

Synergies of Regional and UN Interventions

The Contribution of the UN Mission in Liberia to Civilian Protection

Festus B Aboagye and Alhaji M S Bah, PhD

INTRODUCTION

In 1990 the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in Liberia after the invasion of the country by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). At the end of a tortuous peace process involving about 15 ceasefire and peace agreements, the elections in Liberia in July 1997 saw Taylor installed as president in August 1997. On his installation, Taylor promised to pursue a policy of inclusive government and, in accordance with the ECOMOG Status of Force Agreement (SOFA), which he signed in June 1997, agreed to the restructuring and retraining of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) by ECOMOG. But no sooner was he in power than his one-man show threatened his political opponents into exile. Insisting that it was his sovereign prerogative to reform the AFL, Taylor orchestrated the withdrawal of ECOMOG, whose remnants were then redeployed to Sierra Leone in November 1998.

What role did the United Nations play in this peace process? The UN's role can be classified as minimalist at best and ambivalent at worst. This view is predicated on the fact that the first substantive contribution of the UN started with the deployment of the 368-man UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 866 (1993) of 22 September 1993, to monitor and verify compliance with the ceasefire, the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment, as well as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. Nonetheless, UNOMIL's deployment was historic as it marked the first time in the history of the UN that a peacekeeping mission was co-deployed alongside a regional peace operation. Subsequently, in 1994/95, the UN

deployed Expanded ECOMOG, comprising East African contingents from Tanzania (747) and Uganda (760), pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 866 (1993).¹

In reality, though, the limited total UN troop contributions in terms of numbers and the tenure of deployment of Expanded ECOMOG did not sufficiently alleviate ECOMOG's burden or enhance its operational capacity for the electoral process, which required between 11,000 and 14,000 troops to monitor. On the other hand, the lack of full integration of Expanded ECOMOG with the regional ECOMOG, and disparities in the remunerations of the UN and regional forces, coupled with UNOMIL's recriminatory intention to police ECOMOG's disarmament programme in 1994, affected the morale of ECOMOG and degraded the overall integrity of the intervention operations.²

The relapse of Liberia into another round of conflict in early 2003 therefore confronted ECOWAS, the UN and the international community with the reality of an unfinished quest for peace in that country. Fortunately, lessons from the regional and UN peace operations in Liberia in the 1990s had informed the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel (2000) towards enhancing the capacity of the UN System for effective peace operations.³ This time around, therefore, the UN and the international community were closely involved in the ECOWAS peace initiative from its inception in the establishment of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) on 17 September 2002 to seek a strategy that comprehensively addressed the Liberian crisis and the threat it posed to regional and international peace and security.⁴ Subsequent to the ECOWAS Agreement on the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities (ACCH) of 17 June 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1497 (2003) on 1 August 2003, in which it commended ECOWAS for its leadership role in facilitating the achievement of the ceasefire agreement. More substantive, and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including a further authorisation for UNAMSIL to extend the necessary logistical support (for a limited period of up to 30 days) to the forward ECOWAS elements of the multinational force.⁵

The UN was 'up to speed' with the deployment of a more substantive peace operation than the ECOMIL vanguard force that was deployed in August 2003. In Resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council reiterated its support for ECOWAS's efforts, commended the rapid and professional deployment of ECOMIL and, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided to establish the United Nations

Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), pursuant to Resolution 1497 (2003), to transfer authority from the ECOWAS-led ECOMIL forces to UNMIL on 1 October 2003.⁶

Thus, more or less in similar circumstances to ECOWAS, the UN armed itself with lessons from the Liberian conflict in the 1990s, and strove to support the regional peace initiative and lead on international efforts to stem the humanitarian catastrophe emanating from the upsurge in the fighting.

This chapter highlights the contribution of the UNMIL to the peace-building process in Liberia. It attempts a diagnostic examination of the key aspects of the mandate of the UN mission, particularly those relating to disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), and the challenges that confront such efforts operationally. While highlighting the synergies between regional and UN peace operations, the chapter concludes by questioning whether the mandate of UNMIL contributes sufficiently to substantive peace-building in Liberia and finally makes some recommendations to strengthen future UN peace operations in troubled regions of Africa.

TRANSITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL)

After the adoption of Resolution 1497 (2003) on 1 August 2003, ECOMIL and UNAMSIL, as well as an advance UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) team, worked closely together to ensure a successful transition, especially the transfer of operational authority from ECOMIL to UNMIL. As part of the efforts to support ECOMIL, pursuant to the relevant provisions of Resolution 1497 (2003), UNAMSIL staff officers liaised with ECOMIL headquarters in the planning and initial deployment of ECOMIL. Throughout ECOMIL's operations, one operations staff officer was attached to its headquarters, facilitating daily situation reports to the UNDPKO Situation Centre to enable the DPKO to keep abreast of the Liberian situation.

In order to be better informed of the operational requirements for the establishment and deployment of UNMIL, and the transfer of operational authority to the latter, the UN dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment team to Monrovia on 21 August. The visit of the assessment team was followed by that of Major General Patrick Cammeart, military advisor to the UN Secretary General on Peacekeeping Operations, to assess the capability of the ECOWAS troops and their requirements before the transition to UNMIL.

These visits therefore underscored an important aspect of the transition, namely the establishment of an advance UNMIL Headquarters by the Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was inserted on 25 September 2003 to establish the interim UNMIL headquarters. As a result of its timely deployment, it was able to take over operations from ECOMIL headquarters and, in collaboration with the regional staff, run the headquarters for a period of about one month, even after the transfer of operational authority on 1 October 2003. Simultaneously, the UN deployed the logistics branch, which worked with the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) to take over the logistics operations. These arrangements, in addition to the inputs from ECOMIL headquarters, ensured a smooth transition.

THE UNMIL MANDATE

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), UNMIL was established for a period of 12 months to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect UN staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and assist in national security reform, including national police training and the formation of a new restructured armed forces. The duration of the mandate was extended by another year to 19 September 2005 by Resolution 1561 (2004) in September 2004.⁷ These extensions, which came without any mandate revision, as with UNAMSIL and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC (DRC)), are quite significant. They indicate that the implementation of the mandate is on course. But this does not mean that the mandate is sufficient for the tasks in hand to set Liberia on a path of sustainable peace-building, as discussed later.

