INTRODUCTION

"Development is a paradigm of crisis" argues Nef; yet, it has also become a paradigm in crisis, since the 1990s.1 Issues have appeared on the global development agenda, that point to the need for the inclusion of certain new priorities for the 21st Century. National and human security are such issues. As Reed explains, experience has shown that, unless security materialises, not only will local populations be reluctant to invest themselves in the development of land and industry, but foreign investment – in the context of an increasingly competitive economic environment – will also be scarce.2

The dominant approaches to the study of developing countries posit that their basic problem is (under)development.3 Following the overt security paranoia of the Cold War era, an understanding of global politics is at present invariably characterised by the hegemony of econometrics-centred paradigms. Accordingly, terms such as globalisation, frenetic monetary exchanges, international capital expansion, are often seen side by side with those linked to gross national product and per capita income.4 The result is a tendency to amalgamate socio-economic trends and their repercussions for prospects for human development at the local level with concerns of global economic growth and international financial exchanges. This mode of conceptualisation can be justified by current structural constraints. However, caution should be exercised in revering it as gospel. The origins of this prominence should rather be considered, as well as the manner in which the issue of global economic development is increasingly marked by a strict neoliberal dialectic and prescriptions.

Paradoxically, economic stability is increasingly compromised. The impoverishment of large sections of the world's population indicates a severe dysfunction of the global socio-economic systems. Increasing levels of unemployment, decreasing real income, stubborn poverty, and the appearance of cracks in the mechanisms of socio-economic protection (whether traditional or bureaucratic) all point to the incapacity of the global, national, and local economic orders to maintain and sustain minimum living standards for all, in spite of talks of modernisation and global progress.5

Alongside the hegemony of the economy as a system of reference, a new trend of rising human and national insecurity has emerged. Major security threats, though basically sub-systemic, are today much broader, unpredictable and fragmented. This emergence is symptomatic of the considerable loss of power yielded by the authority of 'law and order', in the context of decaying state capacity and legitimacy.

The frailty of internal and external stability, and the decline in human security should be closely linked with the lack of economic security. Indeed, the correlation between the incidence of social violence, human insecurity and the loss of popular legitimacy enjoyed by any given state, and the existence of feeble socio-economic conditions, is remarkably high. In a world where access to the mass media, the transfer of technologies, and the politicisation of the masses are rife, the tensions between human safety, national security and stability, and micro- as well as macro-economic conditions are likely to be of an explosive nature.6

The rise of insecurity is a threat to the processes of human and economic development. The potential for domestic growth cannot flourish in an environment marked by violence and a sense of political and social uncertainty. Violence prevents individuals and communities from performing the tasks that are crucial to the economy – such as education and welfare – because manpower and financial resources are monopolised by efforts to counter insecurity. Individual participation can also be thwarted by violence, in such a way that the performance of production tasks is decelerated, or comes to a standstill. Farmers are prevented from engaging in the extraction of agricultural capital. Management and employees, resenting the threats to their personal safety, are reluctant to utilise all their efforts in a manner that would guarantee the prospects for improved economic and socio-political conditions in the foreseeable future. Strategic planning at the managerial level is disrupted. Local investors, fearing a worsening of conditions, divest or relocate planned investment. Foreign direct investment opportunities are redirected to safer (more stable) regions.

All aspects of economic participation are compromised by insecurity, its physical repercussions, as well as accompanying conditions of psychological stress. Thus, if development paradigms are to respond to the requirements of new economic conditions and constraints, issues surrounding human safety and national security will have to be reconciled with the wider development agenda.

CHANGES IN THE SECURITY PARADIGM

The security discourse has changed remarkably since the beginning of the decade: as some relish the prospect of a world freed from the ghost of the nuclear holocaust, others admit to a global decline in human security globally.7 Refined security paradigms have generally broadened the spectrum of analysis of academics and policy-makers alike, and the concept of 'non-military threats to security' has become widely recognised.8 Food, gender, and the environment are now part of the security agenda. However, global events point to the need for a deepening of the concept of national security. Indeed, because of the globalisation of economic relations, the disappearance of borders, and the rapid deterioration of the state system, new threats to international security have arisen.

