

THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE IN THE DRC: INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP AND CONGOLESE OWNERSHIP

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Introduction

United Nations Civilian Police officers were first deployed to a peace-keeping operation in the early 1960s, as a supplement to the military observers entrusted with the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC). A small Ghanaian police unit was deployed, followed by a larger Nigerian contingent (some 400 police officers) with the objective of assisting the Congolese police in law enforcement tasks, particularly engaging in riot control situations. The lack of adequate technical support infrastructure, the complexity of internal security dynamics and the territorial magnitude of the area of operations made this a very difficult operation. It was, after all, the first time the UN deployed Civilian Police officers in a peace-keeping environment. Following this experience, and up until the late 1980s, Civilian Police officers were deployed to UN peace operations only sporadically, concentrating on monitoring and reporting of the activities of local police services and accompanying them on patrols.

It was only during the United Nations Transitional Authority Group (UNTAG) peace operation in Namibia (1989) that UN Civilian Police officers were deployed as a component autonomous from their military colleagues. In this case, UN Civilian Police officers were engaged in the monitoring of local police activity and performance, as well as in advising on the restructuring of the local police service. Following the mission in Namibia, Civilian Police officers have been tasked with assisting in reform and capacity enhancement missions in El Salvador, Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, Eastern Slavonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East-Timor, and the DRC.

In the last decade, the role of Civilian Police in peace operations has vastly increased, evolving into more complex mandates. This role expansion is related both to a broader spectrum of activities, as well as to a deeper degree of involvement, requiring the recruitment of officers proficient in various spe-

cialised police functions. For example, the shift from monitoring to advising national authorities on police reform has meant that international police officers must be proficient in the conduct of holistic reviews of the organisation, structure and processes of indigenous internal security apparatuses. In addition, UN Civilian Police have been asked to assume law enforcement responsibilities in conflict-torn societies where the rule of law has been replaced by the rule of might, and national police structures have collapsed. Such responsibilities only make sense in “Transitional Administration” type of peacekeeping operations.

The UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) has also undergone significant structural changes over the past three years. In line with the recommendations of the “Brahimi Report”, a new Civilian Police Division has emerged within DPKO, and it has recently extended its advisory capacity to include Corrections and Judiciary issues (although with limited capacity).

In the cases of both the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East-Timor (UNTAET, later on UNMISSET), the Security Council tasked Civilian Police components simultaneously with law enforcement and capacity enhancement responsibilities. Thus, in addition to maintaining law and order, civilian police elements were mandated with the task of creating (in some instances, from scratch) or assisting in enhancing the capacity of local police services.

While such complex mandates have been implemented successfully in small countries such as East Timor, there is a need to develop an innovative approach to assisting the lengthy process of reform and enhancement of local police capacity in a country such as the DRC, with its vast territorial size and very complex political and ethnic dynamics. In short, a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach to criminal justice and Civilian Police tasks, involving MONUC, Congolese authorities and international partners, is required in order to consistently accomplish a longer-term phased mandate implementation plan.

MONUC’s Civilian Police

MONUC has maintained a Civilian Police presence in the DRC since 28 October 2001. The Civilian Police were initially engaged in assessment, planning, training and advisory tasks, with deployments in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Bunia, although also conducting assessments in other DRC locations. The activities in Kisangani (and more recently also in Bunia) have been more focused on liaison with the local authorities and civil society, planning for capacity enhancement strategies and implementation of related short-term training programmes aiming at strengthening the capacity of local police and

judiciary elements (including integrated training of police officers from ex-belligerent factions).

Civilian Police elements in Kinshasa have been ensuring continuous liaison with the Congolese security services, namely the various elements of the *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC) including *Police d'Intervention Rapide* (PIR), *Police Special Roulage* (PSR) and Territorial Units, the more recently established Close Protection Corps (CPC) and MONUC's Neutral Force (NF). MONUC's Civilian Police provides technical advice as needed, and observe and monitor local law and order elements, including reporting on their activities and the way they discharge their policing responsibilities. The Civilian Police also provides permanent technical advice to MONUC's military structures in charge of security in Kinshasa.

