

# MONUC'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE EASTERN CONGO (MANIEMA AND THE KIVUS)

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## Introduction

MONUC's tangible involvement in the Eastern DRC escalated drastically with the introduction of Task Force 1 and the Indian Aviation Unit into the theatre of operations. During the previous phases of the operation, the focus was on monitoring the situation. The advent of phase three has resulted in a much more visible deployment of troops on the ground, the deployment of expanded military resources in support of the operation and consequently, more protection and flexibility with regards to the employment of the military observers. The most dramatic impact, however, was the promulgation of Security Council Resolution 1493, which authorised a Chapter VII mandate for MONUC.<sup>2</sup> This mandate necessitated a quick adjustment by the contingents previously deployed and functioning under the original Chapter VI mandate. Although the previous Rules of Engagement did not need a major change with the new mandate, their interpretation and application at ground level needed to be adjusted very quickly. In this regard, a two-phased strategy was followed; firstly implementing a quick impact change-and-adapt-programme with interim measures, followed by a more structured and formal training programme which is scheduled to start shortly.

The dynamic nature of the situation can only be understood and taken into consideration during the development of operations, if a proper and complete military information picture is available. This critical requirement for the successful conduct of operations has been greatly enhanced by the deployment of troops on the ground as well as the increase in the number of military observer teams and their deployment to team sites in remote areas throughout the sector.

Since any strategy is followed by structuring and organising to implement and effect it, the transition period during the past few months has been characterised by obtaining the correct posture in order to be successful in the execution of the concept of operations. It is to be noted that this transitioning took place in a period during which a major offensive was launched by the

RCD(G) <sup>3</sup>. Plans and the employment of resources had to be temporarily adapted in order to meet the demands of this situation. In stead of proceeding with DDRRR as the Focus of Main Effort, the stabilisation of the most critically affected areas became a priority.

The establishment of the Transitional Government coincided with the full deployment of military forces available for operations in Sector 5. This coincidence may eventually turn out to have a positive effect on the general acceptance by the population of the objectives of MONUC during phase three of the operation.

This chapter will address the contextual framework within which military operations are planned, directed and controlled within the mission, with specific reference to MONUC Sector 5. This is followed by a short discussion on the Concept of Operations, which creates the foundation for the deployment military personnel and resources within the Kivus. A brief explanation is provided of how the Sector is organised in order to accomplish its mission, before current operations within the area of responsibility. Finally, a number of priorities that have been set for the next quarter provides some insight as to the short-term objectives to be achieved within Sector 5.

## Contextual framework of military operations in the eastern Congo

Military Operations throughout MONUC take place within the context of the mission's goal and objectives. Overall direction is provided by the SRSG's vision and objectives, viz:

**... helping the Congolese succeed in their political transition through achieving four principle objectives:**

- *Stopping the killing and ending the tragedy of war and conflict.*
- *Facilitating the political transition leading to free and transparent elections.*
- *Working towards the establishment of a rule of law and respect for human rights which are essential foundations for economic development*
- *Addressing the legacy of war by improving human conditions for sustainable peace.*

This vision cascades down to all levels of the Mission, and is expressed in the intent published by the members of the Senior Management Team in their guidance to their respective divisions. Of particular importance to the military component of MONUC is the *Force Commander's direction and intent*, which is articulated as follows for Sector 5:

"Establish a UN presence in key terrain, [establish] mechanisms for local conflict resolution, monitor and verify the activities of belligerents and pro-

vide support to DDRRR in order to assist in creating stability within Sector 5 and thereby contribute to stability within the region." Specifically, the Sector 5 commander is to:

- *Establish a presence of the UN in key terrain and areas not able to be reached by MILOBS<sup>4</sup> and civilian UN staff*
- *Establish mechanisms to achieve local conflict resolution, in particular between the factions of the Transitional Government and armed groups.*
- *Conduct monitoring and verification of reports of the activities and presence of:*
  - *Rwandans in the DRC, in the context of the Pretoria and Lusaka agreements;*
  - *The uncontrolled Armed Groups;*
  - *The humanitarian situation and the employment of child soldiers.*
- *Support DDRRR<sup>5</sup> by passing the critical DDRRR message to key target audiences, identify and voluntarily disarm and demobilise combatants and assist them and their dependants' physical repatriation through the Transit Points or direct to their home countries. Establish Assembly Areas close to areas where combatants and dependants are.*
- *Assist where possible with humanitarian operations, human rights and child protection activities, including assistance in the DDR of Congolese child soldiers.*
- *Be prepared to assist with evacuation plans.*
- *Conduct CIMIC<sup>6</sup> tasks to support the mission objectives, including route improvement.*

