A Handful of Armies

The Future Prospects of the Homeland Defence Forces

Greg Mills and Geoffrey Wood

Greg Mills is Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape and Research Associate in the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University in the UK. Geoffrey Wood is Lecturer in Sociology and Industrial Sociology at Rhodes University

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 5, 1992



INTRODUCTION


As befits such a divided a society as South Africa, national level negotiations will not only have to concern the restructuring of a single national army, but rather the integration and rebuilding of many. Important in any equation are the armies of South Africa's four independent homelands. Despite the fact that seconded SADF officers have played an important role in their command structures, they remain autonomous bodies with differing political allegiances. To assess the role these other armed forces might play in a new South African Defence Force (SADF) , it is necessary to critically assess their origins, changing nature and political role to date.

BOPHUTHATSWANA


In October 1976, Chief Lucas Mangope requested South Africa to train Tswanas for military service. Within nine months the SADF commenced training the Bophuthatswana National Guard in time for scheduled independence in December 1977. Initial recruiting produced disappointing results.1 This was probably owing to a certain vagueness as to service conditions and deployment. After the completion of basic training in Mafikeng, the first NCOs were appointed, eight of whom were selected as Candidate Officers and sent for training in South Africa.2 After the completion of basic training, a specialised course was offered in counter-insurgency.3 Significantly, the new National Guard was led by seconded or retired SADF officers. Mangope's first military advisor was Brigadier van der Berg, the first Officer Commanding of the National Guard. When the National Guard was reformed to a defence force in 1979, nearly two years after Bophuthatswana's "independence" from South Africa, Brigadier Riekert was appointed Minster of Defence and another ex-SADF Brigadier, Hugh Turner, appointed Commander-in-Chief. Initially comprising three units - one infantry battalion, a maintenance support unit and a logistics section - the new Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) expanded rapidly.4

Divided today into six military regions, BDF headquarters are situated at Mmabatho. A second base is at Mankwe with an operational base at Gopanu alongside the Botswana border. Organized into a conventional infantry force battalion and one airborne Special Forces Unit (SFU), the BDF is supported by a maintenance group as well as a technical services unit. An air wing was established in 1982. This was initially intended to be a helicopter force, though it was announced in 1982 that additional aircraft had been purchased for a reconnaissance role. Today, Bophuthatswana has the largest air wing of any homeland, possessing an assortment of aircraft including Alouette 111 helicopters, Helio-Couriers (a specialised STOL aircraft), two Pilatus P-68 trainers and two C-212-200 Aviocar transport aircraft. There are no dedicated fighters, the bulk of these aircraft having a dual civil/military applicability.

The Special Forces Unit was established in 1985 out of the need to transport troops quickly out of Mmabatho to some of the more outlying districts. The first paratroopers were awarded their wings by the supreme BDF commander, President Lucas Mangope, in April 1986. Some 42 out of the 63 selected for training qualified from the arduous course at the SADF's One Parachute Battalion training-school in Bloemfontein. Encouraged by this unusually high success rate, more troops underwent similar training in April 1987. It is presumed that this training arrangement has continued since that time. In 1986 a specialised National Security Unit was established to protect 'very important places and installations'. Roughly 600 strong, this unit is divided up into six groups, each with their own headquarters.

BDF soldiers wear olive-green fatigues and high-ankled synthetic leather boots. Weaponry includes South African R1 7.62mm automatic rifles, 7,62mm FN-MAG General Purpose Machine Guns, SI (Uzi) sub-machine guns, and 60 and 80 mm mortars. Vehicles include the South African Buffel Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV). Currently, the BDF has a total of 3,500 members.5

Bophuthatswana is bound by a non-aggression treaty with South Africa to prevent its territory being used as a springboard for attacks against that country. As such the homeland acted vigorously against ANC activity, repeatedly threatening to launch hot pursuit-style raids into Botswana during 1984. Despite this, Mangope never succeeded in eradicating the ANC presence in Bophuthatswana. There has also been evidence of APLA (Azanian Peoples's Liberation Army, the PAC's armed wing) activity. APLA was reputedly responsible for the 1986 assassination of Brigadier Andrew Molope, the head of the feared Bophuthatswana riot police.7

Bophuthatswana has boasted real economic development and an appearance of political stability since independence. However, widespread dissatisfaction at alleged corruption and over the favouring of South Africans for senior posts in the BDF was revealed in February 1988, when elements of the BDF staged and abortive coup. During the attempt, President Mangope, and Brigadiers Riekert and Turner were detained by the plotters at the Independence Stadium and the Molopo military base. The dissident soldiers alleged they were prompted by Chief Mangope's corruption and participation in electoral fraud. Mangope was declared deposed, and the leader of the opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP), Mr Rocky Malebane-Metsing was sworn in. However, the Bophuthatswana Minister of Foreign Affairs fled to Pretoria to elicit assistance from South Africa. Led by the Chief of the SADF, General Jannie Geldenhuys, a South African task force stormed the stadium, freed the prisoners and reinstalled Mangope as President.

