. This is obviously an emotive subject influenced by present media coverage, but still an essential part of any military strategy for South Africa.

Any competent corporate manager, confronted with the task of formulating a strategy or major problem-solving exercise for his firm, would probably start by determining exactly the purpose or objective he would wish to achieve.

After all, 'structure follows strategy' and not vice versa. Secondly he would do a review of the existing environment, both that of his organisation as well as of the factors that influence or could influence his organisation. In this case, given an election date early in 1994, it would be logical to assume a new defence organisation only starting to take shape thereafter. Planning then, is for a defence force for the year 2000 and beyond. What requirement would there be and what role would special forces play in such an organisation?

AIM


The aim of this paper is to set out a description of special forces based on international descriptions and published sources. It is intended as a basis for discussion and a contribution to a complete and integrated military strategy. The arguments for the continued existence of these forces have been condensed but can be expanded as part of the formulation of a military strategy. A new military strategy, with a resultant new structure, is required. It must be the best and most suitable strategy for South Africa in the future.

THE BEGINNING


Although records dating back to biblical times exist of small groups of soldiers penetrating the enemy lines to carry out special operations or to gain information, modern day special forces are generally accepted to date from the Second World War, particularly from the 1941-1942 North African Campaign. This was when the British SAS Regiment was created. They were not the only special group used during World War II, however. In fact, histories of this conflict contain many references to Rangers, OSS, Commandos, Marauders, Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Special Service Force, Special Operations Executive (SOE), and other special forces, all of these being the same type of unit used by either side and most countries, which basically conducted what, in modern warfare, is classed as 'special penetration operations', that is, of small groups of highly trained men, who move among or behind the enemy to conduct military operations. Most of the roles and tasks carried out by special forces today can be traced directly back to one or other of these special groups, which conducted similar operations during World War II. Many of these special groups were formed primarily to exploit a political situation or dissatisfaction among minority groups or to train and support liberation movements. In fact, the history of the victorious Viet Cong can be traced back to the American OSS, which sent an officer to recruit and train Indo Chinese irregulars for operations against the Japanese. One of the first to undergo such training was an ex-history teacher, Vo Nguyen Giap, the later Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence of North Vietnam.

In nearly all the campaigns during and following World War II, special forces have played a decisive, though often clandestine, or deliberately evasive and disguised, role. They have remained a small but decisive element on the broader military landscape. Only by detailed study can they be identified and evaluated.

SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIAL FORCES


Today all modern defence forces have special forces, such as the Russian Spetznatz, American special forces, British SAS, and so on. The South African special forces, or to give them their correct name, I Reconnaissance Commando - 'The Recces' - came into being in 1972. Helmut Heitman in his South African War Machine, gives an excellent description of the selection and training of these men, as well as of some of their type of operations. He distinguishes between 'the Recces' and the Parachute Battalion, 32 Battalion (a counter-insurgency or light infantry battalion), the SWA Specialist Unit (a unit of trackers and other specialist infantry equipped with dogs, horses or motor cycles) and Koevoet. Of course, as he makes clear, Koevoet was a unit of the SA Police. So too, more recently, were the Askaris. This paper does not serve to address these organisations and their particular roles, but stays within the internationally accepted parameters defining special forces.

What then distinguishes 'the Recces' from other soldiers? Firstly, their selection is most stringent, in common with special forces internationally. Of trained soldier volunteers, probably not more than 45 out of 700 will be accepted for training. Secondly, their training is extremely tough, including special forces orientation, parachute training, water orientation and diving, mountaineering, etc. Thirdly, all special forces operate in small groups among the enemy or behind the enemy lines. Fourthly, they operate away from the support and facilities of the major formations of the army in the field. During training, great emphasis is placed on survival, evasion, resistance and escape techniques, since these soldiers are dependent on themselves (and what each man can carry), and their small group alone. There is no other guaranteed support.

