Control of Armed Forces in South Africa

Constitutional Formulae *

Prof Deon Fourie
Strategic Studies, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa

Paper presented at a conference on Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Settlement South Africa, hosted by the Institute for Defence Politics in Conjunction with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, CSIR conference centre, Pretoria, 23 April 1992.

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 5, 1992

INTRODUCTION

"Control of the armed forces" is much more ambiguous a concept than might appear at first blush. As Samuel Huntington has indicated in his well known work The Soldier and the State, the minimizing of military power to which control appears to refer, has much to do with the specific interests of particular civilian groups in minimizing the power of other civilian groups. It tends to have much less to do with controlling the interests and power of the armed forces.

Meaning may be derived from what is to be achieved by control. To Roman governments it might have had much to do with preventing the legions from appointing their own emperors. To English governments it might have had to do with controlling the Sovereign or with controlling Whig or Tory factions in Parliament as much as with preventing the re imposition of a Cromwellian dictatorship under the auspices of the army. To Marxist governments it has had much to do with the fear that the revolution might be taken over by "Bonapartists" among the soldiers thrown up by the revolution.

Meaning may also be derived from the levels at which control is sought to be exercised. In Britain and in the United States it has become a function of the elected representatives to exert forms of control on the armed forces. In Switzerland the control tends to be more in the hands of the Cantons. In Norway and Sweden and in Germany it has devolved upon officials specially designated by the parliaments in terms of the constitutions.

The meaning of control may also be derived from the means used to exert control. It may be by way of legislation, by way of budgetary allocations, by way of the vesting of command, by way of parliamentary investigative procedures, by way of traditional discipline or by way of professional values - which does not necessarily mean that the values may be held only by career soldiers. Or control might be by way of direct political subordination and the policing of opinions.

The meaning of control may refer also to issues in government that need to be controlled: governing the country may be one, the engaging in war against the will of the civilian government, dominating budgetary processes and allocations or to make military goals paramount in society (the real meaning of militarism).

THE THEORY OF CONTROL

Most prominent among the recent writers on the subject of control of the armed forces have been Samuel P. Huntington and Amos Perlmutter.

Whereas Huntington was more concerned with the development of tensions in American society caused by the existence of career armed forces, Perlmutter was concerned in synthesising Huntington's ideas with those of other contributors and with applying the conclusions to a variety of armed forces throughout the world.

For convenience this article will refer only to Huntington's contributions regarding control of the armed forces as a point of departure for the discussion of the issue. (Huntington, Chapter 4 and Perlmutter, Chapter 2)

Huntington sees the concept of control of the military as necessarily implying 'civilian control'. He goes on to say that the issue of civilian control implies that there is control to the extent that the power of military groups in a society can be reduced. In answering the question as to how military power is to be reduced in a society he proffers two broad responses.

Since it is usually not possible to maximise the power of civilian groups as against that of military forces, partly because of the conflicting interests of civilian groups in a society, civilian control inevitably implies that it is for the benefit of one group as against other civilian group that civilian control is to be manipulated. Huntington calls this attempt to maximise civilian control subjective civilian control because it is identified with the interests of only one civilian group or coalition of groups against another.

It thus relies on the maximisation of power of particular government institutions (Parliament versus the King, Congress versus the President). Or as in the 18th and 19th Centuries it relies on control by social classes (aristocratic control versus middle classes power). Or, thirdly, Huntington identified civilian control by constitutional form as a way of gaining power subjectively. Here the argument would be that democracies are necessarily identified with civilian control of the forces and military control would identify with absolute government. As Huntington points out, the Second World War showed that the monopoly of virtue could be violated or true on both sides. On the democratic side some military commanders were able to accrue great power while in the dictatorships surveillance and terror were needed to undermine the politically isolated professionalised officers.

Huntington then argues that as the military calling became a true profession there were military professional functional imperatives which would make the competition among civilian groups very dangerous. Professionalism, however, made it easier to be clear about the meaning of civilian control.

