THE REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS AND ABDUCTED CHILDREN: A CASE STUDY OF PALARO AND PABBO GULU DISTRICT, NORTHERN UGANDA STAVROS STAVROU AND ROBERT STEWART WITH AMANDA STAVROU

INTRODUCTION

The abduction and forced conscription of child soldiers have been shocking features of the insurgency war in northern Uganda since the early 1990s. Rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have abducted some 14 000 children, of whom about 5 000 have escaped or have been liberated from captivity. The ongoing abductions, destabilisation of local communities and the reintegration of traumatised abducted children represent a critical humanitarian challenge to the international community, to the Ugandan government and to aid agencies working in the field.

This article will attempt to contextualise the issue of former child soldiers with the aim of fostering a real understanding of the victim in relation to the broader networks of family and community. Hopefully, it will raise awareness of this outrage against children’s rights and promote realistic and effective interventions – which can be implemented in an abnormal society where militarism and social dislocation have become a part of everyday life.

RESEARCH

The research in Uganda was conducted during a two-week period from 16 to 29 October 1999. Nine days were spent living with the communities of Palaro and Pabbo. In both communities, prior to and after the field visit to Gulu, time was spent interviewing stakeholders in Kampala.1 The researchers conducted 42 face-to-face interviews with individuals and participated in thirteen focus group discussions, involving a vast array of constituents from the communities of Pabbo and Palaro.2

The aim of the research was to:

• document the latest position of child soldiers in the northern Ugandan district of Gulu;
  
  
• undertake a brief assessment of the psycho-sociological reintegration strategies currently available;
  
  
• test whether current strategies are aimed largely at individual abducted children, to the exclusion of their families and the rest of their community; and
  
  
• recommend any improvements, based on the hypothesis that any redress had to be undertaken within an abnormal society (because the war is not about to end).
  

Palaro has a constituency of around 2 000 people and is located approximately fifty kilometres north-east of Gulu Town. Currently proclaimed as a ‘protected area’, it is made up of two distinct residential areas spread along a six kilometre stretch of road. Until about September 1999, a radius of two square kilometres surrounding each settlement was allowed for agricultural activities. Anything beyond that was treated as a danger zone in which the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) could not guarantee the safety of the villagers. Today, this zone has been extended and the road leading to Gulu Town, which was previously traversed only during daylight and under military escort, is open. It has been estimated that since 1990, over 300 local people have lost their lives to the conflict and that there are over 300 children currently held in captivity by the rebel LRA.

Pabbo is a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs) containing approximately 40 000 people drawn from over one dozen villages in the Pabbo Parish. Approximately forty kilometres along the main road from Gulu Town to Jinja (Sudan) is a permanent UPDF military camp. Like Palaro, it is only in the second half of 1999 that the people in the refugee camp have been able to venture further than one kilometre from its boundary. The road both north and south of Pabbo, although severely potholed and littered with bombed vehicles, is safe for travelling. Like in Palaro, it has been estimated that over 1 500 people from this area have lost their lives to the conflict and over 700 children are currently in rebel captivity since 1990. Unlike Palaro, Pabbo is one of the centres of aid activity both by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

METHODOLOGY

Current work in the development of reintegration strategies for former child soldiers and abducted children in Uganda has largely focused on individuals, with few resources available to target families and communities where they originated. While this work has shown that it is possible to make a number of constructive interventions, these have mostly been issue-based, lacking a strategic component in terms of an holistic perspective, the reintegration of the village. Experience in other fields, such as AIDS programmes, has illustrated that, in order to develop and implement an integrated strategic programme that has the capacity to transform people’s lives, corrective strategy needs to be targeted both at individuals and their environments. It is therefore necessary to develop an understanding of how the children, their families and communities feel about certain issues. These issues relate to all past experiences and present attitudes, including indigenous traditional methods that can transform people’s lives and enable them to reintegrate these children into their society.

Political and aid agencies therefore require information that depicts or outlines the attitudes, needs and priorities, as well as general development variables of all affected stakeholders, in order to devise and implement appropriate strategies for reintegration. The challenge of developing an appropriate research process in evaluating the impact of proposed reintegration strategies was to evolve a methodology that would achieve an objective set of opinions carrying community legitimacy, while not being swamped in political and process paralysis.

At the core of the research framework was the acknowledgement that the communities being researched, were not homogeneous, but complex and constituting a sum of diverse interests that reside in a particular defined area. Prior studies have tended to define affected communities in northern Uganda as fairly analogous, and too often analysed them as if there is a homogeneity of needs, constraints and resources. Certainly, Palaro could be said to be composed of a number of heterogeneous communities: families who have been directly affected by abductions as opposed to those who have not, families with income earners, families selling cash crops and families relying entirely on subsistence. This process enabled both points of common discourse and interest to be identified and evaluated against the impact (both positive and negative) of any of the programmes being presented to each generic category of recipients. It was therefore critical to incorporate mechanisms to identify the dynamics and needs of all people and their households. In order to achieve this, the relevant communities were involved in a process of consultative research, which allowed for the evaluation and varying impact of current strategies and service delivery, on each generic grouping. This was the only way to determine the root causes of either successes or failures. As such, it was possible to lay the solid foundation for the understanding of issues at hand, and the impact on future delivery. In addition, it is hoped that the recipient communities were empowered with the means to measure any future implementation strategies. It is also hoped that the research process enabled points of common understanding and concern to be identified, and thus the means by which bridges can be built between the affected communities and external delivery organisations.

Ultimately, the aim of any planning process is to unlock current constraints by promoting an alternative strategy that is focused towards improving the quality of life of the people concerned. In doing this, the approach to planning and research should be built on a strong commitment to an inclusive process. There is no single methodology that was used that could claim precedence over another; thus any approach to this type of research necessitates a mutually reinforcing schedule of different research tools. Two processes, however, lend themselves best to such research: participatory focus groups and structured observation schedules. It is these research methodologies that were utilised in Gulu Town, the administrative centre of Gulu District, and the two communities of Palaro and Pabbo.

Participatory research is by nature dynamic and adaptive. It is difficult to pre-determine the type and sequence of the research exercises exactly, particularly as this may change once more is known about the research area and issues, and even during the research exercises. As such, technique selection was not concluded beforehand, but rather adapted to the interactive process, as the various focus groups progressed. It was crucial not to allow a prescribed technique choice to direct the research process. Instead, the required research objective and type of information formed the basis upon which the selection of methods was made. This may seem an obvious point to state, but many of these techniques are used simply because they exist, rather than because they are relevant. Another point to take note of is that many of these techniques involve the generation of visible information of a public nature, and more sensitive information may therefore be kept hidden. Consequently, it was necessary to allow for fluid processes so that hidden information could be drawn to the surface.

It has been noted from past participatory research that a significant portion of the information gained from visual exercises is derived from the discussion around the exercise – both during the exercise and once it has been completed and is being analysed. It was therefore necessary to take care to always ‘interview’ exercises, as well as to take note of the discussion while the exercises were unfolding. This enabled the researchers to avoid being left with impressive diagrams of which the categories and context were not understood. Although the research was geared towards understanding current trends and expectations, it was always conceivable that ‘shopping or wish lists’ would emerge during participatory research exercises. As some communities have become dependent upon institutions for development aid, it was necessary to pay particular attention to the interrogation of these lists. This is not to say that the communities do not require what is listed, but to establish priority and investigate options related to the issue at hand – reintegration strategies. Unfortunately, a significant portion of the research undertaken in Pabbo ended up being a ‘shopping list’ of requirements, and as such meant that its relevance to the research was limited. However, the remaining interviews and participatory research groups in Pabbo, as well as the activities in Palaro produced rich data and therefore made a significant contribution to the analytical process.

CHILDREN AND WAR

From the beginning of time, children have actively served their nations or communities as soldiers in armed conflict. Perhaps one of the earliest eulogies of child warriors is found during the Spartan era where, at the age of seven, boys were taken from their homes for military training. Throughout Africa’s history, young men have played prominent roles in taking up weapons to defend their villages, just as young women provided both material and physical support for their tribal armies. During peacetime, the same adolescents worked alongside their elders in constructing homes, hunting animals, herding livestock, tending fields or rearing younger siblings. The distinction between adolescence and adulthood has often been blurred and has largely been dictated by survival strategies. Among the Masai, Xhosa and Zulu initiation ceremonies for both male and female adolescents, the transition to adulthood is celebrated on their reaching the ages of twelve and fourteen. Hence, if adolescents were capable of bearing arms, they were recruited as warriors.

During the latter years of the twentieth century, adolescents have become ‘principal’ participants in most of Africa’s wars. Whether their participation was through armed conflict – as in most civil wars in West, Central and East Africa – or through sustained civil unrest – as in Southern Africa – these combatants have become increasingly youthful over the years. Pre-adolescents as combatants are no longer the exception, but have joined their older comrades in becoming the norm. Moreover, the introduction of girls alongside boys as soldiers has become more prevalent.

In the past, however, children were usually enrolled in the armed forces when the reserve of adult soldiers ran short, whereas the youngest are today often the first to be recruited. In Africa’s remaining wars, many ‘rebel’ militias or movements comprise almost entirely adolescents and pre-adolescents – sometimes as young as eight years old. If it is considered that over half of Africa’s population is under the age of eighteen years, it is not surprising, however, that there has been a proliferation of children in the various armies.

Rebel or anti-government forces are not alone in their use of child soldiers. Government forces are also prone to recruit young adolescents into their ranks. Moreover, under international law, it is not illegal to recruit fifteen-year old children for training as soldiers for active combat duty. According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in 1989,3 and ratified by all members except the United States and Somalia, ‘childhood’ ends at the age of eighteen years. Although forbidding the death penalty for all children under eighteen, as well as setting a host of other standards for their protection, the UN sanctions the right of a fifteen-year old to kill or be killed ‘in the line of duty’.

There is more to this than purely the need for conscription: life in the army often offers the only alternative to subsistence survival. The promise of training and a sustained livelihood is a powerful lure in regions where poverty and population pressures overwhelm education and jobs. Nevertheless, the move to recruit younger combatants, either voluntarily or through force, reflects the age-old discovery that children who are dislocated from their family and social networks are easily transformed in fearsome and uncompromising soldiers. When they cannot be enticed into the ranks voluntarily, children are more easily coerced than adults. Once enlisted, they can be facilely moulded into unquestioning fighters. Within the military ranks, young adolescents often develop the sort of loyalty towards their ‘superiors’ that they would have, in a ‘normal society’, towards older family members.