In justifying this intervention, Pretoria later claimed that the Bophuthatswana coup was very different to the earlier Transkei and later Ciskei coups in that it was violent and did not have popular support.8 Yet a more likely explanation rests on the then strategic importance of the Bophuthatswana homeland, bordering on the one side on Botswana and South Africa's major urban concentration on the other. As such, the territory could have provided a springboard for ANC attacks on the PWV area. Furthermore, the BDF had always been led by South Africans (unlike, say, the TDF), whilst the leadership of the opposition PPP were soon to throw in their lot with the ANC. It was claimed that only 80-95 dissident soldiers were involved in the coup, organized by elements of the PPP and one Warrant Officer Phiri.9

It is unclear whether any SFU soldiers were involved in the attempt. What is clear is that Mangope had to rely on the South Africans for his reinstatement. The Bophuthatswana Minister of Defence, Brigadier Riekert, was forced to resign on the grounds of his alleged indecisiveness during the coup. Yet even today, the BDF is dominated by South Africans and a SADF contingent remains in the homeland. The BDF also still remains heavily involved in suppressing internal dissent. Indeed, it has even established a military camp in the middle of four Impala Platinum Mines near Rustenburg, in an effort to combat "unrest" and counter National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) activity.10 The BDF mounts regular patrols in the vicinity of these mines.11

For these reasons, it is difficult to view the BDF as an independent unit, and for purposes of integration is best seen as part of the SADF. For both leadership and training, the BDF relies heavily on SADF assistance. There is one important caveat. Bophuthatswana has yet to sign CODESA's declaration of intent, and Mangope, perhaps assisted by elements in the SADF, may hope to delay the reincorporation process. So far, he has ruled out any participation in an interim government.12 In view of Bophuthatswana's dependence on South Africa, however, such an attempt is bound to prove short-lived, but could conceivably affect the terms under which it is reincorporated.

CISKEI


At independence in 1981, the Ciskeian services were grouped under the umbrella Ciskei Combined Forces. This consisted of the Ciskei Security Services (CSS) (an embryonic infantry unit), a Special Airborne Group, the Ciskei Police Force, the Prisons Service, the Traffic Police and the feared Central Intelligence Services. The Director-General of the Combined Forces, Major General Charles Sebe, a former South African security policeman, was the brother of the first President of the Ciskei, Lennox Sebe.

In 1982 a conventional Ministry of Defence was established to take control of the CSS, renamed the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF).13 Emphasis was soon placed on the creation of an air wing. On his return from a visit to Israel, President Lennox Sebe announced that Israel would supply the Ciskei with weapons, pilot training and other military aid.14 Following this development, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Rev. Ntshinga, announced that 20 Ciskeians had left for pilot training in Israel.15 Both these claims were denied by Israel, who described them as 'boasting and exaggeration'.16 It later transpired that training was being conducted by an Israeli company, the pupil pilots presumably traveling on South African passports. The short history of Ciskei's independence is littered with similar scandals and scams.

The same Israeli concern also attempted to supply Ciskei with Mooney 201 aircraft. Whilst the first batch was impounded by US Customs officials, the second batch arrived safely in 1984. The Mooney 201 is a light sporting/recreational aircraft. President Sebe had reputedly been persuaded to establish an airforce after seeing pictures of similar aircraft in camouflage. Sebe claimed that the aircraft could not only be used for defence, but also fire fighting and crop spraying, tasks for which the Mooney 201 is manifestly unsuited.17 The air section has subsequently been expanded from the original six Mooneys to include two De Havilland Islanders (a civilian commuter aircraft), two Short Skyvans and a single MBB BO-105 helicopter (similar to that used by the South African Police air wing).

Even less successful were attempts to establish a Ciskeian arms industry. The CISKOR arms manufacturing company was established at Dimbaza in 1983. However, it transpired that this concern was used as a conduct by a consortium of South African businessmen to flood the South African market with cheap imported weapons. CISKOR soon ceased operation. This attempt to develop a domestic arms industry having failed, the Ciskeian infantry are armed with South African-made R series assault rifles, FN-MAG 7.62 mm GPMGs, Uzi sub-machine guns, and 60 and 80mm mortars.

