Recent gang fights in areas such as Eersterust and Westbury in Gauteng, and Gelvandale in the Eastern Cape emphasise the national character of the phenomenon, and a variety of issues undoubtedly give rise to different gang fights in the different provinces.

In the Western Cape, gangs have become much more developed and sophisticated in their method of attacks, business operations and organisational structures.

On a national level, the gang problem has had scant resources available as a result of other policing priorities. This is a consequence of the fact that there has been no holistic national strategy to address the gang problem anywhere in the country. It is evident in the way police operations against gangs are planned. These operations usually have a high profile, but an insignificant impact in addressing the reasons why more young people join gangs. It usually has a strong law and order approach with very little emphasis on combating crime. Its designers usually look to reassure the public that there is (nominal) control over the streets.

Moreover, the available statistics provide a sense that there is no national strategy to deal with the linkages that bind gang members across the country. In addition, little consideration is given to the equally explosive situation of illegal Nigerian, Moroccan, Chinese, Pakistani and Russian immigrants becoming involved in local crime syndicates.

Local context

In the Western Cape, the growth of gangs has also been facilitated by the advent of vigilantes, corrupt police officers and ineffective prosecutors. Moreover, police intelligence agencies have not been co-operating with one another, nor have they been sharing information, mainly as a result of historical divisions.4 It became apparent that the criminal justice system was unable to cope with the increase in gang activities soon after the 1994 elections. There was also no uniformity in the approach towards gangs between the departments of Justice and of Safety and Security as a result of political divisions. The police in the province was controlled by the New National Party (NNP) and the Department of Justice was controlled by the African National congress (ANC). There was a clear lack of synergy between their respective fights against crime. The gangs on the Cape Flats sensed this paralysis among these government actors and proceeded to build and consolidate their empires with new vigour.

Gangs such as the Hard Livings, the Americans and the Sexy Boys have grown considerably in size and stature soon after the 1994 election. They have become more organised and have embarked on an organised campaign of criminality intended to build up their legitimacy within the communities where they are active.

Another important factor that has contributed to the organisational sophistication of local gangs has been their need to keep foreign syndicates out of their markets.

The development of local gangs into regional and national players poses many challenges to the SAPS. It has turned the spotlight on the transformation of the police as an institution and has also forced the police to re-examine its stance on organised criminality. This will be examined below.

The initial inability of the police to respond to gang violence in a satisfactory manner has resulted in the growth of civilian initiatives against gangs since the mid-1990s. These span the entire spectrum of community-based initiatives co-operating with the authorities, those working with the authorities while remaining critical of their stance, and vigilante organisations. In the Western Cape, the most notable organisation with clear vigilante strategies is People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) and vigilantes linked to the taxi industry in the townships.

Violence between gangs and vigilantes has taken its toll over the years. For example, the Hard Livings and the Americans have suffered severe losses with the death of their leadership (first and second tier), at the hands of vigilantes. To illustrate the effectiveness of the strategy, statistics show that vigilantes have executed almost thirty senior gang leaders during 1998. While this has seemingly assisted the vigilantes in achieving their short-term objectives, it has also set the scene for younger and more ruthless gang leaders to inherit the leadership, creating a new leadership hierarchy and setting the scene for new ascendancy battles.

Such a situation holds many dangers for residents of the Western Cape, especially Cape Town. During 1999, the focus has shifted from the more organised gang member to the vigilante urban terrorist. With the police almost exclusively focused on monitoring Pagad and other emerging Muslim-oriented vigilante groups, such as Muslims Against Global Oppression (Mago) and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (Mail), new gang leaders have largely gone unnoticed. This has allowed them to capitalise on the divisions that exist between the different government departments that are part of the criminal justice system, and to extend their operations significantly.

Gang leaders have seemingly been able to cut their losses, reorganise themselves and open for business as usual in the face of the national obsession with, among others, Pagad and Mago in a short period of time. Gangs have also started to venture into the sex industry as a natural development of their criminal empires and due to the inability of the police to come to terms with transformation.

Although there are no available statistics, organisations working in the sex industry of Cape Town indicate that there has been a significant increase in the number of sex workers in the city. Gangs have generally moved into the arms trade, and the sex, entertainment, fishing, diamond and property industries. They also participate in assassinations, as well as armed and payroll robberies. These industries have legitimately ‘opened up’ after the political transition, allowing South Africa to trade with the world through various agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and various European Union agreements. The illegitimate opportunity structure was created on the back of formal agreements. Though this complicates the problem, it may allow the authorities to track changes in the criminal underworld, especially in relation to the growth of gangs and their connection to international drug syndicates.