Meanwhile, in Resolution 1509 (2003), the UN Security Council mandated that UNMIL would consist of up to 15,000 UN military personnel, including up to 250 military observers (Milobs) and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which would include formed units, to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, and the appropriate civilian component. Pursuant to the council's decision, ECOMIL transferred operational authority to UNMIL on 1 October; UNMIL subsumed about 3,500 troops of the regional force, which the council had commended for its rapid and professional deployment, as well as the mandate of the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL), whose mandate was accordingly terminated and its major functions transferred to UNMIL.

From its inception, a tough-talking, swashbuckling Jacques Paul Klein (USA), a retired major general from the US Air Force and a former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the UN Mission in Kosovo, was the SRSG and head of mission in accordance with appropriate UN policy decisions (see S/2003/695 and S/2003/696). His first Deputy SRSG for Operations was Souren G Siraydarian (Syria), who left the mission area on 30 September 2004 and has been replaced by Steinar Bjornsson (Iceland) since 20 January 2005. The Deputy SRSG for Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation, as well as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia, is Abou Moussa (Chad). Currently, Major General Joseph Owonibi (Nigeria) is the force commander. He took over command on 31 December 2004 from Lieutenant General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya), who until his appointment as the UNMIL force commander was the UNAMSIL force commander and had served as the chief military observer of UNOMIL from 1993 to 1995.⁸

In more specific terms, informed by the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel (2000), UNMIL was established with a Chapter VII mandate and, in its broadest sense, was tasked to carry out two broad responsibilities: to support and to protect. In its supporting four roles, among others, UNMIL was given the following responsibilities:

- support for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;
- support for humanitarian and human rights assistance;
- support for security sector reform; and
- support for implementation of the peace process.

In terms of its three protection roles, the force was mandated to:

- protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
- ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government; and
- protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within their capabilities.

In order to fully accomplish its mandate, the UNMIL leadership and command identified eight implementation goals, namely:

- peace and security;
- disarmament and demobilisation;
- rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants;


- establishment of the rule of law, including judiciary and corrections;
- establishment of safeguards for human rights;
- restoration of state authority;
- provision of factual information through public media campaigns; and
- coordination of UN agencies for humanitarian assistance.

A HEAD-START ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

The establishment and deployment of UNMIL was given a head start in two crucial areas: the presence of ECOMIL, whose deployment had established a foothold and a bridgehead that UNMIL could consolidate and expand; and the establishment of a hybrid command and control headquarters by ECOMIL, SHIRBRIG and, last but not least, UNDPKO. Because of the complementarity of these two attributes, and given the goodwill of the international community, UNMIL was able to relatively rapidly deploy the needed troops, this in spite of the over-extended deployment of UN peace-support operations around the world. It is therefore significant that about six months after its establishment the mission comprised 607 international civilian staff; 768 local civilian staff; 14,131 military personnel from 47 countries; and 750 civilian police from 30 countries.⁹ In terms of mobility and firepower, the force had 284 combat vehicles and 14 helicopters, besides one Level III hospital, three Level II hospitals, and engineering, transport, road and airfield maintenance assets.

As of 31 December 2004, 15 months after its establishment, UNMIL consisted of 15,788 uniformed personnel, including 14,501 troops (a shortfall of 499, or 3.3% of authorised strength) and 189 military observers (a shortfall of 61, or 24.2% per cent of authorised strength), drawn from 47 countries, as well as 1,098 civilian police (a shortfall of 17, or 1.5% of authorised strength) drawn from 37 countries. Besides the uniform personnel, UNMIL has 485 international civilian personnel and 628 local staff.¹⁰ These staffing levels, which are graphically portrayed in the chart below, are quite impressive in comparison with other missions.

Particularly on the police side, the shortfall in female police officers making up the 479 officers in the four formed police units is a lingering gender imbalance in peace support operations. As the 5th Report of the UN Secretary General notes: "... despite continuing efforts to increase female representation, only 6 per cent of the component are women".¹²

Figure 5.2 UNMIL force level and staff status (as of 31 December 2004)¹¹

It may be relatively easier to achieve gender targets within UNHQ because the recruitment pattern focuses on individual applications. In terms of statutory security forces, the UN has to depend on contributions from its member states. Until a reasonable number of these states achieve reforms in their national security sectors to permit the enlistment and commissioning of women into their ranks, the UN will continue to be faced with shortfalls in the contribution of troops, police and corrections officers to UN peace operations. Yet, besides the need to increase numbers, it is even more important to achieve reasonable and adequate commissioning of female officers as the officer corps represents the professional element responsible for decision-making, as well as the design, level, quality and employment of the security forces and services.

However, it is also significant that despite the goodwill on the part of troop-contributing countries within the international community, the 14 African countries have between them contributed 6,957 troops and police, making up about 44% of the men and women in uniform. In the region, eight West African countries contribute 3,381 uniformed personnel, thus making up about 48.6% of the total African contributions or about 21% of the total uniformed strength of UNMIL. West Africa and the continent as a whole have demonstrated a commendable commitment to the resolution of the Liberian conflict.

