


**ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNION (OAU)
PEACEKEEPING DOCUMENT (Reprint)**

I LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

1. At its Eleventh Ordinary Session held on 10 January, 1995, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, at Ambassadorial Level, sought a clarification about the various parallel initiatives emanating from “**Out of Africa**” in the area of Peacekeeping. Reference was made to the Seminar on Peacekeeping which was going on at that time in Cairo, Egypt.
2. The Secretary General in turn observed that there was a proliferation of initiatives coming from outside Africa, all with the aim of supporting the OAU efforts in the area of peacekeeping. The same issue came up again during the Closed consultative Session of the Central Organ at Ministerial Level which was held on 22 January, 1995, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. During that Session, the Secretary General informed the meeting that since the establishment of the Mechanism, a lot of interest had been generated outside Africa followed by concrete support which had come through the “**OAU Peace Fund**”.
3. Specifically on peacekeeping the Secretary General indicated that the British government had convened Seminars in Camberly, Accra, Cairo and Harare to look at various ways on enhancing the OAU Mechanism by preparing and deploying African troops in peacekeeping duties either under the UN or OAU umbrella.
4. Recalling the idea as contained in his Dakar Report, Senegal, the Secretary General explained that the idea was one of every Member State of the OAU making available a contingent to the OAU in times of crisis. In addition to National duties, these troops would be made ready for peacekeeping duties any time they were called upon. The Secretary General went further to propose that the Secretariat would present a status report on those many and parallel “**initiatives and the way forward**”, declaring that: “Africa must have some degree of preparedness for peacekeeping operations”.
5. That proposal was welcomed by the Members of the Central Organ who also requested that the paper be presented to the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Central Organ, at the level of Ministers.
6. At its Twelfth Ordinary Session, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, at ambassadorial Level, held on 21 February, 1995, and in considering the Provisional Agenda for the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for conflict Management and Resolution, at Ministerial Level, requested that item (5) “**OAU’s position Towards the various Initiatives on Peacekeeping: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in Peacekeeping**” be rephrased to include “**Preventive Diplomacy and**



Conflict Resolution”.

7. With this in mind, the Secretariat has prepared this report covering two broad areas:
 - (i) Preventive Diplomacy and the related aspects of Early Warning and Confidence Building; and
 - (ii) Peacekeeping and the various emerging initiatives.

II. THE CONCEPT OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

8. In his Agenda for Peace, the U.N. Secretary General articulated Preventive Diplomacy as constituting a framework which, among other things, includes:
 - Early Warning;
 - Timely fact-finding,
 - Confidence Building; and
 - Preventive deployment of military units and troops to avert outbreak of hostilities.
9. This framework encompasses conditions of potential and incipient conflict, ongoing conflicts, and conflicts under control. The OAU has found such a framework relevant to potential and real peace on the one hand, just as much as it is to potential and real conflicts in Africa, on the other hand.
10. That Africa in general has both of these goes without saying. Real peace and real violence, potential peace and potential violence live side by side in Africa. Unfortunately, the situation on the continent currently leans rather more heavily on real and potential situations of conflict than on emerging crisis situations. Some other parts are living in the aftermath of violence, thereby calling for efforts leading to reconciliation. The OAU has realized that there is no better time than this in Africa for advancing the concept of Preventive Diplomacy in the diverse internal conflicts obtaining in Africa today.
11. Having accepted the idea of Preventive Diplomacy by establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, what has the OAU been doing to operationalize the concept and its attendant options within the framework of its Mechanism? This calls for the actions, by relevant person, groups, sub-regional organizations, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations aimed at laying down the foundations, within the OAU, upon which all aspects of Preventive Diplomacy can be supported. This includes: the establishment of supportive structures; outlining guidelines; activating national and sub-regional institutions to serve the course of Preventive Diplomacy; and creating positive and cooperative attitude among all the actors and agents.
12. There has been a realization that Preventive Diplomacy and its attendant functions fall under the joint jurisdiction of the Secretary General and the Central Organ. These will need to be fed with relevant information and



data through the active participation and cooperation of Member States, sub-regional Organizations, UN General Secretariat and its specialized agencies, non-governmental Organizations, research centers as well as the media. Each of these categories will be required to play a specific role in advancing particular aspects of Preventive Diplomacy. But for preventive diplomacy to succeed and flourish, the process must be predicated on the early warning signals relating to an emerging crisis in a particular setting.