General growth indicators

The growth of criminal syndicates in South Africa, as elsewhere under similar circumstances, is facilitated by a loosening of social controls as a result of the transition from a totalitarian state to a democratic one.5 Democracy has deepened the illegitimate opportunity structure by allowing anyone to trade and invest in the country. Restrictions on trade were lowered or removed, and the borders were opened up to ensure virtually unrestricted movement of people and foods. The main beneficiaries of these changes were mostly gangs. If intelligence reports are to be believed, the gang problem is being reduced substantially by police standards. As indicated earlier, however, police statistics are to be taken with a pinch of salt, especially in relation to these matters.6

From 1 January to 31 October 1998, the number of shootings on the Cape Flats and outlying areas such as Hermanus, Paarl, Oudtshoorn, Saldanha and Vredenburg attributed to gangs totalled 358 recorded incidents. The highest incidence of shootings was recorded in January and February 1998 with 45 and 50 shootings.

Manenberg recorded the highest number of shootings with 55 incidents in the police area. This translates to about 15% of the recorded incidents, a very high percentage for one area. It could be a reflection of the intense competition for the Manenberg market which has seen many gang fights for control of turf and the right to trade illegal substances (see figure 1).

Although the statistics were made available by the SAPS, they do not indicate the types of weapons used in committing crimes. According to the Cape Town victim survey, guns were used in 46.4% of murders and in 44.1% of robberies and muggings.8 Statistics point to the areas where gang violence has become the norm for residents on the Cape Flats, with Manenberg clearly showing significantly more activity than other areas in 1999. Even more disconcerting is the fact that, with the concentration on the visible policing of violence associated with gangs or vigilantes, it has been the more discreet drug dealers who have escaped the attention of the police.

Considering gang-related murders over the period 1997-1999, it is clear that there has been an increase of up to 36% in the case of Manenberg, 32% in the case of Mitchell’s Plain, and 100% in the case of Athlone. The year 1998 was undoubtedly one of the most violent in terms of the number of people who were killed and injured as a result of gang attacks. It is widely accepted that this trend can be ascribed to the ongoing attacks by anti-drug vigilantes.

Trends in Western Cape communities have shown a significant increase in particular crimes. The crimes committed by local gangs also show a greater sophistication and more thorough planning.

Opportunities to participate in the illegitimate economy have flourished since 1994 and gang syndicates have increased considerably. Prior to 1994, the former South African Police (SAP) did not have an organised crime division. It was only in 1996 that the SAPS set up an organised crime division.

Since 1996, the gangs on the Cape Flats, of necessity, had to progress to bigger operations in defending their turf from the likes of the Nigerian and Russian criminal syndicates that have established themselves in Cape Town. Judging from the response of local gangs, attacks on Moroccan and Nigerian criminal groups, in particular, have also increased.

In his book, The Brotherhoods, Pinnock estimated that gang membership in the Western Cape could easily be close to 80 000. There is no new quantitative study available except this one by Pinnock that was undertaken in the mid-1980s. The SAPS Gang Unit has provided the following figures: approximately 137 gangs are operating on the Cape Flats with membership ranging between 80 000 and 100 000.

Transitional societies

The fundamental lesson to be gleaned from the transition to democracy concerns the growth of the illegitimate opportunity structure. More importantly, the impact of the continuing opening up of South Africa’s borders on the gang underworld has to be taken into account. This has brought many opportunities for illegal diamond and drug dealers from Brazil and Argentina, for example, as well as marine poaching, all of which have impacted locally. Since 1994, the seemingly ‘independent’ character of local community-based gangs has fed the growth of the more organised formations of bigger syndicate gangs.

The question that has to be posed is at what point a gang stops being a street gang and moves into the arena of a more organised criminal formation. Information from the Gang Unit of the SAPS suggests that gangs have become socially organised after the transition to democracy and communities that have played host to these gangs have remained socially disorganised. In the early 1980s, for example, the Hard Livings gang operated on a small scale within its immediate vicinity. The gang used to make money from gambling, betting on soccer matches, collecting donations from people for funerals, and extorting money from local shops. After the transition, the business grew very fast and was soon involved in ‘taxing’ taxi operators, extorting businesses outside Manenberg, recruiting sex workers and running brothels. It also became involved in protection schemes in the entertainment industry, and established a link with tow-truck operators. In the mid to late 1990s, the gang started to buy properties in the rural areas, such as garages and other shops.

