

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTERIM EMERGENCY MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

Alpha Sow¹

Introduction

The interethnic conflict in Ituri erupted in 1998 and took progressively serious proportions, prompting foreign military and political interference by some neighboring countries. In order to address the situation, which became of serious concern to the government of the DRC and the international community at large, the Luanda Agreement was signed in September 2002 between the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. This agreement provided for the holding of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). The two-fold objective of the IPC was the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces from Ituri, and the launching of a pacification and reconciliation process among the Iturians. However, the delaying tactics by the *Union des Patriotes Congolais* (UPC), led by Mr. Thomas Lubanga, did not allow the convening of the IPC before the UPC had been defeated by the Ugandan forces and dislodged from Bunia and most other parts of the Ituri district in March 2003.

The IPC was held from 1-14 April 2003 with an all-inclusive involvement of the Iturians, the participation of the DRC government and the Ugandan government, and the support of MONUC and the broader international community. As a result, the Ituri Interim Administration (IIA) was established so as to manage district affairs until such time the DRC Transitional Government would be in a position to take over. Unfortunately, the grave crisis that took place in Bunia and Ituri following the withdrawal of the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) units in early May 2003, made it impossible for the IIA to function normally.

In fact, a terrible situation was created in Ituri by the ensuing fighting amongst the armed groups during May and June, that was characterised by killings, raping, looting and destruction of property on a large scale, as discussed at length in the chapter by Anneke van Woudenberg in this volume. In order to respond swiftly to this emergency, the dispatching of an international force to Bunia was authorised by the UN Security Council, in accordance

with resolution 1484 (2003) adopted on 30 May. France not only accepted to lead the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) on behalf of the European Union but also provided most of the troops. The IEMF was entrusted under Chapter VII of UN Charter with the mandate:

“... to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town”.

Achievements of the IEMF

The IEMF-led Operation ARTEMIS has been a remarkably positive experiment in co-operation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the domain of peace and security. The IEMF has provided a stopgap to the UN, limited in time and space, which has allowed it to better prepare the transition from peace-keeping to peace enforcing, in a situation where there was not much peace to keep, but rather a war in progress (which had to be stopped) and a peace to build.

The IEMF, in close cooperation and coordination with MONUC, has been allowed to pursue its own objectives, largely without political interference. The Force's limited mandate, in terms of time and space, has circumvented possible political opposition by neighbouring states, neutralising any suspicion of self-interested interference in regional affairs.

The IEMF was deployed in time to support the small MONUC military contingent, which had bravely weathered the chaos of the first days of May 2003, caused by the looting and killing of the Lendu militia, but which could not have blocked the “silent” revenge of the UPC, as well as the initiation of Lubanga's second reign of terror. Moreover, the IEMF re-established security in Bunia, adopting a progressive approach to its positioning in the town. It effectively responded to UPC's provocations, and weakened the militia's military capabilities. It has also cut off military supplies from abroad, through air monitoring of secondary and field airstrips.

The demilitarisation of Bunia has been carried out only partially, because of the time limitation. In three months, Bunia has been rendered a “weapons - invisible” zone, rather than a “weapon free” zone. Thorough house-to-house searches would have needed a much longer stay, and more intrusive methods. This would have generated more frustration, especially among the Hema community, who feel victimised by the international community, and would have, in the longer term, probably impacted negatively upon the peace process.

Thanks to the IEMF's stabilisation action, the leaders of rival armed groups were allowed to relocate in Bunia, and to open up political offices there, from which they could carry out negotiations with the different parties to the peace process. This has also facilitated the return to Bunia of thousands of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), who had left during the May hostilities. Economic and social activities have resumed, although at a modest scale.

The various boards composing the IIA were also allowed to resume their work. The members of the IIA, once fearing for their personal safety, were encouraged to leave their temporary shelters and resume normal life and work. Again, thanks to IEMF's role in stabilising the security situation in cooperation with MONUC forces, all armed groups were represented at a cycle of meetings held in Bunia in June and July, despite the fact that no significant progress was made to stop killings outside Bunia.

