Military Intelligence in a Post Settlement South Africa

The Inevitable Requirement *

Chris Thirion
Major-General Chris (rtd) spent the last twenty years of his career in military intelligence where he held a variety of posts, including that of Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence.

*A paper presented at a public seminar on Military Intelligence and Special Forces - What are the future requirements, hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy (ID)), 24 June 1993, Constantia Park, Midrand.

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 12, 1993

INTRODUCTION

The one thing about which all South Africans are and should be certain of is change; change that is going to affect our lives in no uncertain way. It is going to challenge our perceptions of one another as well as our concepts about key issues like nationalism, nationhood, nation building, government and government structures to mention but a few. The process is also going to affect the very institutions which many South Africans hopes will function as the primary mechanisms for the control of transition.

Change in South Africa is going to take place against a background of mistrust, political polarisation, ongoing and spiralling violence, terrorism and lawlessness, double and hidden agendas, fears and anxiety and political radicalism. The degree of stability (basic political climate) within which these changes are going to take place will first and foremost be determined by how well the process (and the conflict) is managed. Conflict and process management can only be effective when based on sound intelligence. It must also be realised that the challenge of conflict management as well as the management of change is not going to be short-lived or a short-term phenomenon. Judging by the information on the surface and taking into account the complexity of the South African scene (social, economic and political), one need not be an intelligence wizard to realise that change in the RSA will take place in an unstable environment - internally and regionally. Factors causing the unstable environment are not going to change overnight either. On the contrary, some socio-economic factors are going to have a more severe adverse impact for some years to come. In short, there is not much that a new government (whatever the post settlement dispensation) can do in the short term to reduce the real threat of a general climate characterised by instability, violence and terrorism.

Referring to the role of military intelligence in this context, G.R. Copley (Defence and Foreign Affairs Magazine) states the following: '...... intelligence is the key to stable government, and the military itself has its major role in support of domestic stability rather than defending national integrity from external and military threats. It [intelligence] is the first line of defence'

Intelligence as the key to stable government refers to the full spectrum of intelligence activity that could have a bearing on security in its widest sense. It does not only apply to the present government, nor to a specific sector of the South African population. the need for a joint intelligence effort in the RSA was at no stage of our history greater.

LEGITIMACY

For Military Intelligence to fulfil its vital role certain short-term problems as well as longer term command and managerial requirements must be addressed without delay by the broadest possible multiparty forum. the false image of Military Intelligence as a rogue elephant within the security structures of the state and questions surrounding legality and legitimacy need to be rectified out as a matter of urgency. Fears within political parties and amongst political leaders in particular, in this regard, can no longer be brushed aside as propaganda. In fact, the intelligence community as a whole has become a central focus of concern. it is, however, fallacious to think that the real problems and challenges of intelligence in a post-settlement South Africa can be solved by addressing Military Intelligence in isolation. Military intelligence is first and foremost an integral part of the SADF. Military Intelligence has always been and must in any future dispensation form part of the South African intelligence community. this means that military intelligence operates on more than one level and has a departmental and national or strategic responsibility.

In terms of the Military Intelligence input at a national strategic level it is imperative that the structure, organisation and capabilities of military intelligence should provide for this requirement. whereas Military Intelligence, as part of the defence system, functions on the departmental, operational and tactical level. Its structure, organisation, as well as its channels of command, are determined by these requirements. in this regard there are no profound differences between South African military intelligence and its counterparts the world over. like elsewhere in the world 'tactical' and 'strategic' basically refers to the level of decision making and is, according to the philosophy of the SADF a command function and responsibility. in real terms the chief of the SADF has an intelligence responsibility similar to the commanders on the lower echelons. it is however, interesting to note that a tactical or strategic assessment is based on the same information and intelligence - i.e. the same data base.

Structural changes in military intelligence over the years were the result of a change in the threat assessment. with the termination of South Africa's military involvement in Namibia and Angola and the almost simultaneous deterioration in the internal security situation, military intelligence underwent structural changes in order to accommodate a shift in focus.