Subjective control in Huntington's sense makes the military adopt civilian political values and in fact undermines the control of the military forces by making them partisan. However, once they become functionally professional they obey a calling rather than being political participants. This Huntington identifies as 'objective control'.

Objective civilian control amounts to the recognition of autonomous military professionalism and it makes the military politically neutral. Huntington argues that a highly professional corps of officers carries out the wishes of any 'civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state'. (Huntington, p 84) Ironically, now that they are hardly ever reported in the media, the speeches of the South African generals resound very frequently with echoes of this phrase of Huntington's.

This professionalism gives a 'single concrete standard of civilian control which is politically neutral and which all social groups can recognize. It elevates civilian control from a political slogan masking group interests to an analytical concept independent of group perspectives.'

Huntington argues that the advent of military professionalism has made objective civilian control practicable and subjective civilian control an anachronism. But he does caution that there are still politicians who are 'unwilling simply to accept a politically neutral officer corps. They continue to insist upon the subordination of the officer corps to their own interests and principles.'

And one may add in surveying the world we live in, that sometimes this insistence has ultimately been to the detriment of some of those very politicians as they have been swept away in coups engineered by their own protégés. And some have crumbled away before the professionalism of the soldiers and have left no memorials behind.

A striking example of the successful working of objective civilian control which Huntington and Perlmutter cite, is that of Germany. With the most professional officer corps in Europe, the German General Staff gave their advice but took no foreign or domestic policy decisions. Their opinions frequently differed fundamentally from those of the civilians but it was the civilians - such as Bismarck and later Hitler - who took the decisions. Only during the First World War did people such as Hindenburg and Ludendorff cross the line of authority.

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of professionalism, that has created the atmosphere for objective civilian control but which most writers in the field ignore, is that of Switzerland. In that country with only some 3 000 regular career soldiers, the level of professionalism among the part time soldiers has made of them 'objective civilians' ruling their own armed forces accordingly. With four different language groups living in different parts of the state and with Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism as their two main religions, the Swiss have every reason to be driven by the elements of subjective civilian control. Yet, particularly in the Second World War with Germany and France two neighbouring antagonists, the Swiss army remained loyal to the Swiss state and to Swiss neutrality.

FORMS OF CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

In a variety of countries there is an implicit recognition of the objective civilian control of the armed forces in consequence of the professional qualities of the forces. Nevertheless, there is still in some a traditional form of control harking back to a period of subjective civilian control while in others it does not seem clear that the politicians have yet realised that their armed forces have achieved a state of professional status qualifying them for trust as neutral professional forces. Or perhaps it is simply that the politicians do not want to recognise this kind of situation.

The various forms of control may be summarised as follows - control by constitutional provisions, direct parliamentary control, indirect parliamentary control, control by citizen participation, control by devolution of power, control by discipline, loyalty and by professionalism.

The various countries which are to be cited by way of example do not necessarily exhibit pure examples and some of them mix and overlap the various forms of control. Little attempt will be made to separate them in this paper.

DIRECT PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

The most obvious examples of this are the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America. In the examples it will also be seen that there are constitutional forms of control, implicit rather than explicit, in the United Kingdom.

In Britain control is by annual legislation of the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act as well as of the annual budget apart from which a separate act governs the maintenance of the Royal Navy. In fact the British have feared the existence of the standing forces far more than that of the Navy.

Command of the armed forces vests in the Crown, that is, the Queen personally even though Her prerogative as to the armed forces has been severely restricted. Since the Queen no longer exercises Her authority other than on the advice of the Privy Council, i.e. the Ministers She is not unfettered. The Ministers, by convention, do not act without taking the Queen's opinion on some matters - as the recently discharged Minister of Defence, Tom King, appears to have discovered as a result of the announcement of the disbanding of several old British regiments.

Control by Parliament means also that the Public Accounts Committee of the Commons has annual access to officers of the Crown to determine how moneys have been used while Select committees may question officers and civil servants of the Ministry of Defence as to a wide variety of matters pertaining to the activities of the armed forces.