It is not coincidental that most of the conflicts in the world today are staged in domestic situations. Intra-state rather than interstate conflicts are increasingly part of national and international security agendas throughout the world.9 Ethnic nationalism and religious extremism have been responsible for over 75 per cent of the conflicts world-wide since the beginning of the 1990s.10 Ethnicity and religion have taken on new meanings as the bearers of political and economic vindication, with Bosnia, Kashmir, Rwanda and Burundi being openly linked to declining state capacity and ability: Quebec, Corsica, and East Timor are mostly perceived in the context of the minority rights political paradigm. In the 'Jihad versus Mac World', individuals and communities have become permeable to ideologies which allows them to hold onto what they perceive as a secure and familiar sense of identity.11 If unchecked, such aspirations can degenerate into insurgency and high intensity conflict.12

Another aspect of social dysfunction globally is the rapid spread of neo-fascism and xenophobia, which threaten the foundations of the liberal model of government: political tolerance.13 Reacting to economic pressures – unemployment, inflation, globalisation, and the deterioration of social conditions – support for right-wing movements is increasing. Extreme right-wing movements, such as the respective National Front movements in Britain and France, are being emulated in other parts of the world, such as Australia, Zambia, or Sweden. States yield to these threats by promoting greater control over human movement through their borders, and by passing legislation that condone xenophobic sentiments in the populations, as seen in the various 'aliens' acts' around the world. The trends are reminiscent of Europe in the 1930s, a period that was marked by both economic uncertainty, and a strong malaise in the political arena, when liberal democracy, and idealist perspectives were unable to contain popular dissatisfaction.

The decreasing popularity of modern statism is likewise seen in the activities of insurgent political groups that, regardless of their size or popular support, resort to terrorism. Aimed at weakening the power and rule of particular states, terrorist activities have repercussions that harm the social and political fabrics of the nation-states in which they operate. By targeting states, terrorists perpetuate violence against society at large, thus contributing to the general sentiment of insecurity. The recent anti-terrorist summit held in Paris shows that states are concerned with the gravity of the situation, and that they view international co-operation as a crucial weapon in the fight against terrorist activities. Linked to social insurgency and religious extremism, terrorism is even more threatening to the state apparatus, that is seemingly unable to confront it/them.14

The weakening of the state and its sovereignty has meant greater mobility and opportunities for international organised crime. Indeed, operating on a scale closely related to that of multi-nationals, international crime syndicates have expanded into areas previously untouched (Southern Africa and Eastern Europe, for example). Gaining greater mobility and visibility, international crime organisations are undercutting the fabric of national sovereignty.15 Linked to drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, and global proxenetism, these organisations are slashing the foothold of state authority world-wide. By fuelling gangsterism and promoting criminal organisations at the local level, they also foment vigilantism, and the proliferation of arms in all regions of the world, thus raising the potential for low, or even high intensity conflict.16 If crime can be directly linked to poor economic conditions, the violent nature of crime today further points to the degeneration of the social fabric. In a reversed Hobbesian model, the authority of the state is rejected as man seeks to protect himself and his community by turning to alternative sources of authority, and even defies authority by engaging in criminal activities.

Moreover, it is now argued that, since the end of the Cold War, the state as an entity of global and domestic power, and the exclusive notion of sovereignty are losing both their practical reality and their theoretical relevance.17 The fragmentation of states, either peacefully or through bloodshed, is typical of the fragility of the balance on which the concept of the nation-state has rested since the Second World War. The world of the global village is founded on the principles of international co-operation and collaboration, but also intrusion, subjugation and conflict. Today, "it is not only the domestic jurisdiction of states that is being compromised but their economic, social and cultural well-being is also being put in jeopardy..."18 International borders are the subject of much controversy. Some view them as redundant and obsolete, especially with respect to the manner in which they can hamper the movement of both capital and human resources. Others, caught in the freeze-frame of the nationalist and protectionist political economy, wish for them to be strengthened. Others still, are questioning their legitimacy with regard to the historical and geographical context in which they were erected. These trends, whether justified or not, are symptomatic of the widespread malaise of the state system.

