

carried across the border and, until late in 1972, the supply columns, on occasions more than hundred strong, managed to avoid army patrol. (3)

The character of the war and Special Branch method of operation within this climate were incompatible. Apart from the fact that the source of paid informants dried up almost immediately owing to a spate of insurgent 'disciplinary killings', the ambushing of normal Police patrols also severely curtailed this source of information. Within a year of the activation of Operation Hurricane it had become evident that the traditional Special Branch intelligence network had run into serious trouble.

A number of other factors also contributed to what was arguably one of the major intelligence and Security Force failures of the war. As mentioned, Special Branch had noted the deteriorating situation in Tete province, and pointed to the influence this might have on the security situation in the North-east although remaining largely unaware of the extent of subversion inside the country itself. These 'alarmist' reports were sharply contradicted by assurances from the Department of Internal Affairs that all was peaceful in the area. (4) In actual fact, both Internal Affairs and Special Branch representation in the North-east was very sparse indeed. Two Special Branch offices (at Bindura and Sipolilo) and two Internal Affairs offices (at Mount Darwin and Sipolilo) were responsible for the whole area from Msengedzi right around to Nyamapanda in the North-east.

Special Branch patrols had been blaming the Department of Internal Affairs for the administrative neglect of the area even prior to UDI in 1965. But its own cover of the area had also been neglected. When Special Branch did press for the more extensive cover of the area in the early seventies, it was vetoed by the Commissioner of Police. The latter was further to follow a strict policy of rotation amongst Special Branch field officers throughout the war, resulting in a discontinuity of intelligence in some areas. During February 1973, Prime Minister Ian Smith candidly admitted

We darn well know that tribesmen were subverted. We know, for example, that Chiefs have also been playing with the terrorists and they are going to be dealt with, but this isn't anything one can anticipate. It was the information that

didn't come through. We have also known for some time that we haven't got good enough ground cover in some of these remote areas. (5)

It should have been quite apparent to both the military and Special Branch that while there was no lack of strategic intelligence, the counter-insurgency requirements for operational intelligence were not being met. It was some years before this need was met.

9.4 The Development of Military Intelligence Organisations

The military were, on the whole, completely unprepared for the intelligence requirements of counter-insurgency. In the tradition of reliance on Special Branch, the Army intelligence organisation was, for all practical purposes, non-existent. No intelligence corps existed and no intelligence course was presented. Senior military courses presented in Rhodesia placed little emphasis on the correct use of intelligence. Prior to the formation of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in 1973, the military intelligence organisation liaising with the Central Intelligence Organisation consisted of a military liaison officer known as either the Directory Military Intelligence (DMI) or as the Military Intelligence Liaison Officer, and a Director Air Intelligence (DAI). Both were located at the Central Intelligence Organisation. Their function was solely to provide liaison and advice to Central Intelligence regarding military aspects of intelligence (as this was still a Special Branch function).

On paper the total Army intelligence organisation now consisted of a lieutenant-colonel as Director of Military Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Organisation, a G2 (major) at Army Headquarters and G3's (captain or lieutenant) at brigade levels. The G3, in theory, had an intelligence section at his disposal and was responsible for operational intelligence. The link between the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the brigade commander was supplied by a Military Intelligence Officer (MIO) at the brigades. These officers were mainly orientated towards strategic intelligence. Below brigade level some units had an intelligence officer, but in most cases only a corporal. Invariably the task of Intelligence Officer at unit level was seen as a 'soft job' to be filled by someone not

suitable for any other post. It was also considered the first ready-use pool of officers and other ranks, should a shortage of personnel occur elsewhere. At brigade level the same attitude predominated with the intelligence posts mostly filled by operations staff members on an 'over-and-above' basis.

As a result the Army was almost totally reliant on Special Branch for all its intelligence requirements. Even Army captures were interrogated by Special Branch. As they controlled all sources within an area as well as access to them, Army intelligence requirements had to be routed through Special Branch. This situation grew intolerable after the formation of Joint Operational Centre Hurricane as a permanent operational centre early in 1973, since it was the Army that was mainly involved in countering the insurgency. This eventually led to the formation of a Field Intelligence Detachment under the newly-formed Directorate of Military Intelligence, in which territorial soldiers were used on a regular basis to gather intelligence.

The simple formation of an organisation with no-one to fill the posts, and with very little support, both from the majority of middle- and lower ranking Army personnel, as well as from Special Branch, did not in itself solve the problem. Special Branch had traditionally been responsible for military intelligence in the field and saw the formation of an Army intelligence organisation as unnecessary and a threat to its own existence. It was not until 1975 that the Army was able to convince both the Central Intelligence Organisation and the treasury of the necessity for an Army intelligence organisation. (6)

The tradition that existed (in some units right throughout the war) was for the local Army commander to call on the Special Branch Officer in the area to provide intelligence for the planning of operations. The result was that Special Branch members were giving intelligence briefings up to brigade level. Even if capable, the Army Intelligence officer's job was reduced to the updating of maps and other mundane chores. Invariably these Special Branch briefings were a run-down of incidents over a given period with few military appreciations being made regarding the implications of these incidents or of expected enemy intentions. A vital element of the military planning cycle was thus overlooked. This problem was perpetuated by the fact that the Special Branch officer at provincial or district level was

without exception senior (both in rank and experience) to the unit and brigade intelligence officers. Furthermore, he exercised total control over all local sources. Extracting of relevant military information implied a rudimentary military knowledge foreign to Special Branch officers, schooled in Police tradition.

By and large, military commanders failed to appreciate the shortcomings in the intelligence reports they received. In select cases requests were, however, put for closer Special Branch liaison. In many instances this included a request for the attachment of a Special Branch officer to the unit concerned on a permanent basis. (Only in the somewhat unique case of the Selous Scouts was this allowed as the unit itself was to a large extent created by the Special Branch.) Had both the Central Intelligence Organisation and the Army chosen this solution many of the problems involved with the formation and growth of Army intelligence might have been avoided. Although the above solution had been mooted by Central Intelligence and the Army, it was rejected by the Commissioner of Police. (This would have led to the possible accommodation of operational and strategic intelligence within a single, expanded organisation.) Special Branch had, in the interim, become increasingly concerned about the extent to which its internal intelligence sources were dwindling. This led to the regeneration of the concept of pseudo operations and ultimately to the formation of the Selous Scouts as a unit as recounted in Chapter 5.