Weak-points and lessons learned

The time and space limit imposed by its mandate, however, has greatly limited the IEMF's military reach, and finally its long-term effectiveness. The Force has not been able to extend its action beyond Bunia – apart from *ad hoc* pre-emptive raids aimed at preventing attacks on Bunia. The IEMF has thus greatly weakened the UPC, the Hema militia settled within its area of responsibility (AOR), without being able to neutralise the UPC's enemies. This has indirectly tilted the balance of power on behalf of the Lendu militia, who were unwittingly allowed free action in several areas of the district, from where they could attack the already weakened Hema strongholds, and take revenge for years of joint Hema/UPDF attacks. This has enfeebled the Hema communities settled north of Bunia, who have been victims of atrocities reportedly committed by Lendu militia, and has caused a massive influx of refugees in town. While Bunia may be enjoying relative security, the names of towns such as Drodoro, Largo, Nizi, and Fataki have become sadly famous for the atrocities committed there against civilians.

Another weakness of the IEMF's action in response to Lendu-perpetrated atrocities, is inherent in the Lendu militia's combat tactics. Lendu militiamen - whose bases are outside the IEMF's AOR - normally attack with the support of women and children. In order to avoid civilian casualties (sadly reduced in the military lexicon to "collateral damage"), IEMF troops refrained from attacking known Lendu military positions.

Another weak point was the fact that IEMF carried out few foot patrols. In a civil unrest scenario, vehicle patrolling is less effective than foot patrolling. It is instructive to recall the example of last July, when some five boys of Lendu and Nande origin were killed in town by an angry mob during the day,

in reaction to allegations and rumors of a previous attack on citizens of Hema origin. In such scenarios, frequent day and night foot patrolling can greatly contribute to stop the cycle of violence and revenge.

Once MONUC's Ituri Brigade took over from the IEMF, the level of violence decreased, and people started to feel more secure, thanks to house searches carried out by Uruguayan and Bangladeshi contingents patrolling on foot. Coming from developing countries, moreover, the two contingents are better perceived by the inhabitants of Bunia, who feel that MONUC's soldiers are closer to them and more accessible than the European troops. This indicates that sharing the same language is not an automatic guarantee of good communication and relations, but that proper attitude is also essential.

The perception of a certain lack of respect by IEMF forces *vis-à-vis* the inhabitants of Bunia, was in a sense reinforced by the fact that insufficient attention was devoted by IEMF to reparations for damages caused by the "energetic" house-searches the IEMF soldiers carried out in search of weapons. The owners of houses that allegedly suffered substantial damages had filed complaints and requests for reimbursement, but to no avail.

Future scenarios

MONUC keeps fine-tuning its strategy, striving to adapt flexibly to the multi-faceted challenges it is facing in Ituri. A worst/best/likely scenario exercise may therefore be a useful aid to forecasting and planning for future events and consequent reactions.

Worstcase scenario

The ethnic conflict persists and escalates. The *de facto* partition of the town of Bunia between Hema and Lendu is reinforced and crystallised. The militias of both groups start attacking each other from their respective strongholds. The cycle of violence resumes, and civilians are inevitably drawn into it.

On the external side, there is a return to the old system of national and external alliances, in pursuance of local/international economic and military interests. The civil war resumes in Bunia due to the simultaneous attack of Lendu militia from the south (supported from the RCD-K/ML² controlled area of Beni and Butembo) and from the north. UPC and PUSIC³ take-up arms again, supported respectively by Rwanda and Uganda. MONUC cannot stand up to the military challenge. Due to heavy losses of military personnel, and a few helicopters and/or fixed-wing aircraft shot down, the moral of the troops decreases. The troop-contributing countries cannot stand the internal and international criticism, and withdraw their contingents.

Uganda takes advantage of the ensuing chaos and – alleging reasons of national security – intervenes militarily in Ituri and re-occupies strategic locations at the border. A humanitarian crisis ensues, and the district is plunged back into chaos. Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, politically strengthened by his electoral success, denounces Uganda's intervention as an unacceptable threat to Rwanda's security, and also sends troops into Ituri. Clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan forces take place on the territory of the DRC, along the same pattern as the wars of Kisangani.

Best-case scenario

MONUC's Ituri Brigade successfully deploys in the key areas of the district, and is both able to stop the cycle of communal violence, and to neutralize the warlords. MONUC's deployment allows the extension of the IIA authority all over Ituri. The IIA is able to restore order and the provision of basic public services. MONUC's support to the Interim Administration in terms of transport, equipment, and technical training/advising, renders the IIA local administration more effective than other administrations in the rest of the country.