Confusing war and play, child combatants minimise the dangerous environment within which they survive, often becoming oblivious of boundaries that separate fantasy from reality. Isolated for lengthy periods at a time, while being left to their own initiative in spatial and social surroundings that are alien to those they have left behind, socialisation skills break down and a new abstract sense of ‘reality’ emerges. When transformed into military codes of conduct, these rules are invariably more violent and therefore more effective than those of their older predecessors. Without fully developing and comprehending fear as an emotion, they are frequently less terrified of death than adults.

Child soldiers are also easily co-opted into undertaking extremely dangerous tasks associated with combat that older companions often avoid, such as infiltrating villages that have been targeted for attack, serving as spies or messengers, acting as decoys or being suicide bombers. With no dependants of their own to consider, they are not burdened by the liability of obligation, and because they consume less food and have yet to comprehend fully the value of waged labour, children are an economic addition to whatever force they serve.

If one factor can be singled out as being the catalyst for the exponential increase in the use of child soldiers, it has been the proliferation of small arms in military conflicts throughout the world. For much of the twentieth century, weaponry was both too expensive and heavy for children to handle. However, during recent decades, technological development has enabled the manufacture of simpler and lighter weapons – thereby creating the potential for their use by pre-adolescents. Moreover, the post-Cold War period has resulted in the wholesale flooding of redundant, cheap but efficient weapons in Africa. "An AK-47, firing thirty bullets per trigger pull, costs the equivalent of the price of a goat."4 In South Africa, an AK-47 can be illegally purchased for a price of approximately US $12.5

In Uganda, the phenomenon of child soldiers first gained prominence after 1981, during Milton Obote’s second ascendance to power following the disputed 1980 elections. When the current government of President Yoweri Museveni was still a resistance force, there were an estimated 3 000 kadogos, or child soldiers, under the age of sixteen among its ranks. Of these, approximately one-sixth were young girls.6 It is estimated that, since 1992, anti-Museveni rebels have abducted approximately 14 000 children (mostly from the northern Acholi people) with the intent of turning them into child soldiers and sex slaves.7

UGANDA – A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

A political history

Uganda lies towards the centre of the Great Lakes Region, surrounded by Kenya to the east, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, Sudan to the north and Rwanda and Tanzania to the south. The area is characterised by a subtropical climate in the south, which draws ample water from Lake Victoria, to a more arid region in the north towards southern Sudan.

In 1962, under the direction of Milton Obote, Uganda gained its independence from the United Kingdom. Thereafter, Military Commander Idi Amin ousted Obote in a coup d’état in 1971. After a reign of terror that lasted until 1979, Amin was finally removed by a coalition of forces from Tanzania and Ugandan opposition groups. Idi Amin himself was from northern Uganda, a fact which has contributed to negative perceptions of the northern tribes among those living in the south of the country. Furthermore, many of the southerners in the military were purged and replaced by individuals from the north, who participated in the atrocities committed during Amin’s reign.

After a transitional period, Obote was reinstalled in 1980, only to be overthrown again by General Tito Okello in 1985. Thereafter, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) with its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), seized power in 1986 under the military guidance of Yoweri Museveni – who is still the current president.8 Museveni and the NRM govern over a ‘no-party’ political system where people can run for office in their individual capacity or as members of the ruling party. Freedom of assembly, association and expression are restricted.9

In many ways, the origin of the current conflict lies in the complex socio-religious traditions of the Acholi people who inhabit Uganda’s northern-most districts, as well as the deeply-rooted ethnic distrust between the Acholi and the ethnic groups of southern Uganda – a distrust that has erupted in the past into widespread violence. During the period of British colonial administration, the British mostly employed southerners in the civil service. People from northern Uganda, and especially the Acholi, were primarily recruited into the armed forces. This created a class division between northern and southern Uganda that persisted until independence in 1962. As a result, the south was more developed and contained the bulk of Uganda’s educated élite, while the north, including Gulu and Kitgum, the homeland of the Acholi, was much poorer, with the people relying on subsistence agricultural activities and military service for survival.10

During the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda’s economy and social service sector collapsed. Gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 25 per cent, exports by 60 per cent, imports by over 50 per cent and inflation was over 200 per cent. Moreover, Uganda was a nation lost in civil strife, violence, lawlessness and self-destruction.

Agricultural activities were the predominant strategy to secure a livelihood, with few other true employment opportunities available in both the formal and informal sectors of Uganda. At the time, agriculture contributed more than 70 per cent of GDP, and provided 8 per cent of formal sector employment opportunities for the Ugandan population. The lack of economic opportunities was exacerbated by more than two decades of war. Now emerging from this turmoil, insecurity and instability, Uganda’s economy is one of the fastest growing in Africa and is often hailed as a success by Western powers. Nevertheless, the current rate of growth is insufficient to provide gainful employment for more than half of the fast growing population.11 According to the 1991 National Population and Housing Census, Uganda’s population numbered 16,7 million, growing at an average rate of 2,5 per cent per annum. Furthermore, the population of Uganda is becoming increasingly younger. Over the last forty years, the proportion of children and youth in the total population has quadrupled. Almost 90 per cent of the Ugandan population live in the rural countryside. Compared with other East-African nations, Uganda is very densely populated with approximately 85 people per square kilometre.12

The war in the north

The war in the north is in its twelfth year, with the Ugandan military having had no success in stopping it. Many people in the northern districts of Uganda are of the opinion that the government’s weak response is deliberate. Most of these people belong to the Acholi ethnic group and have been historically unsupportive of the current government. Furthermore, during Obote’s second regime, a large percentage of soldiers who committed atrocities belonged to the Acholi group, and many Ugandans from the southern areas therefore often view the group as murderers. They are thus reluctant to lend any support to the northern areas. Moreover, with horrific abuses being committed by rebel forces, President Museveni has been able to ignore and excuse human rights violations committed by his soldiers in the north against the Acholi and other ethnic groups who do not support his government.

The war in Gulu has gone through many phases since 1986. In late 1986, Museveni’s troops were deployed in the north to mop up the remnants of forces supporting the previous Obote and Okello regimes. Human rights violations by these government troops fuelled the conflict, but most rebel troops had given themselves up to the authorities by 1988, and their leaders reconciled with the government in 1990.

In the interim, a woman called Alice Auma, also known as Lakwena (Acholi for messenger), created a force that became known as the Holy Spirit Movement. By late 1986, Lakwena had mobilised numbers of deserting rebel soldiers and Acholi tribespeople, as well as other Luo civilians, through a powerful combination of local spiritual ideology and Christian beliefs. Her forces were eventually defeated outside Jinja in November 1987. Following her defeat, an armed group led by Joseph Kony – initially known as Lakwena Two before becoming known as the Holy Spirit Movement – emerged as the focus of military opposition to the government NRA in the Gulu District. Like Lakwena, Kony claims to be possessed by religious forces that use him as a medium.13 From the onset, forces led by Kony have committed serious human rights abuses against civilians.

In late October 1988, the NRA launched an offensive in the Gulu District. Government soldiers were responsible for extrajudicial executions, the internal displacement of thousands of people and the destruction of homes and granaries. Despite these ‘military efforts,’ Kony’s forces were not defeated, and by early 1991, were known as the United Christian Democratic Army (UCDA). During 1991, the NRA mounted another major military offensive, which included sealing off the north from the rest of the country. Although militarily effective, NRA activities were once more tarnished by significant human rights violations. In 1992, new NRA commanders in the area worked with the civilian authorities on a more politically-oriented counterinsurgency strategy, and in late 1993 and early 1994, government officials held peace talks with Kony’s force leaders, who where by then known as the LRA.

The latest phase of the war began in early 1994, after peace talks collapsed in February following President Museveni’s motion to the LRA leaders to lay down their arms in seven days.14 Meanwhile, the Sudanese government began to provide the LRA with military and logistic support, which gave the movement the means to intensify its activities. As a result, the scale of violence and child abductions increased over the next two years. Since July 1996, nearly half the population of Gulu District – approximately 200 000 people who normally live in communities of scattered farms – have been forced to flee their homes. Some have moved into Gulu Town, others are concentrated around outlying trading centres or small army posts (known as detaches) in so-called protected villages. In the Kitgum District, tens of thousands of people fled LRA attacks on Lamwo County in January 1997. In July of the same year, unofficial estimates put the number of IDPs in this district at approximately 60 000. The UPDF maintains that villagers are fleeing the LRA. While for many, perhaps the majority, this is undoubtedly true, it is also true that others are responding to encouragement and in some instances coercion by the UPDF, which is focused on isolating the LRA in the countryside and then cutting them off from sources of food.

Neither the Holy Spirit Movement of Lakwena nor the LRA of Kony has presented political programmes that are readily understandable to outsiders, beyond calling for Uganda to be ruled according to the biblical Ten Commandments. As the testimony of escaped children attests, extreme violence is a deliberate tool used to terrorise civilians into providing support or newly abducted persons into staying with their captors – and as punishment for not following edicts laid down by LRA commanders. For civilians in the countryside, edicts include a ban on riding bicycles (persons on bicycles can quickly reach army detaches); habitation near roads (where people may witness landmines being planted or ambushes being laid); and keeping pigs (which appears to be in response to support from the Islamic Sudanese government).

Since February 1999, the situation has generally been fairly stable; although only hours after the departure of the researchers, an area not far from Palaro was attacked by rebels, which resulted in casualties.

DESTABILISATION OF THE COMMUNITY

Lifestyle

Since the commencement of the destabilisation period and the infiltration of rebel forces into northern Uganda, the lifestyle of local communities has been drastically altered. Those living in the northern-most regions, particularly those in the Gulu District, have been systematically stripped of their assets – both productive assets such as their cattle and land, as well as their labour power. As acts of violence against the rural homestead increased, the government moved most of the households in parishes north of Gulu Town into ‘protected camps,’ while children were despatched to other areas where the threat was not so severe. Not all families had the option or could afford to send children away, and continued to live under constant fear. Many spent nights sleeping in the bush as a precaution against the increasing number of kidnappings and acts of brutalisation perpetrated by both rebels and government forces. As the number of families who experienced looting, abductions and other forms of physical violence became horrifically visible, this fear spread, as did mass displacement of people.

Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with families in Palaro and Pabbo, repeatedly indicated that entire villages would sometimes spend up to two weeks sleeping in the bush, frequently kilometres away from their homesteads. In many instances, families would divide themselves into smaller units to avoid wholesale capture. Male adults were regularly separated from the rest of the family unit for weeks at a time, while children would have their education disrupted, due to fear of abduction on their way to or from school.

Livelihoods

The impact of the instability on strategies to ensure the livelihood of people in Palaro and Pabbo has been devastating. Rebel groups were making use of the food grown in the communities as a means of survival. While these rebel forces were looting and killing, the UPDF soldiers were also ‘helping themselves’ to any goods that they wanted. As a result, the community was caught between two sides that were equally bad and, as such, had no means of recourse. During an interview with a rebel commander, he justified the looting of food by explaining that he "had to feed 200 mouths every day." In addition, he justified that some of the food they were taking from families was used to feed the families’ own abducted children anyway.

In order to minimise the food supply to the rebels, the government demarcated ‘safe zones’ into which all community members were forcibly herded. Anyone found outside the demarcated area was designated to be a rebel and was therefore a legitimate target. Crops and homes were burned as part of a ‘scorched earth’ policy, and cattle, possibly the single most important asset in livelihood strategies utilised by the inhabitants, were taken for ‘safekeeping’, with the understanding that they would be returned to their rightful owners once the rebel problem was quelled. This promise has never been fulfilled. The general opinion held by affected communities is that the cattle had been given to alternative owners and will not be returned to them, despite ongoing promises.

The loss of livestock has perhaps been the single most devastating economic hardship that this traditionally pastoralist society has had to confront. Consequently, the people of Pabbo and Palaro can no longer depend on their animals to provide both traction power and food for the families living in the region. Notwithstanding the nutritional impact of being denied both fresh meat and dairy produce, the loss of traction power provided by cattle has often meant that the utilisation of available fields for ploughing has been limited. A group of farmers in Palaro said that, since their cattle were confiscated by the government, prior to having their fields denied to them, they could only prepare about 60 per cent of the land in time for planting.

In addition, the Acholi have historically traded livestock produce for cash and other goods and services. Growing and selling fresh fruit and vegetables are common throughout Uganda, thus there is little other competitive advantage that the Acholi have in the Ugandan market place. As such, the loss of their cattle has also meant that they have been denied the one major income generator available to them.

It is evident that, as a result of this, these households have moved into ever increasing levels of poverty and vulnerability to the point where they may no longer be able to sustain their simple lifestyles. Furthermore, levels of savings appeared to have decreased rapidly. According to respondents in Palaro, they currently have about one-tenth of the savings they had twenty years ago. In other words, they are worse off than they were under the repressive Amin regime.

Health

The drastic decrease in farming activities, both cultivation and livestock, has had a devastating impact on the health and economic security of households. Although the soils are exceptionally fertile and the relatively sparsely populated northern territories provide abundant land that can be cultivated, a balanced and nutritional diet is lacking, due to the vulnerable circumstances of the people. Respondents in both Pabbo and Palaro claimed noticeable declines in health, particularly among the very young and the elderly. Although there was little sign of malnutrition among young children in Palaro, malnutrition and disease were clearly evident in Pabbo.

Aside from the ever-present threat of malaria, unsanitary conditions in the camp resulted in an almost continual presence of cholera. Diarrhoea, chicken pox and scabies were common ailments among old and young alike. During face-to-face interviews with families of abducted children in Pabbo, it was established that children were washed at least once a day, but the same was not true of adults. Despite the fact that each community had a local clinic, resources were extremely limited. The lack of electricity and poor transportation links between the two centres and Gulu severely limited the supply of medicines. In both communities, as indeed in Uganda at large, AIDS awareness is high and the distribution of condoms free. However, at Palaro, supplies of condoms had run out seventeen weeks prior to the research.

Children

Childhood is ideally a period of learning, both inside and out of an institutional setting. Exploration of the world and surrounding environment in a safe situation helps the child to form a view of the world that will determine future interpretations of events and the ability to make rational decisions based on this past learning. This period of a child’s life is also meant to be a time to play with peers, while forming social networks that will enhance understanding of their surroundings. Interaction with their family and peers help the learning of language and life skills that complements the knowledge gained in school.15

The reality of existence in Pabbo and Palaro is a far cry from this ideal. Mass internal migration and insecurity have fragmented family and community structures. Children were separated from friends and family, while exposure to violence and fear raises concern over their own future problem-solving skills. Furthermore, the loss of education is and will continue to have a tremendous negative impact on the value of their labour in future years that, in turn, will limit income earning options.

It would appear that both schools and villages are common rebel targets. Between 1993 and 1997, 81 teachers and over 100 children were killed in schools by the LRA in Kitgum District16, while 450 primary school children were abducted and 59 primary schools burnt down. This led to the closure of 136 out of 180 primary schools in the affected areas.17

The following tragic events cast a glimpse of the plight of these children and their families.

ABDUCTIONS

Living in hell’ is what most children currently in abduction are doing. All the children of northern Gulu – those who have escaped from captivity after being abducted and those who have never been captured by rebels – live in constant fear of hell. Recent estimates suggest that up to 5 000 children have escaped from captivity during the past few years.18 According to estimates by the UNChildren’s Fund (UNICEF), an equal number of children remain in captivity, while an unknown number are dead. In Pabbo, a sample of 483 households yielded 302 pre-adolescents and adolescents, ranging in age from seven to 22 years, who had been abducted between 1991 and 1999. A total of 24 children were known to have died, while thirteen had returned. Examples abound: on 25 July 1996, 23 girls were abducted from St Mary’s College and on 21 August 39 boys from Sir Samuel Baker School – two secondary schools near Gulu. On 10 October 1996, in an incident that has since galvanised public awareness of child abduction, 139 girls were abducted from St Mary’s College at Aboke in Apac District. Among the LRA raiders were boys from Sir Samuel Baker School.19

After abduction, children are force-marched back into the bush, carrying the few possessions that the rebels have taken. As a means to sever ties between the children and the households they have left behind, they may be forced to beat or kill weakening children who cannot maintain the forced pace, while the commanders rape and sexually molest the young female captives. Some children remain in the bush in Uganda for several months, as they are used by the rebels as servants and porters. At some point, however, most children who have not escaped or been killed, are taken across the border into Sudan, where the rebels have their main base.20 They receive basic military training, including the use of small weapons, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.

For young girls, abduction holds an even graver picture – that of sexual slavery. Evidence suggests conclusively that sexual slavery is imposed on all abducted girls, with possible exceptions of some pre-pubescent girls. The majority of girls and women in rebel camps have syphilis or other sexually transmitted diseases, against 60 per cent of boys and men.21 With the exception of a small group of young women who had been married or had indulged in sexual intercourse prior to their abduction and therefore may have been carrying sexually transmitted diseases, the vast majority have been infected during their period in captivity. People who work with former child members of the rebel movements verify that female ‘helpers’ inevitably become victims of rape, either by the head of the family to whom they are allocated or senior soldiers.22

Apart from ‘domestic’ obligations, many young women and girls are forced into ‘marriage’, and as such are ‘obligated’ to provide sexual services to their ‘husbands’. Girls as young as twelve are given to rebel commanders or older soldiers as ‘wives’. These girls are referred to either as ‘wife’ or ‘helper’, although girls appear to use the different terms as a matter of self-representation, with the choice of ‘helper’ reflecting reluctance to admit (perhaps to themselves, as well as to outsiders) that sexual relations were imposed upon them.

Children in captivity are ‘owned’ by the LRA and, as such, forced to serve the rebels in a number of different ways. Girls and women are forced to carry out the range of domestic duties that in rural society might be expected of a wife. These include cooking, cleaning, and fetching water and food. Young children, irrespective of gender, are used to run errands, fetch water or cultivate the land. All of the children are trained as soldiers. After repetitive drilling in the use of weaponry, these child soldiers are either send to fight, loot villages for food or capture child slaves.

The rebels enforce discipline by inculcating fear through a combination of threats, violence and death. Children who do not comply with the demands of rebels are either beaten or killed, frequently by other abducted children. Failed escape attempts continue to be punished by death, while successful efforts to escape lead to retaliation – if one sibling escapes, the rebels often kills the other sibling, or return to the child’s home village and slaughter any surviving relatives.

While the children may initially be used to shoulder a variety of non-combat tasks, the shortage of ‘fighting power’ afflicting the rebels means that, at some point, most of the children end up in the midst of combat. As mentioned above, all children are trained as soldiers and as such are expected to fight, if necessary, during raids on villages and stores. Usually ‘fighting’ takes on the appearance of children being forced to run towards the ‘enemy’, thereby acting as a distraction and human shield for the adult rebels and their commanders. Those who retreat, are beaten or killed, often by other children. If any refuse to kill ‘fellow’ child soldiers, they themselves are beaten or killed.23

Throughout the period spent in captivity, the children are repeatedly subjected to arbitrary beatings and violence, or forced to take part in beatings of other captives. Children who are sick, wounded and disobedient, or have attempted to escape, are killed. Few children receive proper nutrition, while sexual abuse occurs among most of the captives. It is impossible to know the percentage of abducted children who die while in rebel captivity.

What is conspicuous by its absence is the lack of ideological training on the part of rebels. ‘John’, a rebel commander, said that the recreation of ‘family’ kinship among ‘recruits’ was the only ideological input that he had to make. It was sufficient to threaten individuals and their families with death if anybody was disobedient or tried to escape. The rebel commander also felt that the strict discipline among ‘his’ troops far surpassed that found in the UPDF. All forms of substance abuse were punishable by flogging, while repeat offenders were locked up and if they transgressed the ‘rules’ again, they were executed. He felt that fear was a sufficient ‘ideological tool.’