Little information has been released officially about exact strengths or how 'the Recces' are organised and how they operate. Since 1972 a number of additional Recce Commandos were established, including a Citizen Force element and 4 Recce, which is based at Langebaan and specializes in amphibious operations. Although Ian Uys identifies Honoris Crux winners from 1, 2, 4 and 5 Recce as well as special forces Headquarters, the strict selection of personnel as well as their combat technique of operating in small groups, probably means that even at the height of the war in SWA/Angola, the total strength of the Recce operators would have been numbered in hundreds and not in thousands. Today, since the end of the conflict and with the subsequent rationalisation of the SA Army, as well as personal contracts and service periods expiring, the total number of operators is probably less than 300. Their successes are due to skills and training and not to the deployment of large numbers. As discussed below, serving in the Recces is often a temporary phase in the professional career of these soldiers. In an army which is demobilising and re-organising after a war, as well as rationalising its strength, personnel and career considerations have an impact on numbers even in elite units.

In most countries, members volunteer from the normal, trained military forces and are selected for further training and employment for a period in the special forces. Eventually, as age, seniority or promotion requirements may dictate, many of these men return to their original mustering and service, thus further spreading the training skills they have learnt. Of course, this also spreads the reputation of special forces as an elite force and draws more volunteers. The conduct and character of these troops is amply attested to by the many awards of the highest decorations and medals won by these soldiers. In Cross of Honour, Ian Uys describes an operation which won 12 members of 4 Recce Regiment the Honoris Crux. The group, a combat swimming team, successfully completed their demolition task in spite of being counter-attacked and having several men wounded. As if this were not enough, the leader and another member were also attacked by crocodiles. All members eventually returned safely.

ROLE AND TASKS


To sum up the role of the special forces generally, they are selected and specially trained small groups of men, who penetrate the enemy, to carry out their specific tasks. At present the description of conventional military operations as opposed to irregular operations is becoming more and more blurred but at one end of the scale is full nuclear war, while at the other, small groups clash with security forces in conditions of 'near peace'. Across this spectrum stands the need for, and use of, special forces to expand the commander's knowledge of the battlefield, increase the flexibility of his forces and enhance their initiative. In modern times six main areas of employment have been identified.

a. Intelligence-Gathering Operations


From the inception of the special forces there has always been a special relationship between them and the intelligence organisation. On the one hand the nature of their work requires that special forces be provided with the very best intelligence available, while on the other hand, because of where they operate, they are uniquely placed to obtain accurate information about the enemy. Some information will be so closely guarded by the enemy, that only by penetrating his security and being ready to fight for it, can such information be obtained. Such operations form the particular task of the special forces soldiers. Deep reconnaissance and early warning of enemy movement during World War II in North Africa, was the special task of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), which infiltrated behind Rommel's lines and physically counted and reported on all the traffic along the coast road. Today, even in the age of satellites and other scientific sensory methods, or where such methods are not available, the need for early warning of enemy movement, can still be met by infiltrating small groups of men to report on such movements. This, among others, was the role of the British SAS during the Falklands War. The small groups of SAS infiltrators hid near the Argentinean airfields to warn the fleet as the aircraft took off. In all these type of tasks, such as early warning, tactical intelligence-gathering, target identification and acquisition, and special detailed reconnaissance ('direct eyes and hands on study of the enemy positions'), the close association of special forces to the intelligence community and the interplay between the two organisations is obvious. However, special forces personnel remain highly trained uniformed soldiers conducting military operations - they are not intelligence staff officers. This remains true of the Reconnaissance Commando soldiers today.

b. Sabotage or Disruption Operations


All sorts of disruptive operations, to delay, disrupt, divert and discourage enemy forces, from the sabotaging of bridges and roads to the destruction of aircraft, from attacks on headquarters or the capture of individuals to the planting of false information, can be conducted in the area where the enemy is generally not expecting it, i.e., in his own so-called 'secure' rear areas. The operations of the original SAS under David Stirling against German aircraft in North Africa provides the classical example of this sort of operation. It also proved the effectiveness and low cost of such operations relative to those of conventional attacks to achieve the same results. Sabotage operations conducted by small bands from the Revolutionary Armies in Southern Africa could also fall within this description.