The formation of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (MID) in 1973 proved to be a step in the right direction, since operational control of the territorial element of Army headquarters intelligence was also gained. To a limited extent the Directorate was now able to provide Intelligence Officers at lower level. Since, however, these members were territorial soldiers any one unit was served by three or four officers on a rotational basis, the interrupted flow of intelligence was by no means ideal, and served to perpetuate the senior role played by Special Branch officers who were at least fully informed. A further problem was that the initial terms of reference of MID were limited to the armed forces of neighbouring states, thus excluding ZANLA and ZPRA. (7) Owing to the large degree of co-operation between ZPRA and the Zambian National Defence Force and the nearly complete integration between the Army of Mozambique, and ZANLA,

this eventually led to the Directorate being responsible for external intelligence and thus ultimately for the intelligence required for external operations. Previously this function could possibly have been seen as the task of the Joint Services Targeting Committee (JSTC) which formed part of the Joint Planning Staff which had existed prior to the formation of COMOPS. The Joint Services Targeting Committee was responsible for the compilation and updating of a central register of all strategic targets. Except for the odd Special Air Service sabotage prior to the start of the external raids in 1976, Security Force targets were insurgent training camps, holding camps, ammunition dumps, and the like, with economic, or real strategic targets, only being attacked in 1979. It thus seemed a largely irrelevant organisation during the early stages of the war, especially as the Directorate of Military Intelligence and its associated military intelligence sections were taking care of the targets being attacked. With the ever present manpower shortage the Joint Services Targeting Committee was dissolved when COMOPS was formed in 1977. All registers were passed to Military Intelligence.

On 1 July 1975, the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps (RIC) was formed and took over the limited responsibility of the Directorate of Military Intelligence for internal operational intelligence. The latter had been running both the intelligence for external operations as well as for the internal operational areas through its territorial members at brigade and unit level. However reluctantly, the Central Intelligence Organisation thus made room for military intelligence within the intelligence community, although on the clear understanding that RIC deployment would be controlled by Special Branch.

RIC was formed at a late stage and hampered by manpower shortages and the Army's dismissive attitude towards intelligence. After training, RIC members were posted to brigade headquarters and made responsible for intelligence at this level. This was in contrast to their intended task: the formation of intelligence detachments in the field for the collection and processing of operational intelligence, although limited RIC/Special Branch combined ground coverage was done at low level in some areas. Rotating Territorial (RIC) officers thus provided the military intelligence function at brigade and battalion level. Although suffering from a lack of continuity, this was an improvement on the previous situation. Owing to its formation at a late stage

and the manpower situation, RIC could never develop to its full potential. (8)

At brigade level the RIC Mapping Section did extremely good work in the updating of maps, as well as regards the production of operational maps. Originally both mapping and operational research fell under RIC. In the years immediately following the formation of RIC, a Mapping and Research Company was added to the organisation. The mapping section was established during November 1976 and by the end of the war provided a very capable service. The original maps were produced by the Surveyor General after which the RIC mapping section updated them by the use of a silk screen. By 1979 operational maps were also being produced for specific operations. Information for the updating of maps was obtained from field offices set up at Joint Operational Centres who collected it, in turn, from normal infantry patrol reports.

The RIC Research Section was formed in February 1977, and was involved in basic operational research, although none of its members had any operational research qualifications. The computer of the Department of Agriculture's Research and Special Services Section was used for this purpose. A number of the studies made included the ratio of gunships to trooping helicopters in Fire Force, the use of Rhodesia African Rifles or Rhodesia Light Infantry units for use in Fire Force, and efficiency study on external operations; camouflage of aircraft, etc. While some of the results were accepted by the military (eg. the increase of trooping versus gunship helicopters in Fire Force), others were not (eg. light grey as camouflage colour for aircraft). Other results were later proved to be incorrect (eg. that Rhodesia African Rifles were better Fire Force troops than Rhodesia Light Infantry).

Throughout the war the Directorate of Military Intelligence was never accepted as a complete and integrated member of the intelligence community. Professional jealousy continued to hamper co-operation in that some of the desks at the Central Intelligence Organisation retained a military function while neither the Directorate of Military Intelligence nor RIC was allowed to build up its own internal network of sources. It was only after the formation of a joint interrogation team in late 1978 that the Directorate obtained direct access to captured insurgents. Prior to the formation of this team, Special Branch had compiled a standard list of Army and Air Force intelligence requirements which, upon

completion, was passed on to Military Intelligence. Central to the problem was that Special Branch considered Military Intelligence generally to be of a poor standard and incapable of undertaking in depth interrogations. As from 1978, however, the Directorate of Military Intelligence's external operational intelligence coverage grew to be superior to that of Special Branch (who concentrated on the internal security situation) due to their relatively sophisticated radio intercepts and better interpretation of military information. Yet, even by 1978 Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly had the following to say about military intelligence

Military Intelligence was a misnomer in the Rhodesian Army for, apart from the good work of a few dedicated Territorial officers at Joint Operational Command levels, they rarely produced anything intelligent to work on. (9)

At the height of the war 8 Signal Squadron obtained a monthly 12 000 radio interceptions for Mozambique alone. The figure for Zambia was, however, much lower.

The interrogation team that was now formed consisted of both Military Intelligence and Special Branch members and fell under the operational control of COMOPS. All interrogation of important captured personnel was undertaken by them. As the team was also included in external operations a distinct improvement resulted in both the extraction of relevant intelligence as well as in its dissemination.