Children who survive this ordeal, slowly, but steadfastly become drawn into a new way of life. The violence that they witness, the death threats directed at themselves and their families, as well as continued indoctrination practices combined with their dire economic situation, prevent them from leaving. For example, if these young soldiers become good fighters, they are rewarded with food, responsibility, rank advancement and wives. Eventually, these young adolescents are drawn into the ranks of the rebels on a permanent basis. A new order and society emerge – and absorb these children. Ironically, this society, despite its dehumanising elements, attempts to recreate the one from where the abducted children came.

However, children are not the only victims; their families and indeed their entire society are held hostage by a host of psycho-sociological problems. Attacks, frequently occurring under cover of night, are brutal. The parents and siblings of the children who had escaped, may be beaten and killed. The women are often assaulted, raped and then also killed. Upon leaving the village, all transportable goods and foods are stolen, while what is left behind, is razed to the ground.

Post-abduction trauma: Impact on children

Escape from abduction may bring a child’s period of incarceration to an end, but it marks the beginning of a new set of ordeals. For many children who escape there is often nowhere to go, as villages have been destroyed by the rebels, their parents have been killed or displaced into camps, or have simply fled the countryside for the comparative safety of the towns. For those children who could return to a rural homestead, many are reluctant to do so, fearing further rebel reprisals, either against them or their families. Furthermore, ostracism by other community members who blame the children for complicity in rebel atrocities or who feel resentful that their own children are still in captivity, is widespread.

Children are emotionally devastated by their experiences. All have been subjected to psychological traumas that are so extreme that self-defence mechanisms frequently result in the children only having blurred memories of their time with the rebels. These memories are so deep-seated that they may continue to revisit the child in nightmares, hallucinations and delusions for many years. Those who have experienced extreme levels of violence face little chance of being successfully reintegrated into society as ‘normal’ persons, particularly if there is no counselling available. Sometimes, the emotional scars of committing violent acts are the hardest to cure, as the guilt overwhelms the child’s whole emotional and physical being. Many children report pains in the abdomen and side, yet complete medical examinations show no physical or medical injury. These are psychosomatic disorders, essentially an emotional trauma that manifests itself as a physical pain or disability. The UN Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur emphasised that "memories of the events remain with them ... causing extreme nightmares, daily intrusive flashbacks of the traumatic events, fear, insecurity and bitterness."25 These children are unable to relate to other children, are suspicious of all adults, are fearful, insecure and display violent outbursts of anger. Depression is common among former child combatants, while hopelessness and desperation have been known to lead to para-suicide or suicide. These children feel stigmatised, often for good reason, as society shuns them as violent, unskilled and uneducated.

One of the most traumatic events that these children have to overcome, is that of separation from the family. The family network is central to the fabric of the Ugandan lifestyle. Displacement through abduction, death or abandonment results in high stress levels. The loss of a ‘family’ network means that many of these children grow up without emotional and economic support, lacking guidance in morality and ethics. The loss of education and the development of life skills that a family usually provide, are also irrevocable, reducing the options open to these children when they are trying to be assimilated back into society.

The effects of these experiences on the child are severe and complex. The severing of the link between the child and the parent and family has ramifications that go beyond the immediate stress or trauma. The family is the primary arena through which the process of socialisation occurs. This process is central to children’s learning about the world and their role within that world. Through interaction with the family and greater social environment, the individual becomes aware of the self and learns what is considered acceptable behaviour and what is not.

For many abducted children, violence is seen as an acceptable and even necessary way of life, and the only means to solve problems and conflict that arise among the ranks of the rebel forces. The gun is regarded as a means to get everything that is necessary, as well as for personal enrichment. This lack of conflict resolution skills and the institutionalisation of violence become visible when the child is under pressure or stress, surfacing with explosive results.

In the section above, the impact of destabilisation on the education of children was discussed. In the event of abduction, the impact is even more severe. In this instance, the child is completely removed from the school setting. Instead, the child is placed in an indoctrinating environment where new forms of skills, which are destructive and are the antithesis to what is required in ‘normal society,’ are inculcated. An alternative form of social construction is created within the rebel camps, one that becomes a substitute for the society from which the children have been removed. New roles and responsibilities are forcibly assigned to the individual through a process of violence and fear. Long-term exposure to this form of social construction can result in a complete replacement of that which was previously learned and deemed acceptable in a normal home environment.

Added to this is the loss of trust and respect for life, particularly directed towards those seen as weak. Abducted children live under conditions of perpetual doubt – where a ‘friend’ may turn traitor and ‘family’ structures are falsely created. These conditions result in a complete breakdown of the trust that is inherent and central to successful interaction between individuals. The power provided through the barrel of a gun over those who do not have guns, as well as the norm of taking what is needed, inevitably leads to a loss of respect for life. This is evident when escaped children who have returned, threaten others by boasting about the number of people they have killed and threaten to harm anyone seen as a challenge to their authority.

The effects of captivity and exposure to combat are severe. These may be divided into two main categories: the emotional trauma, and the physical and medical disabilities with which children are left. Most children appear to have developed a degree of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD manifests itself when individuals experience acute psychological reactions to intensely traumatic events – beyond ordinary human experience.27 Past events, such as exposure to killings in combat, executions, beatings, rape, physical abuse, food deprivation and other forms of violence or anti-social behaviour, have given root to PTSD. As noted, PTSD in most sufferers can be extremely debilitating. Abducted children who were interviewed evidently re-experience memories, often in painful nightmares, hallucinations or ‘flashbacks’ while in a wakened state. Their classmates and teachers recorded their reactions by stating that the children would freeze, exhibit signs of terror, shake uncontrollably, sweat and even shout and scream out loud.

In some instances, external stimuli may trigger the memory of the event/s, which will then be re-experienced by the child. During such times, these children may exhibit diminished responsiveness to the surrounding environment and a ‘numbness’ towards their surroundings. They may find it difficult to respond to affection and will seldom find renewed interest in things they enjoyed prior to the event. This inability to show affection may be a great source of pain to children and their families. Other symptoms are insomnia, depression, anxiety, irritability, hyper-alertness and outbursts of anger and violence.28

The degree to which these symptoms may emerge, depends on the nature of the trauma, as well as the psychological strength of the individual prior to the event. Other factors that have to be considered are the length of time a child spent in the bush and the role played by an abducted child while in captivity.29 Given that the average ages of abducted children range between twelve and fifteen years, they may not have developed the full array of defence mechanisms, making them extremely vulnerable and susceptible to the full force of the scenes they witness. In addition, the greater the number of events witnessed by them, the more severe the symptoms of PTSD are likely to be. Considering that the violence in northern Uganda has affected almost all in one way or another, the incidence and severity of PTSD is likely to be high. While in many cases the symptoms may subside after about six months, they may last for years. However, since the violence, hardship and displacement are still ongoing, the length of time taken for recovery is likely to be longer than in peaceful surroundings.

The responses of children to trauma may differ in significant ways to those of adults.30 Children usually find it difficult to understand what has happened. As a result, they may be unable to describe how they are feeling and therefore express themselves in different ways. Most responses to a traumatic event are normal and will resolve in time with the help of caring family members and friends. However, if the responses are too severe or last too long, the need for professional intervention becomes paramount. Occasionally, these problems may be delayed until some time after the trauma. Frequently, the signs are misunderstood, as it appears that the child is merely being disobedient.

The symptoms of PTSD not only affect the sufferer, but may also impact severely on other family members.31 Relationships with partners and children may become strained and difficult. PTSD may cause the sufferer to reject or withdraw from the very people who care the most.32 If PTSD and the associated problems are not recognised as the cause of the problems, family members may start to blame the affected person or themselves.33 They may feel rejected or unloved, and powerless to help the sufferer. It may mean that the family will require help with other problems that they had been coping with before. Unfortunately, PTSD can be a difficult disorder to recognise, considering there is often a reluctance to talk about the traumatic event(s) and personal reactions, for fear of appearing weak or stupid. This may be exacerbated by unhelpful attitudes in others (e.g. beliefs that PTSD does not exist or that survivors should ‘just pull themselves together’), or by a variation in the intensity of symptoms over time. The sufferer may be relatively well for long periods between episodes and sometimes symptoms may not appear for some months, or even years, after the trauma.

Impact on the family

An area that has largely been ignored, is the impact and trauma experienced by those who witness the violence and abduction, but are left behind. Parents in particular, are left with feelings of extreme guilt about having been unable to save their children. There are some reports of parents being unable to eat, sleep or work, as they constantly lament the loss of their child. Other symptoms that have been reported are sudden and unexpected outbursts of anger, frequently directed towards other children. In one instance, the state of the individual became so bad that he had to be hospitalised. The medical staff was unable to find any physical defect, despite the patient’s complaints of pain in a variety of body regions, including his head and stomach. The patient was given some small white pills and sent home. His condition has continued to deteriorate, and other family members fear that he will soon die.

Children who have avoided capture and enslavement by rebels are also not shielded from the consequential torment and effects of violence and conflict. It is not so much the general instability caused by the ongoing conflict – the economic mainstay of the region, its agricultural base and infrastructure, have been destroyed – but the everlasting fear of abduction that absorbs a large part of their emotions. Ultimately, this emotional experience translates into the most devastating disabling factors that influence their lives, making them susceptible and vulnerable to further inner turmoil.

While the experiences of the abducted child are undoubtedly traumatic, those affecting the family are broader and possibly more complex. This is usually because it is a combined experience of destabilisation, the loss of at least one family member, the loss of their lifetime savings and work, and the guilt and uncertainty associated with being relocated to an IDP camp. Relocation in itself is a traumatic experience, as people are literally uprooted and forced to leave everything behind, only to move into an area without a house, fields, or employment. Furthermore, these camps have hopelessly inadequate health and education facilities, poor sanitation and unclean water. All the respondents stated that prior to the move to the camp, they were healthier, happier and economically better off. They had more meals per day, were able to wash more frequently and did not have to visit a medical practitioner as often. The cramped living conditions and lack of privacy contributed towards their future uncertainty and misery. Ironically, the herding of people into camps under the guise of protection did little to limit the abductions, which continued unabated despite the heavy presence of security personnel.

Another major complaint of the parents of abducted children, was the lack of support for efforts to have their children returned to them. Furthermore, most parents of abducted children stated that they were unaware of any other forms of support, such as grief counselling. Even those who approached the UPDF received little information and help, while on occasion, they would be harassed by troops wanting to know where their child and the other rebels were. It appears that the impact upon families depends upon a number of factors:

• It depends on the length of time that the abducted child spends away from home. Shorter periods have less impact on the family, as they regain the labour input without excessive disruption to the production process. Moreover, the shorter the period of abduction, the shorter the period of guilt for the parent.
  
