ENDNOTES

1. See Appendix A for the full text of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
   
   

2. See Appendix B for the final draft of the programme.
   
   

3. See Appendix C for a list of participants at the workshop.
   
   

4. The authors acknowledge, in particular, information gleaned from the presentations of Takwa Z. Suifon of WANEP, Kwesi Aning of ASDR, Mike McGovern of ICG, and Lt Col Leopold Kohou, speaking on behalf of Col. Miezou Kadjo, Côte d’Ivoire.
   
   

5. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of FANCI. The Minister of Defence, as the political head of the ministry, officially directs the policy of FANCI. Next to the Minister of Defence is the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the armed forces, who serves as the supreme chief of the gendarmerie. There are also Directors in charge of the different arms of service (Terrestrial, Air and Marine). The Commander of the Gendarmerie is in charge of military training. The total troop strength of FANCI is 20,000. The Gendarmerie constitutes 8,500 of the total personnel of FANCI, the Army 7,000, the Air force 1,350 and the Navy 1,250. About 3,500 personnel were recently recruited into FANCI.
   
   

6. Côte d’Ivoire : “The War is not Over Yet” (Brussels, International Crisis Group, 28 November 2003 ).
   
   

7. Emily Wax, “For now, Ivory Coast ’s Northern Rebels enjoy Goodwill; Group’s Leaders noted for Civility, if not Governance,” Washington Post, 10 March, 2003 ; page A 12.
   
   

8. Lansana Gberie, “The Tragedy of Ivory Coast,” Expo Times, 25 January 2003 ; found at: http: //www.expotimes.net/backissuesjan03/jan00025.htm”
   
   

9. Quoted in Emily Wax, “Key to Conflict in Ivory Coast : Who are the Rebels? Outsiders driving Uprising, many say,” Washington Post, 24 October 2004 ; page A 30.
   
   

10. “The War is not over yet” (ICG report), p.53.
    
    

11. Emily Wax, “Ivorians confront Identity Crisis; Immigrant Nation debates Nationality,” Washington Post, 21 February 2003 ; page A16.
    
    

12. While a section of FANCI was complicit in the rebel uprising during and after the mutiny, many of the rebel fighters were foreigners. Some of those involved in the initial attacks in Abidjan did not even know their way about town. The insurgency, therefore, was perceived as a matter of a fight for survival by the majority of the FANCI forces who remained loyal to the government.
    
    

13. Rachel Utley, ‘”Not to do less but to do better…”: French Military Policy in Africa,’ International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 1, Jan. 2002, pp. 129-146.
    
    

14. Ibid.
    
    

15. Ibid.
    
    

16. Tony Chafer, ‘Franco-African relations: no longer so exceptional,’ African Affairs (2002), pp. 343-63.
    
    

17. Adekeye Adebayo, Building Peace in West Africa : Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), p. 37.
    
    

18. Adekeye Adebayo, Bui lding Peace in West Africa, p. 31.
    
    

19. Utley, ‘”Not to do less but to do better.”’
    
    

20. Emily Wax, “Key to Conflict in Ivory Coast.”
    
    

21. This section draws heavily on the presentation by H. E. Amb. Jean-Michel Berrit, Ambassador of France to Ghana.
    
    

22. Keith Richburg, “ France abandons hands-off Policy on African Conflicts; some fear Ivory Coast Quagmire,” Washington Post, January 4 2003 ; Page A10.
    
    

23. Emily Wax, “Pledge peace, creating chaos; Ivory Coast leader said to be behind anti-French protests,” Washington Post, 16 February 2003 ; page A17.
    
    

24. Ibid.
    
    

25. FANCI was not invited to the talks that led to the Agreement, and thus felt slighted by the outcome of Linas-Marcoussis. However, FANCI broadly accepts the principles of the Agreement.
    
    

26. Our thanks to Lt Col Nicolas Casanova for sharing his perspectives as former Licorne Battle Group commander.
    
    

27. This section is based on the presentations by Hon. Akwasi-Osei, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, Col. Dixon Dikio of the ECOWAS Secretariat and Maj. B.A. Gueye, former Abidjan Logistics Rear Support Group Commander
    
    

28. Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans, Senior Political Adviser to UNOCI, Accra, 31 May 2004.
    
    

29. It is interesting to note that, by August 2002, the troop strength pledged to constitute ECOWAS Standby Units stood at a combined total of some 13 battalions. When the chips were down, however, it was a tough task to extract the 2,386 that was pledged at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Defence and Security Commission held on 25 October 2002.
    
    

30. There was no doubt at all that Guinea Bissau was heading for trouble and needed help, because its soldiers had not been paid for a long time. Deploying their soldiers abroad would not only have provided the much needed soldiers, but it would probably have kept them busy and prevented the coup of 14 September 2003 in Guinea-Bissau.
    
    

31. As a consequence of these shortcomings, the ECOWAS Secretariat requested and received authorization by the Mediation and Security Council, in December 2003, to establish a Mission Planning and Management Cell.
    
    

32. With the Government of National Reconciliation not fully in place, it was still possible for the military protagonists to conclude the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in Togo, which was signed in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire, on 31 May 2003. Under this Agreement - which reinforced the earlier one of 17 October 2002 - a Quadripartite Commission was instituted as a mechanism of close consultation and cooperation mainly among the two major military protagonists: FANCI and the FAFN as well as with ECOMICI and the Licorne force (and MINUCI’s Military Liaison Officers).
    
    

33. This section draws on presentations by Brigadier General Abdul Hafiz, Deputy Force Commander, UNOCI, and Colonel Nicholas Seymour, Chief, Military Planning Service, UNDPKO.
    
    

34. The PMCA is a result of Brahimi Report recommendations for more rapid mission start-up. The mechanism provides the Secretary-General with the authority to draw on up to $50 million in funding once it is likely that an operation is to be established – before the adoption of a security Council resolution and approval of a budget.
    
    

35. Details provided in a presentation by Alain-Richard Donwahi, President, Côte d’Ivoire NCDDR and Capt. Christian Lupuleasa, UNOCI DDR Advisor.
    
    

36. According to Lt Col Leopold Kohou, speaking on behalf of Col. Miezou Kadjo (Chief, Joint Operations Centre, Côte d’Ivoire ).
    
    

37. The KAIPTC and the Institute for Security Studies are hosting an International Experts’ Workshop on Identifying lessons from DDR experiences in Africa. The workshop will be held at KAIPTC in Accra from 10-12 August 2004. The aim is to analyze each segment of the DDR process (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) to identify lessons that can be drawn for future practice in DDR programmes in Africa at an operational and technical level.
    
    

38. This section draws extensively on the presentation by Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans, Senior Political Adviser to UNOCI.
    
    

39. The regional approach to the resolution of the conflicts in West Africa, including that in Côte d’Ivoire, involves the overall coordination by the periodic meetings of SRSGs from UNOWA, UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI. The military commanders have also set up a coordinating mechanism to address the cross-border issues.
    
    

40. Participants noted that there is radicalization and militarization of the youth in which the use of force or violence as instrument of policy has gained momentum worldwide. The youth are key actors in the Ivorian crisis and conflicts in the sub-region. The youth is tired of being told by elders to be patient and to wait for tomorrow - for them there is no tomorrow. Taking up the gun to make a living thereby giving perspective to a hopeless situation becomes more and more attractive. Strengthening state capacity is the key to addressing the symptoms and causes of conflict in which the youth play key roles.