**Multi-Level approach.** Within the mission, the emphasis is on joint planning and execution at all levels<sup>7</sup>, but with due respect for the integrity of each component's scope of practice and its field of expertise during all stages of operations. This multi-level approach is characterised by the uninterrupted flow of information, especially on tasks and support requirements, between officials (civilian and military) at the respective levels. Control measures are outcome based and serve as input for both contingency planning and corrective measures.<sup>8</sup>

**Decentralised execution.** Within the context of the multi-level approach, joint missions are conducted, as well as exclusively military missions. The planning and control of joint missions is done according to guidelines from the heads of the various divisions, and with input from the sector commander with regard to military involvement. The integration and coordination of activities takes place under the auspices of the Head of Office in the specific region concerned.

**Future Operations.** Future planning is done regularly, and plans are published on a monthly basis. When major changes in the mission are foreseen, concept planning is discussed and distributed for comments, and feasibility studies undertaken, before the plans are forwarded to UNDPKO<sup>9</sup> for approval.

In this regard, the current thrust of future planning includes, a shift of mission emphasis to the east, and the reinforcement of Sector 5.

## Sector 5 concept of operations

The overall **aim** of the operation is to facilitate the DDRRR process in the Area of Responsibility. This is reflected and elaborated in the Sector 5 Commander's **intent**, which has been stated as follows:

*"My intent is to successfully conduct operations of which the outcome will be the successful DDRRR of all possible candidates, and their dependents, to their respective native countries. Due to the changing environment at the various levels and in particular the dynamics and complexity at the tactical level, a long-term view must be taken to effect the final outcome. Therefore the operation will not be time driven; development of the operation will need to be coupled to decision points and the achievement of objectives per stage. A master plan with regard to how the respective sub-AORs [areas of responsibility] will be addressed must be compiled and regularly updated. I also intend to effect a seamless integration of all military resources as well as other supporting elements. This will entail the sequencing and synchronisation of supporting efforts (engineering tasks, CIMIC, employment of DDRRR specialists and the military information teams) in order to create the conditions for success".*

The Sector Commander's **vision** encompasses three stages of operations:

### Stage 1

During stage 1, three companies of Task Force One (TF1) are deployed into the north-eastern part of the area of responsibility (AOR). Their precise locations must be such that force protection, good command and control, as well as logistic support are all feasible. The details of company AORs are finalised by taking into consideration specific tasks, the current knowledge of MILOB teams, as well as feedback from the DDR teams. High visibility of the companies throughout their respective AORs must be achieved through the skillful use of helicopters, combined with vigorous patrolling. As far as possible, MILOB patrols are co-ordinated with troop movements on the ground in areas where safety and security pose a risk to observers.

The high visibility concept must augment the efforts of DDR and military information teams to achieve stability. A high level of freedom of action at company level is to prevail, in order to achieve the desired balance between maintaining a high level of presence, conflict resolution, monitoring and verification actions. *Ad hoc* DDRRR opportunities must be exploited as far as possible, without distracting forces from the main aim during this stage. Simultaneously, engineering tasks in the sector enhance and enable the eventual conduct of DDRRR on a large scale.

The employment of the helicopters during this initial stage enhances the concept of high visibility, and flying from forward locations to shorten sortie duration must receive priority during final planning and positioning. At least one helicopter is on 24-hour standby for casualty evacuation and reaction force deployment, when troops are deployed in the field. Assistance to humanitarian operations takes place with sanction from the sector HQ.

Within the Kindu area, a vigorous patrolling plan augments and enhances the operations of MILOB teams deployed in the western part of the sector. As far as possible these patrols must be synchronised with riverine operations to highlight the visibility of the UN within the western part of the AOR.

### *Stage 2*

Stage 2 of the operation involves the re-deployment of infantry elements to the south-eastern part of the sector for stabilisation operations in the same manner as conducted in the north-eastern part; the remaining elements commence with DDR activities.

### *Stage 3*

Stage 3 will see the deployment of troops into the central part of the AOR to facilitate DDRRR.