Less conspicuous, but of greater importance was the gradual expansion of the Ciskei infantry at this time. The CDF is today divided into three major components: the Ciskei Security Force (two infantry battalions); the Special Forces Unit known as Ikhele we Sizwe (Sword of the Nation, not to be confused with the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe, or Spear of the Nation); and a paramilitary youth organization known as Pillar of the Nation. The CDF operates from its headquarters, three major bases and a special warfare training centre. It is presumed that specialised troop training occurs at SADF bases, whilst it is known that Ciskeian troops were seconded to the former SADF operational area of Northern Namibia. Numbering some 1,800 men in 1990, the armed forces have expanded significantly since then.18 There is also a police anti-terrorist squad, notorious for its extra-legal actions against government opponents during the Sebe years.

Ikhele we Sizwe was established in 1982, apparently with assistance from former members of the Rhodesian security forces. Nominally under CDF control and dependent on it for administrative and logistical support, operational command is rested directly with the President as Head of State. At first the unit reportedly only consisted of 50 recruits who were given advanced and para training. The unit still contains a small para-trained force. The air unit was incorporated under the wing of this force. The first commander was a former Rhodesian Selous Scout operative, although periodic contact was made and reputedly continues with Israeli security experts.

President Sebe's relationship with his close advisors was shaky from the time of independence. In 1983, his former (South African) security advisor, Major-General Minnaar, was detained and subsequently expelled for plotting to assassinate the President. Minnaar later moved to the Transkei and allegedly played a role in planning the Transkeian raid on the Ciskei.

The President also quarreled with his brothers Charles and Namba Sebe. Charles Sebe and some of his adherents were imprisoned and his security empire split up. The police force was put under the control of the Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence services - long considered General Sebe's personal militia - was disbanded. Subsequent legislation made provision for the establishment of a more clearly-defined Permanent Force, Citizen Force and Reserves. Thus it seems that Charles Sebe's fall paved the way for the Ciskei army to assume a more coherent role. Charles Sebe was later freed when a group of heavily armed white men stormed the Middledrift Prison in September 1986. The same group kidnapped Lennox's son, Major General Kwane Sebe. Charles Sebe later resurfaced in the Transkei where he appeared to enjoy substantial support in government circles (in particular through the backing of the influential Colonel Craig Duli).

On the 4 March 1990, Lennox Sebe was deposed by his Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Sebe appealed for help from South Africa, but his pleas were ignored. Speaking at Mdantsane Stadium, and flanked by Communist Party and ANC banners, the Brigadier claimed that his ultimate goal was reincorporation. He announced that all detainees would be freed and alluded to the vast corruption of the Sebe regime. For two days, the Ciskeian capital, Bisho, was the scene of widespread looting. This was brought to a halt only with SADF intervention at the Brigadier's behest. It is perhaps significant that the First Ciskei Battalion proved incapable of halting the unrest. Since this time, there have been periodic rumours of further coup attempts, some allegedly plotted by the liberation movements. One such coup attempt, led by Charles Sebe in 1991, cost him his life.

After a promising start, the Brigadier's relations with the ANC soon deteriorated. His rule has been followed by a new wave of repression and the chieftanship system has been reintroduced. The ANC has continued to mobilise opposition against Gqozo despite the signing of a peace agreement. The ANC claims that all protest action is strictly legal, and their latest campaign revolving around the Youth League to press for the Brigadiers immediate removal.19 At the same time, South Africa has assumed responsibility for many of the everyday tasks of government. Gqozo has ensured the loyalty of the rank-and-file of his army by purging the middle ranks of the officer corps and cutting back on former or seconded SADF personnel. The CDF is today largely orientated towards maintaining the Ciskeian status quo and little attention seems to be devoted towards conventional military training.

The size, disciplinary history and association with the SADF clouds the future of the CDF. For these reasons, the Ciskei services cannot hope to have the same impact as the Transkei Defence Force in the restructuring and merging of all South Africa's armies.

TRANSKEI


The oldest of the independent homelands, Transkei gained independence on 26 October 1976. Prior to this time, the core of what was to become the First Transkei Battalion had been trained by the Cape Corps Service Battalion at Elsies River near Cape Town. As part of the trappings of "freedom", South Africa handed over the 254 trained soldiers, including 49 Ceremonial Cavalry.20 At this time, the head of the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) was a seconded South African officer, Brigadier Pretorius. The severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1978 resulted in the withdrawal of all seconded South African military personnel and their replacement with ex-Rhodesians, led by Lt.-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly.