In addition, and upon demand, the Civilian Police stands ready to advise on strategic planning and to continue providing intensive short-term training and awareness sessions on specific areas of police expertise, according to international policing standards (e.g. close protection, public security, democratic policing, crowd management, criminal investigations, etc). Civilian Police has also been assisting with Human Rights activities, and have been working in tandem with local and international partners on a comprehensive rule of law approach to the criminal justice system, including the corrections and judiciary elements.

In order to accomplish these tasks in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion, MONUC's Civilian Police officers involved in the security of Kinshasa have been recruited from Member States against five major profile categories: liaison; technical advice (covering the core police specialisations); planning; training/mentoring; and management. They perform their duties with respect for UN core values and the principles of the UN Charter, in a spirit of genuine collaboration with the relevant Congolese authorities and international partners. The activities of Civilian Police experts will be performed according to a general security plan at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

At the strategic level, they are to work closely with the Integrated Central Command (ICC) of Congolese police chiefs. At operational co-ordination level, they are to work with all elements in the Joint Security Operation Centre (JSOC), including the CPC; and at tactical level, they are to be co-located with the Congolese National Police elements (e.g. *Police d'Intervention Rapide*, *Police Special Roulage*, *Police Territoriale of Commissariat de Gombe*, the Immigration services, etc.).

As a matter of priority, MONUC's Civilian Police is to engage in the provision of technical advice for the preparation of a general protection plan, based on a threat assessment to individuals (local political leaders) and venues of the institutions of the Government of Transition, as well as official residences. As far as possible, and in the interest of good co-ordination, such technical advice

should also be debated within the JSOC, where all elements involved in the security arrangements of Kinshasa are represented. Naturally, the development of such plans must also be based on an assessment of priorities and needs, and has to comply with directives from respective decision-making levels.

In this sense, all plans must take into consideration that ownership of security arrangements lies with the Congolese authorities. Plans need to be elaborated in a flexible manner that allows immediate adaptation to evolving scenarios as well as the need to account for the rule of law context of all police-related activities. Hence, Civilian Police officers need to assist with comprehensive contingency planning for security measures for all sensitive locations, including: VIP movements; resources allocated; reserve elements; clear tasks to be performed by each element; and co-ordination mechanisms.

The Security of Kinshasa

Securing transitional institutions

The DRC's transition process has gradually become a reality with the promulgation of the Constitution and the establishment of the *Commission de Suivi* (CdS - Follow-up Commission) of the Agreement, as well as the institutions of the transition. In the 'Global and All-inclusive Agreement', the Congolese parties requested that the international community put in place a security system before the establishment of the Transitional Government. Such a measure, regarded as necessary for the strengthening of an environment of confidence, would allow the parties to work together in Kinshasa, as some have questioned the capacity or interest of the structures in place to efficiently ensure their security in the capital.

To that end, the signatories requested the international community to deploy a 'Neutral Force' (NF) to ensure the general security of the Transitional Government and the Kinshasa population. Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of Annex 5 to the 'Global and All-inclusive Agreement', each political leader may choose 5 to 15 bodyguards who are to assure their personal close protection, including protection of their offices, official residences and other venues, until the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU).

In the context of the Kinshasa security arrangements, MONUC's Civilian Police has a permanent presence with a two-fold responsibility:

- To provide expert advice, observe, report, follow up and assist the co-ordination and liaison among MONUC and Congolese elements of the Kinshasa security system (notably the NF, the PNC and the CPC) ; and

- to assess, plan, advise and coordinate the formation of IPU elements and, ultimately, of a Congolese national integrated police service (the latter is subject to further discussion).

The 'Neutral Force'

It has been clearly understood by all parties that assistance provided by both the military and the Civilian Police must respect the principle of unity of command within MONUC structures. To that end, and well before the formation of the Transitional Government, MONUC re-deployed some of its own existing resources, including Civilian Police officers present in Kisangani and in Kinshasa, to advise MONUC's military contingents that would comprise the NF. The deployment of the NF began on 13 April 2003, ensuring the security of the CdS and later also that of the different organs of the transitional institutions (within a pre-defined Security Zone - including the main arteries and routes within Kinshasa).