In the final years of the war, the Directorate of Military Intelligence thus tended to accept responsibility for the intelligence needed for the planning of external operations, while Special Branch and RIC were in control of internal intelligence requirements. The nature of the war precluded a watertight distinction between military and non-military, yet in general the Directorate's opinion was accepted as regards aspects related to security. However it was rarely accepted as regards decisions with political implications. Although this was not to be faulted, Special Branch internal sources ('ground cover') had slowly been dissipated as the established administration in the Tribal Trust Lands broke down. In many areas Security Force patrols became the main source of regular and reliable intelligence, while ground cover traditionally provided by Special Branch was uncertain. That this had other than purely military implications is

probably best illustrated by the differing predictions presented by Military Intelligence and Special Branch regarding the outcome of the 1980 elections. While the latter gave Bishop Muzorewa's UANC at least a blocking vote, the Directorate of Military Intelligence predicted the possibility of a Mugabe win, although this prediction was made at a later stage. It should, however, be pointed out that Special Branch analysis of the electoral vote was made on the premise that in those areas where proof of intimidation was overwhelming, the party responsible would be disqualified. Seventeen such areas were identified, but Lord Soames informed Ken Flower, the Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation, only 48 hours before the elections were to start that this would not be the case. At that late stage Bishop Muzorewa could no longer back out; mainly owing to lack of South African backing for any such action. A Special Branch officer later admitted that their 'ground cover had folded completely' under the weight of ZANU (Patriotic Front) intimidation. In her comprehensive account of the propaganda war, Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe, Julie Fredrikse gives a clear account of how out of touch the Security Forces were with the black rural population. (10) Launching a massive and very slick Western style political campaign to endorse Muzorewa as Prime Minister, the Security Forces had lost all contact with rural reality.

The one military intelligence organisation that seemed to function relatively smoothly during the war was the Joint Services Photographic Interpretation Staff (JSPIS). As the name indicates, JSPIS had already been in existence during the Joint Planning Staff system and thus had the advantage of being both settled and accepted. This was clearly an advantage since most of the operational intelligence for external operations was derived from aerial photography.

As the insurgents adapted to the ever-increasing frequency of external operations, however, even this source proved to have its limitations. On more than one occasion external attacks were launched on unoccupied bases. This meant Security Forces had to rely on physical reconnaissance as final confirmation in select instances. While this had certain distinct intelligence advantages it also tended to place the whole operation in jeopardy, should the advance reconnaissance party be detected.

9.5 The Role of COMOPS

Probably the single most decisive factor as regards intelligence inside the military was the lack of a central intelligence co-ordination body at COMOPS. To a large degree this could be seen as a further product of the military neglect of intelligence.

Since little allowance had been made within the Joint Planning Staffs for intelligence control and co-ordination, the same situation was perpetuated within COMOPS, although to a lesser degree. (11) Yet it should also be added that at the time of COMOPS formation, March 1977, there seemed to be no senior intelligence officer available to fill the post. Provision had been made in COMOPS Operations Staff for both operations and intelligence sections, but the incumbent initially was a single Army captain with no intelligence training or experience, later to be replaced by an Air Force squadron leader. Their major task was the preparation of COMOPS maps while the intelligence co-ordination that took place consisted in most instances of passing responsibility to Military Intelligence.

There was a need at COMOPS level for an intelligence section with enough background to co-ordinate the work of the other Army and Air Force intelligence sections. At this level all the relevant intelligence from the total intelligence community should have been collated and on the basis of it an appreciation made for presentation to COMOPS at the start of the planning cycle. In an attempt to achieve this, the COMOPS section was enlarged to two officers with the rank of major, one responsible for Zambia and the other for Mozambique. Since neither of these had any background knowledge of the countries concerned, and Special Branch control of sources and general co-operation again proved an obstacle, COMOPS reverted to working directly with MID in the latter stages of the war. One example of the lack of central military intelligence co-ordination is provided by the intelligence process that preceded the attack on the Mozambique bridges (Operation Uric) during September 1979: at various stages, JSPIS, Military Intelligence, Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and finally the planning team at COMOPS carried out duplicating analyses with no central co-ordination of the effort. Had co-ordination existed, a single organisation could have tasked all sources and after completion of the analysis distributed the result to all concerned.

As the war intensified, and especially from

1978 onwards, the Directorate of Military Intelligence began to meet the needs of COMOPS more effectively. A major criticism levelled at the operations planning section at COMOPS, was for shortening the planning cycle that was followed to external operations. This led to the repeated use of set-piece plans which insurgent forces were quick to comprehend and to counter.

9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and the Special Forces Intelligence Centre (SFIC)

Due to the singular nature of their operations, the Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts each had their own intelligence sections at unit level. As discussed in Chapter 2, Special Forces operations suffered from a lack of central co-ordination. This situation was also evident as regards intelligence co-ordination. The latter was arguably the major incentive towards the formation of a Special Forces headquarters.

The major problem concerned the exchange of operational intelligence between Special Force units and Joint Operational Centres. The Selous Scouts were initially established to gather such intelligence and proved the most important source of this vital material. Their type of operation, and the ever-present fear of compromising themselves, led to the minimum exchange of intelligence between this unit and the Joint Operational Centre in whose area they were operating. An area would be 'frozen' for a Selous Scouts operation (ie. all other Security Forces removed from it) the pseudo teams would move in, complete their operations, and withdraw with little if any co-ordinated exchange of intelligence taking place with local Joint Operational Centre. Even the preceding operation of gathering intelligence in preparation for either a Selous Scouts or Special Air Service operation led to problems since security instructions normally precluded the disclosure of the operational plan.

At the suggestion of the Commander of the Selous Scouts a Special Forces Intelligence Centre (SFIC) was established at Inkomo barracks (headquarters of the Selous Scouts) during August 1978. For the seven weeks of its duration, SFIC was largely involved with its own internal organisation. This culminated in a presentation to, *inter alia*, the Commander, COMOPS and Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation in an attempt to establish SFIC

as the prime co-ordinator of operational intelligence.

The concept was that the Selous Scouts and Special Branch would supply all available internal operational intelligence, while the Special Air Service and aerial photography would provide the same for those countries affording shelter and aid to the insurgent forces. Special Forces Intelligence Centre was to be divided into two wings; an external wing manned principally by the Special Air Service, and an internal one manned by the Selous Scouts. Each wing would be divided into ZPRA and ZANLA sections and these again would be subdivided to suit the insurgent operational areas. The Directorate of Military Intelligence would thus have lost its major function, external operational intelligence, to SFIC. But little came of the proposals, as neither General Walls nor Mr Flower saw the need for the Selous Scouts to gain effective control of all operational intelligence at a location removed from Security Force headquarters in Harare. SFIC was thus disbanded and most of its intelligence personnel seconded to the Directorate of Military Intelligence. (12)

Suitable manpower having been its critical limitation, the demise of SFIC led to a drastic improvement of the Directorate of Military Intelligence as military intelligence organisation. Henceforth Military Intelligence was called on almost exclusively to provide intelligence for external operations. This led to the formation of the joint interrogation team (Military Intelligence/Special Branch) mentioned previously.