Installed as the new Chief of the TDF, Reid-Daly embarked on a programme of rapid expansion, introducing a parachute course and playing a key role in the formation of a Special Forces Regiment. The Ceremonial Cavalry was upgraded to a fully fledged mounted unit. And the expulsion of the ex-Rhodesians did not halt the policy of expansionism. Under the current ruler, General Bantubonke Holomisa, the TDF has stepped up recruitment to 500 troops a year, despite pressure from its chief benefactor, South Africa, to rationalise.21

Although the Transkei is predominantly Xhosa, recruiting is done without consideration to ethnic or tribal origin.22 The entrance requirements are now higher than those of the SADF. Officer training has now been intensified, selected members being sent to India in terms of a recent training agreement. Some 500 soldiers are training at the University of Transkei.

Presently some 3,500 men strong,23 the TDF possess a small air wing. A second infantry battalion is in the pipeline and will boost the force level. Equipment is largely ex-Armscor, with supplies of both weapons and technical help from South Africa continuing despite political differences.24

As is the case with the other independent homelands, the Transkei has suffered from political instability and the involvement of the military in politics. The employment of the ex-Rhodesians alienated many senior TDF officers, this being exacerbated by later Rhodesian-led raids on the Ciskei. Endemic corruption was cited by the military in justifying the two (both successful) coups that took place in 1987. In the first coup, President George Matanzima was toppled, and replaced by Stella Sigcau. After twelve weeks in office she was thrown out by a Military Council led by General Holomisa. The General had taken over as head of the TDF in the restructuring that followed the expulsion of the ex-Rhodesians earlier that year.

Holomisa quickly developed a good working relationship with both the PAC and ANC, and accepted the principle of wholesale reincorporation into South Africa. A failed attempt to unseat him in November 1990, led by a conservative faction under Colonel Craig Duli, has left the General firmly in control. Yet despite good relations with the liberation movements, Holomisa continues to employ terms such as "the Transkei nation", persists in referring to the Transkei as a foreign country, and has indicated that he would not accept unconditional reincorporation.25 There is little doubt that Holomisa sees the TDF as playing an important role in any future military restructuring.

The TDF has retained its separate identity, despite periodic erroneous rumours of integration with Umkhonto we Sizwe. Similarly, APLA members are not being trained within the TDF, although there is a significant APLA contingent in the Transkei. Nonetheless, the TDF has cordial, albeit informal, ties with both liberation armies.26 Yet a number of factors mitigate against the possibility of the TDF playing a central role in the new South African armed forces, either as a praetorian unit or in forming the corps component of a reconstituted officer corps. For one there are a host of other contenders to such a role, including the main liberation armies.27 Such units would be far more politically trustworthy and somewhat less experienced in toppling governments.28 It could instead be argued that the TDF would be better suited to a regional role.

VENDA


In October 1978, Venda Chief Minister Patrick Mphephu announced that a Venda national army would be trained to "fight terrorism" after independence, scheduled for 1979.29 Given its location near South Africa's northern border, SADF planners saw the homeland as having great strategic importance. Indeed, immediately prior to independence, the strip bordering on the Limpopo River was excised from that homeland and a new SA Air Force base built in the area. Independence saw the formal creation of the Venda National Force (VNF), combining the army, police, traffic police and prisons services. This was a role not unlike that performed by the original Ciskei Combined Forces.

The VNF was commanded by a former South African security policeman, Lt.-Colonel T.R. Mulaudzi. Indeed, Kenneth Grundy asserts that the Force was 'simply a surrogate force representing South Africa'.30 By 1980, the civil functions of the VNF were separated from the purely defence functions of what would become the Venda Defence Force (VDF).31 During that year, a COIN unit was established and it was announced that Venda soldiers had served on border duty in Namibia.32 By 1980 the embryonic VDF was some 450 strong.33 As was the case with other homeland armies, the core of the new VDF was a single infantry battalion. The first Chief of the VDF was a seconded SADF Brigadier, P.G. Steenkamp. Today, the VDF has two battalions, namely the Manenu and Vuwani, a small air wing stationed at P.R. Mphephu Airport and logistic/support services.34 There remains a significant SADF presence, with 39 seconded South Africans occupying a range of positions.35 During 1985, the Venda National Force was formally disbanded, the policing functions being taken over by the new Venda Police Force.36