In the Western Cape, the tendency towards bigger Mafia-type gangs has been eclipsed by syndicates that have rapidly consolidated their control over the street gangs. This was witnessed by the formation of, for example, The Firm and the Community Outreach Forum (Core). In an interview conducted with Ivan Waldeck, the former chairperson of Core, he stated that Core was founded to liberate the community from fear and that all the gangs were involved in Core.

The killing of a drug dealer in a street in Salt River in August 1996 by the vigilante group Pagad, hastened the greater organisation of crime. Former sworn enemies who were members of the Hard Livings and the Americans united against the perceived and real threat of Pagad.

It should be pointed out that drug dealers who headed the cartel known as The Firm were also part of the gang consortium called Core. This consolidated what many observers were secretly fearing: an alliance of criminals who was intent on continuing their business.

The number of gangs have not increased in the Western Cape since the 1994 election. However, members entering their ranks have increased noticeably. There are currently fewer gangs in operation, but with a far wider reach. For example, the Americans gang has been able to recruit smaller gangs under its banner and has thus become a bigger organisation. The end result is that there are fewer gangs in an area like Manenberg, but with more members and better organisational abilities.

Schärf contends that gangs have come of age since the early 1990s, and have become more organised with the formation of The Firm.9 The fact that gangs have become more organised in this period reflects the social status frustration which marginalised sections of the population experience as a result of the unequal distribution of wealth. Apartheid ensured that wealth would not be shared among people. With the advent of democracy, few were more attuned to the intentions of the new government than the gangs. As Waldeck proclaims:

The frustration reflected by the communities is indicative of the perception held by gangsters that democracy would mean extended legitimate opportunities. This would eventually translate into employment opportunities. In the South African transition, this has not transpired as it was expected and gangsters turned to illegitimate opportunity structures for income. If Core is considered, it is clear that it attempted to seek reacceptance in the communities terrorised by its members, with its leaders proclaiming publicly that they wanted to end the violence and live in peace. This was a typical strategy of a leadership who realised that they were not going to survive if the government managed to fulfil its responsibilities to the people. Those who made lots of money attempted this strategy and, when it was rejected by the political system, turned to their old ways.

Corruption of communities

During the formation of gang organisations such as Core and The Firm, communities were targeted as support bases for their activities. It was no coincidence that Manenberg, Bonteheuwel, Valhalla Park and Mitchell’s Plain were used as headquarters for the different gangs operating on the Cape Flats. By operating various loan schemes within these communities, gangs won their support by providing money and resources for sections of the communities across the Cape Flats.

By gaining access to local community police forums (CPFs), gang members were transformed into respectable community workers and members. A case in point is the Bishop Lavis CPF where re-elections had to take place once it was established that gangsters had infiltrated the executive committee.

Corruption is not only found among police and public officials. Communities can also be corrupted to protect leaders of gangs and syndicates. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Bogota, Colombia where the late Pablo Escobar succeeded in corrupting large sections of both the town and including local town council, as well as politicians and the police. His lookouts were the local townspeople of whom many owed their allegiance to him as their main provider in the face of poverty.

Events on the Cape Flats suggest similar experiences, especially when police raids occur. Many of the residents throughout the Cape Flats have often supported the activities of the gangs and attacked the police when raids occurred.

The local reaction to the police should always be a consideration when undertaking raids on gangsters living in poor communities. It is obvious that residents would mostly choose to defend gang leaders when they are in trouble with the law. This is apparent in a case against Rashied Staggie where a member of the community defended him in court.11 The person was found to be an unreliable witness by the magistrate. The magistrate pronounced in his verdict on the bail application of Staggie:

 The economics of poverty and power

Poverty has always played a major role in organised crime in any developing country. Before the political transition, many communities, as well as the banned political organisations saw poverty as a collective problem. When democracy was attained in 1994, the new political élite soon changed this position. In the ‘new’ South Africa, it was ‘your own fault’ if you were poor. This has led to criminals exploiting the demoralisation that set in with the realisation that governing a country was not as easy as resisting a government.

The results of the expectations of the masses and the ability of the new government to fulfil them led to a crisis that engendered criminality. The bosses of criminal syndicates were soon able to recruit people who were previously disinterested in crime. The results were telling: newspapers reported that former police officers and former Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) soldiers were involved in payroll and cash-in-transit robberies.