While SFIC itself had thus proved to be still-born, its demise was to the distinct advantage of the Rhodesian intelligence community as a whole.

9.7 Security and Counter-Intelligence

As a result of the limited number of aircraft available, the security of external raids presented a great problem. Any relatively large external operation necessitated denuding all internal operational areas of aircraft some two days before the raid for maintenance purposes. These aircraft would be concentrated at either Thornhill or New Sarum, which were used jointly by both civilian and military aircraft. Owing to the standard method of attack by vertical envelopment, the majority of external operations were conducted by air and the concentration

of aircraft was thus a sure indication of a pending attack.

A fact that never ceased to intrigue intelligence officers was that the defence forces of the insurgent host countries were invariably put on alert before an external raid by Rhodesia, indicating at least prior knowledge of an impending attack, even if not of the target itself. (13) While various decoys were attempted, the aircraft problem remained a sure indication throughout the war.

Within the small white Rhodesian community rumours spread quickly and it was extremely difficult to maintain security since all white families had some connection with the war effort. The general attitude prevailing was that a white face was secure and a black one not. With this credulous attitude, senior Army and other commanders exercised little caution in distributing classified information within the white community. With the influx of foreigners into the Security Forces, Special Branch, which was responsible for the security clearance of personnel, was literally swamped and in any case found it impossible to clear 'personnel' from the United States of America, Portugal or elsewhere. Up to the formation of Army Counter Intelligence (ACI) in 1975, Special Branch was solely responsible for counter-intelligence. Owing to the continuing lack of manpower as well as the lack of importance attached to counter-intelligence and security in general, Army Counter Intelligence never really became fully operational but was limited to the investigation of small scale security breaches.

Throughout the war security as an element of planning was never taken into serious consideration, while it continued to be weakened by the employment and placement of foreigners, some of whom were later to be identified as CIA agents (in the Air Force, for example). One example of this ignorance of security was the failure to conceal the concentration of decision makers at COMOPS prior to an external operation. A second example was the call-up of Special Air Service territorial members some days before an external operation.

It is difficult to determine the effect of the obvious lack of security, but little doubt exists that the success of at least some operations was compromised by it.

9.8 Conclusion

The central problems surrounding the intelligence services of the Rhodesian Security Forces may be summarized in the following quotation:

The central purpose of the various control and intelligence activities must be directed towards the destruction of the clandestine organisation, and towards nothing else. Thus it is absolutely essential that all the intelligence-gathering agencies should be co-ordinated and centrally controlled in such a way that the political objective never becomes subordinated to the military. (14)

Although the formation of the Directorate of Military Intelligence and RIC was the result of an alarming deficiency in operational intelligence, this tended to divide and weaken the unity of central co-ordination. Since the number of skilled men in Rhodesia was limited, it might have been more cost-effective to attempt to adapt Special Branch to the challenges of a Revolutionary War and the requirements of operational intelligence.

The second, and fundamental problem was related to the lack of a national, mainly political, strategy and thus also of a coherent military one. This aspect has already been discussed in Chapter 2.

When the network of agents and informers of Special Branch was found to be disappearing, local administration had also collapsed with the affected areas. Julie Frederikse correctly states

While Internal Affairs had little control over the military situation on the ground, it had near total control of the information flow from the rural areas. (15)

This removed all official permanent representation and contact with the local population. 'Security comes first, voluntary information comes later.' (16)

Without permanent protection at local level, insurgent forces were free to organise and intimidate the local inhabitants at will. Security Force patrols provided little more than an immediate presence. It was only with the introduction of Security Force Auxiliaries in 1978 that the Security Forces could maintain any such presence. Had a general strategic concept been followed according to which areas under government control were slowly extended

by the use of massive population control measures, and the involvement of the local population in their own defence and development, intelligence 'ground cover' would have been extended concurrently. Although military patrols within the Tribal Trust Lands were numerous and maintained limited contact with the local population, the existing military forces lacked the manpower, inclination and time to maintain a permanent presence within these areas. Increasingly, therefore, Security Forces tended to extract information by force which could only be counter-productive in the medium and long term.

It is too seldom understood that an unwillingness to supply information to the government on the part of villagers is not necessarily a sign of political support of the guerrillas, as ideologically or emotionally 'motivated' sympathizers in the West are apt to assume. It may of course be the result of the success of the Communist 'violence programme'; or it may be a sign of a generalized local support for the guerrillas. But it may be much more basic and apolitical; an unwillingness to betray local boys ... to a central administration viewed as alien to the village community. Hence the enormous importance in counter-insurgency of involving the locals in their own self-defence units. (17)

In spite of the criticism noted above, however, the establishment of a single effective intelligence organisation able to meet the challenges of counter-insurgency warfare is no easy task. Not only are problems of method and structure encountered, but also more established ones of vested interest and an inability to grasp the complexities of revolutionary war at an early enough stage.

NOTES

1. To an extent the friction between Internal Affairs and Special Branch was due to Branch One's warning that the revolutionary potential in the Tribal Trust Lands was rising rapidly. Special Branch viewed this, in part, as a result of administrative neglect.

2. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 18.

3. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country,

revised and extended edition (Pan Books, London, 1980), p. 109.

4. To a large extent the blame for the situation that had developed was placed on the shoulders of Internal Affairs, see for example the Rhodesia Herald of 12 Feb. and 5 Apr. 1973.

5. D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981), p. 8.

6. The extent to which Special Branch was prepared to go in order to forestall the formation of RIC provides substantive evidence to this effect. During 1973 Special Branch broke into offices to obtain copies of a presentation prepared by a senior Army officer towards the formation of RIC. This information enabled Special Branch to counter all arguments in detail the following day when the presentation was given.

7. MID fell under the Army for administrative purposes, but was responsible to CIO for all intelligence-related activities. DMI was the military intelligence adviser to both DG CIO and Commander of the Army.

8. A further factor that had a negative effect on the work done by RIC was the extension of operational areas during 1977. Existing RIC personnel in Operation Hurricane were further thinned out to obtain candidates for service in Repulse and Thrasher.

9. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 330.

10. J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe. (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1982).

11. The DG CIO appointed an intelligence liaison officer of the rank of chief superintendant at COMOPS (equivalent to Army rank of lieutenant-colonel) but since his was only a liaison function, he could play no effective role within COMOPS itself. As a 'civilian' among military there also tended to be a communication gap.