c. Organising, Training and Conducting Operations of Resistance Movements


Starting with the original British SAS in North Africa, special forces have always been in contact with, and relied upon the help, or at least neutrality of, local inhabitants. Frequently this has led to the organisation and employment of resistance movements behind the enemy. The Second World War abounds with case studies of Russian partisans led by Red Army soldiers, French 'Marquis' led by SOE or Jedburgh Teams, and so on. In recent times this support for resistance movements was a major role of the American special forces, the 'Green Berets', in Vietnam. Also, in fact, every Arab battalion in the coalition during Operation 'Desert Storm' went into battle accompanied by a special forces team. Assistance from the South African forces contributed to the success of UNITA - particularly at Cuito Cuanavale - and RENAMO.

d. Anti-Terrorist Operations


In the modern world and particularly since the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre and the successful freeing of the hostages at Entebbe, special forces have also been organised to conduct anti-hijack and anti-hostage operations. Governments recognise that, when negotiations fail, these situations may call for special operations requiring expert handling beyond the capabilities of the police force. The most spectacular operation of this sort in recent times was the storming of the Iranian Embassy by the SAS in London in 1980. No one can foresee when such a situation may occur - witness, for example, the events during the Pope's recent visit to Lesotho. Anti-narcotic trafficking operations along these lines are a likely future development.

e. Counter-Guerrilla Operations


Small groups of such highly trained men are usually better at guerrilla operations than the guerrilla bands themselves. Guerrilla operations represent extremely economic use of manpower, since the success of the guerrillas' tactics depend on security forces being forced to deploy large numbers of men to counter the small groups of guerrillas. When this situation is reversed, greater operational costs are incurred, in terms of men needed to create secure base areas or 'written off' as casualties. This makes guerrilla warfare unpleasant and costly for the guerrillas, as proven in Malaya, Aden and Borneo by the SAS. It was in regard to this type of operations during the Borneo campaign that General Walter Walker said of the SAS 'I regard 70 troopers of the SAS as being as valuable to me as 700 infantry'.

f. Training


Against this background of small group operations it follows that special force soldiers are also very suitable for improving military training in general, in their own or foreign military forces. This role is more prominent nowadays as few smaller countries can afford a defence organisation based on the major defence forces of the nuclear age.

CONTROL


Command and control of any special forces is always centralised at the highest level possible. This has nothing to do with the numbers involved or the rank of the individual members. The sensitivity of their operations and the level of security involved led, in the SADF, to the appointment of the General Officer Commanding Special Forces. For ease of control, the General Officer was also in charge of the Civil Co-operation Bureau but this was a 'marriage of convenience'. Members of the latter organisation were recruited for a special task and were not selected and trained as members of 'the Recces'. In any future South African defence organisation, control, not only of the special force element but of the entire organisation, will obviously be a critical issue and the subject of much debate in future. In respect of major operations by members of the SADF in general, perhaps a Multi-Party Defence Committee, or a special group drawn from the majority party, working with the Commander in Chief, the State President, may be necessary for control, review and approval. However, within the military organisation, the internationally accepted method is to limit control of special force operations to the highest military level applicable and this should remain the case in the future SADF. Thus the Commander of the special forces, the Chief of the SADF and the Minister of Defence would probably be delegated control of such operations.

THE FUTURE


Dr Rocklyn Williams along with many other writers has forecast a future SADF in which the SA Army will probably not be involved in the internal police role and which can therefore be much smaller than at present. Both the United States and Britain have in recent times undergone major force reductions leading to the disbandment and discharge of thousands of men. Yet, neither country has considered doing away with its special forces. On the contrary, just as no modern defence force would be without anti-tank weapons or try to operate without air support, so too are special forces, capable of conducting deep reconnaissance, a vital part of any modern military organisation. Their flexibility and cost-effectiveness makes it logical to assume that in a future and smaller SADF they will be absolutely necessary, even if other sacrifices must be made. In fact, the smaller the numbers involved or available, the greater will be the need for careful selection, good training and correct employment and, most important of all, high quality information about any enemy. These elements form the essence of the special forces.