While these committees as well as the reports received from the Comptroller and Auditor General signify a significant degree of control over the armed forces, their power is largely ex post facto and confined mainly to the detailed control of public moneys.

What is supposed to confer power on Parliament are the acts which date back to the post-Cromwellian attempts to prevent the rule of England by the major-generals who had supported the Lord Protector's dictatorship. The most important antecedent was the series of Mutiny Acts which began with the constitutional renewal under William III and Mary (1 Will & Mary, c.5). These acts of Parliament were passed annually. Now as in 1689 the Act begins with the preamble that 'Whereas the raising of or keeping of a standing army within the United Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law;' This Act provides then for the exact numbers of soldiers airmen and marines that may be raised and maintained in the succeeding year 'for the safety of the United Kingdom...'

As part of the protection of citizens under the Mutiny Act, the 1703 Act allowed billeting in 'inns, livery stables, ale houses ... and in no private houses whatsoever' since this had been allowed under James II and the Declaration of Rights required the consent of private householders.

Eventually, in 1881, the Mutiny Act was replaced by the Army Act which contains the sum total of the codes of discipline and other rules necessary for the maintenance of the Army and the Royal Air Force. But none of these other acts has any force or effect until the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act has been passed by Parliament. And this has to happen each year. The constitutional principle is that of Parliamentary control over the discipline without which the forces cannot exist.

In a country such as the United Kingdom where the members of Parliament feel themselves very free to act as they see fit, this kind of convention is very powerful in maintaining control over the land and air forces simply because no other officials will carry out their duties to support the forces if they are aware that Parliament has refused to pass the act pertaining to discipline. In a similar manner Parliament knows that officials will not act if Parliament refuses to allocate moneys to the forces. In any country observance of the law and conventions of Parliament depend very much on public willingness to recognise them and this is probably what enables the British to employ these means. In a similar manner loyalty to the Crown, to the individual regiments, to the army as well as personal discipline supplement the means described.

In the United States of America there are similar controls by Congress. Whereas the President is a non-hereditary George III, Congress inherited many powers of Parliament but that the Constitution altered provisions as to the war power, saying that congress had the power.

To declare War, ...

To raise and support Armies but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

And the President was to be 'Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States' as was the King of England in effect. As Wormuth and Firmage argue in To Chain the Dog of War, this has caused a great deal of difference of opinion and some say, downright deception, in the succeeding centuries. Huntington argues that the fault lies in the framing of the power as an office rather than as the function 'to command' which, he believes leaves the powers undefined. However that may be, several war time presidents - and 'peace time' presidents - have acted as the effective commanders of the forces, for good or ill. Despite the appointment, however, the President has probably less clear authority over the forces than does the Prime Minister of Great Britain - who has no such office in relation to the forces.

As presidents have acted according to their own lights, Congress has either passed acts such as the Neutrality Act of 1794 or resolutions such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 which began to tie the President's hands over Vietnam by seeking to 'insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities...' Since Sections 3 and 8 went on to delegate the exercise of powers President Reagan was able to act against Grenada and deploy marines in Lebanon within the provisions of the Resolution.

Apart from these actions by Congress to control the employment of the military - against a fellow politician rather than against the armed forces - they may sanction or refuse budgetary appropriations to the armed forces. They also may have recourse to investigating by way of the Armed Services Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives or by Special Committees, such as when particular questions have indicated that inquiries are necessary. Sadly, the tendency toward subjective civilian control has appeared most often in the USA when congressmen have seen advantages in exploiting differences within the services or between factions in the executive. Investigating committees have lent themselves to this form of action. Since the militia or National Guard serve as entirely separate forces from the career forces they have also provided the opportunity for political lobbies to use and be used by them.

Nevertheless, the political life of the USA in which there is not the party discipline that we know in South Africa or even in the United Kingdom, the freedom accorded to members of Congress to act according to their own lights, enable them through the system outlined to exert a remarkable degree of control over the armed forces strengths, appropriations, expenditure of funds, confirmation of senior appointments and even military policy and, for subjective reasons, the deployment of defence industries and military bases.