  
• The second factor is the level of destruction left in the wake of the rebel forces. If other family members are severely beaten or killed, this will naturally increase the impact on surviving members. The number of children who are abducted, will also correlate with the intensity of impact. As such, it is important to recognise that those left behind have suffered an enormous shock, and by all accounts probably undergo symptoms of PTSD themselves.
  
  
• Related to this is a third factor, namely the socio-economic situation of the family. The children of many African societies are seen as security measures for the time when the parent is older. Instead of the formal security systems that are paramount in the west, African societies utilise family ties and social networks as means to ensure future income security. Children are particularly valued for their associated labour value, while an inherent gender bias raises the value of male children above that attributed to female children. As a result, the loss of a child may be regarded, in purely economic terms, as the loss of a very valuable productive asset.33 Female children are particularly placed in the role of caregivers at an early age, thereby freeing time for the older caregivers to focus on other income earning and subsistence activities.
  

Given this, the successful reintegration of the child back into the family and society is also largely intertwined with the level of poverty and the availability or lack of economic opportunities, that are presented. The loss of cattle and land, the removal of resources and trade links, and constant insecurity tend to promote risk-adverse investment behaviours. In this scenario, individuals or families will not risk the little they have in a gamble, where the potential returns would be sufficient to lift them out of their dire economic position. Instead, the fear of losing the little they have, results in small, safe investments where the returns are guaranteed, yet insufficient to have any real positive impact on the economic status of the individual or family. These families are constantly preoccupied with survival, limiting the attention that can be directed towards the returning child.

Wealthier families who are able to continue functioning as a productive economic unit tend to suffer a lesser impact in comparison to poorer families who have to struggle continually simply to survive. In this sense, the family with the greater asset base is better able to cope with the shock or impact of losing a family member. These same factors are central to the success of reintegrating children, should they be fortunate enough to return to their families after the abduction.

As mentioned above, the role of the child is to care for the parent in later life, basically embracing the role of income earner in the absence of a formal pension. The loss of a child essentially means the loss of an economically secure future for the parent. This was articulated, in particular, as a major concern by parents who had lost children to the rebel forces. The loss of a human asset, coupled with the loss of other productive assets (as discussed earlier) have placed those families living in the IDP camps in a grim economic situation, with an uncertain future that depends largely upon future rebel activities in the area.

In addition, families who have survived these ordeals are uncertain whether or not the abducted child is still alive. Parents talk of a need for closure, so that they will be able to continue with their lives and not spend each waking hour wondering if they will ever see the child again. Even when there is news of a death, this may not always be accurate, and thus the need to get the body home for burial, as a form of closure, grows. More often than not this is impossible, adding yet another element of uncertainty to their lives.

Few of the remaining parents are able to think beyond the present, and there is a sense of inevitability in their shrugs when asked about the future. Most of the parents of abducted children stated that they wish only that their child would return and that the violence would come to an end. All conceded that they could not really plan beyond the day when the violence would stop for certain – as this itself was only a distant reality. When asked how they could be reassured that the violence would indeed be over, there was a constant request that all the military leaders meet in the villages and camps to declare that the violence had come to an end. This need for a definitive end to the violence again underlines the insecure situation in which they live, where uncertainty rules and possibilities are limited.

THE RETURN: REINTEGRATION STRATEGY

Aid groups estimate that 3 000 to 5 000 children have escaped rebel captivity.34 These escapes may happen at various stages of captivity, which also has implications for the reintegration strategies that are to be used. Some of the children may escape shortly after capture, while others may only manage to do so after a long period with the rebels. Others simply drop their guns at an appropriate moment and surrender to the UPDF or Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Unfortunately, while official policy within the UPDF is to create a diversion for children to escape, many are wounded in the crossfire.

The process of reintegration can be roughly divided into four stages. The first is that of recapture or surrender to the UPDF and the subsequent debriefing in a safe house. This stage may be exceptionally stressful as it usually occurs during a firefight where children are frequently injured.

The army is the first contact outside the rebel group. While only recently set up, specific care centres outside the barracks are designed to reassure the child, while other care centres are contacted and a full debriefing takes place. Children who go through this army debriefing reported higher levels of stress than those who had not.35 It appears that individuals involved in the debriefing process and responsible for the safekeeping of the children while under the care of the army do not have specialised skills or the training that is required for this task. As such, it is not surprising that this experience alone is deemed stressful for the children.

The second stage commences when children are passed on to the Resident District Commissioner’s Office (RDC) – when the child is welcomed back. This is a vital stage, because it is the first time when the child is greeted as a civilian instead of a soldier or slave.

The third stage is the longest. The children are remanded into the custody of the care centre where they receive medical attention, training and counselling. The point of transfer is into the care of the rehabilitation centres – in Gulu Town, these are run by the Gulu Save the Children Organisation (GUSCO) and World Vision Gulu. The children are clothed, washed and given food and medical care. Over time, they are matched with a counsellor who provides guidance and allows the children to tell their stories. During the time spent in the centre, children receive some education and skills training, while being prepared to meet their families, if they can be traced. The centres also have the responsibility to counsel parents to prepare them for the reunion with their child. Under the circumstances, these centres provide an invaluable service, and there is unanimous agreement from all sectors that they play a vital role in the children’s reintegration into society.

There are, however, a number of factors that limit the success of these centres – the most noted is the problem of capacity. During the height of the violence, World Vision had up to 600 children in its care at any one time. Given the available facilities, a realistic maximum capacity is probably around 100 children. This over-subscription of resources inevitably led to a decline in the quality of counselling and care. During this period, the emphasis on providing care and counselling lay within the confines of the centre itself. Unfortunately, counselling and follow-up support for parents in the community were limited. The situation has stabilised, however, since the past nine months have been relatively peaceful. The centre has been able to provide the quality of care that is needed, as well as providing follow-up support at community level.

There are a number of inherent weaknesses in the approach used by the counselling centres, most of which are due to limited resources. One of these is the fact that, while there is selected counselling and support aimed at the child, at parents and, sometimes, at community leaders, the community at large are not educated about the needs of returning children. Given that the wider community is less likely to accept the children back as readily as the family, this is an important gap that has to be addressed, if successful reintegration is the ultimate goal. However, this is not only the responsibility of the NGO sector, but should also be shouldered by the government.

Another potential problem is the lack of formal training among counsellors. While their intention and dedication are Herculean, the inability to recognise the symptoms of specific behaviours and make an accurate diagnosis coupled with appropriate treatment, may well prove to be a limiting factor. Caution has to be applied, however: the accuracy of predominantly Western defined concepts of abnormal behaviour, rendering guidelines for treatment most certainly inappropriate to the Ugandan situation, needs to be questioned. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a safe environment in which children have the time and care to begin the process of healing physical and mental scars is a positive step forward.

For children, the final stage is the move back to the family. Children receive a letter from the RDC, which includes a full presidential pardon for any activities they may have been involved in during their time in captivity.36 Undoubtedly, the most severe problem with counselling is the contrast between that received in Gulu Town and the different approach used in follow-up care provided at community level. These volunteers, who should be commended for their time and effort, do not have adequate training to deal with the magnitude of this rehabilitation process. A three-day training session, on top of a very basic education, is not sufficient to deal with the problems that inevitably arise once the child has returned home. In addition, the training is only aimed at helping the child to deal with the environment, and not at assisting the environment to deal with the child. Furthermore, the mode of treatment provided by the caregiver is not consistent with that provided by the centre, where children are encouraged to articulate their feelings and experiences. Instead, they are instructed to forget and move on – not to dwell on the past. The reality is, however, that until the past is adequately dealt with, the child will not be able to forget – and repression will only make the problem worse. This discontinuity in treatment style is potentially damaging and therefore an area that needs to be addressed.

The voluntary nature of caregiving is also questionable. Without meaning to decry the good intent that volunteers display, the fact that they have little incentive to carry out their counselling duties cannot be refuted. Even if there were no intentional neglect, the time taken to earn a living would limit the time available for such a service.

A final and potentially contentious point on the content of rehabilitation needs to be clarified. While the use of religion in counselling and rehabilitation is a tried and tested method of dealing with trauma survivors, there are questions that must be raised when it is used in the treatment of children, particularly in an African society. The first question concerns the matter of choice. At no stage are the children asked if they wish to abide to Christian beliefs, norms and values, nor to distance themselves from their traditional beliefs. This is a problem of great magnitude, particularly if the parents of the child are not Christians and still adhere to the traditional beliefs and ceremonies that are discouraged in some counselling centres. In some instances, children have to leave the centre under the pretext of visiting the family or another guise in order to undergo traditional cleansing ceremonies. This ‘necessary’ lie immediately creates a distance between the centre and the child and his or her family. Furthermore, if the family does not practice Christianity, another element of discontinuity emerges, while conflict over religious practice may arise.

The school

Further gaps in the reintegration process are identifiable when returned children re-enters school. The potential for conflict is enormous. In addition to ‘normal’ peer pressures and bullying that exist in any school situation, the children are often targets for name-calling and abuse. Much of this takes place behind their backs, as most of the other children are afraid of them and their reputation as ‘killers’. Even if the social pressures at school are disregarded, classroom pressure to compete and pass, despite missing out on past education, often results in psychological and emotional ‘breakdowns’ in the classroom. These include ‘flashbacks’, as well as other symptoms of PTSD. Teachers are required to deal with these situations and other behavioural problems such as outbursts of anger, even though they are not necessarily equipped to do so.

The family

Most former combatants reported that they would like to return to their family and local community. Research has shown that some families and communities often reject young soldiers upon their return, fearing the ‘crimes’ they had committed. The children may have been directly involved in violence against their own communities, while they have almost certainly aided the rebels in some way in their plan to attack these villages. In some African cultures, strong spiritual convictions hold that the evil spirits of the victims haunt anyone who has killed. Even those children with supportive homes and communities fear leaving the centres, because of the danger of being re-abducted and killed.37 Part of the problem lies in the fact that, after a long period of abduction, most families do not think of the problems they may face if their child returns, and are therefore totally unprepared when problems do inevitably arise.