Figure 5.3 UNMIL staff compositions (as of 17 March 2005)

Total contributions: 15,788 total uniformed personnel, including 14,501 troops and 189 military observers; 1,098 civilian police, supported by 485 international civilian personnel and 628 local staff

Troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, **Benin**, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, **Egypt**, El Salvador, **Ethiopia**, Finland, France, **Gambia**, **Ghana**, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, **Kenya**, Kyrgyzstan, **Malawi**, Malaysia, **Mali**, Moldova, **Namibia**, Nepal, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, **Senegal**, Serbia and Montenegro, **South Africa**, Sweden, **Togo**, Ukraine, the UK, the US and **Zambia**

Contributors of civilian police personnel: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, the Czech Republic, Fiji, **Gambia**, Germany, **Ghana**, Jamaica, Jordan, **Kenya**, Kyrgyzstan, **Malawi**, **Namibia**, Nepal, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, **Senegal**, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, **Uganda**, Ukraine, the US, Uruguay, Yemen, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**

Against such an objective performance, what is the picture of the developed states, especially in light of the persistent policy of Western abdication and hybridisation of peace operations by some major countries? While it may be significant that all P5 countries – China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US – are participating in UNMIL, it is equally striking that with the exception of China, which provides a total of 597 personnel, some of the other contributions by the P5 are small.¹³

In general, it could be argued that there is considerable global goodwill towards Liberia. This amounts to a serious investment in returning durable peace, stability and security to the country for its socio-economic development. Liberia should not squander this capital again. However, the impressive establishment and build-up of the force should not obscure difficulties in populating the table of organisation and equipment of the force. It is pertinent to recall difficulties over the participation of Morocco, which, in spite of not being up to brigade strength or a major contributor, insisted on being assigned an organic sector. Without going into the technicalities of sector command, it is clear that those troop-contributing countries that have command of the four sectors in the mission area are all contributing in excess of a battalion of combat troops.¹⁴ For a while, at the crucial time of consolidating its foothold across the entire mission area, the withdrawal of the Moroccan contingent as a result of its disaffection because it was not allowed to establish an

organic sector command exacerbated the operational effectiveness of the force. This operational exigency was caused by the time it took to source replacement contingents from Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal, which were already heavily committed in the mission area and elsewhere. Ethiopia also had its own security concerns in its border area with Eritrea. The end result was that even though the task brigades were operational in the four sectors, the mission was thin on the ground in some counties, namely Maryland, Grand Kru and Grand Gedeh. Particularly in these areas, as well as others, the insecurity had implications for the start of the DDDR and the overall safety, security and protection of civilians.

The in-mission operational deployment of UNMIL was also affected by the conventional factor of mobility, in this case, the absence of good roads in several areas of the mission. As noted in his Fifth Report, therefore, the UNSG states that in spite of its impressive troop strength and the successful deployment of a third Ethiopian battalion in River Cess County:

“... the projected deployments of Ethiopian companies to Tiapie and Toe Town in Grand Gedeh, Fishtown in Maryland and Grand Cess in Grand Kru Counties, as well as the deployment of a company from Pakistan to Foya in Lofa County, were postponed pending the establishment of reliable road links, which would allow logistic support to these locations.”¹⁵

This situation had affected the operations of ECOMOG in the 1990s and forced it to rely on PAE MI-6 helicopters to re-supply such locations as Noway Camp and other inaccessible areas behind overflowing creeks and rusted washed-out corrugated bridges. UNMIL’s problems are apparently compounded by the numbers of troops and positions involved and the consequent scale of the problem of re-supply by helicopters, which may find it difficult to even operate in heavy downpours accompanied by severe lightning. The engineering task of road construction is no less daunting and this implies delays to the deployment and continuing insecurity in these areas, which may affect the elections scheduled for October 2005.

FRAMEWORK OPERATIONS: DDDR AND REFORM OF THE LNP AND AFL

In terms of the ability of the force to accomplish its mandate, the key determinants are force design and composition, as well as firepower. The other equally important factors are mission leadership and command,

control of communications, as well as logistics, but it is assumed that within the framework of UN missions these are adequately provided for, while training is too subjective to discuss here. Nonetheless, it is relevant to the discourse to briefly focus on aspects of the mandate underpinning the first goal of achieving security and stability and the challenges entailed in the protection of civilians. (Other aspects are more adequately addressed in the relevant chapters.)

It is more than fair to say that through its successful and relatively speedy deployment UNMIL has been able to build on ECOMIL's successes of in re-establishing security in Monrovia and Liberia as a whole. This was made possible by the implementation of the CPA and in such areas of the peace process as the successful completion of voluntary disarmament and demobilisation on 31 October 2004, leading to the disbandment of armed factions in early November. This paved the way for the commencement of the repatriation of refugees in early October and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in early November, as well as the restoration of state authority to several parts of the country. But this progress derives from the continued reform – recruitment and training – of the new Liberian National Police (LNP) service, correctional institutions and other allied security services.

It is assumed that reform transitional security is the most urgent task of the UNMIL and that without such security, the implementation of the other tasks stipulated by the CPA and Resolution 1509 (2003) will be severely jeopardised, if at all possible. In this context, however, besides the security umbrella established through the operational deployment and activities of UNMIL, transitional security devolves on two broad requirements, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) and the reform of existing security institutions, notably the LNP and the AFL.

DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION


In seeking to provide a balanced framework for DDRR, Article VI of the CPA called for the cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all former combatants, as well as confinement of the AFL to barracks, including placing their arms in armouries and their ammunition in storage bunkers.¹⁶ In addition, an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) was to be established to “oversee and coordinate the disarmament, demobilisation,

rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, and work closely with the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and all relevant international and Liberian institutions and agencies".¹⁷ Pursuant to the operationalisation and coordination of all relevant aspects of the DDRR, UNMIL established a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU).

In collaboration with the NCDDRR, UNMIL formally launched the initial DDRR on 3 December 2003, for a phased voluntary registration of ex-combatants, starting from Monrovia and its immediate surrounding areas in order to maintain and restore security in the capital as a secure base for its operations. Incidentally, the first phase, which commenced on 7 December 2003 at Camp Scheffelin, focusing mainly on former GoL soldiers, collapsed. Owing in part to the lack of sufficient coordination with all stakeholders, the enthusiastic response to the programme overwhelmed the capacity of the infrastructure at the cantonment sites for processing the caseload. The collapse of the programme underscored the need for careful timing of the start of disarmament and demobilisation (DD) programmes after thorough preparations and consultations with all relevant stakeholders. It also emphasised that while DD programmes should not be politically driven or based on political expediency, they should not outpace political aspects of the peace process. In this instance, the programme was launched when UNMIL did not have sufficient military and civilian personnel on the ground, and consultations were continuing over the installation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL).¹⁸ Nevertheless, a total of 13,490 GoL combatants were disarmed, along with the collection of 8,679 weapons, 2,650 unexploded ordnance and 2,217,668 rounds of small arms ammunition. As noted in the preliminary paper, the collapse served to pilot the programme, bringing out key lessons for a smooth resumption in 2004, as well as expediting the inflow of and access to pledged resources.