Recently military intelligence underwent meaningful structural and organisational changes as a result of rationalisation caused by decisions and instructions by the State President and parliament and cuts in the defence budget. this goes to prove that the threat assessment, political decisions and budgetary constraints among other factors, cause structural and organisational changes in military intelligence from time to time.

THREAT

With reference to the simplistic foregone security scenario in the introduction, it is clear that Military Intelligence is both necessary and desirable in a post-settlement South Africa. it is as necessary and desirable in peace as in war. we are unfortunately not living in a safer world! However, there are a number of specific interacting factors that necessitate a rethink on intelligence. Essentially, it boils down to an indisputable change in the threat assessment over the last two years. In classical military terms the probability of a conventional threat has diminished drastically while the RSA experienced a sharp increase in armed violence, both criminally and politically motivated. there has also been a dramatic shift in the geographical pattern of the armed conflict - it is no longer projected from outside the country as a matter of co-ordinated strategy. the streets and some rural areas are increasingly becoming the proverbial battlefield. the inability of our neighbouring states to stop illegal cross-border arms trafficking is going to influence South Africa's internal security for years to come.

With the change in the security situation and the progress towards a change in government, the intelligence community is confronted with a change in its mind-set.

Earlier in this article I noted that Military Intelligence forms part and parcel of the overall defence force structures (i.e., command and control). Intelligence is a command function and responsibility which means that all Military Intelligence activities are part of the task of the SADF. Questions as to whether military intelligence should involve itself in operations in the interior can and should be related to the operational mandate of the SADF which must, in turn, be the result of a top-down approach. In other words a political decision should result in instructions to the military. this is the surest route to develop Military Intelligence objectives to meet national goals.

When addressing the future requirement and structure of military intelligence from the present perspective it is necessary to consider the most probable political developments on the road ahead since there has always been an unmistakable interplay between major political events and the internal security situation. it is therefore perhaps more appropriate to refer to three phases in the transitional process namely a pre-election (TEC) phase, followed by a government of national unity and thirdly the final phase of transition to majority rule.

In the present pre-election phase, the level of violence is such that internal deployment of military personnel cannot be scaled down. On the contrary, once agreement is reached on the election date and party political campaigning gains momentum, the security situation is likely to deteriorate which may see a rise in military force levels deployed in the run up to elections.

The internal security situation during the next phase, namely that of government of national unity will be threatened by armed violence (disruption, boycott and sabotage actions). i am referring to the use of violence to promote political preferences. if extreme left-wing and right-wing resistance in whatever form can be contained by the South African Police (SAP), we will witness a scaling down of military operational deployment inside the RSA. along with that the need for Military Intelligence activities inside the RSA will become less critical and maybe even unnecessary. in certain academic circles there is some optimism in respect of this transitional phase. This view is that since a new government will have more legitimacy, it will be able to act more firmly to combat crime and unrest. the greater degree of legitimacy will in itself remove some causes of unrest.

This phase of government of national unity is not expected to last for more than 5 years and is to be followed by the final transition to majority rule. this means moving on to long-term predictions and consideration of the main factors likely to influence government decisions. whereas internal security and political considerations were dominant in the short-to medium-term, the size and composition of the defence force will be determined by defence and national criteria in the longer term. this is the stage when, according to the ANC, the challenge is to address not only the security institutions and their composition, but also to go deeper and address the nature of security policy itself.

The basic principles underpinning such a policy should be based on a realistic assessment of threats to peace, territorial integrity and personal security. the question of a viable deterrent however will also have to be addressed. the broadened concept of security and the growing interdependence of countries in southern Africa call for new operational approaches. according to Lt Gen Steyn the military concept of a rapid deployment force, made up of elements of all the arms of service, does in fact constitute an affordable and viable conventional deterrent. here one would probably put a higher premium on aspects such as speed of deployment, accurate and sustainable fire power and survivability than on sheer size of the force. naturally, one would expect to gain the competitive edge through technological superiority in relative, rather than absolute terms.