A. EARLY WARNING

13. Any given crisis and at whatever stage contains within it the potential for further escalation, or for possible diffusion. If acted upon early, there will be hope for the crisis to be diffused. If left to escalate, the crisis will turn into a full-blown conflict, with all the negative implications to the local community.
14. In internal conflicts, signs of tensions are usually experienced and observed by the local people fairly early. Breakdowns in communication between groups of people in a given setting, quarrels relating to depletion and scarcity of shared resources and many others usually serve as early warning signals for a crisis in the making.
15. Realizing the need for timely information on potential conflict situations, the OAU envisages to embark on a process of establishing an Early Warning Network to cover the entire continent. This Network could have Member States as the key focal points. However, as has been pointed out earlier, the Network could also include, Sub-regional Organizations, the U.N. and its specialized agencies, Academic Institutions and Research Centres, the Media and NGOs, with a coordinating facility located at the proposed OAU Conflict Management Centre which will be fully equipped with a Crisis Management Room. It is here that a core of officers will be receiving, synthesizing and analyzing the relevant information and data and making recommendations to the Secretary General and, of course, to the Central Organ on the Options open for EARLY POLITICAL ACTION. Realizing the shortage of human resources in the Conflict Management Division, such monitoring officers could include military personnel seconded from Member States who will meet their salaries as the case is at the U.N. Operational Centre.
16. The action of the Secretary General and/or the Central Organ could be based in the following options:
 - a) despatching a Secretariat Fact-Finding Mission;
 - b) the Secretary General himself undertaking an assessment Mission to the Member State in distress;
 - c) despatching a Fact-Finding Mission from the Central Organ; and
 - d) Appointing a Special Envoy or Special Representative for the purpose.
17. Cognizant of the crucial role an **Early Warning Network**, matched with **an Early Political Action**, can play in conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the OAU envisages to host, within the next few months,



a seminar to look into how such a Network will work. This Seminar will draw participants from Member States, sub-regional Organizations, the media, Academic and Research Institutions, NGOs and the UN relevant specialized Agencies. These Participants will, with assistance of “**Experts**” in the field of Early Warning, brainstorm, Concept, and how it could be made to work in Africa, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the continent.

18. It must also be recalled that, at its Forty-ninth Ordinary Session, the U.N. General assembly adopted, on 30 November, 1994, Resolution A/49/L143 encouraging Member States on the UN to help the OAU in strengthening the conflict resolution capacity, in particular in the areas of:

(1) “Establishment of an Early Warning System; and
(2) Conflict Prevention, Management and Settlement of disputes.”

19. Indeed, the relevance of establishing an Early Warning System to help in the operationalization of the Mechanism cannot be overemphasized. Experience with that Mechanism for one year and a half has clearly demonstrated the important role which **speedy exchange of information** on conflict situations in Africa at their earliest formation can play. Quite often, the OAU Secretary General has sought information on new developments relating to conflict situations within Member States, but all in vain. They have been unable to get the necessary information and to take the necessary action until after a couple of days later. Still quite often, the Secretary General has wished to dispatch directives to the OAU missions on the field or to consult African leaders in the various national capitals about conflict situations obtaining in various parts of Africa but unable to do so due to communication problems. Thus delays in communication have helped to complicate further the already complicated conflict situations in Africa and consequently have **impeded the decision making process** of both the Secretary General and that of the Central Organ.
20. It is this infrastructure for information flow and communication, devoid of “**bureaucratic clog**”, that the OAU proposes to establish.
21. The recognition of conflict early warning signals calls for thorough investigation of the underlying causes of a crisis: be they political, social, economic or whatever. This means that information storage on the development processes of Member States will be absolutely necessary.
22. The OAU has embarked, therefore, on establishing a Data base covering all 53 Member States. This information has been divided into two broad categories: (a) a country’s general profile and (b) a conflict profile of a given Member State. It is envisaged that the Data base will also have profiles of individuals who can be engaged as Special Envoys or Special Representatives of the Secretary General; information on OAU’s involvement in election observing; and information on the effects of conflicts including situations of refugees and internally displaced persons within the Member States.




B. CONFIDENCE BUILDING

23. Measures to build confidence, especially during the post-conflict period, are as important in internal conflict situations, as they are in regional conflicts. This requires the identification of groups among whom confidence is to be built for purposes of avoiding the recurrence of a particular conflict. Groups or individuals involved in a conflict situation should form a part of the process of confidence building. This would call for the involvement of elders, local leaders, religious leaders, the youth, the women and all others who wield power and influence in a given community.
24. Measures should aim at building confidence among conflicting groups and enabling them to forge cooperation based on common interest and dialogue; confidence to seek and embark on local initiatives for conflict resolution; confidence in attitude formation by perceiving peaceful co-existence as not only possible but actually desirable; and confidence to build unity out of diversity.


III. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING

25. It will be recalled that in July 1990, a “**Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World**” was adopted by the Assembly of the African Heads of State and Government, in which the Assembly committed itself to deploying greater efforts towards the creation of an **enabling environment** for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
26. During the Fifty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the Twenty-eight Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government that took place in June/July 1992 in Dakar, Senegal, the Secretary General submitted to those Heads of State and Government his proposals for the establishment, within the OAU General Secretariat, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. At that time, the idea of establishing such a Mechanism was approved, in principle, by the Heads of State and Government. In Cairo, in June 1993, a Declaration leading to the establishment of such a mechanism within the OAU General Secretariat was adopted by the Heads of State and Government.
27. However, it will also be recalled that the idea of the OAU preparing itself for peacekeeping was part of the Secretary General’s report which was submitted to the above mentioned Fifty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the Twenty-eight Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Dakar, Senegal, when those two bodies were discussing the Secretary General’s proposals for the establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. At that time, the Secretary General’s proposals generated considerable debate. At the conclusion of that debate, a general consensus emerged that while peacekeeping will be desirable in the long-run, OAU should, in the short-run, **focus on** conflict prevention and peace-making. It was, thus, decided that peacekeeping should not constitute a priority activity of the OAU at least,



at present. Obviously, the rationale behind that decision was understandable. Indeed, peacekeeping is not only an expensive undertaking but also a difficult and complex exercise, not only involving military as well as **civilian** components, but also heavy **financial**, **logistical** as well as **technical** input.

28. No doubt the caution that was given by the Ministers at that time was commendable. Indeed for the OAU, and as the Cairo Declaration stipulates, **“Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peacemaking and peace building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance”**. In this regard, and again as the Cairo Declaration stipulates, **“... in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the United National,”** a body with more resources, more experience and, therefore, greater capability, **“will be sought under the general terms of its Charter. In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contributions to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively in the peacekeeping operations in Africa.”**
29. Be that as it may, it is important to stress that our experience of the last one year and a half clearly demonstrates the increasing reluctance on the side of the United Nations, especially on the side of the major powers, to get more involved in peacekeeping operations directly. Some of the governments of those major powers are in fact pleading for cuts in their national budgets for peacekeeping operations abroad.
30. But while we must continue to insist that the UN, as a body entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining international peace, security and stability should honour that responsibility, in doing so it should not make exceptions when it comes to conflict situations in Africa. At the same time, and as the Secretary General argued in his report submitted to the Sixtieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994: **“... it would be prudent for Africa and the OAU to take appropriate measures possible so that we do not allow ourselves to be caught off-guard.”**
31. In the same report, the Secretary General advanced the view that Africa, given the existing realities, could not afford to remain indifferent to an African problem however formidable it may be in terms of financial or material resources. He emphasized that need for Africa to prepare herself for **“the worst eventuality and facilitate OAU’s preparedness and capability through, inter alia, having Member States earmark forces in their respective armies and security structures for possible utilization in peace observation and peacemaking operations first and foremost by the United nations and in exceptional situation by the OAU.”**
32. The General Secretariat still feels that the need for Africa to be prepared



to take some degree of **responsibility in peacekeeping is even greater today than it has ever been before**. This feeling is primarily based on the current parallel initiatives that have continued to emerge, all aimed at assisting the OAU in the area of peacekeeping. For reasons of clarity, it is necessary that this report reviews those initiatives and see how best the OAU should involve itself, without losing touch with any of them.

IV. EXTRA-CONTINENTAL INITIATIVES

A. BRITISH INITIATIVE

33. The starting point of the British initiative, was a visit undertaken by the British Prime Minister Mr. John Major, to South Africa in 1994 following the successful holding of elections and the installation of a Government of National Unity led by Mr. Nelson Mandela.
34. In a speech he made to the South African Parliament on 20 September, 1994, Mr. Major expressed concern over the scourge of conflicts in Africa and the need to help develop an African capacity to manage conflicts, drawing on their unique traditions and experiences in mediation and conflict resolution.
35. On 28 September, the Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the 49th General Assembly Session of the United Nations in New York, during which statement, he enunciated in one brief paragraph, what could be done for the Africa and the OAU under the auspices of the United Nations, in the area of Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping. As would be expected, that speech and the proposed course of action contained therein, was UN centred and no reference was made to OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Management.
36. In order to follow-up what the British described as "the encouraging response to the Foreign Secretary's initiatives on Africa Peacekeeping", the British Government organized two Seminars, in Accra and in Cairo, in collaboration with the Governments of Ghana and Egypt respectively to consider how to "help African nations help themselves" and jointly to identify areas for practical support from the International Community.
37. Prior to the Accra and Cairo meetings, the British Government also organized a UN Peace-keeping Simulex and Mapex Exercise from 7 - 9 October, 1994 at the Camberley Staff College, London. This exercise was followed up from 23 - 27 January, 1995, by a workshop on peacekeeping, jointly organized by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