Better informed by these lessons, the programme was resumed on 15 April 2004, and the daily rate of disarmament was carefully regulated to about 250 ex-combatants per cantonment site, while a degree of balance was built into it to allow for the simultaneous disarmament of all factions.¹⁹ Thus, while the second phase again concentrated on Monrovia and the surrounding areas, it included provisions for the establishment of four demobilisation (D2) cantonment sites for the simultaneous disarmament of all the major warring factions: Gbarnga for GoL, Buchanan for MODEL, Tubmanburg for LURD and the VOA area for GoL elements. The success of the programme is evident in the disarmament of a total of 40,225 former combatants.²⁰


Figure 5.4 Disaggregated factional disarmament



The next phase of the disarmament and demobilisation programme commenced in early July 2004, focusing on the Zwedru area, and targeting mostly the MODEL caseload in Grand Gedeh, Nimba, River Cess and Sinoe counties. In addition, D1 and D2 camps were opened in Kpein and Ganta in Nimba County, targeting the GoL caseload in that area, while similar sites were established in Voinjama in Lofa County to deal with the LURD caseload, in spite of the poor state of infrastructure that hampered a comprehensive DD programme in these areas.

As at 1 December 2004, the voluntary disarmament and demobilisation, which ended on 1 October 2004, had successfully ensured the disarmament of a total of 101,449 ex-combatants.²¹ However, as at 7 November 2004, the actual data processed by the JIU at the end of the voluntary disarmament on 31 October showed that 98,113 ex-combatants had been disarmed. The disaggregated distribution of the total disarmed by factions is depicted in Figure 5.4. As discussed in Chapter Four (ECOMIL), the relative strengths of the opposing forces show that LURD and MODEL had superior forces (over 42,600 combatants) to the AFL–GoL alliance (about 27,800 combatants).²² In addition, the chart shows that of the factions, LURD was the most pessimistic at the start of the programme in December 2003. However, while the programme gained the confidence of the AFL and LURD in the second phase, MODEL and GoL appeared to have remained sceptical until the

Figure 5.5 Disaggregated disarmament by gender



final phase, when their largest numbers went through the disarmament programme. Overall, the programme was more successful during the second phase, with Phase 3 serving to mop up remaining weapons at large. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the programme has been able to remove all illegal weapons from the society. There is therefore a need for a forceful search and recovery operation in the aftermath of the post-voluntary disarmament.

The disaggregated numbers for gender groups also presents an interesting picture which accords with the age-old tradition of combat being a male-dominated vocation or social activity. Nonetheless, it is significant that as at 1 December 2004, as many as 22,313 women had disarmed as 'women associated with fighting forces' (WAFs), in addition to the disarmament of 8,547 boys and 2,477 girls. (See Figure 5.5.²³) Purely in relation to their male counterparts, Liberian women directly and indirectly bear about 37.8% of the carnage, even though it is understandable that a disproportionate number of women were forced to participate in the conflict.

The disarmament and demobilisation programme also saw the identification and/or disarmament of 612 foreign fighters from Côte d'Ivoire (50), Ghana (1), Guinea (308), Mali (4), Nigeria (7) and Sierra Leone (242), whose repatriation is pending negotiations with the neighbouring countries. Be that as it may, the accuracy of the disclosures by foreign fighters is doubtful. Questions have to be asked about the differences in the figures obtained in the earlier phases, which indicated that in about July 2004, 462 of the total of 53,326 former combatants originated from

Guinea (245), Sierra Leone (132), Côte d'Ivoire (78), Ghana (5), Burkina Faso (1) and Libya (1).²⁴ As discussed elsewhere, the close affinity of ethnic groups across the Mano River basin, coupled with the lack of proper documentation, perhaps explains the confusion. Pending further clarity from UNMIL, in relative terms the proportion of foreign fighters from Liberia's closest neighbours was greater than those from further away in the region. In contrast with earlier information, it also appears that many of the foreign fighters opted for repatriation as opposed to applying for refugee status to be reintegrated in Liberia.²⁵


Finally, it is equally important to note the physical numbers of arms and ammunition handed over by ex-combatants during the voluntary disarmament. According to the available information relating to the three phases, the breakdown of the weapons and ammunition collected is as follows:²⁶

Table 5.1 Consolidated summary of weapons and ammunition collection

	Weapons	Small arms ammunition	Other ammunition
Phase 1	8,679	2,717,668	2,650
Phase 2	9,417	2,290,285	17,695
Phase 3	8,904	1,145,678	9,449
TOTAL	27,000	6,153,631	29,794

According to the UNSG report, however, as at 31 December 2004 over 23,500 of the weapons collected had been destroyed, while some 33,000 rounds of heavy ammunition and unexploded ordnance, as well as over seven million rounds of small arms ammunition, had been collected and destroyed.²⁷ Undoubtedly these are impressive data that point to the success of the UNMIL disarmament and demobilisation in relation to the earlier DD by ECOMOG in 1993/94 and 1996/97. During the latter programme UNOMIL, which took the lead with the disarmament and demobilisation in 1993/94, could disarm only 3,192 combatants at 27 sites throughout Liberia. On the other hand, in 1996/97 ECOMOG, in collaboration with UNOMIL, was able to disarm 20,332 combatants, including 4,306 children and 250 female fighters, in addition to the collection of 10,000 pieces of weapons – 4,428 fully serviceable – and 1.24 million rounds of ammunition. Once again it is evident that in order to be successful, DD programmes need close collaboration between all major stakeholders, among other factors.²⁸

Figure 5.6 UNMIL ex-combatant reintegration and rehabilitation skills preferences



Despite this success, ECOMOG could not destroy the weapons and ammunition owing to lack of agreement with the Liberian national transitional government and arguments by Charles Taylor that the stocks should be kept for the reformed AFL in order to reduce the security burden on the new government. Subsequently, it took Taylor until July 1999 to orchestrate a ceremonial incineration of only 1,500 small arms, promising to destroy the remaining stocks of 30 containers later in Tubmanburg. At this ceremony, which was attended by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali and three former ECOMOG commanders, including Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo (Ghana), the UNSG hailed the exercise as follows: “Today, with these flames of peace, peace in Liberia burns more brightly, and we can see a glimmer of hope for peace and security across the African continent.”²⁹