Like Ciskei, Transkei and Bophuthatswana, Venda has not been immune from political turmoil. On the 5 April 1990, Lt.-Colonel Gabriel Ramushwana, the Second-in-Command of the VDF, seized control. Brigadier Steenkamp was expelled from the homeland. Ramushwana invited all political organizations to hold talks, but with the proviso that they would not be allowed to hold demonstrations or forcibly propagate their ideas.37 This "impartiality" was not universally appreciated. Under threat from ANC supporters, Ramushwana had to abandon an attempt to address 15,000 people at the Venda Independence Stadium.38 There is an uneasy relationship between the Venda authorities and the liberation movements. Like the Ciskei Defence Force, the Venda army remains a small unit beset with disciplinary problems and characterised by highly ambiguous political allegiances.

COMMON GROUND AND FUTURE PROSPECTS


The four homeland armies have common ground in a number of areas. First, created as part of the trappings of independence, the core of all four consists of infantry battalions, trained according to the SADF model. All have a record of disciplinary problems. Although Bophuthatswana has a small, but significant air force and the Transkei a mounted unit, the armies remain infantry- orientated.

Second, all are highly politicised and have succumbed to military coups, albeit in the case of Bophuthatswana only briefly. As is generally the case with much of Africa, military governments in the homelands have faced persistent problems of legitimacy and lack a clear ideological direction.39 The important exception to this rule is the Transkei, where Holomisa's good working relationship with the ANC and PAC has given a far greater coherence to the activities of the ruling Transkei Military Council.40

Third, although it has been argued that the leadership of African armies is not generally materially different from that of civilian government, this does seem to be totally the case of the homeland armies.41 The traditional leadership element generally seems less well represented in the homeland militaries than in civilian administrations. Finally, in all the homeland armies, rapid promotion of inexperienced officers has taken place, creating certain expectations at lower ranks which cannot always be fulfilled.42

Yet these armies do also differ in a number of important respects. Venda and Bophuthatswana are geographically located close to the PWV industrial heart and the SADF's operational focus. The BDF has always been led by South Africans, and should not be seen as fully distinct from wider SADF structures. The role of the SADF in crushing the Bophuthatswana coup illustrates this point. Similarly, the VDF was originally dominated by former members of the South African security forces.

Despite periodic moves by Ramushwana and Gqozo to cement new alliances, Venda and Ciskei have placed themselves on the periphery of South African politics. Their respective armies are both very small and, as noted earlier, will probably have limited impact on any military restructuring. Currently, their principal role seems to be that of suppressing internal dissent. Even the PAC's tiny APLA will probably have a greater impact in the military integration process on account of the ultimate need to bring all parties into a final settlement.43 Plagued by disciplinary problems and the lack of any military tradition, the VDF and CDF will have to undergo substantial military retraining and, in the short term at least, cannot be entrusted with any strategic or ideologically sensitive role.

As noted earlier, the TDF's future might rest in that of a regionally-base paramilitary force. This would accord the TDF a distinct and special role as the reward for speedy reincorporation, yet aid in its depoliticization and reduce its potential for acting in a praetorian fashion. However, rigidly enforced structures of accountability and control would have to be established to preclude such a force being seen as simply 'the armed wing of Xhosa nationalism'.44 Alternatively, the relatively well-trained officer corps of the TDF could provide a major input of middle and senior rank leadership into a 'new' SADF. Importantly, this group would fit in more easily into existing SADF structures than, say, members of MK, APLA or AZANLA. Yet at the same time, the TDF is viewed as sympathetic to the ambitions and sensitivities of the liberation movements.

The BDF is probably the least distinct from the SADF of all the homeland armies, being heavily reliant on the latter for both training and leadership. Yet, it cannot be treated as a truly integral part of the SADF given the reluctance of its government towards negotiations. Yet the 1988 coup attempt raises questions about its military capabilities.

In the Ciskei, the CDF proved likewise incapable of halting the orgy of looting that followed Sebe's fall from power. This would appear to indicate that command structures within the homeland armies need to be critically reappraised as part of the broader restructuring.

The reintegration of all the armed forces, and indeed of the homelands themselves, remains one of the most pressing and sensitive items on CODESA's agenda. In this the homeland armies should feature prominently. All are probably larger than at least the PAC's and AZAPO's armies. In this respect, the Venda and Ciskei armies will probably have the least impact given their size and utility.

