

ENDNOTES

1. See for example Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Liberia the first organised DDR programme for under-age combatants took place in 1994, in Sierra Leone in 1993. This early implementation (with the war still going on) was possible because of the illegal status of children involved in fighting in these countries.
2. The term 'youth combatants' in this case will denote those between the ages of 12 and 25.
3. M Wessells, Recruitment of Child Soldiers in sub-Saharan Africa: an Ecological analysis, in *Comparative Social Research*, special issue, L Mjostet & S van Holde, eds., *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces* vol. 20, 2002, p.247.
4. K Peters, P Richards, & K Vlassenroot, What Happens to Youth During and After Wars?: A preliminary review of literature on Africa and an assessment of the debate, working paper, the Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council (RAWOO), 2003.
5. G Goodwill-Gill, & I Cohn, *Child Soldiers: the Role of Children in Armed Conflict*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp 23–24.
6. P Richards, Militia Conscription in Sierra Leone: Recruitment of Young Fighters in an African war, in L Mjostet & S Van Holde, op cit, pp. 255–276.
7. N Long, From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case of the Actor-oriented Sociology of Development, in N Long & A Long, eds., *Battlefields of Knowledge, the Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*, Routledge, London, 1992, P.22–23, quoted in J Goodhand and N Lewer, *NGOs and Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention*, unpublished paper, 2001.
8. A Honwana, Negotiating Post-war Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola, *Codesria bulletin* 1 & 2, pp4 – 13, 1999.
9. I Abdullah, Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL), *Africa Development Special Issue: Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: the Sierra Leone Civil War* 22, 3/4, 1997.
10. Upon entering in the east and south of the country, the people were ordered by the RUF to cut palm leaves, the symbol of the SLPP party, to decorate the villages and towns.

11. Peters & Richards, op cit.
12. According to an informant, “whenever you fired 10 bullets you had to drop the gun, open your zipper and pee on the arm to making it to cool down, before you could use it again.”
13. P Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: war, youth and resources in Sierra Leone*, James Currey, Oxford, 1996 (reprinted with additional material 1998).
14. Richards & Fithen, op cit.
15. Most of the young people who joined the Kamajo movement were still in school or had seen their education disrupted as a result of the war, see Peters & Richards 1998b, op cit.
16. P K Muana, *The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-insurgency*, *Africa Development* vol. 22(3/4), 1997 pp. 77–100.
17. CIA factbook, 2001, see <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.
18. J MacGaffy, *Solving the Problems of Urban Living: Opportunities for Youth in the Second Economy*, in H D’Ameida-Topor, O Goerg, C Coquery-Vidrovitch, F Guitar eds., *Les Jeunes en Afrique*, 1992.
19. Richards, 1996, op cit.
20. W Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
21. D Keen, *Internationale Samenwerking 3/2002*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, 2002.
22. S Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: the Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, Hurst & Company, London, 1999 and P Atkinson, *The war economy in Liberia: a Political Analysis, Relief and Rehabilitation Network paper*, ODI, 3/1997.
23. K Cain, *The Rape of Dinah: Human rights, Civil War in Liberia and Evil Triumphant*, *Human Rights Quarterly* 21(2), 1999, pp 265–307.
24. Q Outram, ‘It’s terminal either way’: an analysis of armed conflict in Liberia, 1989–1996, *Review of African Political Economy* No.73, 1997, p362.
25. K Peters & P Richards, *Jeune Combatants Parlant de la Geurre et de la Paix en Sierra Leone*, *Cahier d’Etudes africaines*, 2–4, pp. 581–617, 1998b.
26. Simon Arthy raises this point for Sierra Leone: “In a country where over 85% of the population rely on agriculture for their economic livelihood, the relative unattractiveness of the NCDDR agricultural reintegration package offered, compared for example to the vocational training package (with its associated

financial benefits), meant that only 16% of the ex-combatants opted for agriculture, in comparison to 60% opting for skills training and short term artisan apprenticeships. See S Arthy, *Ex-combatant Reintegration-Key Issues for Practitioners Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone*, Interim paper presented at NaCSA, Sierra Leone, 2003.

27. Often it is assumed that ex-combatants are not interested in agriculture. Indeed, learning to be a motor-mechanic or driver is often preferred. However, research on the reintegration process of ex-child combatants in Liberia indicates that ex-child soldiers who have been exposed to farming during their time in a Interim Care Centre, waiting Family Tracing, were more involved in agriculture than their counterparts who did not spend time in such a centre. It seems that, if these ex-combatants learn about the value of (and the money one can make by) farming, they will be interested in agriculture.
28. S Archibald, P Richards, *Conversion to human rights? Popular debate about war and justice in rural central Sierra Leone*, *Africa*, 2002.
29. Former president Momoh once stated that education was a privilege when he visited the Eastern province of Kailahun.
30. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Report Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, 1998.
31. K Peters, & P Richards, *Why we fight: voices of under-age youth combatants in Sierra Leone*, *Africa*, vol. 68(2), 1998a.
32. *Ibid.*
33. K Peters & P Richards, *op cit*, 1998b, pp. 581–617.
34. *Ibid.*
35. For example, Musevini in Uganda, Rawlings in Ghana and Sankara in Burkino Faso.
36. Archibald & Richards, *op cit*.
37. Peters & Richards 1998b, *op cit*.
38. Outram, *op cit*, Peters, *op cit*.
39. An Ex-RUF commander sums up, “I) *Thou shall not take the liberty of women. Which means that you are not allowed to have forced sex or rape of woman. II) Thou shall not loot. III) Thou shall not take a needle or thread of the masses. IV) Pay for everything you damage. V) Thou shall not destroy crops. The rest I forgot... oh wait. VI) Anything you borrow you must return it.*”
40. On the frontline the commander was allowed to summarily execute anyone who did not follow a command.

41. On the apparent contradiction between the strict rules and regulations of the RUF and the widespread atrocities committed by its fighters, see forthcoming article by this author.
42. Peters & Richards, op cit, 1998a.
43. Ibid.
44. Archibald & Richards, op cit.
45. Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, 1994; Human Rights Watch 1994; R Brett, & M McCallin, Children: the invisible soldiers, Swedish Save the Children, Stockholm 1996.
46. S Mokuwa, Rice biodiversity education: a problem-based curriculum innovation for post-war recovery (case study of Kambia District and Freetown in Sierra Leone), Msc thesis, Management of Agricultural Knowledge systems, Agricultural University, Wageningen, the Netherlands, 1997.