Certainly, the UNSG was wrong. What went wrong was that ECOWAS, the UN and the international community were a little too gullible in believing Charles Taylor. A word of caution may be expedient. The regional and international stakeholders should not allow themselves to take the ceremonial disarmament and demobilisation of the 48 senior commanders of the three armed factions on 2 November 2004 beyond its face value. The history of the Liberian conflict is replete with the resurrection and proliferation of armed groups that were otherwise defeated, dead and buried. Similarly, the signing of the joint declaration attesting to the completion of disarmament and demobilisation of the armed factions on 3 November 2004 should not lead to a false sense of complacency with the armed factions and their leaders, including the

exiled Charles Taylor. In view of the continuing bickering among the former factions, UNMIL and ECOWAS need to be more vigilant in their efforts to validate whether the disbandment of the three armed factions and their command structures, as well as their acknowledgment of the cessation of their military existence, is a fact of history or a ploy.

REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

There is no gainsaying that the disarmament and demobilisation DD programme has made more significant strides in disarming the former combatants than the reintegration and rehabilitation programme has been able to reintegrate and rehabilitate them. In theory, the core reintegration and rehabilitation programmes consist of a:

- transitional support programme, including start-up allowance and repatriation of ex-combatants to their local communities;
- transitional payment to assist foreign ex-combatants to return to their home countries; and
- social services programme, which includes macro- and micro-infrastructure development, education, vocational training and outreach. Specific aspects of the social services programme cover the establishment of social service requirements for male, female and child ex-combatants.³⁰

In practice, though, only 95,562 ex-combatants had received the full allowance of \$300 of the total disarmed, of whom between 85,629 and 87,363 have been demobilised as of 1 November 2004. In terms of vocational preferences, of the 85,629 demobilised ex-combatants, made up of 66,516 males and 19,113 females, 4.05% (2 742 males and 744 females) opted for agriculture, while 0.65% (515 males and 47 females) opted for employment. By far the largest proportion of the ex-combatants, estimated at 41.01% (28,236 males and 7,051 females), opted for formal education, while another 54.04% (35,023 males and 11,271 females) opted for various vocational training programmes ranging from auto-mechanics and computer studies to tie-and-dye. Overall, there has been little change in the pattern of vocational preferences since the preliminary paper was published in November 2004. Thus, the majority of female ex-combatants (13.16%) prefer vocational training programmes, whilst a high percentage of male ex-combatants (44.10%) prefer formal education and agriculture.³¹

Similarly, the resettlement pattern hardly changed. Of 85,723 ex-combatants, by far the largest number of 33,719 (31.19%) preferred to be reintegrated in Montserrado County, obviously in Monrovia, followed by Nimba County with 10,740 (12.48%), Lofa with 9,405 (10.93%) and Bong County with 9,051 (10.52%).³²

As was pointed out in the preliminary paper, there is a demonstrable tendency for a massive influx of civilians into urban areas, considering that 41% of the former combatants have opted for formal education, while over 33% have opted to be resettled in Montserrado County. There is therefore a need for a mechanism to avert the post-conflict rural-urban migration syndrome. Among other arrangements, RR resources need to be focused on rebuilding schools, artisan and vocational institutions, as well as health delivery facilities, in the rural areas, not only to encourage people to move back to the countryside, but also to ensure a fair distribution of national resources between rural and urban areas. In the past, the concentration of resources in Monrovia and other urban centres tended to create a great deal of resentment by the rural folks, who felt marginalised by the urban elites. In addition, such a mechanism would facilitate the revamping of the neglected agricultural sector, an area of tremendous potential for Liberia, especially as many of the returning refugees would have acquired new skills, including agricultural techniques.

The most urgent concern, however, relates to the conspicuous disconnect between the DD and RR components. As noted by the secretary general, the funding gap of some \$60 million has implied that apart from the absorption of some 7,000 children by UNICEF, and another 16,190 under UNDP, USAID and EU funded projects, a disproportionate number of 40,000 are awaiting planned projects, while another 43,000 ex-combatants cannot be covered by the RR programme.³³

In addition, as a result of lack of capacity for effective implementation of the RR programme, over 500,000 ex-combatants, IDPs and returned refugees are still encamped in and around Monrovia in about 23 huge IDP camps. With the largest of such camps containing over 30,000 residents, these camps cause huge collateral damage in the devastation that the inhabitants bring to overexploited and deprived villages and farms. It is also a worrisome observation that the affected village dwellers do not seem to be adequately and appropriately compensated for their loss by aid agencies and/or their local implementing partners who are responsible for siting the camps. There is a real danger that unless this estimated 80,000 'vagabond' force is gainfully integrated into

the socio-economic fabric of Liberia, the entire peace-building process stands at risk of unravelling because these elements provide a potential recruitment pool if Liberia, or any of the neighbouring countries, relapses into conflict. Undoubtedly, unless the funding gap is speedily plugged in order to set the whole chain in motion, there is bound to be a setback in the DDRR programme, with dire consequences not only for Liberia's peace process, but also for the stability of the entire Mano River basin and the safety and protection of the civilian population in the region.³⁴

REFORMING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SECTOR

After DDRR aspects, the reform of the LNP, ALF and other allied security forces is the next most urgent aspect of UNMIL's mandate. Its importance stems from the impact of the 14-year conflict on Liberia's security forces. In addition to being politicised, the forces were complicit in gross human rights abuses, while their equipment, whatever was left of it, was in a run-down state, with personnel remunerations falling into arrears. With such low and affected morale, the reform of Liberia's security forces is crucial for the success of the peace-building process.

The CPA (2003), in Article VIII, is the first of the instruments of peace enjoining the restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security services – the National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Services (SSS), custom security guards and other statutory security units – adopting a professional orientation that emphasises democratic values and respect for human rights, among others.³⁵ In addition to its law enforcement tasks, the International Police Service (IPS), which includes formed units, is to assist the NTGL in monitoring, restructuring and retraining the LNP, consistent with democratic policing, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organisations and interested states.