The deployment of the Ituri Brigade also restores security on the main supply axis. This allows the flow of humanitarian aid, the rehabilitation of the main roads through "food /cash for work" projects. This has both a direct and an indirect beneficial impact on the social and economic situation of the district. The multiplication of employment opportunities leads to better nutrition, education, access to health services, and also increases the incentives for demobilisation and re-insertion into civilian life for militiamen.

MONUC is able to steer and monitor the effective cantonment, disarmament, and reinsertion of most combatants, with the support of the donor community, and in close co-ordination with the Transitional Government, which is able to contribute – even if minimally (due to its young age) – to the DDR effort. Thanks to this co-coordinated action, the Transitional Government gains legitimacy in Ituri. All negative ties between neighbouring countries and the ethnic communities that seek external military support are severed in a non-violent and non-intrusive manner. Ituri is fully re-integrated in the DRC, and the Transitional Government gives proof of its commitment to efficiency, proactiveness, and democracy

Most likely scenario

MONUC manages to enforce only a partial arms embargo, and topical infiltrations of weapons keep destabilising Ituri. The use of satellite intelligence helps to monitor the process, but the presence of numerous and hidden field

airstrips hinders it. Uganda and Rwanda keep trying to influence the politics in Ituri, but they are dissuaded by international diplomatic pressure. Uganda, however, keeps its grip on some of the border areas, especially through Jerome (leader of FAPC⁴, controlling the northern part of Ituri), who plays an ambiguous game and does not allow full extension of IIA's authority in the area under FAPC's control.

Lendu militias are co-opted into the peace process. Some extremists, however, keep inciting part of the Lendu community to attack and evict the Hema community, keeping the cycle of violence alive, even if under control.

Lubanga and the other Hema leaders are also co-opted into the peace process. However, the racist and supremacist discourse of part of the Hema leadership keeps mobilising the most radical layers of the Hema community. In the northern part of Bunia, discrimination continues against citizens of Lendu and Nande origin, and the city of Bunia is not homogeneously multi-ethnic.

The extension of IIA authority is accomplished, but its control over the Ituri territory remains heavily dependant on MONUC military and political support.

The challenges ahead

The international community is now striving to make amends for having neglected Ituri during the past years of tragedy and upheaval, and is building upon the relative success MONUC has achieved by not having withdrawn from Bunia during the hostilities of last May. Operation ARTEMIS has taken place at the optimal moment, and has allowed the UN Security Council, the troop contributing states, and MONUC to get ready for the deployment of almost 5,000 military personnel to the district. The challenges ahead, however, are enormous. The leaders of the armed groups have well understood the strong message addressed to them by the Transitional Government, together with MONUC, which stressed that the continuation of military activity in Ituri is a breach of article 182 of the transitional constitution.

In cooperation with the DRC's transitional authorities, MONUC has a daunting task of peace-enforcement, peace building, and also longer-term conflict resolution in Ituri. The approach to be adopted must be multi-layered - the best strategy should include coherent political, military, judicial, information, humanitarian and development interventions. In brief, MONUC has to use both the stick and the carrot to induce compliance. The carrot, in fact, isolates the extremists, while the stick weakens them. Once the extremists are "neutralised", the more moderate citizens will be able to occupy the public space and start again dreaming about a prosperous and peaceful Ituri.

The best strategy is an integrated one. MONUC's intervention should be multi-layered and homogeneous, in the sense that all components are targeting the same objectives. This is the only viable way to ensure the success of a long-lasting peace process.

Political strategy

From a political point of view, MONUC will keep supporting steadily the IIA, the only authority considered legitimate by the international community. MONUC provides political advice to the IIA leadership, which is young but promising and, most important of all, representative of all communities in Ituri. It also facilitates contact between the donor community and the IIA. In addition, MONUC administers – through a trust fund – USA and European funds that allow the IIA to maintain itself and expand its authority throughout the district. MONUC also acts as the main interlocutor to the donors, steering their contribution towards the growth of conflict transformation capability, negotiation skills, and the creation of public spaces for dialogue.