In the event of an abducted child returning, the differences in the socialisation processes and the rule of authority can result in violent conflict and clashes. For example, conflicts may arise due to the change in discipline from one of fear and intimidation by peers, to one of respect towards elders in the home. This inability to accept discipline and authority from an authority based on age instead of power and fear has resulted in the death of a parent at the hands of a child in some instances.

Another problem that poses great difficulty is whether or not returned children are perceived as having participated in attacks on the village.38 If this perception exists among the community, inhabitants make the lives of both children and their families very difficult. The situation is exacerbated when children are unable to adapt to the new surroundings and their behaviour is seen as ‘abnormal’. Related to this is the scenario when the abducted child from one family is accused of killing a child from another family within the same community. In this instance, the family and the accused child may be completely ostracised, making complete reintegration almost impossible. Furthermore, if the community at large is unable to understand that accused children were not volunteers and did not have a choice in the matter, then community tolerance becomes unrealisable. Due to the limited counselling services available, this scenario appears to occur frequently.

Young women or girls who escape and are able to return home face even greater hurdles. The perception that they were willing wives of the rebel commanders makes them untouchable – as if they have been completely used. They suffer shame and the humiliation by other children and adults who taunt and tease them. The discussion by World Vision on the effects of armed conflicts on girls states that, among these children, girls are 52 per cent more likely to commit suicide.39

The role and importance of traditional ceremonies

An aspect of the rehabilitation process that has only recently been recognised and addressed by western NGOs, is that of traditional cleansing ceremonies, practised by many families when a child returns home. These ceremonies include the slaughter of a goat or chicken, which is then eaten by the family. Other rituals include the breaking of an egg underfoot and stepping over a log on the footpath leading to the house. These ceremonies are performed when relatives have been away from home for a long time with little hope of their return. An Adjwaka or traditional healer usually performs these ceremonies. However, in some instances, village elders would perform such ceremonies. While they may make little sense to Western culture, they are in fact often central to the healing process in the African setting. Some respondents even noted that there is little point in carrying out the ‘modern’ methods of grief counselling until the traditional ceremonies have been performed. The ceremonies are noted to have a marked impact on the outlook of the children, as they are able to reconcile with their parents and realise that they are forgiven for all their actions.

Over and above these welcoming practices, other ceremonies are performed by the family when a child is killed in the bush or when one child is said to have killed another. Traditionally, when one Acholi slays another, there is a need to perform gato – a reconciliatory ritual. The gato is performed once and is a general ceremony for the whole community, thus not person-specific. The kwer, which is a rendering of the gato, is performed at the family level. The rwodimoo or the male counsel elders carry out these ceremonies. Originally, if there were violence perpetrated against one individual, the family of the perpetrator would have to pay the other family in goats or cows. However, as the violence escalated and livestock were confiscated, this part of the tradition has waned.

Current reintegration programmes

Only a few organisations – World Vision Gulu, GUSCO, the Gulu Vocational and Community Centre, and the Community Services Department of the Gulu District Administration – are active in providing aftercare for former combatants. Due to limited resources and immediate demands, recent reports indicate that efforts thus far, have focused on the reception and resettlement of returning abducted children. This involves children being placed in reception centres, where they have access to first-line counselling and treatment, as well as assistance to trace, assess and be reunited with families. To date, three rehabilitation centres have been set up and are run by NGOs in Uganda – two in Gulu Town and another in Masindi District, south of Gulu District. At these centres, children are involved in programmes that include feeding, medical treatment, accommodation and trauma counselling. While those children involved in the struggle for freedom against Obote before 1986 were given a degree of support from the government, the presiding opinion is that children caught up in the armed rebellion in northern Uganda since 1987, have not received adequate support from the government.40 No government programmes or resources for children abducted by the LRA have been identified. In the current research, none of the key respondents, both from within and external to the government, were able to identify government support strategies.

Generally, the conditions in these care centres are regarded as inadequate, particularly when violence increases. As mentioned in the forgoing section, there is overcrowding, too few counsellors and little training or education materials. Some attempts are made to teach basic carpentry, tailoring and bicycle repair at a few of these centres. However, most children have nothing to do and therefore sit around or play cards. Aside from this, these are safe houses where children who have shared experiences can begin to interact with one another, in preparation for reintegration into ‘normal’ society.

Possibly the most comprehensive approach to date has been undertaken by World Vision Uganda that, since March 1995, has been operating a Traumatised Children of War Counselling and Rehabilitation Centre for demobilised child soldiers and young adults. The centre aims to help children who have been abducted and recruited into the LRA in the Gulu and Kitgum districts of northern Uganda. To date, 2 500 children have passed through the centre. In addition to counselling and medical attention, these children also received vocational and life skills training – one of the more important components in trauma counselling.

There are a number of other centres that provide relief to veterans from the former NRA. One such centre is the Veterans’ Assistance Board (UVAB), which was set up by the government of Uganda in 1992. The main objective of the UVAB was to "formulate policy and co-ordinate all activities for the implementation of the government’s programme for assistance to veterans." In addition to this, the Board facilitated and mobilised all necessary steps to promote the "smooth transition of veterans into productive civilian life." UVAB works in association with donors and other NGOs supporting the reintegration of veterans’ programmes. Notable institutions include Africare, Appropriate Technology International (Uganda), CARE International, Heifer Project International, Uganda Community-Based Association for Child Welfare (UCOBAC), UNICEF, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Volunteers in Overseas Co-operative Assistance (VOCA), the World Bank, and World Learning Inc. The programme has provided assistance to approximately 2 810 veterans.41 Sadly, not all of these accommodate components for former child soldiers. However, a distinction must be made between children who are abducted by rebels and those who are ‘recruited’ into the UPDF. The choices really open to these ‘recruits’ are a life of poverty, alone and uncertain without funds to attend school, possibly orphaned and wanting revenge, not ones to promote any real choice. Furthermore, the current practice of using children within the UPDF ranks legitimises the use of youth in warfare and does little to dissuade the rebels from using similar tactics.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions and recommendations contained in this article are divided into two main parts. The first section examines the reintegration of abducted children in the context of the political and military situation, as well as more traditional development factors, such as poverty and associated problems. The second section considers the psycho-social context and the counselling measures required, in order to promote the reintegration of these children into society and the rehabilitation of the wider community. While dealt with separately, it is essential to realise that successful reintegration depends on treatment and support, in both psychological and development senses, as the two are inextricably intertwined.

Conclusions around development issues

Given the plethora of problems that exist in the northern regions of Uganda, it is difficult, if not irrelevant, to determine a starting point from which problems may begin to be solved. Instead, the situation should be seen as a multilevelled scenario, ranging from the macro or international political context, to the micro or local level context.

An issue that has far-reaching ramifications for the international community, as well as the Ugandan and Sudanese National governments, is that of military security. It became apparent at an early stage of the research that security or its absence is the predominant hindrance to the economic and social recovery of the region. Not only does the Ugandan government pour millions of dollars into fighting rebel forces each year, instead of into essential social services, but there is also a lack of investment incentives at both the macro and microlevel – directly as a result of this problem.

At the macrolevel, political stability is widely recognised as a necessary precursor to foreign investment that, in turn, determines the condition of the country’s balance of payments. At a microlevel, the constant insecurity is a threat to a different kind of security, that of food security. There are literally thousands of square kilometres of available, fertile, virgin land that could potentially return Uganda to its status as the food basket of Africa. The fear of violence, however, acts as a disincentive to return to the deserted areas and engage in agricultural activities once again. The risk that individuals face in investing the little they have in some form of land-based livelihood strategy is still too great, thereby relegating them to dependence on the World Food Programme as a form of ensuring food security.

The underlying root cause for this ongoing problem may be analysed at both the international and national levels. At the international level, the conflict in Uganda is dependent upon the continued political ‘cold war’ between the Western and Islamic powers. With the West funding the SPLA in an attempt to destabilise the Sudanese government, and thus to prevent the entire country from becoming an Islamic state, the Sudanese government has reason to retaliate and fund the LRA in Uganda. As long as there is Western involvement in supposedly sovereign state governance, the Ugandan people, but the children in particular, will be caught in the crossfire. A solution would possibly be closer if an agreement could be reached and a settlement negotiated that the support given to the LRA could be cut off and the movement outlawed in both Uganda and Sudan. This would deny the rebel movement both the base from where it operates, and the funding for food and weapons upon which it relies. For this to work, the same needs to happen to the SPLA. Unfortunately, this solution is a distant reality, given that the US government recently pledged its support to the SPLA in a highly publicised meeting,42 as well as the implication that the LRA will seek alternative assistance.

At a national and provincial level, the current Ugandan government has done little to foster relations between the military and the northern tribes of Uganda. Given the history of conflict between the northern and southern tribes, this apathy, in itself a form of retribution, limits the effectiveness of the government’s already minimal action against the rebel forces. If anything, the containment activities undertaken by the UPDF have exacerbated the rebel force’s damage. The systematic stripping of assets, cattle in particular, has limited the livelihood options available to northern inhabitants. The high level of poverty and the ongoing instability have also decreased their ability to purchase more cattle on their own initiative. The few efforts that have been made by the government to return cattle to the community have failed miserably. For example, a small-scale project to return cattle to the inhabitants of Pabbo resulted in three head, out of a total of approximately forty, surviving. While the exact causes of this failure are difficult to determine, it appears that a combination of poor cattle selection, in terms of natural resistance to diseases, and a lack of complementary support services contributed to the failure. However, the initiative is valuable in that it raises a number of concerns – one of which is whether the necessary skills for a successful cattle-farming nation still exist, or whether these have been lost in the past decades of instability.

Related to the issue of cattle and other productive assets is the added dimension created by poverty when attempting to reintegrate the child into the family. The successful reintegration of a child into a family and society is intertwined with the availability of economic opportunities. Families who are constantly preoccupied with survival have limited time or resources available to them and, as such, are less likely to have the capacity to provide the required attention needed by the returning child. These families also rely on a disciplined system of production, where each has a specific role to play. If an undisciplined and disruptive element creeps into this production system, the increased vulnerability may create stress and result in conflict between family members.