CONTROL BY CONSTITUTION, DEVOLUTION AND PARTICIPATION

In the heady days when the Americans were becoming Americans Samuel Adams wrote:

A standing army, however necessary it may be at some time, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People.

The temper he was expressing was that Americans did not want military power concentrated in the hands of any central government likely to replace that of George III. Moreover, the experience of the new citizens in the Colonies had taught them to value the services of the militia composed of civilians in uniform who were not uncaring strangers.

It is, when the early deliberations are read, not surprising that the Articles of Confederation of 1781 as well as the Constitution of 1787 provided for state militias with Congress and not the President with the power to call them into federal service to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections and to repel foreign invasion. For reasons which cannot be dealt with now, the intention to maintain an independent militia in each state and virtually no standing army was ultimately abandoned. What is important is that the early Americans saw their liberties better served by a militia system that was aimed at protecting the constitution and the states against central authority.

In Switzerland the same sentiments were the basis for the Swiss army which today maintains some 650 000 citizen soldiers, some 400 000 members of a civil defence establishment and a mere 3 000 career soldiers.

When the Swiss male turns twenty he steps into two associated statuses as a citizen: he becomes a voter and he receives the call to attend the initial sixteen week course at the army recruit school. For decades he will remain an enfranchised citizen and a disciplined, trained soldier. The Constitution of Switzerland adopted by referendum in 1874 provided that, as with the USA in 1781, no standing army would be permitted. In the case of Switzerland, this provision of the constitution has remained in effect. Various amendments to the law relating to military service have been voted on during national referenda and always accepted with decisive majorities.

The legal 'supreme command' of the Swiss army vests in the Federal Assembly and it exercises command once two thousand men are mobilised or mobilisation exceeds three weeks. Only for purposes of command during active service does the Assembly elect a General as commander in chief. This is the only time that a Swiss general is known as anything but 'colonel'. Thus during peacetime, the five Oberst Korpskommandanten (i.e. lieutenant generals) are the effective commanders of the Federal Swiss Army and form a Commission for National Military Defence. The actual administration of the army vests in a civil Military Department under the authority of a member of the Federal Council (Cabinet) to whom he is responsible. The structure and distribution of command at this level are all manifestations of the Swiss attempts to divest the central government of concentrated military power and to emphasis the devolution of power.

Certain units of the army are recruited and maintained as forces belonging to the Cantons (i.e. provinces) and their officers are appointed and promoted up to the rank of lieutenant colonel, by the cantonal governments. At the same time, even those troops who are recruited for the forces falling under the direct control of the central government have to be recruited proportionately according to their geographical and linguistic origin.

In practice the cantonal forces are as much at the disposal of the federal authorities as are the federal units and formations and cantonal command, as in the USA, is really confined to civil defence and to police duties.

The political history that would have made the Swiss a prey to what Huntington has called subjective civilian control is past. Largely this is because the Swiss system has not produced a military career force divorced from society as a whole. Instead, the Swiss militia system based on a general military compulsion has created a unity of soldier and citizen, of people and army. The soldier is the citizen in uniform and the citizen is 'der beurlaubte Soldat' - the soldier on leave.

But they are also 'professional' in every sense. They spend sixteen weeks on any course they might undertake and at the end of a lifetime of service other ranks and officers have put in not less than one year's full time service as well as regular part time service. They are trusted as Swiss and not suspected as German or French or Italian soldiers. Twice in the Second World War German plans to invade Switzerland were shelved.

Why have the Swiss chosen this form of military system? According to their constitutional history it is to defend the weak cantons against the strong cantons, to defend the cantons against the central government, to defend the constitution against the central government and against those who would be powerful at the expense of others and to defend the central government and the unity and neutrality of their country. One has to remember that into the last century the Swiss had fought civil wars about religion as much as about language. At the same time they understood the value of standing together and reaping the benefit of their geographical situation.