The response to security issues remains notably unsettled, and the failure of international and national bodies to resolve the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina, Rwanda, Burundi or the Middle East, together with the inability of national states to curb increases in crime, are symptomatic of the need to review security principles at the global level.19 Furthermore, the failure of governments to end the growth in insecurity has generally undermined the legitimacy of state institutions and powers alike. By losing the loyalty of their respective constituencies, states are now facing the enhanced threat of fragmentation, social insurgency and reactionary movements, and a loss in their ability to steer the path of national and international policy-making, or to foster development.20

The state system's sword of Damocles, in the form of ethnic nationalism, terrorism, neo-fascism, international organised crime, and a rise in local violent crime, can be linked to a decrease in the sovereignty and the authority of the state. Arguably, these forecast negatively on governments' potential to reverse the situation, and protect populations that feel increasingly alienated. Paradoxically, the most influential development paradigms have not yet recognised this potentially explosive situation, and remain staunchly attached to the principles of liberalisation, and political and economic laissez-faire. At a time when "everything that happens in the world visibly forms circular reactions, and active circumbiance of consequences",21 this attitude could be devastating, by having a direct impact on international peace, but also by threatening prospects for economic, as well as social development.

Because the assumptions on which development paradigms have rested since the 1950s no longer hold,22 the priorities of the development agenda to include insecurity concerns as prominent threats to development needs redefinition.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO A DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The neoliberal paradigm seeks to promote development through modernisation and the restructuring of developing countries' economies. This approach has gained leverage in the past twenty years, although some argue that this is more because of the dramatic loss of credibility of other paradigms, than its effective promotion of development.23 Within this context, the World Bank and its sister agency the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have redefined the concept of development along the following lines: "sound macro-economic policies; structural policies that promote the efficient use of resources and a responsive supply side; an open trade and exchange regime; active and effective social policies; and good governance."24 These institutions stated aim is to assist developing countries by providing them with funds. Although this process can be the catalyst for development and allows for the poorest states to remain at the subsistence level and finance some of their expenditures, it has several shortcomings. Firstly, it ensures that the majority of the funds are spent in a way that benefits the donor countries or agencies.25 It is mostly undertaken in the form of loans instead of outright grants, thus aggravating the problem of the external debt (when some countries spend up to 70 per cent of their GNP on debt servicing).26 Most importantly, it is accompanied by very specific, and uniform types of structural conditionalities.

These prescriptions include the reduction of state involvement in the economy in order to rectify inadequacies which are perceived as hampering the development process.27 Among these are the reduction of state subsidies in order to promote incentives for certain sectors of the economy, especially agriculture. In the long term, these have sometimes led to increased production. Yet, the more immediate effects have often been linked to intensified human suffering and political upheaval. Removing state subsidies on basic products, such as bread, petrol, or rice, has created situations where the population, unable to face inflation on staple products, has taken to the streets in protest, sometimes looting shops, and targeting state buildings as the symbol of their suffering (Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Pakistan, and Russia). Another pillar of liberalism has sought to reduce budget deficit. Again, it is widely acknowledged that the state in the developing world is over-inflated, often counter-productive and corrupt. However, decreasing the revenue available to the state in order to achieve greater savings and efficiency can also reduce the scope and quality of the services it has to provide. These include health-care, education, and especially policing and defence. Evidently, the resulting impact, seems at odds with the requirements of a global order where economic, human and national insecurity are on the increase.