Against the background of increasing budgetary constraints resulting in shrinking force levels as well as cutbacks on development projects, the combat potential of the SADF is expected to be affected negatively. this situation must be compensated for by force multipliers among which intelligence is the most important. thus, to the extent that combat potential is scaled down, Military Intelligence becomes more important. this would be the case even with a defensive posture. force multipliers come in different guises, but the ability to sustain and conduct operations with effective logistical and medical support, as well as competent command, control, communications and intelligence, will be most important.

CONCLUSION

The general deteriorating socio-economic situation in the southern African region and the resulting controlled and illegal mass immigration of people across the borders into the RSA and specifically towards growth points, is going to add a new dimension to future threat assessments. border protection is going to take on a new meaning and put extra pressure on the SADF and more specifically Military Intelligence. It is important to realise that this is going to create a situation conducive to drug and illegal arms trafficking and international terrorism. it is important that decision-makers are not lured into the trap of opting for total and complete structural changes for the sake of change and to deal with military intelligence in isolation. in doing so one could end up 'putting the cart before the horse'.

once the role and functions as well as the mandate of the SADF is clearly spelled out by the government, the functions and structure of military intelligence will fall into place. Provided this is done in no uncertain terms, there remain a few recommendations I would like to highlight:

military intelligence must not involve itself in any non-military and non-intelligence executive functions. its task should be carried out in strict adherence to the operational mandate of the SADF.



It is of paramount importance that the functions (terrain of responsibilities) of the different intelligence agencies be spelled out in detail in legislation.



The task of Military Intelligence can never be left to civilian agencies. strategic Military Intelligence is not confined to purely military matters. there will always exist a gray area between military, political and economic matters. Maintaining a degree of competition between the civil and Military Intelligence services is not necessarily bad. it will exist anyway, so it is best to make it a productive phenomenon. Joint evaluation and interpretation of information at a national level is imperative and the necessary formal structure for this must receive immediate attention.



The concept of national security must be clearly defined.



A code of ethics must be established and rigorously applied. Intelligence is by definition the truth timely, well told. There can be no room for manipulation.



The success of an intelligence structure relies as much on management or command and the people involved as it does on the form it takes. like elsewhere in the world, government should be assisted and advised by a multiparty parliamentary committee in the selection of top level intelligence personnel. this is but one way to enhance credibility and legitimacy.



It serves no purpose to look for models elsewhere. the South African situation is likely to be unique. there is no such thing as a perfect intelligence service or services and the interaction has never been perfect. the solution must be tailor made. there is no single blueprint or model structure for an intelligence service, let alone an entire intelligence community which will function smoothly, let alone faultlessly over protracted periods. it is possible to build on existing building blocks. The existing military intelligence consists of well trained and skilled personnel commanding many years of experience as well as a sound infrastructure. it is pointless and dangerous to take the obvious shortcut of bringing in the services of a major foreign ally to assist in training or service formation. developing new building blocks is labour-intensive, expensive and time-consuming.



It is critical that the topmost office of the intelligence community be sufficiently senior, and respected, so that it can play a decisive role in government leadership. in the South African scenario this calls for the appointment of a top-level security adviser close to the head of state and parliament. The control of an intelligence service or community is a top-down process. the security adviser can never be seated within any one of the executive services. the function is to maintain national goals, assure that budgeting and accounting (although of course, in the smallest possible circle in government) is properly done and as a matter of routine. thirdly the security adviser should maintain liaison with all clients and the intelligence community itself. the security adviser must ensure that the requirements of public accountability be met. the co-ordination and hands-on management of covert collection must also form part of the task of the national security adviser. likewise, the question of co-ordination of technical collection capabilities should rest with this office.



With special reference to military intelligence all intelligence functions must be controlled in a top-down fashion. Military Intelligence cannot be looked upon as just another staff function. This is especially true of covert collection which could cause tremendous political embarrassment, and should be controlled by centralised command.

Finally there is one aspect of intelligence in general that I would like to emphasise. there is a tendency to see the task of the intelligence services as threat-orientated with the consequence that they are considered to be of lesser importance when there is a low overall threat perception. the function of intelligence services in alerting the leadership to national opportunities is too often overlooked.