INDIRECT PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

In this section a different level of control over the military is discussed. As a system it is far less concerned with the control of the armed forces as an institution vis a vis the civilian authority than it is concerned with dealing with the complaints of individuals in service. Certainly, the control of finances and administration are dealt with in certain instances but this is not general.

It is found in relation to the armed forces in Sweden, Norway and Israel. Germany has also found it to be requisite in the post-War atmosphere - although it must be said that until late in the Third Reich the German Wehrmacht seemed to have been able to protect itself so well from the NSDAP that joining the army was called 'aristocratic immigration' by some.

Consequent to a new defence organisation's being adopted in Sweden in 1901 a member of Parliament proposed that an official responsible to Parliament be appointed to do in defence matters what the spokesman (ombudsman) for civil affairs (JO) had done since 1809, i.e. to prosecute officials who have acted illegally or neglected their duties.

Parliament rejected the proposal but in 1908 the government appointed a committee to investigate military administration and expenditure and the welfare of conscripts. After Sweden had increased her forces in 1914, it was obvious that the JO could not cope with all his duties. Moreover, conscription made the voting public more aware of the armed forces and thus uncomfortable for the parliamentarians, especially since Swedish preparations in case of war meant large financial allocations.

The decision was thus taken to appoint a Militieombudsman (MO) to take over the duties of the JO regarding the military. He was not to interfere with military technicalities but would act to strengthen public confidence in the defence organisation. He would carry out investigations as a matter of routine, investigate complaints from the conscript or his family and intervene in cases of abuse. The Constitution was accordingly amended and legislation passed to regulate his work. Appointed for four years at a time after a ballot in Parliament the MO has a Deputy and three jurists as assistants. Periodically other officials may be made available to help him.

While he supervises military officers and officials to ensure that laws and regulations are carried out, he has no supervisory authority over the Minister of Defence. In the strange system of Swedish justice, judges who deal with military cases may be prosecuted if the MO decides they have neglected their duties. Most of the time very few of the cases he deals with arise from complaints but when Sweden mobilised in the Second World War, more than half of the cases arose from soldiers' complaints. When complaints are received most are from conscripts and deal with leave, special appointments, favours and exemption from service. His other sources are newspaper reports and inspection tours. Explanations are requested and hearings may be held or the police may investigate. Most remedies are corrections rather than prosecutions although he may propose changes in laws or take advantage of the fact that the government invites his opinion on matters.

The German Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs (Wehrbeauftragter) has a function much like that of the MO and his appointment is 'to safeguard basic rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control'. This wording is interesting because the creation of the post as an organ of the Bundestag went along with the establishment of a Defence Committee much in the nature of the American committees and which nominates the Commissioner. Indeed, regarding this Becker writes that 'when after World War II, it was proposed to re-establish the armed forces ... there was broad political consensus that the extra power that would accrue to the executive balanced by specific instruments that would strengthen legislative control and supervision'.

In contrast to the Swedish MO, it is expected that the PCMA should have rendered military service and one of his tasks is to ensure that officers observe the principles of leadership and character guidance (innere führung). As with the MO he has the right to secure the information he requires and he may allow an opportunity for matter complained of to be set aright.

In Israel the Israeli man and woman serves in the armed forces for much of their lives as do the Swiss. They serve in national service units, in the reserves and finally in the home guard or in the auxiliary police. In 1972 when a public Complaints Commissioner was established in Israel a separate Soldier's Complaints Commissioner (SCC) was also agreed to by the Knesset. Surprisingly, the first man chosen for the post was General Haim Laskov, former Chief of Staff of the IDF. In the Israeli case the reasoning was that someone well versed in military matters could best cope with the task. While the Minister of Defence would nominate the SCC, this was subject to the approval of the Foreign Affairs and Security committee of the Knesset. The role of the SCC was to enforce good order and discipline and efficiency by notifying the IDF of infringements, wrongs to soldiers and advising how the misdemeanours could be corrected. He has no power to interfere himself and he may only act on receipt of a written complaint. He has the power to subpoena witnesses who may have to testify on oath and he is freed from procedural objections in terms of the rules of evidence. Thus the post has teeth. Reporting on progress takes place weekly, bi-monthly and six-monthly on units that have a reputation for complaints. There are other forms of controls and checks to ensure that soldiers are not kept waiting. Only three per cent of reports were found to be justified in the first year but all complainants were given written responses. It would be interesting to know how the Intifadeh has affected the work of the SCC.