Finally, the new orthodoxy of the World Bank and the IMF with regards to foreign assistance equates sound economic governance with political restructuring. As Leftwich explains, the concept of 'good governance' has come to encompass two factors, that of economic efficiency along liberal lines, as well as, "an insistence on competitive democratic politics..."28 This has resulted in governments in the South rethinking their positions, and has led, in part, to the process of democratisation that has swept through the world since the beginning of the decade. Greater accountability can foster cautious and sound redistribution in the southern states,29 but it could also put pressure onto the governments to deliver and fulfil expectations that are often unrealistic.

Traditional paradigms can and do threaten stability by decreasing the levels of economic security, and by limiting the capacity of the state to provide a stable environment for human and economic development. The irony is that major donors often only consider the issue of security in conventional terms and ideology. If the World Bank showed some interest in military demobilisation (as in Mozambique and Angola),30 this token gesture was 'too little too late', for it is evident today that one cannot afford to dissociate both security and economic concerns if one is to ensure prospects for development.

ALTERNATIVES: THE EXAMPLES OF FRANCE, THE UNDP, AND SWEDEN

In contrast with the rigidity of the principal neoliberal agencies, alternatives have been developed that take the various facets of development into account. This approach recognises the importance of safety and security, and the necessity of building state capacity and ability to promote peace and development. These alternatives have generally adopted attitudes that are spared from the overwhelming hegemony of the econometrics paradigm and concentrate on more realistic and people-centred approaches.

French 'Co-Operation'

Although basically reliant on neoliberal principles, the French approach to development asserts the need for capacity-building and a moderation of the extreme approach of the IMF and the World Bank. Africa's relationship with France, owing to the continuation of strong economic ties after the accession of Francophone African colonies to independence, can be equated to that between a backyard and the warden of the main house, where maintenance is all-prevailing. Even though the European Union has taken the baton in formulating development relations and programmes for the Third World, France is still the holder of much of the economic and political clout of western involvement in Africa. Although tinted with neoliberal colours, the perspective of the French Government on development in Africa has been undeniably more pragmatic and realist than that of the IMF and the World Bank.

France has adjusted the mainframe of neoliberal paradigms to suit what it sees as practical realities and necessities to be remedied in Africa. One of the most notable elements of French assistance is its concern for institutional as well as economic capacity-building. Indeed, as a supporter of democratisation in Africa, France recognises that democratisation and development, in the context of structural adjustment processes, can be seriously threatened. Because its own involvement in Africa bears both the responsibility to ensure continuing trade relations, and to prevent the deterioration of both political and economic conditions which has led to mass migration from Africa, France has to operate in a manner that balances its own macro-economic and political interests in the region with its concern for effective economic and human development.31 Thus, if its support for Bretton Woods is part and parcel of French 'co-operation', it is also marked by policy designs which show an understanding of the tensions linked to the management of both economics and security at all levels of society in African states.

Practically, African states have been encouraged to 'modernise' their economies, to forego import barriers, to restructure fiscal systems, to redirect and prioritise spending, to adjust their currencies (as in the 1994 CFA devaluation), to create an economic environment that favours private investment, and to permit the formation of an accountable and transparent state.32 These aspects of economic policy remain well within the paradigms of Bretton Woods. However, remarkable emphasis has been placed on the necessity to remedy the accumulation of institutional backlogs which prevent the facilitation of development. Accordingly, the legal aspects of trade and investment are an important focus, but priority is given to the institution of a strong and independent judiciary, and the promotion of a culture of accountable government.33 High on the agenda of French development is the concern for political stability, and human security, because "the respect of citizens' fundamental rights requires a concern for their security .... [and] there can be no fundamental economic changes if individuals are constantly fearing for their lives."34

Security is therefore crucial to the French perspective on development. To this end, security capacity-building has received considerable attention. In practically terms, the reinforcement of security mechanisms has been favoured. However, this has not meant that militarisation has been the order of the day. Rather, several campaigns of policing assistance have materialised, such as the technological and financial aid to enhance the French-based system of the gendarmerie, and other peacekeeping mechanisms since 1990. Another divergence from the rigid neoliberal paradigm is the open support pledged to regionalism, and the search for regional self-reliance. Such a venture, accordingly, would encompass economic, socio-political, but also strategic and security matters.

THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Since the mid-1980s, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has initiated a radical paradigm shift within its own development agenda. The realisation that "all really basic and fundamental changes have been people led, bottom-up movement,"35 is a welcome shift from the top-down, authoritative approach of the World Bank and the IMF. Although the UNDP recognises the importance of national economies, priority is awarded to human development, in order to improve the conditions of life of people around the world. Recognition is given to the fact that development does not occur in political, social and environmental vacuums. Popular empowerment also ranks high on the development agenda of the United Nations. Yet, the most progressive aspect of the UNDP is the advocacy that "sustainable human development is not a straitjacket; it does not mean conditionality."36 Like the British-based relief agency OXFAM, the UNDP supports the initiative to reduce the debt of countries of sub-Saharan Africa whose economies are now drained by debt servicing and repayments to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).37

Remedies for underemployment, unemployment and the marginalisation of the poorest societies of the world are seen as priorities. Acknowledging the failure of global economic integration of the least developed states into the capitalist economy, the UNDP advocates the construction of local programmes for human development. Its argument is based on the principle that weak and maladapted state institutions cannot foster the growth of the local economy. Yet, in opposition to the prescription of the World Bank and the IMF whose views on the state stress the need for reduction and disengagement, the UNDP views the role of the state as central to development and asserts that the state and its institutions have to be strengthened. Capacity-building of the various branches of the state, and of civil society organisations is thus one of the core principles of development in the region.38 What is apparent in this approach is the will to incorporate both the political and economic aspects of development. Yet, the UNDP does not seem to seek or demand democracy per se, but rather regards civil participation in the running of the state as quintessential. Non-government organisations, civic associations and civilian movements are thus seen as complementary to the state and its role in the economy. In the context of the global weakening states, and in the light of the historical role of the state in fostering economic growth, the potential for such an approach is remarkable.

The focus on human development rather than on economic growth posits that development is an instrument for the improvement of individual living conditions. Grassroots projects are thus favoured, and funds are distributed at all levels of society to ensure accountability, prioritisation of assistance, and the strengthening of civil society.39 Paradoxically, "by concentrating their assistance on public agencies and adopting top-down approaches, [neoliberal agencies] have contributed to the dominance of the state, thereby weakening civil society and expanding the opportunity for exploitation."40

UNDP projects view development as all-encompassing. Education, health, gender issues and the environment are therefore also incorporated into the greater economic agenda. In the light of decreasing standards of living and declining access to basic services, this may help to shoulder the burden of the state and improve the quality of life of the poorest societies. Furthermore, it could also strengthen popular acceptance of the state system and support civil society.

Finally, the UNDP recognises that development has failed to achieve and safeguard human security in several countries. Considering issues such as political instability, the erosion of basic human safety and security through terrorism, crime, violence, and intra-state high intensity conflict, the agency advocates the recognition of the global crisis of human insecurity. Their involvement in preventive diplomacy, humanitarian relief assistance, military demobilisation, and their support for disarmament and crime prevention show an appropriate concern for this issue.41 In Southern Africa, several projects have been implemented such as the HABITAT-led 'Sustainable Reconstruction and Development: Durban Local Agenda 21 Campaign' in KwaZulu-Natal. This initiative has been designed to ensure that all aspects of urban development are taken into consideration, particularly the stigma of political violence, and the legacy of social polarisation.

THE SWEDISH COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

The multidimensional approach of the UNDP is echoed in the development programmes designed by Sweden. The Scandinavian country's lack of 'colonial baggage' enables it to design programmes that, perhaps more so than other developed countries, will reflect genuine humanitarian concerns, and will be able to examine the problems of the continent from a fresh angle.