**Each stage of the operation has an envisaged end state, described respectively as follows:**

### *Stage 1.*

The north-eastern part of the sector is stable. Clashes between the various factions have scaled down to such an extent that the security situation can be controlled by the deployment of MILOB teams. Ex-FAR and Interhamwe elements have been sensitised about the DDRRR process, and locations where possible assembly areas can be deployed have been identified. The amount of possible candidates for DDRRR has been determined, and there is willingness on the part of the ex-FAR and the Interhamwe elements to continue with the process. The infrastructure has been improved to such an extent that ground movement of heavy vehicles and materiel is possible on the route Kindu – Bukavu, with relative ease. DDRRR can commence. DDR of Congolese combatants takes place within the ambit of policy guidelines provided, and contributes towards the stability in the sector

### *Stage 2.*

The north-eastern part of the sector remains stable, and DDRRR is in full swing. The south-eastern part of the sector is also stable, and is ready for full-scale DDRRR activities.

### *Stage 3.*

DDRRR is in full swing in the entire eastern part of the sector, and this fact creates the conditions for successful DDRRR in the central part of the sector.

In pursuit of his vision, the Sector Commander has identified the following as critical success factors for all three stages of the operation:

- Force protection;
- Effective flow of information to and from the sector HQ;
- Guaranteed medical support at all levels;
- Guaranteed logistic support;
- Guaranteed air support;
- High level of command initiative at lower levels;
- Good relations with the local population at all locations where sector elements are deployed;
- Well-defined command and control structure that enhances quick and effective decision-making; and
- Well-structured liaison fora at all levels.

## Military force deployment in Sector 5

**Force Composition.** The current force deployment in Sector 5 can be divided into Mobile Forces, Static Forces and Supporting elements. The mobile force elements are directly involved in the achievement of the aim of Sector 5, while the static elements execute mainly a security function, in order to release the mobile elements to focus on operations. The supporting elements render the full range of supporting functions to both mobile and static forces, in order to maintain the momentum of operations. The amount of military personnel deployed in Sector 5 numbers just over two thousand two hundred.

## Mobile Force Elements

- *Infantry Battalion.* The mainstay of the mobile forces is the Infantry Battalion of Task Force 1, deployed into four sub-areas of responsibility: Kindu, Lubero, Goma and Bukavu. This infantry battalion is a four-company motorised battalion, with battalion support weapons decentralised to company level in order to enhance flexibility and fire power. They are equipped with Casspir Armoured Personnel Carriers (Mine Protected) to enhance and facilitate the movement of the battalion reaction force.
- *Aviation Unit.* The mobility of the infantry battalion is enhanced by the Indian Aviation Unit, deployed in Goma, which is central to the stage 1 area of responsibility (the north-eastern part of the sector). The Indian Aviation Unit is equipped with MI-17 Utility helicopters and MI-25 Attack helicopters.
- *Riverine Unit.* The third mobile element is the Uruguayan Riverine Unit, stationed in Kindu, with the task of providing mobility and security on the

Congo river and its tributaries from south of Kindu to Ubondo. This unit is equipped with two fast-patrol boats and several semi-rigid boats.

- *Military Observers.* One hundred and sixty military observers, organised in twenty-seven teams, are deployed throughout the sector. They are equipped with two four-by-four vehicles and the necessary communications equipment per team.
- *Engineering Units.* Two engineer companies, one from Task Force 1 and the other from China, are deployed at Kindu and Bukavu respectively. They are employed in various locations throughout the sector, with certain elements also deployed outside the sector in the larger mission area. The Chinese Engineer Company is a construction company, while the Task Force 1 element includes field engineers. The Chinese engineers are equipped with the full range of earth-moving and road construction equipment, while the Task Force 1 engineers also have a well drilling unit and a ferry unit at their disposal.

## Static Forces

The static forces in the sector comprise of a Senegalese Guard Company, deployed in Kindu, and an Uruguayan Guard Company, deployed in Bukavu. The Indian Aviation Unit also has a guard component responsible for apron security and guard duties.

## Support Elements

- *Swedish Air Support Unit.* This unit is responsible for the management of Kindu airport. It provides a cargo and personnel handling function, an Emergency and Fire Fighting capability, a weather analysis and reporting function, as well as an apron management team.
- *Level II Hospital.* This facility is deployed in Kindu, and is manned by the Chinese. The full-range of medical services include dental, radiology, laboratory, gynecology, surgery and clinic functions.
- *Aero Medical Evacuation Team.* This is a South African team, ensuring a short reaction time within the Sector to the Level II hospital as well as to the Level IV hospital (1 Military Hospital) in the RSA.
- *Military Police.* A military police team from the RSA is currently deployed in Kindu. It is soon to be replaced by a team from Bangladesh.
- *Air Cargo Handling Teams.* One team, from the RSA, is deployed at the Goma airport; another team from Uruguay, at the Kavuma airfield north of Bukavu.
- *Emergency Crash and Rescue Team.* Deployed at the Goma airport by the RSA.