To restore public confidence in the LNP after years of neglect and politicisation, UNMIL has established a Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee³⁶ to formulate major policy decisions impacting on the reform and restructuring of the LNP. Pursuant to its mandate, the IPS started its three-dimensional policing functions – operations, reform and training – with the registration of all police agencies, and co-located its Reform and Restructuring Unit with the LNP headquarters, in order to ensure interaction, monitoring, mentoring and provision of advice every day and around the clock.

In restoring public confidence in the LNP, the IPS is attempting to bring it up to internationally recognised policing standards, among other measures, by ridding it of elements enrolled through Taylor's good offices and grand regime security agenda after the 1997 elections. This vetting measure is intended to mitigate political influences on the professionalism of the LNP and ensure a geo-ethnic balance within its ranks. The screening mechanism also serves as a tool to clean up the LNP and prevent the enrolment of persons liable for criminal prosecution for human rights abuses. In tandem with this mechanism, the IPS and LNP have established a databank on past incidents of human rights abuses, which might prove useful to any future criminal tribunal.

Further to the screening, the IPS has established a number of training programmes to improve the LNP's professional standards. In addition to emphasising the fundamental importance of community engagement and crime prevention in policing, the IPS is focusing on needs-based training on criminal investigation and correctional procedures. In this context, the first training was conducted within the framework of Operation Restore Calm, a joint patrol exercise aimed at crime prevention.³⁷ Towards this end, a three-day course was run in early 2004 for 21 Liberian police officers to form the nucleus of the LNP's Crime Prevention Unit. Subsequently, in order to address the urgent need for 400 trained police officers in basic functions, the IPS designed and launched an interim police training course (IPTC) on 12 January 2004. The course consisted of modules encompassing two six-day weeks for vetted students and focused on the fundamentals of democratic policing, human rights and crowd control for serving LNP officers. By mid-June 2004 a total number of 646 officers had been trained through this programme.

Subsequently, through an unspecified bilateral component of US government assistance, UNMIL has refurbished the LNP Academy for a ten-month basic police training programme for the recruitment, vetting and testing of external recruits. Since May 2004 it has seen the induction of 708 new external recruits into the programme out of a total of 6,057 applications, 2,081 of which were processed. The vetting of serving officers has also resulted in the induction of 225 serving LNP officers and 106 SSS officers into the programme. The training at the facility proposes to graduate 1,800 police officers before the elections, which are scheduled for October 2005; the projected full strength of 3,500 LNP personnel is estimated to be attained in 2006.

With inputs from UNMIL's Rule of Law units, CIVPOL/IPS and civil society organisations, such as the Law Association of Liberia and other

stakeholders, the training programme incorporates human rights, gender and the protection of vulnerable groups. In spite this focus, recruitment efforts targeting women applicants have resulted in the acceptance of only 68 female candidates, reflecting a success rate of only 6.8%. However, the existing pool of candidates for forthcoming classes is likely to see the gender ratio for those classes double to 13%, this being not only the highest to date, but well within internationally accepted standards of gender inclusion. Furthermore, thematic training designed to build competence for LNP and other agencies, as well as to ensure skill orientation to bilaterally donated equipment, is run in tandem with the normal courses.³⁸

AN OVERVIEW OF UNMIL'S CORRECTIONS REFORM

Within its mandate, UNMIL's Corrections Advisory Unit is charged with responsibility for the operationalisation of the Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan focusing on three major areas: to review, revise and improve penal legislation, policies and procedures; to reflect international guidelines: and to apply human rights standards for prison administration. It is also charged with raising prison personnel standards to international standards, including observance of human rights; and rationalising the organisational structure and level of manning.³⁹

In comparison with the LNP reform efforts, however, correctional reform efforts are streets behind. The fundamental reason for the differential reform speeds is the lack of a UNMIL correctional division that is comparable to the UNCIVPOL/IPS, while the NTGL lacks the human, institutional expertise and financial resources and capacity. Thus, if in spite of its efforts the IPS's reform efforts face challenges, then the correctional sector, which has no UNMIL correctional unit efforts, faces even more daunting challenges. Liberia's correctional facilities are faced with an acute shortage of prisons, resulting in overcrowding and the gender insensitivity of holding all gender groups and juveniles together in the same prisons. As noted in the occasional paper:

“In addition to overcrowding and the lumping together of men, women and children, accused persons were often held in detention for an indefinite period, owing to lack of prosecutors and defence lawyers ... as a result of the conflict, most legal professionals either fled the country or moved into private practice, which is considered more lucrative ... while the LNP was dutifully arresting criminals, there was an acute shortage of

judges, prosecutors and lawyers to bring them to trial ... therefore [being] denied the right of a speedy trial.”⁴⁰

The implications for human rights issues and the rule of law are quite obvious, as women and the under-aged are liable to abuse by adult prison inmates, in addition to the prolonged detention without trial of several other inmates because of lack of judicial and law enforcement capacities to expedite bringing suspects to trial. UNMIL will try to bridge the correctional, rule of law and human rights gaps by establishing panels to review all detentions and juvenile cases, in order to recommend appropriate remedial measures to the Justice Ministry.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE STATUS OF UNMIL'S LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL REFORMS⁴¹

Pursuant to its mandate, the UNMIL CIVPOL/IPS has made significant progress in the re-establishment of the rule of law in Liberia, though there have been some delays for a number of factors, including funding deficits. It has been able to rationalise the force level of law enforcement agencies, particularly the LNP and the SSS. Through relevant impact analysis, the Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee has placed the NTGL in a good position for making an informed decision about the downsizing of existing law enforcement agencies, in terms of the remunerations of those retained and the induction of new recruits into the new LNP. This has involved the amalgamation of functions to eliminate duplication of effort, optimise the available manpower and gain long-term operational effectiveness and an efficient cost of public safety for the national economy. On the basis of the rationalisation, a total of 3,730 LNPs have been registered out of an overall total of 9,727 personnel for all law enforcement agencies, others having been disqualified by the Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee because of age and lack of minimal educational qualifications.