With regard to the international dimension of the conflict, MONUC will pay further attention to its regional aspects. The geostrategic position of Ituri is so sensitive and crucial for so many actors, that the problems of the district cannot be treated in isolation. The influence of Uganda, for example, is sure to be monitored closely. Despite public declarations of assurance from Kampala, individuals and/or criminal networks continue exploiting Ituri's resources, which exit the district towards the eastern neighbour, often in exchange for weapons. MONUC can use the tool of multi-thematic (political, human rights, and police) investigation missions to gather evidence on both sides of the border about the existence of such illegal flows.

The role of Rwanda and even of Sudan should also not be neglected. At a more diplomatic level, MONUC should feed the information on the regional dimension of the conflict up to the forthcoming International Conference on the Great Lakes.

Ad hoc conflict resolution initiatives

MONUC is also facilitating *ad hoc* dialogue initiatives, aimed at promoting conflict resolution and transformation. The first step, and probably the most challenging one, is the facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Hema and Lendu communities. This was started by DSRSG Behrooz Sadry, as an 'on-the-side' activity, during the fifteen days of the IPC (01-14 April 2003). The dialogue started with few sessions, and was due to be resumed after the end of the conference. Unfortunately, the hostilities abruptly interrupted this

process. The participants to these sessions, however, have declared to MONUC that the dialogue was already bearing fruit, and have asked for its resumption.

Other areas of informal mediation can be identified. It appears, for example, that the community of businessman of Hema origin had always felt threatened by competition from tradesmen of Nande origin (settled in the pro-government areas of Beni and Butembo). MONUC can facilitate dialogue and trade negotiations between the two lobbies, helping them to understand that trade alliances, rather than exclusionary competition, provide the best means to increase profit. Regulated trade, in fact, can generate a “win-win” situation.

Military strategy

MONUC's Ituri Brigade is composed of almost 4,800 troops and endowed with some heavy armament and combat helicopters, which makes it a much more powerful force than IEMF. It is now completing its deployment in Bunia and carries out *ad hoc* multi-purpose assessment missions, under the Chapter VII mandate, to stop or prevent killings and other major violations of the law. The Ituri Brigade has appropriately been entrusted by the Security Council with the same mandate as Operation ARTEMIS. The brigade can, therefore, pursue and challenge militarily the militia even when it is not directly attacked. The new mandate extends considerably the action range of MONUC troops, and empowers them to suppress and prevent any violation of the cessation of hostilities agreements.

The first priority for the Brigade is to deploy as soon as possible in all key areas of the district. In the northern belt of Bunia, for example, the UPC (now seriously weakened by the IEMF) has quartered its militia and is facing joint FNI /FAPC⁵ attacks. The two armed groups are taking advantage of the tilt in the balance of power to extend their territorial control. This means that the armed groups, despite all their formal declarations, have not yet given up the option of violence and territorial conquest at the expense of civilian lives. It is evident that MONUC has to use its power vigorously, in order to freeze the situation.

One of the necessary tools will be the implementation of the arms embargo, as established in UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003). This will be a difficult task for MONUC. On the one hand the mission will have to dispose of satellite surveillance and air monitoring means. ARTEMIS had carried out air surveillance and managed to cut off UPC bases from external supply of weapons. On the other hand, however, land supply lines will also have to be tackled. For example, in the areas jointly controlled by FAPC and FNI, the

militia apparently loot cattle and other movable goods, export them to Uganda, and trade them for weapons. Most probably this traffic follows country paths, and in order to discover these routes, MONUC will have to work in tight co-operation with the local communities.

Another tool for long-term pacification is the implementation of the DDR process. This process ought to be implemented by the Transitional Government, which must be supported in the design and development of a nation-wide strategy as well as to implement it in coordination with MONUC and the support of donors. DDR aims at “channeling” the militia and the factions’ armies in part back to civilian life, and in part to the new national army. It is a must for the whole country, which has been badly damaged by five years of war. But it is even more essential for Ituri, one of the last districts of the DRC where para-military activity is still ongoing and causing hundreds of deaths each month. This is why the international community is encouraging the Transitional Government to elaborate an urgent and specific DDR strategy for Ituri.