## Organisation

In order to execute proper command and control and to maintain a pre-emptive posture, a decentralised command and control concept is followed. The Sector Headquarters is currently deployed in Kindu, while three Forward Operations Centers are deployed in Lubero, Goma and Bukavu respectively. The Sector Headquarters provides overall direction, coordination and prioritisation of operations throughout the sector, while the Forward Operations Centers co-ordinate force employment in their respective areas of responsibility. Force Employment entails the employment of all military forces in the specific area of responsibility, including the deployment of Military Observer Team Sites as well as their patrol and liaison programmes.

The Sector Headquarters is manned by Task Force 1 officers, augmented by United Nations military staff officers. All the Forward Operations Centers are manned exclusively by UN military staff officers. The Sector Headquarters has an added responsibility, in that it coordinates operations within the Kindu area of responsibility as well.

The deployment of mobile forces ensures better coverage within the sector sub-areas of responsibility and is as depicted on Map 5.

This concept enhances the flow of information, as well as the hands-on management of issues related to a specific area of responsibility. It is also dovetailed with the deployment of the UN civilian offices and sections within Sector 5. Most of these offices have a Head of Office, administrative elements, and officers from MONUC's political affairs, public information, human rights, humanitarian affairs, DDRRR and child protection divisions. Most of the Forward Operations Centers are co-located with a UN Office, or close to it. At Office level, daily planning, coordination and integration of operations take place. The key to success at this level depends on the sharing of information, in order to determine cross impact and verification of information received by the different role players.

## Current operations

Current operations within Sector 5 are characterised by the effects of a long and drawn out war in general and by the aftermath of the RCD(G) offensive and the establishment of the Transitional Government in particular. The focus of main effort currently is on stabilisation through local conflict resolution and high visibility operations in order to create confidence among the population and develop conditions conducive to large scale DDRRR.

## Map 5: Current force deployments MONUC sector 5

### Lubero

Infantry Company  
 Engineer Section  
 Military Police Section minus  
 Explosive Ordnance Section  
 Signal Section  
 Workshop Section  
 Medical Section

### Goma


Battalion HQ  
 Infantry Company  
 Engineer Section  
 Explosive Ordnance Section  
 Signal Section  
 Workshop Section  
 Level 1 Hospital  
 Air Support Unit

### Bukavu

Infantry Company  
 Guard Unit  
 2 x Engineer Sections  
 Military Police Section minus  
 Explosive Ordnance Section  
 Signal Section  
 Workshop Section  
 Medical Section  
 Air Support Unit

### Kindu

Sector HQ  
 Infantry Company  
 Guard Unit  
 2 x Engineer Sections  
 Military Police Section minus  
 Explosive Ordnance Section  
 Signal Section  
 Workshop Section  
 Medical Section  
 Air Support Unit  
 Level 2 Hospital



## Local Conflict Resolution

The military involvement in local conflict resolution is currently pitched at two levels. Firstly, the Chiefs of Staff at the Forward Operations Centres are involved as advisors and active participants, under leadership of political affairs officers, in initiatives in the Lubero, Bukavu, Goma, and Kindu areas.

- In the Lubero area of responsibility, the military observers deployed in Beni are directly involved in the pacification process between the Mayi Mayi and the APC (military wing of the RCD-KML<sup>10</sup>). A break occurred in their alliance during and after the RCD(G) offensive in the second quarter of 2003.

- In the Bukavu area, conflict resolution is focused on achieving a decrease in tensions between the Mayi Mayi leaders and the RCD(G)'s ANC<sup>11</sup> elements deployed in the area.
- In the Goma area, initiatives are aimed at stopping the fighting between the ANC and the Interhamwe to create conditions conducive to DDRRR.
- In Kindu, the local pacification forum was revived and chaired by the Sector Headquarters Chief of Staff. The forum currently meets on a weekly basis and steps have been taken to hand over the chairmanship of the forum to a locally elected leader.