In conjunction with training and mentoring by the IPS, these mechanisms are helping to accelerate the restoration of public confidence in a new professional LNP, following the deployment of 197 LNP personnel to 15 locations, and pending the deployment of an additional 36 personnel, resulting in a further marked reduction in major instances of LNP violations relating to arrest and custody procedures. It has also yielded improvements in the legal processing of juveniles and the illegal incarceration of police officers on disciplinary grounds. In addition,

joint efforts between the UNMIL CIVPOL/IPS and the Judicial Unit have ensured effective prosecution and legal application of criminal procedures. These achievements notwithstanding, the re-equipping of the LNP within a five-year developmental plan needs the sustained support by external partners.⁴²

But despite these measures the overall capacity of the LNP for effective operational intervention in incidents of civil disorder remains weak owing primarily to persistent inadequate equipment, and slow training to bring up levels of expertise through fully trained police officers from the police academy. In terms of corrections, while the measures are going some way towards the release of detained personnel, such ad hoc measures are far from adequate, and do not address the need for juvenile courts and detention centres, which are still non-existent. Existing correctional gaps imply that even though the LNP might undertake investigations that will lead to arrests, there will still be no capacity for trials or for incarceration of persons found guilty of offences. There is a need therefore to achieve equal progress on all fronts in order to achieve effective rule of law and human rights protection.

REFORMING THE AFL

The disconnection between the police and correctional institutions pales into insignificance when compared with the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). As noted in the preliminary paper, the delay in the restructuring and retraining of the AFL, coupled with disparities between police and judicial reforms, constitutes a potential source of insecurity that could unwind the modest progress made in the peace process.⁴³ Since then, it has become clearer that the NTGL has engaged with the US government, which is leading on the reform of the AFL, subject to an UNMIL Blue Paper providing an "outline for a new defence policy aiming to secure territorial integrity, including the establishment of a new coastguard to provide maritime patrols".⁴⁴ As noted for the LNP, UNMIL is assisting in the re-documentation and establishment of a database on AFL to facilitate the determination of the eligibility for retrenchment of such personnel and their end of service entitlements.

In addition to the mundane lack of funding that is plaguing the peace-building process, there is a need for a great deal of transparency and public participation in the debate over the country's security policy in relation to the military policy of the AFL. In the absence of prior knowledge of the UNMIL Blue Paper, one can only hope that the

military policy of Liberia and the new AFL, including its professional leadership, will be ethnically balanced and, above all, under sound civil oversight by appropriate national institutions. At the end of its reform, the AFL should not be a drain on the national economy, a threat to Liberia's neighbours, or the president's private army; nor should it serve the interest of any particular ethnic group, including the Americo-Liberians. The reform of the security sector in Liberia is discussed further in Chapter Eleven.

CONCLUSION

Since the decade of poor relations between ECOWAS, the UN and the international community over the conflicts in the Mano River Union area, the persistent conflicts and the humanitarian crises they engender had informed a positive change in mutual cooperation and collaboration between the regions and its international partners. Starting with the region, in sharp contrast with the political, diplomatic and legal acrimony reminiscent of ECOWAS's interventions in the 1990s, the broad consensus within ECOWAS is a manifestation of acceptance by its member states that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention should yield to humanitarian intervention. This underscores the maturity of regional integration, informed by the wisdom of the interlinked nature of conflicts in the region. ECOWAS, the AU and the international community, including the UN, have therefore become wiser in recognising the need for regional and continental approaches to the resolution of conflicts that would ordinarily have been perceived as domestic.

While commending the ECOWAS and ECOMIL peace initiatives, however, the UN and the international community should realise the need to support efforts to enhance ECOWAS's regional capacity for timely intervention. Such support should be in the areas of greatest need, notably strategic air- and sea-lifts, mission logistical sustainment and mission funding, as well as communication equipment. They need to recognise the inseparable linkage of the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIIG) with the African Standby Force (ASF). Such UN and international community efforts should therefore be considered within the multilateral framework of the AU, since the regional and continental standby capacities offer the greatest synergy.

Beyond the successful transfer of operational authority from ECOMIL to UNMIL, one should pay recognition to timely deployment of UNMIL in fewer than 90 days after the signature of the CPA and the deployment

of ECOMIL. This is worthy of note, particularly as it derives from the operationalisation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel (2000). Looking even further, it is more important to emphasise close collaboration between ECOWAS and the UN System, underscoring the principle that collaboration between regional organisations – including such region-to-region collaboration as the deployment of SHIRBRIG for the operationalisation of UNMIL headquarters – and the UN, with adequate and suitable support from the international community, creates an effective synergy towards the timely resolution of conflicts, and the protection of civilians. Nonetheless, such a mechanism needs to be formalised contextually within the framework of the Peace-Building Commission proposed by the UN High Panel, in order to make it more predictable and less ad hoc than it has been hitherto.

Much of the consolidated peace that prevails in Liberia today devolves on the rapid deployments of ECOMIL and UNMIL, coupled with the successful implementation of key aspects of UNMIL's mandate. UNMIL's successful voluntary disarmament and the reform of the law enforcement and rule of law sector institutions, albeit limited in some areas and still facing challenges, has contributed considerably to the restoration of peace and stability.

However, in spite of progress in these areas, it is doubtful whether sustainable peace would result from the UNMIL peacekeeping process, given the inadequate nature of the mandate, the disconnect between the DD and RR components, as a result of funding gaps, and the lack of transparency and substantive capacity-building within the security sector. One can only emphasise that the huge investments that have been made in Liberia should not be squandered because current efforts did not go far enough to deal with the root causes of the conflict, or to rebuild transitional capacities for sustainable peace-building.

NOTES

- 1 Festus B Aboagye, *ECOMOG, a sub-regional experience in conflict resolution, management and peacekeeping in Liberia*, SEDCO, Accra, 1999, pp 115, 144, 166 and 172.
- 2 Aboagye, *ECOMOG*, op cit, pp 172–174. Indeed, besides the tardiness of the UN efforts, the international community had also questioned the justification and legality of the regional intervention in a conflict that it considered as domestic to Liberia (see op cit, pp 215–222).
- 3 See Report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations (Brahimi Panel), August 2000.