12. Functionally a further problem related to the formation of SFIC was the addition of yet another intelligence organisation to the total intelligence community. CIO had increasingly come to accept MID as a member of this community, if not wholeheartedly. It was, however, hesitant to extend its co-operation to yet another military intelligence organisation.

13. This was more the case with operations into Zambia than was the case with Mozambique. The FAM were on almost continual standby, presumably due to faulty analysis of Russian signal interceptions.

14. G. Fairburn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 316.

15. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 87.

16. Fairburn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, p. 315.

17. Ibid., p. 304.

Chapter 10

THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979

Insurgent activity had its primary material impact within the rural areas of Zimbabwe. Only the secondary results of this onslaught, such as increased urban squatting, were felt in and around towns and cities. Much of the country, formerly known as the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's) was poorly developed by comparison with the mainly white-controlled commercial and farming areas. This is still the case today. It was within these often remote areas that ZANLA and ZPRA forces established their base areas which eventually encircled the economic heartland of Zimbabwe.

By mid 1978 increasingly large areas of Rhodesia were no longer provided with veterinary services. As a result, the spread of tsetse fly was unchecked and the situation deteriorated to that state which had existed during the previous century. Following a concerted insurgent campaign, the rural bus services which transported about 95% of the country's black population between the main urban centres and the TTL's had virtually collapsed by the end of 1978. Malaria, bilharzia and other endemic diseases, once under control, now became widespread. An increasing number of reports of malnutrition were reported by the few doctors that remained in rural areas.

After the Elim massacre of June 1978, medical services in these areas had declined further. Of the thirteen Catholic mission doctors in Rhodesia during 1975, only four remained by October 1978. Nine out of 31 Catholic clinics were closed during the same period.

During February 1979 the Financial Mail reported that administration in the Tribal Trust Lands around Mudzi and Mutoko in eastern Mashonaland, in the Fort Victoria region and in parts of Matabeleland had ceased. White farming communities were dwindling in the

Mutare region, in Cashel Valley and around Melsetter, Birchenough Bridge and Chipinga, around Rusape, Headlands, Macheke as well as to the north of Harare around Centenary and Sipolilo. Added to the economic disruption of the farming industry, which earned more than half of the country's foreign exchange, Rhodesia had suffered a negative real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975. By 1979 the real per capita GDP was virtually the same as at the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. In the period 1975 to 1978, employment had decreased by more than 60 000 while 80 000 jobs were needed annually to accommodate additions to the labour supply.

From the initial figure of a few hundred insurgents that had entered the country during 1973/74, intelligence estimates for late 1977 put the combined ZANLA/ZPRA figure at over five thousand. By December 1978 the figure was close to nine thousand.

The internal settlement agreement of March 1978 had been Prime Minister Smith's last real chance to obtain international recognition and relief from sanctions while retaining much of the power in white hands. Following the failure to obtain these objectives, both Bishop Muzorewa and Smith's bargaining was increasingly weakened by the sharply rising number of insurgents inside the country. At the time of the internal black majority elections in April 1979, ZANLA alone had 13 500 trained insurgents, of whom 9 500 were deployed inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A further 12 000 ZANLA recruits were under training in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Libya, while the Directorate of Military Intelligence estimated that a further 15 000 recruits were available in Mozambique. ZPRA, in contrast, had about 20 000 trained personnel of whom only 2 900 were deployed in the country. The remainder were in camps in Zambia. A further 5 000 men were under training in Angola and Zambia with an additional 500 to 1 000 men undergoing advanced/specialist courses in Russia and other communist countries. Potentially ZPRA had no lack of recruits. A total of 17 000 suitable men were calculated to be available in Zambia and Botswana. Added to these figures were, according to Martin and Johnson, an estimated 50 000 mulibas inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The desperate situation facing the Security Forces by mid 1979 was aptly summarized in a classified Army briefing document:

There are at present 3 900 well trained troops ... deployed against 12 400 CTs (Communist

Terrorists): a ratio of 1:3,2. Adding of SFA (Security Force Auxiliaries) to troops, the ratio becomes 1:1,15. In classical COIN (counter-insurgency) terms, this is a no-win or rather, a sure lose equation.

Casualty figures for the period 1973-78 probably provide the clearest evidence of the sudden intensification of the war from 1976 onwards (Table 10.1). This was in spite of an overall 'kill rate' of better than 1:10 in favour of the Security Forces. (If insurgent fatalities during external raids are included:)

Further indication of the extent of insurgent activities within rural areas is provided by an extensive classified Rhodesian Intelligence Corps study entitled ZANLA and ZPRA Tactics and Modus Operandi. Selected extracts on ZANLA reads as follows:

In some areas a well organised and security conscious civil administration is working. Under this system a person is appointed who is known as the supervisor. He controls twelve kraals and collects money for CT's (Communist Terrorists) at the rate of 30 cents per head each month. In farming areas the average tax can be as high as \$2,00 while teachers can pay up to \$30,00. Under him are three chairmen who each control four kraals and under them are administrators who organize the supply of food, beer and cigarettes for the CT's. In addition there is an intelligence branch consisting of one man who controls the movement and activity of the mujibas in the area and finally there is a police system which consists of four men to every village, and whose duties entail the seeking out and killing of sellouts ... The supervisors often have such powers over the area that the Chief becomes only a figurehead. CT groups travelling through the area are required to carry a letter of introduction from the Chairman of one civilian cell to another. In some instances, the supervisors control the businessmen in order to obtain supplies as well as the war and civil administration. They also hold authority over the CT groups and direct their movements and discipline them for infringement of good behaviour ... In theory at least, every established ZANU area has a defence committee that knows the number of CTs and local

militia in the area. The committee trains the militia in the basic use of arms ... Sometimes health committees are set up which are responsible for basic sanitation ... CTs have directed that food crops, as opposed to cash crops, should be grown, and these are controlled by the committees. PV's (Protected Villages) are sometimes raided specifically to abduct locals to grow these crops for CTs in chosen areas ... Schools have been reopened in some 'liberated' areas by the committees who have been issued a new marxist syllabus by CTs ... The committee system as a whole is now called Hurunwende, which means 'government' ... Where committees are not in force, locals have been instructed to run, in some areas, when they see SF (Security Forces), so as to avoid being moved to PV's ... All secondary schools are to be closed to prevent men from becoming eligible for National Service. In some areas CTs have ordered locals to do National Service when called upon, but to desert after training to CTs and inform on SF training and tactics.