(a) THE CAMBERLY EXERCISE

38. Exercise Blue Caucus was a combination of both Simulation Exercise (Simulex) and a Map Exercise (Mapex). Senior Military Officers from Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe attended from Africa, while the OAU was represented by a Military Officer. The aim of the exercise was threefold:



- (a) To afford the participants a better understanding of the complexity of planning, co-ordinating and conducting UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- (b) To apply the principle of a common doctrine in conducting such operations; and
- (c) To learn about decision-making at the strategic level.

(b) *THE UK/ZIMBABWE WORKSHOP ON PEACEKEEPING*

39. Like the Camberly meeting, the Harare workshop concentrated on the military rather than the political aspects of peacekeeping. Essentially, it examined the conduct, practices and principles of peacekeeping operations from a military perspective, with a view to providing guidance for commanders on education and training requirements. The workshop was attended by senior officers from 17 African countries and there was active participation from a number of countries outside the Continent.
40. The OAU was represented by a Senior Military Officer, who presented a paper on "OAU Peacekeeping Operations: Past Experience and the Challenges of the New Perspectives". During the workshop, the major focus of participants was a review of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
41. Two very interesting papers were presented during the workshop. The first paper by Dr. Jack Spence, Director of Studies, Chatman House gave Geopolitical view from outside the Continent. In essence, he informed participants that following developments after the ending of the Cold War, Africa had lost its strategic relevance in the "new world order" and in the wake of events in Somalia, the mood around the world, especially the United States and the West generally towards Africa had changed considerably for the worse, to the extent that no government from that part of the world is keen to send its people to die in Africa. Africans therefore must be prepared to undertake peacekeeping duties.
42. The second paper on co-ordination of Peace Support operations was presented by General Emanuel Erskine. Essentially, the General urged Africans to abandon the colonial stereotypes and divisions which identified them simply as Francophones and Anglophones, thereby inhibiting common training, common planning and joint peacekeeping operations.
43. Other issues dealt with by the Workshop included Peacekeeping mandates, training, maintenance of logistics bases in Africa and the UK concept of "wider peacekeeping operations" which in essence refers to peacekeeping in Africa by Africans, with the logistical support of the major powers, through the creation of UN logistical centres. Other contents of the UK concept include Conflict Management, Demobilization Operations, Military Assistance (training) and Humanitarian Relief.

(c) *THE ACCRA AND CAIRO SEMINARS*

44. The ACCRA Seminar held from 14 - 15 November, 1994, focused on:



- (a) The establishment of an Early Warning System to assist in identifying potential trouble spots and decided on whether preventive diplomacy needs to be employed;
- (b) The setting up on an institutional framework for preventive diplomacy which would promote the collaborative role of the UN and the OAU in the provision of experienced personnel, equipment and support, to allow for urgent diplomatic intervention before full-fledged conflicts break out;
- (c) The development of peace-keeping capabilities in Africa which would include:
 - (i) The establishment of UN Peace Keeping Skills Centre at African Staff Colleges, giving training in doctrines and disciplines of peacekeeping and in mediation and conflict resolutions;
 - (ii) Creation of UN logistics bases in Africa to store essential equipment and ensure that it is readily available;
 - (iii) Creation of UN Rapid Mobile logistics Teams to help in the maintenance of equipment and speedy deployment as well as providing training and maintenance support; and
 - (iv) Creation of Sub-regional peace-keeping support centres where the staff of the UN Headquarters could identify and help remedy logistics weaknesses.
- 45. The CAIRO Conference on Early Warning, Preventive Diplomacy and African Peacekeeping held from 10 - 11 January, 1995, was a follow up to the Accra Conference. It had the following objectives:
 - (a) Attracting international support, bilaterally or multilaterally for OAU's activities in the area of conflict management;
 - (b) Narrowing down the Accra conclusions;
 - (c) Using the occasion of the meeting to examine the possibility of preparing the language for possible adoption/endorsement by the OAU Council of Ministers; and,
 - (d) Preparing the ground for action at the United Nations, especially the Security Council.
- 46. The Session was attended by Representatives of the 16 OAU Member States as well as the UN and Representatives of Canada, Britain, UK, France and USA.