In conclusion, one may reflect on the issue of ‘child soldiers’ based on two main factors. The first is the underlying cause of conflict, as opposed to the impact and end result of the conflict. There is little point in pouring resources and effort into damage control when the cause of the problem itself continues unabated, as is the current approach. The second is to address both the social and the economic issues that face these families and communities in the struggle for survival, and in their attempts to integrate abducted children back into society. Addressing only one side of the same coin will result in partial solutions that are inherently flawed. While those involved in the counselling programme are to be commended, the complete absence of preventive measures is to be lamented.

Given the multiple factors contributing towards the instability in northern Uganda, it is necessary to present recommendations aimed at particular target audiences. The major roleplayers in this conflict are the international community, the national and provincial government of Uganda, foreign national governments, and NGOs operating in Uganda.

The international community

In recognition of the greater forces at work in the ongoing conflict in Uganda, it is recommended that immediate solutions should be sought between the major international parties that are involved in funding opposing military forces that operate in the region. Until these parties are able to reconcile and come to some form of agreement, the violence and abductions will continue. Furthermore, it is essential that the international community should lobby the Ugandan government to stop the ‘recruitment’ of under-age children into armed forces and, as such, to lead the effort aimed at ending the use of under-age children in armed conflict by example. Another possible avenue through which the international community may be able to help, is through the deployment of a peacekeeping force, to monitor the conflict in the north.

The government

Given the nature of the conflict, the lack of military security and the antipathy between the residents and the UPDF, it is recommended that focused efforts should be made to bring all sides closer together in a relationship of mutual assistance, in order to combat the rebel forces more effectively. This includes purging the UPDF of all those who harbour hostility and animosity towards the northern population and are unwilling to pursue a working relationship. In the event that action is not taken by the UPDF when required, it is essential that a full investigation should be launched and any unconstitutional behaviour is brought to light and punished.

It is also recommended that the government should take a leading role in setting up a trust for those families affected by the violence. This could be managed and supplemented by NGOs and other international donor organisations. At present, there is no clear-cut legislation or policy aimed at dealing specifically with children abducted into armed conflict. Such an initiative must be addressed with urgency, while the implementation of legislation and policy must be lead by government in co-ordination with the NGO sector.

Given that there are no short-term solutions to the conflict, it is essential that the health services in the IDP camps are improved immediately. The unsanitary conditions contributing towards the spread of disease, as well as the ever-present threat of cholera, serve only to increase the vulnerability of the inhabitants. At this level, the NGO sector also has a vital role to play and, as such, productive partnership agreements between the government and the NGO sector need to be established. There seems to be little military justification for not creating numerous smaller camps, which might allow for greater access to land, cattle and associated subsistence strategies.

Non-governmental organisations

The NGO sector plays a vital role in Uganda, hence it is recommended that all NGOs, human rights groups and child welfare groups combine forces to lobby the Ugandan government, and other national governments effectively, to redress their respective roles in the conflict immediately. Given the problems that have arisen as a result of the loss of cattle and other productive assets, it is recommended on a practical level that cattle should be returned to those who have lost stock to the government forces. This will require a joint endeavour between the government and NGOs, such as Heifer Project International. In addition to these efforts, it is recommended that skills training and veterinary services should be provided, thus ensuring that the ability to manage and maintain healthy stock is instilled in the community once again.

In recognition of the role that the child plays in the economic functioning of the family, there is a need to provide support directed at the surviving family members in the event of the death or loss of a family member through the conflict. This support may take the form of counselling, as well as financial support, or transference of skills to enable the remaining family members to complete the economic unit once again. It is therefore recommended that families affected by the violence should be targeted as recipients for counselling, financial support and skills training.

Linked to this is the desperate need for accurate data collection in order to determine the exact magnitude of the abduction phenomenon. The data has to be collected at periodic intervals by an agency that is specifically designed for this purpose. Thereafter, the data must be processed and synthesised into a form that can provide the necessary information to all parties concerned. It is essential that the dissemination process of the information to appropriate organisations must be efficient and timely so that targeted interventions and functions may be carried out in an effective manner. Such information should include continuously updated figures on abductions, as well as a record of children who have returned or been killed in the conflict. Linked to this is the need for enhanced networking between the organisations involved so that there is sufficient interactive participation and shared knowledge in order to design appropriate programmes and support mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon.

Conclusions around counselling issues and advocacy

In light of the above problems, intervention techniques and support can be given at various levels – the child or survivor, the family, the community and on national and international levels. Each of these levels are interrelated and has definite areas of synergy.

The child

At the individual level, children are coerced to be part of the conflict, either as human shields, soldiers and hostages, or as the forced sexual partners of older men. Inevitably, this affects the family as a whole and promotes insecurity, fear and anxiety within the community. While adult caregivers have significant influence over the child’s ability to recover from a traumatic event under normal circumstances, family functioning in Uganda has either been stretched or dislocated on an emotional, economic and physical level. It is therefore important for individuals or structures directly involved in the rehabilitation camps, counselling centres and schools to be aware of and able to implement methods and processes that will ultimately assist these children to cope with their integration back into the society or community.

Most war-ravaged countries cannot provide children with the necessary therapy by incorporating professional therapists into reintegration processes.43 As a result, teachers, health care workers, lay counsellors, religious leaders and adult survivors of trauma have been singled out as those who may have close daily contact with children and, as such, are the most likely persons to be trained in assisting these children on their road to recovery. However, the training provided to these people, as well as to the wider community in northern Uganda, is either inadequate or completely lacking. The counsellors working for World Vision or GUSCO are provided with adequate training and possess the skills to carry out their roles effectively. Nevertheless, should long-term support for successful reintegration be attained, these skills must be transferred to community-based roleplayers.

The family

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child acknowledges the family as fundamental to a healthy society that offers a natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, but particularly children. Children who have been violated and/or subjected to acts of violence have a heightened need for a nurturing family environment.44 For this reason, social workers, aid workers and other professional bodies in the field of trauma guidance and counselling must be encouraged to develop programmes aimed specifically to meet the needs of the community as a whole. However, due to the displacement of people into protected villages or camps near UPDF military installations, family life has been deeply fractured. Coupled with the ever-present fear of impending violence and continuous economic insecurity, families have very little left to offer their children. Scarred by decades of violence, it is not uncommon to find an absence of parenting skills among many younger families. The focus group discussion with women and caregivers in Palaro highlighted this problem. There was immense support for the incorporation of parenting skills training as a basic component of reintegration programmes.

During discussions with adult family members of both abducted and other children, the following symptoms emerged as being common to all members of these communities:

• feelings of guilt because they have not been direct victims of abductions (not having had any children abducted);
  
  
• feelings of guilt because they have children who have survived abduction, while others died or continue to be in captivity;
  
  
• feelings of guilt because they have children who have committed atrocities in abduction, particularly towards children from the same village;
  
  
• feelings of guilt because they have daughters returned from captivity having been sexually abused on a mass scale or, even worse, have returned with children of rebel commanders;
  
  
• low self-esteem and hopelessness for not having been able to do anything to prevent the past abuses;
  
  
• lack of confidence in their ability to provide a secure environment for their families and to provide food;
  
  
• helplessness linked to the fear of being attacked again, and to the fear of revenge targeted towards their families and themselves; and
  
  
• anger towards the rebels for abducting and killing their children and towards the government for doing nothing.
  

When asked whether there was any programme in place to help them to deal with these issues, the vast majority dismissed the notion as being frivolous, as survival was more important than therapy. Communities are existing in an almost surreal world, where a situation that no person should have to live through is shrugged off as a matter of fact. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that, if the cycle of helplessness and violence is to be broken, the symptoms will have to be treated.

Women and girls as a vulnerable group

Rape is undoubtedly one of the most traumatic experiences any person could endure. Repeated sexual violence against children shapes their entire perception of most future personal interactions they would experience, and fosters unrealistic perceptions of themselves. Furthermore, these negative experiences are very likely to be transferred to the next generation. Interviews conducted with adolescents who have escaped showed a state of denial. When discussing experiences while in captivity, an attitude of ambivalence quickly emerged. It is understandable that, within a few hours of initiating contact, it is unlikely that any traumatised adolescent would share such past experiences with an outsider. However, further interviews with adults and caregivers in both Pabbo and Palaro revealed that ‘suppression’ was the only means for survivors of abuse to ‘move forward’.

Further input from children who had fled captivity more than five years before, revealed that the following continued to be experienced:

• sleeplessness, nightmares and flashbacks;
  
• an inability to cope with and a general fear of the unknown;
  
• unstable weight maintenance and poor self-image;
  
• ongoing depression and suicidal tendencies;
  
• a sensitivity to strange or loud noises and sudden movements; and
  
• irritability either while at home, at school or at work.
  

These symptoms are not only found among former girl soldiers, but also among boys. In the focus group discussion with former male soldiers, the following common themes were expressed:

• feelings of shame about past actions and of guilt about having survived while others died or continue to be in captivity;
  
  
• low self-esteem and hopelessness about the future, lacking confidence in their ability to create a home/family, to make a living and to improve themselves;
  
  
• helplessness linked to the fear of being attacked again, and to the fear of revenge targeted at both their families and themselves; and
  
  
• anger targeted at the rebels for taking away their youth, at the government for doing nothing and at their community for not understanding them.
  

Not surprisingly, adult family members also display similar symptoms. These survivors feel disconnected from the rest of the community when they discuss their past experiences.

The two girls’ inability to express their feelings may largely be due to the fact that they have not yet been truly accepted back into the community, as well as the stigma associated with rape, and the conspiracy of silence that surrounds the traumatic experience and therefore the need for denial. Counsellors at World Vision related experiences of fathers rejecting their daughters because they had been ‘tainted’ by their abusers. One young girl of fourteen who had given birth two days prior to being interviewed, was concerned about whether her new-born looked like her or her abuser.