MONUC's Civilian Police has been providing permanent assistance to the NF and to Congolese police elements, as well as to the later established Close Protection Corps (CPC). This assistance has centred on co-ordination, liaison, and technical advice activities. MONUC elements engaged in this mission have reassured the parties through a visible, deterrent presence within the Security Zone, with static and mobile patrols, including military armed escorts. In addition, this mission has an extraction capacity in case of serious threat to a political leader within the Security Zone. NF elements may use force proportionately, in situations of self-defence (including serious threats to the physical integrity and/or life of themselves and of individuals subject to their protection), as well as in defence of critical sites, including institutions of the transition. Elements of the NF are not authorised to act outside the Security Zone, to search or arrest criminal suspects, nor to immobilise or search vehicles or disperse demonstrators.

Nevertheless, a number of factors influence the effectiveness of the NF, including:

- preparedness to provide a visible presence in support of security arrangements within the Security Zone (including deployment of adequate equipment);
- level of coordination and support among the multi-national contingents;
- level of communication with Congolese authorities (including French language capacity); and
- efficient liaison with MONUC Civilian Police officers on Law and Order issues.

Congolese authorities remain responsible for public security and criminal justice, for law and order and the security of Kinshasa. Control of access to the sites of the transitional institutions also remains the ultimate responsibility of Congolese authorities. It has been established that the NF will gradually withdraw and the IPU will start to take over its tasks within six months after the establishment of the transitional institutions. These timings need to be flexible, however, pending donors' commitment and support to the establishment of the IPU.

The Joint Security Operations Centre

The Joint Security Operations Centre (JSOC) is an essential operational co-ordination and liaison mechanism, involving all parties with responsibilities for the security of Kinshasa. As was previously discussed in the chapter by Henri Boshoff, the area of responsibility of this mechanism extends from N'Djili Airport to downtown Kinshasa, Gombe Commune, the main arteries leading to the public buildings of the transitional institutions, the Airport and the river port. In addition, entities involved in the security of Kinshasa need to pay attention to all events and information concerning the remaining areas of Kinshasa and the DRC territory in general, so as to constantly assess potential threats that may impact on public order and public security in Kinshasa. Specifically, the JSOC is responsible for:

- operational coordination of the activities of the various Congolese and international entities involved in the security arrangements for Kinshasa;
- centralised collection, analysis and dissemination of relevant information; and
- provision of advice and support on wider security issues.

While all members of the JSOC report directly to their respective hierarchical authority, the co-ordination of the mechanism can be ensured by the Congolese themselves, assisted by MONUC Civilian Police and military elements. The JSOC needs to operate permanently and must be supported by a separate communications system, which is compatible with both the MONUC and PNC systems.

The Close Protection Corps

The "Memorandum II on the Army and the Security", signed in Kinshasa on 29 June 2003 by the signatories to the "Global and All-inclusive Agreement", refers to two essential elements for providing security during the transition. The first is the Close Protection Corps (CPC), for the security of the political

leaders, while second – an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) - aims at enhancing the security environment in the city of Kinshasa. In addition to its main task of securing Kinshasa, the Memorandum establishes that the IPU will support the CPC and may also serve as the embryo of a Congolese National Integrated Police service.

The CPC is composed of Congolese members recruited from the police, armed forces and security elements of the ex-belligerent parties, and is established for the protection of political leaders of the transitional institutions. It is vital to keep this a limited operation, as well as to register and control the number of these individuals – essentially bodyguards – as well as the equipment in their possession. Otherwise, the Corps could become a disruptive element that may eventually impact on the success of the transition process. The CPC's co-ordination structure - the Integrated Central Command (ICC) - will include police chiefs from the ex-belligerent parties and a limited number of integrated headquarters staff. MONUC's Civilian Police proactively advises the ICC, as needed.

The main tasks of the CPC are: close and personal protection of the political leaders of the transitional institutions identified as in need of or entitled to bodyguards; and the static protection of offices, residences and other critical buildings and sites utilised by the institutions of the transition. The ICC, the commanding body of the CPC, needs to liaise with the NF, the Command of the Integrated Police Unit (once established), MONUC's Civilian Police, and the relevant authorities of the Transitional Government. The ICC is also responsible for the evaluation of the sites that need static security, as well as to assure adequate co-ordination of the close protection provided to all political leaders. The ICC may also be engaged in planning and advising on the modalities for the establishment of the IPU and, eventually, a reformed internal security apparatus in the DRC, including a Congolese integrated national police service.