The Cairo Seminar identified the following main themes:

- The OAU is the main Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa. It was also recognised that the OAU has an



important contribution to make to all peacekeeping operations in Africa. At the same time, this should not be seen as a departure from the concept of universality, especially, when dealing with the United Nations. It was also stressed that there is a clear complementarity between the work of the OAU and the UN;

- For Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, it underscored that the OAU had a clear role to play in identifying the causes of conflicts (especially ethnic and internal conflicts) and helping develop mediation techniques and preventive action, especially at a time when increased democratization of African Countries, was releasing underlying tensions;
- The need for training was also underscored, including the training of civilians in mediation techniques, Seminars for both African military and civilians was considered to be a priority area. It was also felt that the experiences of individual States in addressing the seeds of conflict was an experience to be learnt and absorbed;
- Progress on the operationalization of OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Management was acknowledged, while noting the limitations imposed by resources on its infrastructure especially in the crucial area of information processing and management of field teams.

(d) THE FRENCH INITIATIVE FOR AN AFRICAN INTERVENTION FORCE

47. The other parallel initiative which is being pursued alongside the British initiative, is the French proposal for an African Intervention Force which emerged from the BIARRITZ SUMMIT of 1994. Essentially, the principal objective of the French proposal is to create a modest permanent force, with the possibility of contributions from African countries, which could be utilized during times of crisis. Such a force, it was further proposed, would be mobilized under the auspices of the OAU and African States.

48. Additionally, the objective would focus on the following:

- Preventive diplomacy;
- Dealing with the Humanitarian aspects of a crisis; and
- Maintenance of peace.

49. As understood by the Secretariat, the Mission of the Force would include assessing the capacity of Member States in a particular Sub-region to intervene during crisis situations, training of contingents in relation to the maintenance of peace, and undertaking the training of the high command staff.

50. Furthermore it is envisaged that the Force Command which may not necessarily be permanent, must be relevant to the Mission and also be in a position to co-ordinate participants from different Countries. Such a Command would be under the political direction of the OAU.

51. In terms of mobilization, the French proposal prefers action on a Sub-



regional basis as against Continental Mobilization. However, such a preference, does not exclude the possibility of a Sub-regional continent from the Western part of the Continent, being deployed to deal with a crisis in the East of the Continent.

52. From available information, the French initiative arose after the experience in Rwanda, particularly, the need for preventive and other diplomatic actions. It is also the understanding of the Secretariat, that in order to further crystallize the ideas behind the initiative, H.E. President Eyadema of Togo had been informally entrusted with the task of further reflecting on the possibility of establishing the framework for such a force, within the perspective of action at the Sub-regional level.
53. In general terms, the main thrust of the **ANGLO-FRENCH Initiative** relates to the setting up of a **Multi-National African Rapid Peace Deployment Force**. The initiatives have European and American Support. In order to give such forces quick access, rapid deployment and operational means, the initiatives also envisaged locating equipment depots (logistics Bases) in strategic points in Africa. The proposals are intended to give practical expression to the concept of "PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT", with Europe, USA and others providing logistics while Africa would supply the personnel.
54. For the British initiative, having concluded the first series of Seminars and workshops, plans are now being made to move the different strands of the initiative forward in three areas:
 - (a) At the level of the OAU through the Conflict Management Mechanism;
 - (b) Action in New York to support the UN Dimension; and
 - (c) Action that may emerge within Africa itself by individual States or groups of States.
55. The French initiative, as mentioned earlier, is still being refined under the guidance of H.E. President Eyadema of Togo.
56. There are diverse other initiatives being pursued concurrently. These include the Dutch initiative for which the Secretariat has not yet been seized of and of course the initiatives of GLOBAL COALITION, AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM, ACCORD's initiative, CARTER CENTRE and the UN AFRICAN REGIONAL CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT to name just a few.
57. In principle, these initiatives should be welcomed. It must also be clearly stated that since the OAU is not against the initiatives, it has a responsibility to situate them within the framework of its current pre-occupations to deal with conflicts on the Continent and thereby ensure that, the final outcome will serve Africa's interest. This is critically important especially in view of the well-known fact that at the initial stages, both British and French initiatives were not strictly speaking OAU centred and the involvement of the Organization only came after the insistence of African leaders and Member States on the centrality of the



conflict Mechanism to African peacekeeping efforts.