- 4 Ibid.
- 5 See UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) of 1 August 2003, pp 1–2.
- 6 See UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003, pp 2–3.
- 7 See UN Security Council Resolution 1561 (2004) of 17 September 2004.
- 8 Aboagye, *ECOMOG*, op cit, pp 115 and 171.
- 9 See UNMIL Mission brief, Monrovia, Liberia, 23 July 2004.
- 10 See Fifth Report of the UN Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN S/2004/972, 17 December 2004.
- 11 It is to be noted that the total authorised military strength of up to 15,000 is the sum of the military units and the military observers (MILOBS).
- 12 See UNSG Fifth Report, 2004, op cit, p 12.
- 13 See Annex I to UNSG Fifth Report, 2004. Such contributions include: France (one staff officer); Germany (four civilian police); the Russian Federation (20 civilian police and six military observers); the UK (three staff officers); and the USA (six military observers, five staff officers and 68 civilian police).
- 14 See Annex I to UNSG Fifth Report, 2004, op cit. Sector commands are vested in: Sector 1 – Monrovia: Nigeria – two battalions (+); Sector 2 – Bomi: Pakistan – battalion, medical, engineers; Sector 3 – Gbarnga: Bangladesh – battalion (+); and Sector 4 – Tsien (Zwedru): Ethiopia – three battalions.
- 15 See UNSG Fifth Report, 2004, op cit.
- 16 See Comprehensive Peace Agreement, op cit, p 8.
- 17 Membership of the NCDDRR was to comprise all the national and international stakeholders in Liberia, including relevant agencies of the National Transitional Government (NTGL), namely GoL, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, the UN, the AU and the ICGL.
- 18 See Comprehensive Peace Agreement, op cit, p 8.
- 19 See the NCDDRR Joint Implementation Unit – DDDR Consolidated Report: Phases 1 and 2, Monrovia, Liberia, July 2003. Under the DDDR programme, persons aged 17 years and above were considered adults. However, one of the major challenges confronting officials of the DDDR programme was how to establish the age of former combatants, in the absence of birth certificates.
- 20 In all, the total caseload comprised 6,250 from the AFL, 16,450 from LURD, 2,828 from MODEL, 4,769 GoL/Militia, including paramilitary, and 9,928 from other groups. In addition, a total of 8,941 weapons and 1,918,566 small arms ammunition were collected. In all, out of the 53,366 former combatants covered by the first two phases of the DD process, 28,741 were adult males, 7,553 adult females, 3,061 male children and 870 female children.
- 21 See Fifth Report of the UNSG on the Situation in Liberia (S/2004/972), dated 17 December 2004.
- 22 NCDDRR/JIU Consolidated DDDR Report (Phase 1, 2 & 3), of 7 November 2004. According to the report, the data was based on processed UNMIL forms. See F B Aboagye and Alhaji M S Bah, *Liberia at a crossroads, a preliminary overview of the UN Mission in Liberia, ISS Occasional Paper No 95*, November 2004, pp 8–9.

- 23 UNSG Fifth Report, 2004, op cit, p 5.
- 24 See UNSG Fifth Report (2004), op cit, p 6.
- 25 See Aboagye and Bah, *ISS Occasional Paper 95*, op cit, p 8.
- 26 See NCDDRR/JIU Consolidated DDDR Report (November 2004). According to the report, the data was based on information provided by UNMIL as at 1 November 2004.
- 27 See UNSG Fifth Report (2004), op cit, p 5.
- 28 Aboagye, ECOMOG, op cit, pp 115–116 and pp 127–128.
- 29 For the statement by the UNSG, see the UN – IRIN West Africa, 27 July 1999.
- 30 For details see Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan UNMIL, Monrovia, Liberia, 21 April 2004.
- 31 See NCDDRR/JIU Consolidated DDDR Report (November 2004). According to the report, the data was based on information provided by UNMIL as at 1 November 2004.
- 32 See NCDDRR/JIU Consolidated DDDR Report (November 2004). According to the report, the data was based on information provided by UNMIL as at 1 November 2004.
- 33 See UNSG Fifth Report (2004), op cit, p 6.
- 34 Aboagye and Bah, *ISS Occasional Paper 95*, op cit, p 10.
- 35 See CPA (2003), p 10.
- 36 The Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee comprises the UNMIL Rule of Law Unit and the Liberian Ministry of Justice, the National Security Advisor and the Director of the LNP.
- 37 The major crime unit assisted in investigations into the murder of a member of the US assessment team on the reform of the military, in May 2004. However, even though the unit has identified all the suspects, only one arrest has since been made.
- 38 This type of training focuses on radio communications, motorcycle operation and safety, management, forensics, county commanders training, basic safety and security for Roberts International Airport screeners and customs officers, defensive tactics for Freeport police, crowd control and incident management training.
- 39 Aboagye and Bah, *ISS Occasional Paper 95*, op cit, p 11. The unit comprises the Correctional Service Advisory and Mentoring Group and the Correctional Service Training and Development Group. In addition, the CIVPOL/IPS provides collaborative assistance to the Corrections Advisory Unit in the development and implementation of correctional training, as well as operational coordination on juvenile issues, custody and detention.
- 40 Aboagye and Bah, *ISS Occasional Paper 95*, op cit, p 11. Of the three prisons, Belle Yalla (Lofa County) Prison provides for condemned convicts; Post Stockade (Montserrado County) is reserved for political prisoners and inmates convicted of treasonable offences; while the Central Prison Compound (Monrovia City) serves as the general prison.
- 41 This section is based on notes obtained during the research and subsequent clarifications from the field. See also UNSG Fifth Report (2004), pp 6–7.

- 42 UNMIL has established a CIVPOL Donor Aid Coordination team to manage the proper use and accounting by local authorities of bilateral equipment acquisitions, and assess logistical needs and capital improvement requirements at police facilities.
- 43 Aboagye and Bah, *op cit*, p 17.
- 44 See UNSG Fifth Report (2004), p 7.