In spite of the localised success obtained by the Security Force Auxiliaries, the evidently high insurgent casualty rates resulting from external operations and the demonstrated efficiency of Fire Force inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, both ZANLA and ZPRA could lay claim to physically controlling the majority of the Zimbabwean population by 1980.

By the end of the war more than 30 000 people had been killed. The International Red Cross estimated that 20 per cent of the population were suffering from malnutrition. More than 80 000 people were homeless. The maimed, blinded and crippled totalled at least 10 000. According to the Salvation Army, of the 100 mission hospitals and clinics in the rural areas, 51 were closed, three destroyed and numerous others badly damaged. More than 100 000 men in the towns were unemployed. At least 250 000 refugees waited to be repatriated from camps in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. About 483 000 children had been displaced from their schools.

By the end of 1979 white Rhodesia had been defeated.

GROUP	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	TOTAL
<u>Insurgents</u>							
Killed ⁺	94	263	145	1 244	1 770	2 508	6 024
Wounded ⁺ *	611	709	942	8 086	11 505	16 302	39 155
Captured	79	112	91	160	219	342	1 003
<u>Security Forces</u>							
Killed	25	26	12	112	166	345	686
Wounded	78	214	132	786	855	1 520	3 585
<u>Civilians</u>							
Killed	49	163	105	548	984	3 187	5 036
Wounded	23	217	138	769	1 107	2 111	4 365
TOTAL	959	2 704	1 565	11 705	16 606	26 315	59 854

TABLE 10.1: Casualty Figures: 1973-1978

NOTES

- + These figures only refer to insurgents killed and captured inside Rhodesia
- * No statistics for wounded insurgents exist. These figures were computed on a ratio of 6,5 wounded to every 1 killed, i.e. the same as that which can be deduced from ratios of Security Force members wounded/killed.

Chapter 11

CONCLUSION

Hurunwende, Shona for government, designated the new committee system already enforced by ZANLA in the 'liberated' areas. This word stands out as the clearest proof of the inexorable progress of insurgency. In their psychology, sympathy and thinking, the local population, scattered over wide tracts of the Rhodesian bush, had succumbed to the insidious advances of ZPRA from the West and ZANLA from the East. Vast areas which had once been under the close control of the white capital, were now regarded by that same administration as distant and alien quarters. Urban enclaves had remained secure in their ignorance while an assault was precisely marshalled and launched from the remote borders inwards to the very outskirts of the cities. Reduced to this beleaguered state, whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia saw their territory bartered piece-meal in an anxious attempt to gain time, but nothing else. There now no longer remained to them the ground to negotiate. In their concern to rid the land of insurgents they had forgotten the residents of those large reaches who had slowly but inevitably been alienated from white control. Hurunwende spelt observance to the dictates of a new regime.

When the war for Zimbabwe came to an official close at midnight, 21 December 1979, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces had executed the most important components of an effective counter-insurgency strategy. Despite exhaustive efforts to implement such measures, very few of these had in fact proved successful.

To the white population, the threat facing Rhodesia was an external one rather than that of black nationalism within their own borders. They failed to understand that although the initial threat originated geographically from outside Rhodesian borders,

Conclusion

once these first insurgents had entered the country and begun subverting the local population in the rural areas, the insurgency gained a momentum from within the Tribal Trust Lands themselves. Security Forces continued to deal with the threat oblivious of the fact that the very fabric of government within these remote areas, the support and respect for local authorities, was disappearing. For all practical purposes, government control within the Tribal Trust Lands collapsed when the Department of Internal Affairs and Police could no longer effectively administer the area, for they were the only real link between the rural black population and Government in Harare. The restoration of government control together with the concurrent destruction of the insurgent control mechanisms within these areas should have been the real aim of Security Forces operating in the black rural area on a permanent basis. In their single-minded determination to eliminate insurgents or punish the local population for assisting insurgents, Security Forces lost sight of their essentially supportive role. The Security Forces and even more important, the white politicians, remained insensitive to the less tangible aspects of the conflict. The local population were in fact the determining factor, not the insurgents. Thomas Arbuckle addresses the same phenomenon when he writes

The real problem is that the Rhodesian military have misunderstood the nature of the war which they are fighting. They have failed to realize that the war is essentially political rather than military ... (1)

The attitude amongst middle and lower ranking Rhodesian Army officers as well as that of Internal Affairs was not conducive to an effective total counter-insurgency effort. The general belief that the insurgency problem was primarily a military threat derived from experience during the sixties remained a hallmark of the Rhodesian approach to counter-insurgency. Coupled with a sincere belief that the unsophisticated black African was incapable of choosing between alternative political systems, Rhodesian Security Forces continued a paternalistic tradition irksome to the majority of the population.

What was required was an awareness that the war could not be won only in terms of killing armed combatants, but in gaining the active support and involvement or at least neutrality of increasing

Conclusion

numbers of the local black population. This could only have been achieved by first providing the black rural population with permanent protection, or enabling these people to protect themselves.

Because they lacked any sound political basis from which to argue a viable alternative, the Security Forces, in general, were unable to convince the local population that the existing order was just, fair and worth defending. Paul Moorecraft expressed it clearly when he wrote

Politicians proved more adept at explaining why Africans should not support the guerrillas than at explaining why they did ... the initial aim of the war was to prevent power passing to any black government, no matter how moderate. (2)

In fact, the excessive use of aggressive and unlawful practices rather led to loss of government legitimacy thus easing the acceptance of an alternative value-system and authority.

Possibly the most important means by which the Security Forces could have disseminated the advantages of their own form of government was by the deployment of Security Force Auxiliaries. These auxiliaries stood in direct competition to the insurgent forces, while at the same time providing local participation. Had any such scheme been attempted earlier and not been restricted by shortsighted Army attitudes regarding the loyalty and general disciplinary standards of such forces, the Auxiliaries could have secured ever-increasing rural areas for government control in the same slow invasive manner so typical of insurgent forces. At the time of the scheme's institution, however, the military and not the political advantages of such a project were evaluated and found wanting. In the light of these apparently limited Auxiliary capabilities, the scheme at best received stop-start and half-hearted support. But, most important of all, Army commanders realized too late the potential of a politically matured local militia from the people themselves.