The Swedish Committee of Development and Security in Africa recognises the urgency of the crisis in Africa. The Committee stresses the necessity to tackle development problems, in the ideological context of indebted, weak, and marginalised nation-states.42 It is argued that capacity-building should be part of the development process, and that self-reliance ought to be prioritised.43 Furthermore, the problems of violence and human insecurity are presented as central to development matters. The Committee favours the local management of conflicts, with the financial and physical assistance of international bodies, such as the United Nations. It highlights the need for conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, security co-operation, and disaster relief to be implemented as part of development initiatives.44 Indeed, security is part and parcel of the Swedish development programmes.

From the above alternatives to the strict neoliberal development perspectives of the World Bank and the IMF, it is obvious that economic considerations are not the 'be all' and 'end all' of development. Indeed, appropriate concerns for the crisis of security and safety can be integrated into the wider development agenda. In both cases, institutional capacity-building and civil society participation are likewise prioritised. In the light of conjectural conditions, these approaches may well present solutions to the paradigm crisis and the worsening of economic and socio-political insecurity. Local agents, at all levels of society, will have to bear the brunt of change and rely heavily on their own initiative if development and peace are to be achieved.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of the decade, development has become the chasse gardée of the neoliberal agencies of the World Bank and the IMF. Whereas both institutions, have designed development paradigms based purely on economic variables and reflecting an overriding concentration on macro-economic considerations since the 1980s, at present another prescription for development applies in the form of political 'good governance'. Areas such as the balance of trade, the liberalisation of the economy, the deregulation of tariffs, and the implementation of democratic forms of government, are the pillars of the neoliberal paradigm which, owing to the dependency of Southern countries on the two lending agencies, has become the sine qua non of development assistance.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security paradigm has been broadened and diversified. Non-military threats to security, such as environmental degradation, are recognised. However, more direct threats to social and national security have emerged. On the eve of the 21st Century, states and societies are at the mercy of increased impoverishment, intra-state conflict, political insurgency, intensified social and economic polarisation, the rise of social intolerance, terrorism, the proliferation of criminal organisations and intensified criminal activities. These threats to security have emerged in the global context of declining socio-economic conditions, and the weakening of the state system. Yet, none of the traditional development programmes have even considered the issue of insecurity as pertinent to development, while several of their prescriptions appear to threaten political and socio-economic stability, and the state system. It has been shown that this approach is problematic, for not only will insecurity increase if left unchecked, it will also hamper efforts in the development realm.

There is an interdependency between safety and security, economic growth and human development. The risks associated with a failure to recognise the adverse effects of insecurity and of the weakening of the state system have been highlighted. Alternatives to the neoliberal paradigm have been designed, which incorporate the necessity to tackle the problem of human insecurity and underdevelopment through capacity-building at the state and civil society levels, as seen in the approaches taken by France, the UNDP and Sweden.

However, local initiatives will have to support the main thrust of development and peacebuilding. Measures can be taken at the local, national and regional level to counteract the rampant level of social violence and insecurity and to promote development. It has become clear that capacity-building of the state apparatus, in conjunction with greater popular participation in the development and social processes, are desirable if Africa is to emerge from the morass. Secondly, greater national and regional co-operation can foster the optimisation of financial, information and human resources in the fight against poverty and insecurity. Co-operation in the economic and social realms that ensures economic growth, redistribution and human development in the spirit of national reconciliation, appears to be the only way forward, because "peace is the condition in space for non-violent development."45

ENDNOTES

J Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: An Exploration into the Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, IDRC Books, Ottawa, October 1995, http://www.idrc.ca/books/focus/795/html.



W C Reed, The RPF Politics and Development in Rwanda, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 23(2), 1995, p.12



C E Adibe, Weak States and the Taxonomy of Security in World Politics, Futures, June 1994, p. 491



D A Morales-Gòmez, Development and Social Reform in the Context of Globalization, http://www.idrc.ca/books/focus/761/intro.html.