Secondly, the military is also involved in local conflict resolution at the tactical level, involving the deployment of troops in order to support local initiatives. The most notable operation in this regard was the Monitoring and Verification of the implementation of the Bujumbura Cease-fire Agreement. This operation started during July 2003, and is currently winding down with the implementation of the final phase. The operation involved the Task Force 1 company deployed in Lubero, as well as several military observer teams from Lubero and Goma. The company deployed in the Demilitarised Zone between the ANC and the APC, and executed escort duties for the Joint Monitoring and Verification Teams. In addition to this, escorts were provided for civilian convoys taking produce through the DMZ (de-militarised zone), as well as school children attending final examinations for the year. Military Observer Teams throughout the area in contention executed monitoring and verification visits and contributed to the compilation of a comprehensive report of the operation by the Sector Headquarters.

## High Visibility Operations

One of the specific tasks given to the Sector 5 Commander, is that of establishing presence in areas never visited before. Several inroads have been made in this regard, of which the most notable is the active patrolling east of the Congo River in the Maniema province, as well as in the Kindu environment. The first patrol across the Congo River received a heroes' welcome from the Alunguli population and was showered with leaves and rice as it passed through the crowds. Several members of the population accompanied this on-foot patrol for several kilometers before returning to their homes. In Kindu, the population figures, according to local authorities, grew from approximately 20,000 inhabitants in January 2003 to in excess of 220,000 in August 2003. This change in the number of inhabitants is indicative of the security situation returning to a higher degree of stability. Several markets in the area have also started functioning again, although harassment from both the Mayi Mayi and the ANC troops with

regards to confiscation of goods and produce remains a problem. During the past two months Kasongo, Kampene, Kama, Shabunda, Baraka, Lulingwe, and several other smaller villages, have been visited by MONUC personnel.

## **Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration**

The instability in the sector has had such a detrimental effect on DDRRR operations that stability and confidence building have become pre-conditions without which large scale DDRRR cannot take place. It is actually a chicken-and-egg situation: without stability, large scale DDRRR cannot take place; on the other hand, the mere presence of the "Uncontrolled Armed Groups" creates instability. In this regard, two assembly areas for Rwandan Armed Groups have been established at Kasuo and Nyabiondo respectively. At both these assembly areas, the concept is to provide security at the site and to further enhance security by active patrolling in the surrounding area. These security patrols are also used to spread the DDRRR message and to collect information on possible candidates. Future plans include the further strengthening of this security blanket with active patrolling by the MI-25 helicopters. Although a small number of candidates have been processed by the Kasuo Assembly Area, the sensitisation process will have to run its full course before any large scale DDRRR will be possible.

## **DDR of Congolese combatants**

Security Council Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003) authorised MONUC's involvement in the DDR of Congolese combatants. In the absence of a formal national programme by the Transitional Government, the bridging role played by MONUC is of vital importance. Requests to make contact with MONUC are slowly, but surely becoming regular events, especially in the Kindu area. Since the beginning of August, more than 140 Mayi Mayi soldiers have been disarmed by MONUC in sector 5. Military personnel have been instrumental in establishing the contacts in conjunction with political affairs officers. The most important factor is, however, the confidence created by the UN military presence on the ground. In the case of Kindu, security provided by the military during the brief cantonment periods has allayed fears of interference by the ANC and the active recruitment drive they have been conducting over the past few weeks. The biggest stumbling block at this stage for large scale DDR of the Mayi Mayi, is probably the socio-economic situation in the Kivus and Maniema. Combatants are using their weapons to loot and extort goods necessary for survival.

## **Curbing the distribution of arms and ammunition**

This is probably the most difficult task of the military in Sector 5. The area to cover is vast and very inaccessible, and it is nigh impossible to provide effective coverage with the available resources in manpower and equipment. The discovery of smuggled ammunition in an aircraft in Beni during August 2003, for example, was only possible due to bad weather that had forced the pilot to land on an “unsafe” airfield. A more pro-active approach is now being launched to combine the monitoring of remote airfields with all other activities, such as ground and air patrols, as well as a more vigorous patrol schedule focusing on this issue by Military Observer Teams deployed close to possible routes and air nodes.

## **Support to Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs**

Support to these divisions is done primarily on a support requirement basis. Military support is usually in the form of providing security and by providing escort tasks. During the recent past, successful actions included patrols in support of vaccination programmes to the west of the Congo river into Maniema province, river patrols to escort Non Governmental Organisations to establish medical clinics in inaccessible areas, and escorting Child Protection Officers on patrols in South Kivu. A spin-off from active patrolling in areas where human rights abuses and violations are rife, is the decrease in incidents while the patrols are operating in the area, and immediately thereafter. The unfortunate truth is, however, that very soon after a patrol has left an area, the abuses and violations start again.