CONTROLS IN THE SADF

The measures available for control of the armed forces in South Africa naturally derive from the constitutional and military relationship with the British Empire and Commonwealth. The Parliamentary institutions and procedures derive directly from the British Parliamentary system. Certain procedures within the ambit of the Defence Act also are derived from the antecedent British systems that were incorporated partially or wholly into the South African Defence Act of 1912 and subsequently taken up into the Defence Act of 1957. There are, however, other institutions and procedures which have developed either formally or informally and which differ from the British practice. The one single factor which influences the availability of remedies remains the argument that certain acts are in the interest of national security. Since this is so much of a subjective issue, it is always difficult to gainsay.

At the top of the pyramid of controls is the responsibility of the Minister of Defence to Parliament. This means that he should be available to answer questions and to inform Parliament during debates on his budget and during interpolation periods. In fact, in South Africa for the most part members are so poorly educated on defence matters that very little benefit has ever accrued from this procedure. It is significant that in past years when opposition defence spokesmen were former Second World War servicemen and well informed the Ministers tended to treat them with respect and to inform them by way of confidential briefings. In latter years as tension developed on defence matters in the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) the relationship with the Minister appeared to break down. Apparently, the PFP latterly declined confidential briefings as being compromising. One may ask whether this kind of response is what should be expected of an opposition party if it is to be effective.

Close to the Minister's responsibility to Parliament has been the responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Force as Principal Accounting Officer since the abolition of the post of Secretary of Defence. This makes him liable to answer probing questions before the Public Accounts Committee as well as before such Select Committees as may be appointed. Once again, Members of Parliament who have educated themselves on defence matters should be capable of making good use of this system to touch on questions relating to the control of the Defence Force. Lacking both that kind of specialist knowledge and in the absence of an adequate system of Parliamentary Research Assistants schooled in the subject the potential has not been developed. One may speculate that there is infinitely more knowledge available on agricultural and economic matters in the South African Parliament.

Supplementary to the Public Accounts Committee but acting independently, is the office of the Auditor General whose staff carries out detailed and probing examinations into the nature of expenditure by departments such as the SADF. In the course of these financial inquiries there are opportunities to bring wrongful or simply doubtful actions to the notice of Parliament.

There are also provisions in the Defence Act and in the General Regulations which provide for control by the civilian authority. The Defence Act (S8) provides for the appointment of all executive commanders by the Minister. This should ensure the accountability of these officers to him and through him to Parliament. Although this practice has fallen by the wayside in the RSA, this means that Ministers should resign when their executive commanders commit misdemeanours of any kind - including being simply inefficient. At the same time this responsibility is emphasised by the provision of the General Regulations for the Chief of the SADF's responsibility to the Minister (Reg 5, Ch 2).

On the executive side of government, the State President is much the same person as the Governor-General was and the First Schedule of the Defence Act also provides for the delegation of disciplinary powers from him down through the normal chain of command to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the SADF.

The same relationship which in the past might have given officers direct entry to the Sovereign provides for all members of the SADF to appeal for a redress of wrongs to their superiors up to the State President if satisfaction is not received. In theory and often in fact the normal chain of command serves to deal with most complaints and problems experienced by serving soldiers.

At a level akin to that at which the ombudsman systems would work there is also a Complaints Office attached to the Chief of Staff Personnel. The Complaints Officer is a retired naval officer and in fact his duties resemble those of the Israeli CSS. He acts as a facilitator, receiving complaints and referring them for attention to the responsible authorities and, in turn receiving reports on what has been done to correct the matters complained about. As a retired officer this Officer is fairly independent but he is not an independent entity such as those in Scandinavia, Israel or Germany who report to Parliament.