MONUC will be actively involved in the process, perhaps now as more of a “stick user.” However, the Mission needs urgently the support of other UN system organisations and other development and humanitarian agencies, to provide the necessary “carrot” for DDR. Incentives to return to civilian life have to be provided to militiamen who are used to win their bread on a gunpoint.

DDR implementation should be carried out as soon as possible, as external influence and maneuvering could resume and take advantage of the lack of action. However, the Transitional Government has already chosen a wise course in its communication with armed group leaders - it has admitted that it needs more time to assume its responsibilities for DDR, which it will pursue in coordination with MONUC and other actors.

Humanitarian Strategy

The provision of humanitarian assistance – food, safe drinking water, sanitation, and basic health services – is absolutely essential to the restoration of peace and basic living conditions in the district. Ituri is extremely well endowed with agricultural land, as well as rainfall and other weather conditions that are conducive to cultivation. It should be sufficient to provide security in Ituri and allow the return of the IDPs who, after three months, could reach a state of food-self sufficiency. The current situation, however, makes it necessary to provide emergency relief to thousands of people. The existence of IDP camps is also a source of security concerns, for they are sometimes used as arms caches and safe havens for militiamen.

Development aid

Development projects should be already identified and designed. This would favor a quick recovery of the living conditions of the Iturians, and increase the incentives to peace. When business and production resumes, in fact, the most productive layers of the population separate from the extremists. Development projects, however, should be selected or designed on the basis of their capacity to favour reconciliation between communities at war with each other. UNDP, for example, disposes of US\$3 million for the funding of projects with a clear reconciliation impact.

Human rights

The most powerful “weapon” at the disposal of MONUC’s Human Rights Division is its investigative presence at the field level, and its capacity-building activities on behalf of local Human Rights institutions. MONUC has always conducted routine and special investigation activities and missions. What is new, however, is the forthcoming extension of the ICC (International Criminal Court) to the DRC. The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor has undertaken to consider Ituri the Court’s first priority. This provides MONUC with an additional and very powerful “stick”. The Court’s universal jurisdiction for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the principle of individual responsibility for such crimes, are very much feared by the armed groups’ leaders. Their dreams of fame and political power vanish when they are reminded that, once indicted by the ICC, they can be arrested anywhere in the world.

One dilemma, however, will emerge very soon. During this sensitive phase of transition, international and national actors prefer to co-opt the warlords into the political peace process, rather than to scare them away with prospects of international prosecution. On the other hand, the fashionable discourse of amnesty and pardon can weaken the principles of accountability and strengthen a culture of impunity. This dilemma will have to be faced and dealt with at the high political level.

Law and order

The insecurity caused by the Ituri civil war, hopefully very close to its end, is progressively transforming in insecurity caused by widespread criminality. The militaries will soon be expected to hand over more and more of their powers of control to judicial and police institutions. MONUC’s Ituri Brigade, a military body, has no specific mandate to carry out policing activities. On the

other hand, national judicial, correctional, and police structures have been very seriously damaged by the war. DPKO New York has conducted a thorough assessment mission on the three components of the law and order system – judiciary, correction facilities, police staff – and has come up with recommendations on how to reinforce the three components, as discussed by Antero Lopes’ chapter above. Donors are responding generously to this challenge, and MONUC is extending the Kapalata experiment (Kapalata is the training center used by MONUC Civilian Police in Kisangani) of training local police officers to reinforce their capabilities. Of course the IIA, assisted by the Transitional Government, will have to take care of the “last link of the chain” – the provision of salary to the local police personnel.

With the reestablishment of relative calm and order in Ituri, some of the factors that contributed to the fueling of the war will fall increasingly under the jurisdiction of civil and criminal law. The consumption of drugs, so widespread among young combatants (as a means to increasing their courage on the battlefield), will have to be prohibited and punished according to the law. Traditional rituals, often implying mutilation of human bodies, will also fall under this jurisdiction. Extending legal jurisdiction to the customary sphere, however, will have to be done in a very careful manner, so as not to upset the local traditions, which, of course, cannot be in violation of basic human rights.

Illegal exploitation of natural resources

The international community has come to know the potential of the reports produced by the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. For example, the Panel’s 2002 report may have contributed to the fall of Coltan price on the world market, and to the relative weakening of the links between the Kivu wars and the precious metal. Knowing how much the gold mines in Ituri have contributed to the civil conflict, and how much they are coveted by foreign and local military forces, the international community should encourage the Transitional Government to better manage the exploitation of the mines – and to channel the profits back into public finance resources. The latter can be used to nurture IIA development, and to promote the creation/provision of basic public services.