## **Implementing the Chapter VII mandate**

MONUC received its Chapter VII mandate in July 2003. The immediate effect was a range of expectations from a variety of role players. In essence the population, who have been on the receiving end of human rights violations and numerous abuses, now have the expectation that MONUC will use its military force to protect them. In Sector 5, two incidents have already occurred – in Lubero and Uvira -which showed the commitment of the forces to adhere to the mandate and to take the necessary steps to protect the population.

Two members of TF1 deployed in Lubero returned from a meeting in Kanyabyonga when they were informed of a kidnapping that had happened moments ago. They pursued the kidnappers, and caught up with them. Unfortunately, upon sighting the UN soldiers, the kidnappers shot their victim

and started shooting at the TF1 members. In the ensuing firefight, the armed belligerent was shot. The remaining kidnapper grabbed the rifle and continued shooting on the TF1 members. He was subsequently shot as well.

In Uvira, MILOBS on patrol encountered a group of women being harassed by soldiers of the local brigade. They confronted the leader of the soldiers whom started firing on them. After several shots were discharged, the weapon had a stoppage and the leader was disarmed. He was subsequently handed over to the local brigade commander for action.

## Operational priorities: Sector 5

The situation in Sector 5 is very dynamic. With the new Chapter VII mandate, the deployment of TF1 and the Indian Aviation Unit, as well as the political progress with regards to the Transitional Government, priorities need to be adapted regularly in order to address the significant changes of circumstance in the sector.

The present priorities are reflected in the Sector Commanders' intent, which is as follows:

*"It is my intention to support the DDRRR of Foreign Armed Groups as the Focus of Main Effort, in order to enhance and to create stability in the sector. As Supporting Efforts, we should curb human rights violations by maintaining a high level of visibility in the respective Areas of Responsibility.*

*Secondly, the current Monitoring and Verification Operation must continue, as well as others that may result from successful local conflict resolution. The monitoring of arms and ammunition distribution as well as the DDR of Congolese combatants must contribute to the achievement of an acceptable level of stability in the sector. Within this context, and according to demands in the respective AORs, humanitarian support actions should also receive attention to stimulate and build confidence".*

## Conclusion

Military involvement and activity in Sector 5 has increased dramatically during the past four months, with the introduction of Task Force 1 into the east. The increase in troops and the resultant visibility of UN military personnel on the ground underlines the notion that the mere presence of peacekeepers does have a stabilising effect on an area that is suffering the aftermath and effects of war. Due to the size of the sector, priority areas have had to be determined and addressed in sequence.

The success of any military operation depends on the flow of information, and this certainly holds true in the case of operations in Sector 5. A tailor-made command and control system is essential for the successful conduct of

operations in a complex environment. Decentralised command enhances quick decision-making and the effective use of resources. It is therefore essential that the commanders' intent, three levels up, be perfectly understood by all. The successes that have been experienced to date have been the result of an integrated effort covering a variety of peace-keeping tasks. The return of thousands of people out of the forests is an indication that the military presence in the Kivus and Maniema had a positive effect on the population before and during the establishment of the Transitional Government.

## Notes

1. Colonel L.R. Smith (SA National Defence Force) is Commander, Sector 5, MONUC
2. On 28 July 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1493 which, among other things, extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 July 2004, increased the military strength to 10,800 and (acting under Chapter VII) authorised MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in Ituri and North and South Kivu.
3. Rally for Congolese Democracy – Goma.
4. Military observers.
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration.
6. Civil-military co-ordination.
7. "Jointness" in this context refers to co-operation between MONUC civilian divisions and the military.
8. The facilitation of the implementation of the Bujumbura Agreement provides a good example of the multi-level approach. After the Bujumbura Agreement was signed, the implementation modalities had to be agreed upon by the respective role players. The MONUC facilitation team was led by the Deputy SRSG, who was supported by her own political affairs staff, as well as the MONUC CoS, as military advisor. The Commander Sector 5 was included in her team to have first hand knowledge of the negotiations, because he was going to implement and control the Monitoring and Verification of the agreement. This approach ensured a seamless operation, because it could be launched immediately, without the delay of having to wait for formal orders before planning and Warning Orders could commence. When the orders from MONUC HQ arrived, the Sector 5 plan was already in draft form and could be finalised quickly. The Operation Order for the first phase of the Monitoring and Verification Operation was published within 48 hours after the negotiations in Beni were finalised.

9. United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.
10. RCD-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (*Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie Kisangani-Movement de Liberation*).
11. Congolese National Army (*Armée Nationale du Congo*).