World Bank, Status Report on Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 1994: The Many Faces of Poverty, World Bank Findings, 35, World Bank, Washington DC, 1994.



J Neuman, Lights, Camera, War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996.



Ü Kirdar (ed.), Change: Threat or Opportunity for Human Progress: Political Change, United Nations, New York, 1992.



Nef, Op. cit.



For an overview, see F Jean (ed.), Populations in Danger – A Médecins sans Frontières Report, Routledge, London, 1995.



L Diamond and M Plattner, Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.



B R Barber, Jihad vs. Mac World: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, Ballantine Books, New York, 1996



C Sommaruga, Humanitarian Challenges and the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century: Keynote Address, International Review of the Red Cross, 310, January 1996, pp. 20-35



Ibid.



The Domestic Front, Real World Intelligence Inc.,1994, clueless@look.lookoutpoint.com.



P Williams, Transnational Organized Crime, unpublished lecture, at the Insitute of Security Studies, Halfway House, 23 October 1996.



P Lock, The Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Cold War World: A Global Problem, paper read at UNIDIR Conference, Berlin, May 1995, pp. 8-9.



J Groom, The End of the Cold War, Conflict and Global Governance, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 17 (1), May 1996.



Ibid.



Nef, Op. cit.



Canadian Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper on Defence Policy, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/dp/index.html.



G Ionescu, quoted in G Parry and M Morran (eds.), Democracy and Democratization, Routledge, New York, 1994, p. 117.



See C Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1996, for a 'stock-taking' of development theory since the 1950s.



N Chazan, R Mortimer, J Ravenhill and D Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1992, pp. 27-28.



M Camdessus, quoted in J J M Boughton and K K S Lateef (eds.), Fifty Years After Bretton Woods: The Future of the IMF and the World Bank, IMF Publications, Washington, 1995.



M Todaro, Economic Development, 5th Ed, Longman, New York, 1994, p. 546.



International Development Research Centre, http://www.idrc.ca/.



G Hyden, Rethinking Theories of the State, Africa Insight, 26(1), p. 26.



A Leftwich, Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World, Political Science Quarterly, 14(3), 1993, p. 606.



K Marshall, Regional Development Strategies and Challenges: Some Economic and Social Underpinnings, Paper presented at a conference organised by the South African Institute of International Affairs, The World Peace Foundation and the Institute for Defence Policy, Johannesburg, 4 - 6 August, 1996.



World Bank, Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, discussion paper, World Bank, Washington DC, October 1993.



Y Marchand, Une Urgence: l'Afro-Realisme: Pour un Nouvelle Politique de l'Entreprise en Afrique Subsaharienne, discussion paper, Caisse Française de Développement, Paris, 1996.



This is the case, even though French co-operation involvement in the realm of democratisation is based on the principle of non-interference, and support thereof is given only at the request of individual states.



Le ministère de la cooperation, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, Ministère de la Cooperation, Paris, p. 36.



Interview with G Serre, Caisse Française de Développement, Johannesburg, November 1996.



J G Speth, Seeking a New Consensus on Development, address to the NGO/DPI Annual Conference, General Assembly Hall, UN Secretariat, New York, 8 September 1993.



Ibid.



K Watkins, Oxfam International Assessment of IMF-World Bank Debt Reduction Initiative, OXFAM Publication, Policy Department, Oxford, March 1996.



H Paqui, UNDP Press Releases, 15 March 1996, hilda.paqui@undp.org.



V Massingue, A Munchanga and R Labelle, Sustainable Development Networking Program in Mozambique, UNDP Project Document, Maputo, 21 July 1995.



P Landell-Mills, Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment, Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(4), p. 564.



M Shaw and P Zwane, UNDP Safety and Security Status Report, Pretoria, 1996.



Committee on Development and Security in Africa, Executive Summary, Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, February 1996, pp. 8-9.



Ibid.



Ibid., pp.15-21.



J Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, Sage Publications, London, 1996, p. 223.