58. In this connection, it is important to point out that there is a real danger that if unco-ordinated, the many initiatives now emerging, could have the potential of distracting Member States and, therefore, the OAU Mechanism from undertaking action in this area. The above argument is strengthened by the fact that the experience of the last two years, especially in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi and now Somalia, clearly demonstrates that the OAU cannot leave everything to the UN. As admitted by the UN itself, the Organization is overstretched and too involved around the world to be expected to deal with all the demands of African Peacekeeping. The OAU must, therefore, be prepared to expand from the present limited observation Missions into Peacekeeping because apart from the over-subscription of the UN, experience has shown that the OAU does possess and needs to further develop the duality of the political and military initiatives to keep the momentum of the peace process in conflict areas. It was possible in Rwanda before the arrival of the UN, and the Organization is currently making a meaningful contribution in Burundi through OMIB, because of that enabling duality, however minimal the military aspect may seem to be.

(B) THE WAY FORWARD

59. From the foregoing, it is very clear that the OAU must provide the necessary leadership needed to co-ordinate the various initiatives from Africa's external partners. It must also prepare itself to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities. Peacekeeping plays a crucial role as a restraining buffer between combatants and warring factions, if a credible and operational peacekeeping force can be deployed. Although the operational and political limitations of peacekeeping forces are well known especially to the OAU, peacekeeping is a form of Conflict Management which can be crucial in the resolution of conflicts.

(a) DOCTRINE

60. Peacekeeping operations by the OAU, would require a clearly defined doctrine, which enunciates the principles of peacekeeping and provides guidelines for OAU peacekeepers. Realising that peacekeeping takes place in a susceptible and vulnerable political environment where pressures from various interested parties are targeted to influence events, such a Doctrine must emphasize principles like impartiality, transparency, credibility and subordination to the political leadership of the OAU.

(b) PLANNING, COMMAND AND CONTROL

61. Peacekeeping operations like any military operation, requires a clearly defined Command, Control and Direction hierarchy. The chain of command must equally be firmly established. The increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations including mine clearance, needs not only well-defined mandates, but most importantly, unified command and control, as well as firm political direction from the OAU Secretary General.



62. In this connection, therefore, the OAU must establish a proper machinery and unit to manage peace keeping operations. This includes staffing of the Military Unit (even on an ad-hoc or temporary basis) to provide for Planning: Logistics Officers, Communications Officers, Administrative Officers. This may also entail establishing administrative and financial guidelines relating to Military Operations, guidelines for peacekeeping operations, as well as structuring the important element of consultation, and co-ordination between the Central Organ, the Secretariat and potential troops-contributing countries.
63. In order to reflect further on the implications of these developments and the modalities of formulating an appropriate OAU response, it is recommended, that a meeting of the Chiefs of Staffs of State Members of the Central Organ, be convened at the earliest opportunity to bring their professional competence and guidance to bear on these and other proposals, especially as they relate to African and extra Continental initiatives on peacekeeping.
64. Among other areas to be considered by the Committee of Military Chiefs of Staff and any other African Military Expert to be co-opted by the Committee, should include the initiation of action to take a census of what could be available from the military of African States - that is a determination of what different African Countries can provide in terms of Units or Contingencies that can be utilised during periods of Crisis; advise the Secretary General on the establishment of a proper co-ordinating unit, as well as examining possibilities of establishing a proper military Co-ordinating Unit at the Secretariat and Funding.
65. Finally, such an advisory body of Military Experts could also examine the possibilities for the standardization of training for peacekeeping and peace observation, bearing in mind the fact that training is a continuous process which seeks to refresh skills.
66. Besides the standard training required in conventional military skills, experience has proved that crisis situations come in very different and politically sensitive environment. This require preparation in accordance with the critical tasks of a peacekeeper. Training for such operations must take into account, the special nature of the Mission, including ethics, geopolitical and cultural background, nature of the mandate, political awareness and awareness of other problems e.g. mine awareness.
67. This training can be undertaken at national, or sub-regional level, as a normal routine before deployment. There will also be a need to work out the modalities for mobilization in accordance with agreed procedures well in advance of deployment.

(c) FUNDING AND LOGISTICS

68. Bearing in mind the financing and logistics difficulties encountered during current and previous OAU operations, careful consideration should be given to the funding of peacekeeping operations.