Instead increased emphasis was placed on the elimination of insurgent forces in neighbouring countries and eventually on the punishment of these host countries for the active assistance accorded to both ZANLA and ZPRA. This tends to vindicate the argument that Security Forces perceived the threat

as being of an essentially external nature. The general viewpoint that insurgent fatalities held the key to the successful conclusion of the conflict fitted in comfortably with this perception. Operations aimed at eliminating concentrated numbers of trained insurgents prior to their entry into a target country do constitute a primary element in counter-insurgency strategy. However, these operations are no substitute for a total and balanced counter-insurgency strategy. The war for Zimbabwe was not lost in Zambia or Mozambique, but within the Tribal Trust Lands of Rhodesia. It was in these areas that the imbalance on the Rhodesian counter-insurgency programme is best illustrated when measured against the comprehensive doctrine of stability operations.

As detailed in Chapter 6, American doctrine clearly states the need for a complete and balanced combination of environmental improvement (i.e. rural development), population and resources control and counter-insurgent (i.e. military) operations. When measuring the Rhodesian performance against these, a clear assessment can be gained of the racial preconceptions that permeated all levels of white/black interaction, specifically in the rural areas. Counter-insurgent operations were conducted to the exclusion rather than the support of environmental improvement. Population and resources control, a means to the end of regaining and re-establishing government control, became an end in itself: the object simply being to facilitate counter-insurgent operations. Stability operations, and specifically civic action could have contributed immeasurably to the consolidation of government controlled areas, yet the limited Rhodesian response could be termed no more than armed propaganda. At no stage was attention at high level seriously directed towards redressing grievances exploited by the insurgents to justify their criticism of the existing white administration. Had Rhodesian authorities been sensitive to the localized and most directly relevant complaints within the Tribal Trust Lands, and had all available forces been deployed in an expanding area defence, rather than a mobile counter-offensive across the entire country, the concept of stability operations would have contributed significantly to the consolidation of government control.

Instead, by the overly aggressive use of tactics such as the purely intelligence orientated pseudo methods, Security Force actions tended rather to be aimed against the local population than in defence

of them. In the short term, pseudo operations were successful in obtaining information leading to numerous insurgent fatalities, yet in the long term the extent to which these methods were used resulted in an undeniable loss of legitimacy and credibility by the Security Forces *vis à vis* the local inhabitants. Again the aim, as in the case of Protected Villages, was to facilitate the immediate detection and elimination of armed insurgents to the exclusion of other, long term, objectives.

In the case of Protected and Consolidated Villages resources were allocated to the resettlement of rural inhabitants, but for the wrong reasons and in the wrong places. Instead of halting the further spread of subversion and thereafter slowly increasing those areas under government control, the establishment of these villages was seen as an impediment to insurgent logistical routes. Little long term emphasis was placed on the provision of improved living conditions as compensation for the disruption of a rural existence. Aimed at increasing the vulnerability of the insurgents, the strategy lost sight of the real objective, protecting and gaining the support of the local population. Instead of attempting to involve inhabitants of these villages in their own defence, the strategy was primarily seen as a method whereby depopulated areas could be created for Security Force operations.

The same confusion regarding method and object is even more readily discernable in the history of Rhodesian border minefield obstacles. The initial concept, the erection of a barrier against cross-border movement along the border between Operation Hurricane area and the Tete province of Mozambique, was itself ill-founded and fraught with problems in execution. The further extension of the scheme along several hundred kilometres of virgin bush questions the existence of sound strategic analysis at Joint Operation Centre level, and a national counter-insurgency strategy at the highest level. Particularly in view of the extremely limited resources available to Rhodesia in the defence of such extensive territories, the allocation of substantial manpower and financial priorities to the construction of these obstacles was without sound motivation. Such resources would have been far better invested in environmental improvement of government controlled areas, itself an extremely expensive programme.

Similarly, efforts were seriously misdirected within the Rhodesian intelligence community. Regret-

table errors were made in identifying both the location and intensity of the insurgent threat during the period 1972 to 1973. Much of the blame is, however, to be placed on political insensitivity to warnings pertaining to the gravity of the threat. Having determined their inability to meet the challenges of gathering intelligence in a revolutionary environment, sustained attempts were made, and resisted, to establish a new organisation that could meet these challenges. Rapid and determined increase in the functions, personnel and co-operation of Special Branch with all Services involved in combating the war, would possibly have resulted in a much higher standard of operational and strategic intelligence than resulted from the establishment of both the Directorate of Military Intelligence and RIC. In view of its broader approach to the problem of counter-insurgency Special Branch was furthermore better suited to the revolutionary environment than a more restrictive military intelligence service.

The lack of a coherent counter-insurgency strategy at national level could be cited as an important reason for the absence of a unified high level command structure. Only the latter could have enforced compliance over all government activities directly related to the counter-insurgency campaign. Even had such a national strategy been formulated, COMOPS alone could not have enforced compliance. After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote

... there was no laid down military strategy applicable to every operational area. Brigadiers were given their operational areas to command and thereafter each one did his own thing ... as did the Police ... as did the Special Branch ... as did the Internal Affairs ... they all blamed the politicians for the disasterously developing state of affairs, and, needless to say, the politicians blamed everyone else. (3)

Despite this lack of a national strategy by which the various Joint Operation Centres could fight the war, it is, however, possible to typify the general military strategy as employed in Rhodesia.

Rhodesia had in fact opted for a mobile, counter-offensive strategy rather than one of area defence. Although large numbers of troops were deployed in static or semi-static defensive roles, these forces were generally not deployed within the Tribal Trust Lands.

The emphasis in Rhodesian Security Force

operations was placed on gaining the highest possible kill ratio.

Rhodesian Security Forces strategy is shaped by a particular constraint, the lack of troops made available for deployment on offensive operations in the bush. Consequently, the Rhodesian strategy has consisted of finding and destroying the larger guerrilla concentrations, breaking these up with small units of highly mobile troops, who, immediately after such an operation, are shifted to other lucrative target areas. (4)

The lack of Security Force consolidation of any area was a basic shortcoming in the strategy. Any strategy aimed at keeping the enemy off-balance can only be temporary, as in the case of external operations, and must ultimately be an element towards a broader goal.