The Integrated Police Unit (IPU)

Guiding principles

An Integrated Police Unit is to be established as soon as possible to support the security of Kinshasa during the transition period. It will incorporate elements with specific expertise from within the PNC, such as suitably qualified officers from the PIR (*Police d'Intervention Rapide* - Rapid Reaction Police), PSR (*Police Special Roulage* - Special Traffic Police) and Territorial Units. The Government of Transition is responsible for defining the practical modalities of the establishment of the IPU, which will gradually take over the tasks currently performed by the NF. While the IPU is being established, the elements of the Congolese

Armed Forces based in Kinshasa shall remain in their garrisons, where they will focus on training and integration, with no need for engagement in law and Order situations. The UN has been actively engaging and co-operating with donors, especially the EU, regarding assistance to the establishment of the IPU.

UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003), confirms and supports the deployment of the IPU.² The establishment of an IPU that is respectful of human rights, in a country desolated and divided by war, needs to be a politically-driven act. It should be accompanied by adequate legal instruments, which regulate its powers and specify its organisation, functioning, and activities. In this respect, MONUC Civilian Police will need to continue playing a proactive advisory role in:

- providing technical assistance on the proper development and employment of the IPU, in partnership with donors (namely the European Union);
- gaining the commitment of Congolese authorities to the protection of the population against potential acts of abuse of authority; and
- effective prevention of threats against the security of the institutions of the transition and its leaders.

Composition and training

In December 2002, it was agreed in Pretoria that the IPU would be composed of elements recruited from the three main ex-belligerents (signatories of the Lusaka Agreements). It was understood by the parties that the IPU should be of a similar strength to the NF. It is further understood that the IPU will be comprised of professional police officers, recruited from the police services formerly in place (an essential profile pre-requisite).

The disparity of background, including training and origin of potential candidates to be recruited for the IPU (ex-combatants from different armed factions, ex-militia converted to police functions, ex-gendarmes, ex-civil guard, ex-police professionals) requires the implementation of serious vetting, selection, recruitment, training and skills enhancement plans, to be agreed upon by the Congolese authorities according to minimum requirements of international standards.

Pre-selected candidates will be vetted to meet criteria of integrity, competence, medical condition and physical fitness. Upon incorporation into the IPU, they will enter a supplementary training programme. A multi-level training approach needs to be considered. The selection and recruitment process will need to be conducted by a special joint committee, incorporating representatives of the Government of Transition and relevant international partners (including MONUC and eventual bi-lateral donors). Adequate structures and

reporting mechanisms to follow up and support the development of the IPU role need to be decided as a matter of priority.

Command, control and co-ordination

It is envisaged that the IPU be placed under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and Security of the Transitional Government, as per consensus reached by the Integrated Forum of Congolese Police Seniors. In order to ensure an effective chain of command, the commander of the IPU (whose appointment will be based on a recommendation by the Minister of Interior and Security) will report directly to the Inspector-General of Police.

The IPU Command needs to be assisted by an integrated HQ and, in the interest of co-ordination and rationalisation of resources and structures, a senior level post (e.g. Director-General) could be created by the Government of Transition to co-ordinate future activities of both the IPU and the CPC. The command, control and co-ordination structures and processes to be established need to ensure accountability and transparency of the IPU's activities.

Main tasks

The core tasks of the IPU will be based on the responsibilities taken over from MONUC's NF, within the established Security Zone. The deployment of the IPU will be gradual, as trainees graduate from the supplementary training programme, and essential equipment is provided. Its main tasks will include: the security of international entry points (e.g. the airport and riverine harbour); the security of the main arteries in and out of Kinshasa; and to act as a complement to the protection provided by the CPC, including assistance with the extraction of threatened VIPs. The activities necessary to ensure those tasks will include patrolling (especially the N'Djili airport, riverine harbour, downtown and Gombe areas, and the main arteries connecting these areas), and provision of static guard to transitional institutions buildings, official residences and other sensitive points. The IPU therefore has to be organised according to a model that is compatible with meeting these operational expectations.