The Cape Flats have borne the brunt of the organisation of crime if statistics of the SAPS on gang and drug-related crime are examined. The Western Cape has by far the most convictions for drug-related and gang-related crime in comparison with other provinces. The issue remains of what constitutes gang-related and drug-related crime. The SAPS categorises gang-related crime as crime committed by gangs as groups or by individuals who are part of a gang. If a crime is committed as a result of membership of or affiliation to a gang, then the crime would be categorised as gang-related.

The abuse of power within legitimate structures by illegitimate actors was nowhere more obvious than in the Bishop Lavis CPF. During the late 1990s, gangsters infiltrated the CPF and set themselves up as community workers, thereby gaining access to police strategies. After it was discovered that one of the ‘community workers’ was the brother of a prominent drug dealer, a new executive was elected. In a follow-up of the case, it was discovered that a person belonging to the CPF had approached the Goodwood magistrate’s court with the view of becoming a lay assessor. The same person later interfered with the case, and a charge of attempting to defeat the ends of justice was laid against him.

What is clear from the above two examples, is that gangs have become much more sophisticated than those operating in the early 1970s to the late 1980s.

An old trick of winning community support was to provide food and basic necessities to community members who needed it. During the period 1994 to 1996, Rashaad Staggie operated a loan scheme from a shop, assisting some poor families. He was able to provide bread and other basic necessities to people in need. As a more blatant tactic, he would also drive through the streets and throw money that was illegally obtained from his moving car to ensure that people would continue to support him.

The act of throwing money from a moving car was quite a spectacle.13 Staggie would first drive his car up and down the street and tell the children that he would be throwing money out when he returned. As a consequence, hundreds of people, including adults, were drawn into the street. They would wait for the car to pass and everyone would scramble at the first sight of fluttering money. Adults, children, old and young would run around to get their hands on some money. In this way, the gang leader would sometimes throw up to R20 000 out of his car window for the community.

This allowed Staggie to win large sections of the community to his side when he was in trouble with the law. He did not restrict his activities to the streets alone: it was extended to soccer fields where champion clubs pulled large crowds, especially at derby matches. It would invariably disrupt matches with people running onto and across the field to pick up money. This ploy was extended to the urban riots during the 1989 tricameral parliamentary elections. While people were standing in the streets waiting for the riot police to arrive, the gang leader would drive his car down the street and throw money from the window. It angered many of the political activists who felt that the gangs were trying to hijack legitimate political protests.

In this way, a situation developed where the stature of gang leaders was considerably enhanced in the eyes of the poor. Another way gang leaders used to find favour in communities would be to show that they cared when someone died. They would send a few of their people around to collect money from other residents. They would deliver the money to the bereaved family as a sign of respect, or personally go and sympathise with family members.

The act of providing for the community is a stepping stone in gaining control of the community to the point where gangsters are able to commit crime without fear of being reported. Gangs in the Western Cape have succeeded in doing this by effectively exploiting the economics of poverty.

Notes

1. Department of Safety and Security, Policing priorities and objectives for 1999/2000, CTP Book Printers, Pretoria, 1999.
   
   
2. Police Commissioner Smit, Provincial Head of Detectives, Opening of SAPS Gang Course, Bishop Lavis Police College, Cape Town, March 1998.
   
   
3. L Camerer, A Louw, M Shaw, L Artz & W Scharf, Crime in Cape Town: Results of a city victim survey, ISS Monograph 23, April 1998, p 82.
   
   
4. The recent revelations by Deon Mostert about police complicity in the Cape Town bombings provides useful evidence of this.
   
   
5. I Kinnes, The Hard Livings: The impact of political and social transition to democracy on the gang in Manenberg (1992-1998), unpublished MSc dissertation, London School of Economics, 1999.
   
   
6. See Cape Times, 29 October 1999. Even the president has questioned the accuracy of police statistics, for example, on rape.
   
   
7. M Oosthuisen, SAPS, CMIC, Cape Town, December 1999.
   
   
8. Camerer et al, op cit, p 61.
   
   
9. W Schärf, The Firm: Organised crime come of age, in R Galant & R Omar (eds), Pagad, gangs and drugs, Claremont Mosque Publications, Cape Town, 1996.
   
   
10. Interview conducted with Ivan Waldeck, 24 November 1999.
    
    
11. The Argus, 19 January 1995.
    
    
12. Transcript of the bail hearing for Rashied Staggie.
    
    
13. This is the author’s observation over many years residing in Manenberg.