Counsellors in Gulu Town pointed out that the increase in street children in Kampala could be partly due to abandoned children born to girls used as sex slaves. Although difficult to corroborate, a focus group discussion with sex workers in Kampala also raised the same point. Because of this and other stigmatisation, most survivors decide never to tell anyone of their experience. Currently, with the exception of sensitivity and forgiveness being asked of families and other community members towards survivors of sexual abuse, little else is provided in terms of therapy. Although working under enormous constraints, it is important that caregivers and those directly involved with the community recognise that such experiences cannot be wished away, and that mechanisms to deal with them must be explored. A psycho-sociological support programme dealing with such issues, currently in its second phase, has been initiated by Red Barnet. It is worth noting that this programme has targeted teachers as an important component of support provision in the community.45

The community

At the community level, it is important that individuals and structures working with displaced families and children in crisis become involved in raising concerns regarding the violation of children’s rights with the relevant authorities and obtaining a commitment to the process. At the same time, it is crucial to sensitise communities and advocate community-based campaigns in order to raise awareness of children’s rights and to prevent further or secondary traumatisation.

As previously mentioned, education in the form of vocational training has been singled out as an important part of the child’s recovery. An organised learning environment and a good teacher-student relationship can assist in the child’s recovery and reintegration back into the community. Due to the violence and trauma that most of these children have been subjected to, and the fact that they often had no control over many aspects of their lives prior to, during and after the abduction, the education and reintegration process must ultimately be empowering. The children must be in a position to make decisions, to take charge over particular activities that enables them to be part of the process and, in so doing, once again gain control over aspects of their lives. This requires that the teacher or trainer has a clear understanding of the child’s multifaceted problems, as well as having contact with the child’s family and the community as a whole. The teacher should ideally provide a link between the child, the family and society.

While there are efforts to provide education and training for abducted children, there is a need for psycho-education for the community as a whole. This involves addressing the reality of the situation in which people live and preparing them for events that are likely to occur. It involves the transfer of knowledge as a means to empower individuals to deal with traumatic events as they occur. As such, it is a preventive approach, as well as a means to deal with the outcome of the event.46 GUSCO and Red Barnet (1998-2001) have proposed several objectives for training and education in the Gulu community. Accordingly, former child captives need to return to their families and former communities. This process has to be supported by counselling and a sympathetic reintegration programme.

This would involve training staff in terms of psycho-social support using outside consultants to assist children, their parents and relatives. Additionally, they aim to offer support for girls in a centre specially provided for the purpose of educating them on issues such as health education, including mental and reproductive health, and other support to build self-esteem and a positive perception about the future. They aim to keep track of reintegrated children to assess living conditions and the levels of acceptance of the children in the community. Monitoring and documentation appear to be a high priority. This type of intervention, however, could be problematic as it singles out one particular group, who may already find it difficult to integrate back into the community without being singled out as a particularly needy group.

Included in this approach are family/community-based mechanisms to raise awareness about children’s rights and war-affected children. This needs to be done together with equipping children with practical skills, improving access to basic education and structuring community-based activities for all children. Although Uganda has ratified all the relevant international instruments, they allow for each state to seek its own means of implementation in terms of its cultural, social, political and economic reality. Thus, various human rights instruments are not directly enforceable by the courts or other administrative authorities in Uganda. They first have to be promulgated as part of internal legislation. For a ratified law to become municipal law in Uganda, it has to be debated by Parliament, and a bill has to be passed before a law is made. The Ugandan Law Reform Commission is responsible for incorporating all ratified international laws and educating the public about them. However, this has not happened, largely due to a lack of resources.

National and international levels

Awareness needs to be raised, both nationally and internationally, about the lack of protection for children and their families, and the perpetual violation of children’s rights. This process has to include journalists, human rights groups, various international bodies and those involved in research in violence-torn areas. National lobbying for the promotion of the rights of the child must be undertaken in a collaborative effort in order to force all parties involved to revisit their respective roles in the conflict.

In situations of massive destruction and human tragedy, the tendency to focus on the immediate negative effects of violence on the human psyche is understandable. However, victims of violence should not simply be reduced to patients with serious mental disorders. In northern Uganda, people have developed, and will continue to develop coping mechanisms to replace or restore the lost protective factors offered by social networks, religion and culture. It is therefore recommended that psycho-social programmes embrace and encourage these mechanisms of adaptation, and explore avenues to reconstruct that which has been deconstructed, in an holistic and all-embracing manner. The concept of a ‘normal’ coping response to extreme stress is crucial. During the emergency phase, and in a situation of continuing violence, mental stresses should be regarded as normal reactions to abnormal circumstances. In Uganda, the widespread labelling of extreme stress as pathological disturbances have contributed to the stigmatisation and victimisation of those already in a vulnerable position.

Training of local staff is of vital importance. Intervention should be focused on the provision of emergency primary health care in community settings. The research found that, notwithstanding many of the problems, communities were generally supportive of one another. Therefore, the provision of at least a minimum level of outreach services to the communities, coupled with establishing support groups, would provide valuable back-up support to the ‘in-centre’ counselling services provided in Gulu. It is therefore recommended that caregivers, teachers, community leaders and lay counsellors who are community-based, receive additional skills training and are remunerated in order to provide stronger support services to the community. It is also recommended that these services should be aimed at both the individual and the family. Furthermore, the support must be provided at the pre-abduction, abduction, post-abduction and return stages.

Given the widespread need for support, it is advisable to use the media to disseminate psycho-education to help creating an environment in which war-related emotional problems can be acknowledged. A weekly radio programme may be used to explain the notion of traumatic stress, the normality of various responses to stress, the principles of self-help and support to others, as well as the possibilities of professional help.

Other essential areas requiring action include:

• All the children of Uganda affected by the war should be protected by international law by having the right to appropriate psycho-social treatment in terms of recovery and their reintegration into society.
  o The state should provide all children with access to education or vocational training, with training in values, cultural belief systems and life skills. Children with special needs, such as the learning or physically disabled, should be catered for accordingly.
  
  
• According to Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the lowest age for children taking part in hostile activities is fifteen years. Thus, states are obliged to protect children who are forced to participate in wartime activities under the age of fifteen, and must implement strategic methods of control to prevent abductions with the help and assistance of the international, as well as local communities.
  
  
• The minimum age for voluntary recruitment for children should be raised to eighteen years as promoted by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
  
  
• Children have to be protected from the consequences of war and their lives must be improved as stated in the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children in the 1990s.
  
  
• Comprehensive assessment strategies must to implemented to assess the ongoing exploitation and abuse of children in war zones and their reintegration into communities.

Notes

Stavros Stavrou and Robert Stewart are researchers at DRA-development. Amanda Stavrou is a Social Worker in private practice. A review of this document was made by Sam Sole of the Sunday Tribune (South African national newspaper), Carol Kaufman of the University of Colorado, Health Sciences Center, and Stacey van Schalkwyk of Generating New Understandings (development consultancy).

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance given by World Vision Gulu, and in particular Nicholas Ochirowijok. Without their insight into many of the issues and their help in organising entry into both Palaro and Pabbo, the fieldwork would have been limited. In addition, the children in the care of World Vision Gulu, and the people of Palaro and Pabbo are sincerely thanked for availing themselves to the group sessions and numerous hours of informal discussion.

1. Many references have been drawn from documents sourced from the Internet, reports made available that were lacking authorship and other details. Wherever possible, it was attempted to reference the work accurately, but there have been many instances in which the necessary information was not available. We would like to acknowledge the valuable work of these earlier researchers.
   
   
2. A list of persons interviewed and focus group discussions is provided as an appendix.
   
   
3. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.
   
   
4. G Machel, 1996.
   
   
5. Unpublished research finding from a project on f irearm proliferation, undertaken by DRA-Development for the Arms Management Programme of the ISS, October 1999.
   
   
6. Muhumuza, Guns into ox-ploughs: A study on the situation of conflict-affected youth in Uganda and their reintegration into society through training, employment and life skills programmes, 1998.
   
   
7. Northern Uganda Psycho-social Needs Assessment Report, 1999.
   
   
8. Muhumuza, op cit.
   
   
9. Stopping the harvesting of children, Internet article.
   
   
10. Human Rights Watch, The scars of death: Children abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 1997.
    
    
11. Muhumuza, op cit.
    
    
12. 1991 National population and housing census cited in ibid.
    
    
13. Amnesty International, Breaking God’s commands: The destruction of childhood by the Lord’s Resistance Army, 1997.
    
    
14. Ibid.
    
    
15. White paper on social security SA, <www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/social97gloss.html>.
    
    
16. The Kitgum District borders the Gulu District to the north-east.
    
    
17. Women’s Vision, The New Vision, 19 October 1999.
    
    
18. Uganda civil war ensnares its children, LA Times, 11October 1997.
    
    
19. Amnesty Internationalop cit.
    
    
20. G McGrory, Action group for Uganda’s children: US policy and the human rights crisis in northern Uganda – Analysis and Recommendations for President Clinton’s upcoming visit, 1999.
    
    
21. Amnesty International, op cit.
    
    
22. Ibid.
    
    
23. Human Rights Watch, op cit.
    
    
24. ‘John’, the former rebel commander, was interviewed the day after he was released by the UPDF, following his defection from the rebels four days previously.
    
    
25. Muhumuza, op cit.
    
    
26. White paper on social security, op cit.
    
    
27. J Acocella & R Bootzin, Abnormal psychology: Current perspectives, 5th edition, ???? 1988.
    
    
28. Ibid.
    
    
29. B Bigome, Leadership challenges of demilitarisation in Africa: Reintegration of ex-combatants and child soldiers, paper presented at the conference of the AICC, Arusha, Tanzania, 1998.
    
    
30. The National Centre for War-Related PTSD, 8 October 1999, internet article.
    
    
31. Ibid.
    
    
32. Ibid.
    
    
33. C Moser, Poverty reduction in South Africa: The importance of household relations and social capital as assets of the poor, draft paper, World Bank, 1997.
    
    
34. LA Times, op cit.
    
    
35. UNICEF, Personal interview, 1999.
    
    
36. Ibid.
    
    
37. Human Rights Watch, op cit.
    
    
38. Amnesty International, op cit.
    
    
39. Muhumuza, op cit.
    
    
40. Ibid.
    
    
41. Ibid.
    
    
42. Meeting between the United States Secretary of State and the SPLA leadership, week 43/44 1999 (during the field study) in Nairobi, Kenya.
    
    
43. Dodge and Raundalen, 1991.
    
    
44. Red Barnet Councillors, Interview, Gulu Town, 1999.
    
    
45. Red Barnet, Interview, Kampala, 1999.
    
    
46. The Kossor Education Newsletter, <www.voicenet.com/~sakossor/Pe2_15.html>.