A possible operational model

As discussed, the effectiveness of the IPU will depend upon good organisation (e.g. with rapid response sub-units) and adequate resources, including basic equipment. Being an element of the civilian public security service, the IPU needs to function in a disciplined manner that enables a permanent state

of readiness and capacity to tackle law and order problems in Kinshasa, during the critical transition period. To meet these challenges, the IPU's organisation and functioning should be based on four principles of:

- *Availability and readiness* presumes that IPU sub-units may be mobilised at any given moment, at all times, in order to face and/or prevent any critical incident. This requires a section standby and rotation system, based on a "barracks" model of deployment ;
- *Mobility* encompasses the existence of adequate means of transportation, including eventually access to air and marine assets, that enable a rapid deployment in difficult access areas and situations for VIP extraction.
- *Technical specialisation* dictates that the IPU sub-units need to have specialised personnel for dealing with different aspects of public security incidents.
- *Adaptability* means that the IPU elements need to be able to adapt to operating in any terrain, as well as top handling diverse types of incidents in order to control and manage situations efficiently.

The IPU's possible future structure

The IPU could be structured in two Groups of four Companies each. Each Company may comprise four Sections (two ordinary sections, plus an Intervention and Protection Section and a Support Section). Each Section may be composed of four Teams. Pending assessed needs and resources available, a Team may be composed of six to ten officers; a Section may be composed of 30 to 50 officers; a Company may comprise a strength of 120 to 150 officers; and the strength of a Group may range between 480 and 600. Consequently, the IPU's strength may range between 960 to 1,200 officers.

The Group of Companies would be the largest organisational unit of the IPU. It would be composed of four Companies and commanded by a senior police officer, assisted by a Deputy designated from within his/her senior staff. The Company would be the basic formed administrative and tactical unit for the maintenance of law and order, especially formed to manoeuvre. Each of the IPU's four Companies would be commanded by a senior police officer who would report directly to the Group Commander. The Company commander would also be responsible for the discipline, training and welfare of the personnel under his/her command. The Section would be the smallest operational unit that could be utilised in maintenance of law and order situations. It is composed of three or four Teams. Each Section Chief reports to the Company leadership. The Teams would be typically composed of a Chief, driver, and four to six agents. Specialised Teams would include various experts, as per needs assessed.

The listed strength could be utilised as follows: three Companies dedicated to the general security of the area defined by the Security Zone, including the river harbour; two Companies to support the escort and movement of VIPs; one Company deployed to N'Djili Airport; and two Companies to ensure Protection and Intervention tasks (Reserve Force).

Public service ethos

In a democratic society, human and fundamental rights are to be protected by public services. Such services are established for the benefit of all citizens, and not to serve the narrow sectional interests of some. This is *the* guiding principle for the establishment of public order intervention units (of the IPU type) and for the role of civilian authorities responsible for public order. The principle is addressed in Law-Decree number 002/2002 of 26 January 2002 about the institution, organisation and functioning of the PNC. Also, the Constitution of the DRC clearly states that “all Congolese have the right to peace and security” (Article 53). Therefore, the use of public force by the IPU can only be authorised upon request and under the control of civilian authorities.

The principles of minimum use of force and proportionality of means are to be strictly followed. In addition, democratic policing principles will include appropriate ethnic and gender representation, as well as integrity, transparency and accountability mechanisms.³

In addition, a reformed police system needs to be based on community policing philosophies, and to develop proactive rather than reactive approaches to policing. Although basically a reserve unit dedicated primarily to crowd management with protective operations capacity, an IPU-type of operational unit also has to be integrated into broader community policing strategies. Ultimately, all police are to work according to the Law, and therefore to be respected and not feared by the population.

Conditions for a successful Civilian Police mandate implementation

MONUC’s Civilian Police current Mission Statement concerning the security arrangements for Kinshasa encompasses a mandate implementation plan, divided in three phases that correspond with some short, medium and longer-term objectives:

- *First phase*: the core objective during this phase, which covered the period from the signature of the “Pretoria Agreements” up to the establishment of

the Transitional Government, was to ensure the security of the members of the CdS. Thus, MONUC's Civilian Police operations were integrated with MONUC political and military elements, while engaging in assessment, planning and advisory activities related to law and order aspects of Kinshasa security and the establishment of an integrated police unit.