... lack of a Security Force permanent presence in many Rhodesian Tribal Trust Lands is probably the most serious fault in the Security Force strategy, for it means small guerrilla groups are able to garner popular allegiance easily as there is no alternative for the local people to turn to for protection. (5)

Thus, by following a mobile counter-offensive strategy, Rhodesian Security Forces precluded the type and numbers of recruits that could be trained for this task within the strict budgetary restraints that existed throughout the war. In the second instance, the Security Forces, by own choice, could thus not compete with the insurgents for the establishment of base areas inside the country. Only with the advent of the Security Force Auxiliaries in late 1978, did this emphasis change.

In the final year of the war a number of middle ranking Army officers in fact attempted to convince COMOPS to adopt an area defence strategy. During the military preparations for the April 1979 elections, a terrain appreciation was undertaken by the Directorate of Military Intelligence with the aim of determining which areas of the country had to be held in order to ensure a victory for Bishop Muzorewa. Circulars were distributed to all interested parties, specifically the farming and mining communities, and industry. The data received was transposed on a map from which the key terrain that

Conclusion

had to be held was determined. (See Figure 11.1)

Accordingly, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was classified in three categories; Vital Assets/Ground (VAG), Ground of Tactical Importance (GTI) and other ground.

- a. VAG. Vital Assets are those, the capture damage or control of which by the attacker will result in, or significantly contribute to, national defeat. The ground on which the Vital Assets are situated is known as Vital Ground.
- b. GTI. GTI is Good Tactical Ground on which to fight the battle to defend the Vital Assets/Ground.
- c. Other Ground. Other Ground is those areas which are not classified as VAG or GTI. This does not include areas of GTI superimposed on VAG.

In practice VAG corresponded with the economically important terrain of the white population. All Tribal Trust Lands bordering on VAG fell into this category. The remainder of the country was not considered to be of immediate strategic importance and was temporarily to be abandoned by Security Forces.

In the run-up to the internal elections Security Forces were deployed internally as follows:

- a. Domination of GTI to enable the election to take place
- b. Protection of VAG, largely by domination of adjacent/overlying GTI
- c. Temporary abandonment/occupation of other ground, depending on the tactical situation.

Externally the following tasks were carried out

- a. Disruption of terrorist reinforcements and resupply ...
- b. Dislocation of terrorist command and control
- c. Destabilisation of host countries to weaken their support for terrorists.

The strategic concept as embodied in VAG and GTI was in actual fact the product of a number of ideas one of which was known as the corridor approach. This had envisaged the identification of insurgent infiltration routes and the subsequent step-by-step elimination of them. Instead of attempting to cut insurgent infiltration routes into the country,

Conclusion




Figure 11.1 Vital Asset Ground

Conclusion

Security Forces would have worked their way down the infiltration corridor from its deepest point in Rhodesia consolidating areas as the operation progressed.

Both VAG and GTI stood in sharp contrast to the strategy of mobile counter-offensive which had failed. Although neither strategy was accepted early enough to significantly influence deployment patterns, they marked a total reappraisal Security Force strategy. The acceptance of VAG and GTI by COMOPS in December 1979/January 1980 for the first time led to a national military strategy whereby COMOPS influenced Joint Operation Centre deployment in the broader national interest.

The same problem addressed above can be viewed from a different angle, that of relative mobility and the political/military impact of a strategy of mobile defence. Insurgent strategy, specifically that of ZANLA, was to infiltrate as many groups as possible into Rhodesia, in the knowledge that large casualties would be incurred. The aim, however, was to enable hard-core cadre members to reach the Tribal Trust Lands where two-thirds of the black Africans lived. Ultimately base areas were to be established in these areas from where the struggle would be intensified.

Once ensconced in the TTL's (Tribal Trust Lands) by means of an effective doctrine, the guerrillas use them as secure bases from which to launch attacks on neighbouring white farms, road and rail communications, schools, council offices, black owned stores and beer halls, attacks which have the political purpose of destroying government authority. This guerrilla strategy is primarily a political one as opposed to the Security Forces' mainly military strategy of search and destroy. An important element in the guerrilla strategy is utilisation of the Rhodesian Achilles Heel, poor manpower distribution to short-circuit Security Force mobility.

As mentioned above, the country had been experiencing a severe recession at the time that the war entered its most critical phase. Although the Republic of South Africa aided Rhodesia on an increasing scale, this was not enough to offset the effects of a troubled economy. Military strategies such as Protected Villages, a cordon sanitaire and external operations required vast capital investment and

Conclusion

expenditure. This capital was specifically needed for socio-economic development projects in the rural areas. Denied access to the world money markets, these projects were often beyond the means of a relatively small although sophisticated, economy.

Nevertheless, even had Rhodesia retained access to these funds, had their approach to the war been more supportive than punitive, and had population and resources control measures been instituted in time, at root white Rhodesians were circumvented by their own political creed.

The whites had no strategy other than beefing the status quo and maintaining their privileged position.

Ndabaningi Sithole

By a determined refusal to effect any transfer of real power, and an inflexible assertion of white minority rule, the government of Ian Smith alienated the black majority, driving the populace to the expedience of communist subversion. The Rhodesian Front party in fact refused to accept that the threat of rural insurgency was serious enough to warrant restructuring the distribution of political power.

Rhodesian strategy was shot through with a fatal negativism. There was little real faith in positive political reform as a war-winner. (7)

Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1974, and were then able to host insurgents directed against Zimbabwe. Rhodesia had not initiated a meaningful transfer of power before the independence of these bordering countries precipitated the intensified onslaught from 1976. Had she done so this would have constituted a crucial initiative in presenting a defensible alternative to Marxist ideology.

Government was at first unprepared, and then too late, to take this decisive step forward so that Security Forces lacked a far-sighted political strategy that would have allowed them to formulate a central military strategy. From this, in turn, they could have defended the legitimacy of the existing order to themselves, the local population and the enemy.

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4. Arbuckle in RUSI, p. 29

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NOTE

Most of the information collected for this study was obtained by means of personal interviews with numerous members of

NATJOC
COMOPS
MID
SB
Branch Two
JSPIS
JOC's
SAS
Selous Scouts
1 POU
The Sheppard Group
RHE
HQ Spec Forces
RIC
Directorate of Psywar
Guard Force

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