The independent political stance assumed by the Bophuthatswana government may ensure the BDF elevated status in the restructuring process. Like the TDF this could take the form of a regional role, as part of some Bophuthatswana regional administrative structures that may be retained as the reward for peaceful reincorporation. Should the BDF actively attempt to sabotage the reincorporation process, it could ultimately face disbandment or disappearance into other military units. As the oldest, largest, most distinct and efficient of the homeland armies, the TDF will conceivably have the most impact in this process. This is both on account of the position adopted by the Transkei government and its capabilities when compared to other homeland and liberation armies.

Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand once remarked that war was much too serious a business to be left to military men, and it is indeed the politicians that will define the parameters of future military reconstruction. Ultimately, it is the final form of the political settlement that will determine the future role of the homeland armies. The four "other armies" are all heavily politicised, either in supporting past orders or in helping to usher in new. Clearly, all the homelands are facing reincorporation. The issue remains when, how and where will they end up. Given their differences in terms of size, structure, status and capability, the TDF, and possibly the BDF, may play a significant role in the process of military restructuring. The armies of Ciskei and Venda will probably not. Whatever their ultimate role and status in the future, the process whereby the handful of armies are reintegrated will be one of the key issues in the restructuring of the South African armed forces.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

  1. Grundy, K., 1983: Soldiers without Politics (UCLA, Los Angeles), p.239.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Rand Daily Mail, 10 July 1980.
  4. Grundy, op cit., p.240.
  5. Cilliers, J. Quo Vadis TBVC? - The Security and Military Dimension. Paper delivered at a conference on the future of the TBVC states, Nuanedi Conference Centre, Venda, 30 October-1 November 1991.
  6. Laurence, P. Bophuthatswana, Indicator South Africa 12, 3 (1985): p.61.
  7. Van Staden, G. The Return of the Prodigal Son, SAIIA International Affairs Bulletin 12, 3 (1988): p.61.
  8. South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR), Race Relations Survey 1989-90, Johannesburg, p.41.
  9. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1987-88, Johannesburg, p.92.
  10. Weekly Mail, 8-14 May 1992.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Daily Dispatch, 18 May 1992.
  13. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1983-84, Johannesburg, p.333.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Ibid.
  17. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1984-85, Johannesburg, p.517.
  18. Cilliers, op cit.
  19. Interview, GRACA committee member, Grahamstown, April 1992.
  20. Wood, G. and Mills, G. The First of South Africa's Other Armies. Paper delivered at a conference on the Reintegration of the Transkei, Rhodes University, East London, November 1991.
  21. Interview with the Commander of the TDF, Brigadier T.T. Matanzima, Umtata, April 1992.
  22. Ibid.
  23. The exact size of the TDF is uncertain as no central records are kept. Cilliers notes that in 1990 the force level was at 2,800. See Cilliers, op cit. Since then it has grown to approximately 3,500.
  24. Interview with Brigadier T.T. Matanzima, Umtata, April 1992.
  25. Wood and Mills, op cit.
  26. While the PAC argues that the homeland armies are simply extensions of the "army of occupation", it acknowledges that the TDF has played a constructive role and should continue to "throw in its lot with the forces of liberation". See The Role of the Armed Forces during the Period of Transition. Paper delivered by an APLA member at a symposium on the reintegration of the TDF, Tracor Centre, Umtata, 11 April 1992.
  27. Wood and Mills, op cit.
  28. Ibid.
  29. Grundy, op cit, p.240.
  30. Ibid.
  31. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1981-82, Johannesburg, p.297.
  32. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1980-81, Johannesburg, p.212.
  33. Ibid.
  34. Cilliers, op cit.
  35. Ibid.
  36. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1985-86, Johannesburg, p.266.
  37. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1989-90, Johannesburg, p.538.
  38. Ibid.
  39. Gutteridge, W., 1975: Military Regimes in Africa (Milleners, Bungay), p.175.
  40. Wood and Mills, op cit.
  41. Gutteridge, op cit, p.8.
  42. This phenomena appears common in Africa. See Armed Forces in Africa in Baynham, S.J. (ed.), 1986: Military Power and Politics in Black Africa (Croom Helm, London), p.5.
  43. APLA probably has a few unevenly-trained cadres only. By 1986 some 150 members had been trained by the organisation's then principal backer, Libya. During 1987, just 16 per cent of the insurgents known to the South African security forces were APLA members. See Van Staden, op cit. p.42 and p.44.
  44. Wood and Mills, op cit.