- *Second phase:* after the establishment of the Government of Transition, MONUC's Civilian Police component continued their assessment, planning and advisory activities, strengthening their role *vis-a-vis* the NF and the Congolese entities involved in the security of Kinshasa. These included the CPC (responsible for the close protection of the Congolese political leaders of the transitional institutions), and the PNC (where ultimate responsibility rests for security missions in general).
- *Third phase:* this phase will be characterised by the gradual replacement of the NF by an IPU. During the third phase, MONUC Civilian Police will proactively advise, observe and report on the NF/IPU "handover" process.

The 'operationalisation' of the IPU (with the support of the European Union) may result in a model for the creation of other similar elements in the DRC and, ultimately, a future Integrated Congolese National Police Service (pending decisions on the latter from the Congolese authorities and donors' support). MONUC's Civilian Police is expected to continue to play a major role in planning and assistance to vetting, training and coordination of activities aimed at enhancing sustainable local police capacity (within the context of the criminal justice system and the rule of law). Such efforts need to be undertaken with the commitment of local authorities, MONUC and other international partners/donors.

Also, subject to further discussion and Security Council approval, the Civilian Police will need to periodically review their benchmarks and evolving concept of operations. This will involve studying the modalities of enhancing MONUC's capacity to assist with assessment, strategic planning, co-ordination and establishment of comprehensive strategies for the eventual reform of the Congolese internal security apparatus. Furthermore, the Civilian Police may need to stand ready to assist with the planning and establishment of local security arrangements in support of the future electoral process, thus implementing lessons learned on similar tasks from previous peacekeeping operations.

Therefore, Civilian Police have identified a number of basic requirements considered necessary for the successful implementation of their mandate within MONUC:

- *The need for integrated and multi-dimensional cooperation.* Proactive co-operation and an integrated effort among Civilian Police and criminal justice

partners, military, political and humanitarian agencies (at both national and international levels) are considered vital in the implementation of effective and sustainable internal security solutions in the DRC. Integrated and multi-dimensional co-operation will contribute to the development of feasible long-term exit strategies. In assisting the DRC authorities, MONUC's Civilian Police component has responsibilities *vis-à-vis* some of these challenges. Through applying lessons learnt from peace operations worldwide, the Civilian Police has identified the advantages of maintaining integrated working relationships with all relevant international and national partners in the DRC.

- *The need for donor support and coordination.* It is crucial to foster the willingness and ability of donors to develop a coherent approach to the development of a reformed, integrated national police service (we emphasise "service" and not "force") in the DRC. While such involvement has successfully contributed to sustainable police achievements in peace operations worldwide, this still needs to be fostered in the DRC with the commitment of international and national entities.
- *The need for political support.* Political debate and support is vital in order to ensure that an adequate environment exists for the full and accountable implementation of mandated police tasks, as well as to prevent potential shortcomings with undesirable effects. In this regard, it should be noted that internal security matters ought not to be regarded as a minor issue on the domestic political agenda. In fact, a stable internal environment in the DRC will enable the functioning of democratic institutions, attract foreign direct investment, and pave the way for sustainable social and economic stability and progress. Consequently, the maintenance of an enabling political environment in the DRC is critical for the implementation of the UN Civilian Police mandate and therefore for the establishment of a gradually reformed and sustainable Congolese integrated national police service as a key element of the internal security apparatus. This is relevant in the short-term, with the establishment of integrated police elements, as well as in the longer run, when assistance may focus on broader aspects of strategic planning, advising, training and development.
- *Complementary of the public security and criminal justice systems.* Efforts towards the establishment of a sustainable Congolese integrated national police service need to bear in mind the complementary dimensions of both public security and the criminal justice systems within a rule of law context. Criminal law, courts, defence bar and corrections systems are essential elements to be looked at in tandem with the police system. Comprehensive assessments are needed as regards the restoration of a rule of law environment (including legislative, executive and judicial elements). On the public security aspects of MONUC's Civilian Police mis-

sion, which are more directly identified with support to law and order, a clear division of labour among donors and the strengthening of joint planning arrangements between police and other relevant experts will ensure that efforts in each of those areas are complementary and can be successfully co-ordinated.