The special forces would be valuable not only to the future SADF itself, but also in another role foreseen by Dr Williams in providing SADF assistance to other countries in the region. Most southern African countries, faced by insurgency or terrorism, would prefer receiving help from 70 SADF special force soldiers than that provided by deploying a SA Armoured Brigade. If the assistance required is for training, 'the Recces', who are used to operating without the full facilities and support of the rest of the Army, are probably better suited to the needs of other defence forces in southern Africa, which lack major or heavy equipment facilities or support.

The South African special forces need to prepare for their role in a future defence organisation. There will be changes brought about by reorganisation, rationalisation, reduced budgets, new tasks, new weapons and techniques and so on. The concept of special forces, however, based on small groups of highly trained, selected soldiers is not only part of modern defence forces but offers much to South Africa. In particular, where the future of the defence organisation is unclear, the considerable capabilities of the special forces are needed. Most of all perhaps, the special forces need to break down the barriers that may exist between them and the rest of the Defence Force, as well as the general public. They need to be seen for what they are - an internationally recognised, professional elite element of the military whose work and importance should be known to all future decision-makers.

In conclusion, all military operations in recent times, from Northern Ireland to the Falkland Islands, and culminating in the War in the Gulf - Operation 'Desert Storm' - accentuate the continued need for special forces in a small but modern defence force. They are acknowledged as a force multiplier and as one of the more recent developments in military thinking, away from the massed but ill-trained armies serving as cannon fodder for still bigger armies. In summary, for South Africa, the reasons for the continued existence of a special forces element are as follows:
  1. They form an essential part of any modern defence organisation (particularly in regard to deep reconnaissance operations).
  2. They are relatively cheap in terms of requirements for finances, equipment and numbers of men.
  3. They are extremely flexible in employment and can react at very short notice and with great precision.
  4. They provide an improvement in general training throughout their own defence force.
  5. They are ideal for rendering direct military support to neighbouring countries or assistance with their training.
  6. They reduce considerably casualties on their own side, compared to other military means required to achieve the same result.
  7. The past record of South African special forces proves that the basis for this highly efficient organisation already exist in the SADF.
The future Defence Force will still have the problems of a limited budget, scarce modern equipment, etc. Its resources must meet its real needs. It must not end up with more than it needs to deal with situations which are unlikely to develop but with less than is required. Military organisations with skills of the standard of special forces do not develop overnight. What South Africa does have is a highly efficient and internationally respected basic organisation and system already in place, as well as the manpower potential in the new South Africa to meet its needs. Its special forces comprise an organisation which is ideally suited to counteract violence and promote inter-regional co-operation by countering subversion, terrorism and insurgency. An efficient special forces element could provide the future Defence Force with a force multiplier out of all proportion to its costs. It will help ensure that, in the military field, South Africa fulfils its true role as a leader in the interdependent region, where population growth and environmental degradation add pressures to weak economies and unstable political systems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. V Cowles, The Phantom Major, London, Grafton Books, 1958, pp19-42.
  2. H Heitman, South African War Machine, Johannesburg, CNA, 1985, pp 94-113.
  3. Ibid, pp 176-182.
  4. Ibid, pp 94-113.
  5. A de la Rey, South African Defence Force Review, Durban, Walker-Ramus Trading Co, 1989, pp 169-171.
  6. H Heitman, op cit.
  7. I Uys, Cross of Honour, Germiston, Uys Publishers, 1992, pp 124-125.
  8. Ibid.
  9. A Brown, The SAS, London, Orbis Publishing, 1986, pp 40-41.
  10. I Padden, US Navy Seals, New York, Bruck Communications, 1985, pp 14-17.
  11. A Brown, The Green Berets, London, Orbis Publishing, 1986, pp 88-93.
  12. A de la Rey, op cit.
  13. A Brown, op cit, pp 40-41.
  14. Ibid.
  15. R Williams, South African Defence Review, Issue no 10, 1993, pp 23-24.
  16. Ibid.