Managing entry points

The resources generated from the collection of customs’ duties have been one of the main factors of the current (suspected, but very likely) military alliance between Ugandan military leaders and the FAPC [one of the five armed groups presently controlling, jointly with FNI, the northern part of the district,

including all the major points of entry on the Uganda/DRC border in Ituri]. “General” Jerome, the FAPC leader, is still resisting the extension of IIA authority in the territory he controls, mainly because he is conscious of the fact that the IIA will also take over customs duty collection. In Ituri, the phenomenon of warlordism remains and is closely connected with creating chaos and keeping at bay the control of legitimate public authority.

Should the Transitional Government not be ready to assure directly the collection of custom duties, an alternative model may be the Mozambican one. The government of Mozambique has signed a protocol of accord with its UK counterpart, by which it temporarily gives up control over its own customs and excise, and entrusts it to the “Crown Agents” - a semi-public company that specialises on the issues. Crown Agents have assumed control of customs, provided ‘on-the-job’ training to local customs clerks and officers, and have increased the total custom revenue approximately threefold. This example, or other more imaginative solutions, could be conceived to tackle the problem of custom control.

Conclusion

The Ituri Pacification Commission and the subsequent creation of the IIA have been a successful example of imaginative diplomacy in the service of peace-keeping. Operation ARTEMIS, in conjunction with MONUC forces, has insured the protection of this achievement against the forces of chaos and violence. In reality, the IIA can be defined as a permanent conflict resolution mechanism, in line with the best African tradition of democratic and collective negotiation - the model of “*l’arbre à problèmes, l’arbre à solutions,*” that was successfully used in the in the Kivus after the 1993 conflict.

So far, the achievements have been considerable, but the challenges ahead are enormous. Decades of neglect and absence of state authority under Mobutu’s rule have weakened the societal and economic fabric. The youth has grown up and been socialised in a climate of conflict, and is easily tempted to use violence as the easiest available mean to solve conflicts.

Grievances, old and new, are numerous on all sides. The Lendu, for example, complain about systematic discrimination in the education system since the time of colonisation. The Hema, on the other hand, accuse the Lendu of planning to exterminate them. However, once the root cases of the conflict are analysed in depth, the issue of land and property emerges above all others. The coexistence of both a customary and a market-based community, both with a strong need to have access to land complicates the problem. In the DRC, in fact, citizens have access to land both through customary authority, which

is ethnic-based, and by monetary transaction. Yet, the two orders can conflict with each other.

In fact, the Lendu claim land ownership on the basis of their ‘indigenous rights’. In extreme Lendu rhetoric, in fact, it is maintained that since they were the original inhabitants of most part of Ituri, and that the Hema and other ethnic groups came in successive waves of immigration, they do not have any genuine right to land or property. Hema extremists, on the other hand, fear being evicted from Ituri as “foreigners” and “settlers”, and propose an exclusionary and racist way to manage the urban space and the opportunities of self-promotion through business and education.

The grievances of all communities and layers of society should be attentively separated and taken into consideration. Genuine grievances are too often manipulated by greedy military and political leaders in search of opportunities for self-enrichment. The natural wealth of Ituri provides them with golden opportunities.

The UN has several ways to tackle greed. For example, better cooperation with the UN Panel on Illegal exploitation of natural resources would offer a perfect tool to trace the links between natural resources and armed conflict, and to sever them. The progressive and transparent involvement of the Transitional Government is also an optimal manner to make this effort more lasting and fruitful.

Ultimately, addressing the twin issues of greed and grievance robustly and with sincerity is the key to success.

Notes

1. Mr. Alpha Sow is MONUC Head of Office, Bunia, DRC.
2. RCD-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (*Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani-Movement de Liberation*).
3. Congolese Patriotic Union (*Union des Patriotes Congolais*) and the Party for the Unification and Safeguarding of the Integrity of the Congo (*Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo*).
4. Congolese People's Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Populaires du Congo*).
5. Integrationist Nationalist Forces (*Front des nationalistes et integrationnistes*).