While a multi-dimensional and multi-agency model is gradually being developed (with the assistance of the international community), the Civilian Police's immediate priorities need to focus on strategising a gradual nation-wide reform and enhancement of the internal security environment. This includes concerns *vis-a-vis* the restoration of the rule of law, the rehabilitation of the criminal justice system institutions (including the establishment of an integrated national police service), whilst continuing to support the arrangements for the security of Kinshasa and thus the institutions of the transition. Some support to the security of the electoral process is also an element to be considered in a next review of the Civilian Police concept of operations.

Conclusion

Civilian Police components of peace operations have been tools of immediate civilian crisis management, leading to social stability, democratisation and sustainable development. They play a critical role in restructuring and enhancing national police services, and sometimes also ensuring law enforcement in conflict-torn societies. Equally important, they may play a major role in building an environment for an appropriate and feasible mission exit strategy.

The operational effectiveness of Civilian Police components, including that of MONUC, remains dependent on support from police contributing countries, the UN partners and the political leadership of the territory hosting the peace operation. In fact, the effectiveness of MONUC's police mission can be impaired at the international level if contributing countries lack the political will and commitment to engage high-calibre professionals for the identified assessment, liaison, planning, training, management and coordination activities. Timely support is also needed to provide the necessary financial and logistic resources for the immediate establishment of the IPU, as well as further major projects related to the reform of the internal security and criminal justice systems - including the establishment of a nation-wide integrated police service.

The demand for Civilian Police participation, especially dedicated to reform and strategic advisory tasks, is now common to other peacekeeping operations in Africa and other continents. In the past, planners of UN police missions have focused mostly on tactical aspects of police reform: the training,

size, structure and equipment needs of national police services. Gradually, it has been realised that rehabilitation of the criminal justice system (in the context of the restoration of a wider rule of law environment) involves confidence-building measures, so that the population trusts their police's ability to impartially protect their rights and freedoms. Nowadays, that perception calls for a more strategic, policy-based approach to reform elements in the context of public administration that also includes structures, processes, organisational culture and sustainability concerns.

Essentially, learning lessons from other missions, this means bringing about a shift in the self-perception of a national police service from an instrument of the state to a public service institution. Experience has taught us that such a shift is only viable when it is supported by a corresponding shift towards a propitious political context in which the police may enforce the law in an impartial and accountable manner, within a rule of law environment. These raise obviously very sensitive matters that need to be discussed with the involvement of all relevant partners, involving also the civil society.

In short, creating a democratic civilian police service in the DRC is part of a major exercise in restructuring its public service institutions. While such a platform has been achieved with the "All-Inclusive Agreements", policy-makers need also to continue recognising the role of Civilian Police as an integral and essential part of a vast and ambitious project of political and socio-economic development for the DRC. Ideally, that recognition would enable increased awareness and better understanding of the potential of short and long-term Civilian Police achievements in conflict-torn societies.

Notes

1. Mr Antero Lopes is Deputy Police Advisor, Civilian Police Division, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The references used in this chapter range from Security Council Resolutions on MONUC; Reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC; the "Pretoria Agreements"; Inter-Congolese Dialogue documents; Reports of the United Nations Civilian Police Commissioners in MONUC (e.g. plans drafted by the Offices of MONUC Police Commissioners); and various publications on Peacekeeping and the role of Civilian Police in Peace Operations. He prepared this text in support of the discussions held during the Workshop.
2. See paragraphs 6 and 7. Also see the second special report of the Secretary-General, dated 28 May 2003, paragraphs 35 (b) and 36.
3. The following references pertain: 'Global and All-inclusive Agreement', signed at Pretoria at 16 December 2002; 'Memorandum on the Army and

Security'; 'Law-Decree number 002/2002' of 26 January 2002, on the institution, organisation and functioning of the *Police Nationale Congolaise*; 'Act on the Creation, Organization, Functioning and Attributions of the Neutral Force'; 'Operations Orders concerning the Neutral Force'; and the 'Operations Orders concerning MONUC's Civilian Police'.