Doing much the same as the Complaints Officer are officers in Army Headquarters whose assignment is to receive inquiries regarding complaints sent to the Minister of Defence. They act as a channel to the various executive commanders who may be the subject of the complaints, requests and other correspondence emanating from soldiers or their families. Their task is to report back to the Minister that the correspondence has been dealt with satisfactorily. As in other countries complaints are largely to do with postings and inconvenience of service away from home.

For some years the Chief of the Army has been supported by a staff officer who is a Citizen Force officer to act as a liaison between serving CF and Commando members and the Army and between the Army and employers. In each regional Command there is a senior staff officer with much the same assignment. Inevitably, the citizen soldier turns to these officers as well in order to have problems he may experience with service solved. A former incumbent of the post at Army Headquarters referred to this post as being that of an ombudsman. This does not really reflect the nature of the work done by these officers and yet ultimately they do find themselves acting as arbitrators between the Army and the men who make up the Army.

It is clear that there are control systems built into the SADF and the Parliamentary system. As in every other country, however, there are brakes on the full employment of the system. One is the problem of deciding when 'national security' should bar access to information. In the United States extreme measures have been taken to overcome this problem but it requires a parliamentary structure such as the one prevailing there to make this possible. Another is that the parliamentarians are themselves ignorant as what remedies are available to them and how best to exploit what they are able to know and do. Another is simply the ignorance of military personnel as to what they should be imparting and how they should support the system of controls. These labyrinthine matters are not usually the subject of military training anywhere.

What the SADF does have, and which is on all fours with the system of objective civilian control described by Huntington, is a high degree of professionalism. In the same way as the Swiss the SADF has worked hard to produce part-time professionals as well as career professionals. What one sees as the end product is a force which obeys the political head of the SADF in spite of personal opinions as ordinary citizens. Perhaps it is a schizophrenic kind of acting for ordinary citizens. But it is what is expected of professionals if they are to stand aside from the political issues as the Swiss did in 1940-1945. It is what has taken South African soldiers through two World Wars and a long war on the Namibian border. No one could argue that the CF and the Commandos are made up of people of one political persuasion. Nor is the Permanent Force. It is necessary that the politicians see the discipline and professionalism in the SADF for what it is and for what it can contribute. This attitude of mind can be seen explicitly illustrated in the speeches made, for example, by the Chief of the Army who repeatedly tells soldiers that the Army is above politics and serves the state.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have brought together a range of the forms of control that are used in various parts of the world. It is selective and the examples were chosen simply to show what is available. It is instructive to notice that in most cases there was an historical foundation which probably has nothing to do with the uses to which the systems are put today. Fundamentally, no system is worth the paper it is printed on if there is no desire among the citizens to make it work. Sometimes drastic things have to happen to test its practicability and reality. The fact that the Americans and the systems were workable guarantees of the constitutions. The union of both was ultimately maintained.

What makes citizens want to make a system work may have a lot to do with the history of the society, with their desire for safety and to avoid instability. As Huntington says, it may have to do also with the faith the politicians have in the professionalism of their armed forces. In South Africa the propensity to have this faith has been upset by the fact that in the past the armed forces have resisted the attempts of competing political movements to take power. The objective facts then must become clouded by political resentment and suspicion. It means also that South Africa is still in the unstable state of subjective civilian control in which control simply refers to a desire to control the armed forces against another civilian political group.

When one reads papers on the defence question and listens to discussion it sound very much as though the participants opposing the status quo still see a need to subvert the military forces as a route to power. As much as with some politicians on the more conservative side, they find it difficult to distinguish ordinary political life as it has to develop here from the old days of conspiratorial subversive politics. It is to be hoped that discussions such as these today will help to bring the various political parties and movements to a better understanding of the relationship of the SADF to the public as a whole. In that way, when control is spoken of one may hope that it will relate to the objective civilian control and not simply means of turning the SADF into a party armed force as was done in Nazi Germany with the SS or in Stalin's USSR with the MVD and KGB.

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