CHAPTER 5

THE AFRICAN UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Published in Monograph No 119, May 2005

The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime
Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect

Kristiana Powell

The United Nations and the African Union

The UN will also form a critical block in the overall security architecture envisioned by the AU. Although the AU and the UN have not yet formalised the terms of their relationship and modalities of task-sharing,55 the PSC Protocol envisions a partnership based on cooperation and mutual recognition of joint responsibility. For example, Article 17 (1) of the PSC Protocol states that “the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. Moreover, the documents establishing the ASF indicate that the AU and regional PLANELMs might be based on the UN/SHIRBRIG (Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations) system, not only because this is a well-established standby arrangement but also because it “has the added advantage of ensuring that a mission HQ level structure can be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN peace support operation with relative ease”.56 The AU will also call on the international community for the requisite logistical, financial and political support for its military activities “in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security”.57 Indeed, this model of task-sharing coheres closely with the evolving dynamics of UN-regional arrangements. The UN Charter states that the Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security matters but implies that this responsibility is not exclusive. This is reflected in Chapter VIII of the Charter, which legitimises the existence of regional arrangements or agencies and acknowledges the contribution they can make to maintaining international peace and security. In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reinforced this principle and called on regional organisations to play an even more robust security role, not only as means of alleviating mounting UN over-stretch but also to “contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs”.58

However, while key AU documents call for shared responsibility between the UN and the AU, the AU has also internalised the lessons of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and acknowledges that the continent must be prepared to take action in situations where the UN is unwilling or unable to conduct or even authorise an intervention. As a senior official at the AU Commission noted: “Africans know that if we have to wait for the UN, people will die.”59 Accordingly, the AU’s PSC Protocol states that the UN has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but it also notes the AU has primary responsibility for peace, security and stability inAfrica, thereby subtly staking its claim to the continent. Indeed, neither the Constitutive Act nor the PSC Protocol are clear on what will happen if the UN will not authorise intervention.60 Cilliers and Sturman argue that this ambiguity leaves “sufficient leeway for the AU to sanction intervention without prior UN Security Council approval”.61 The AU’s March 2005 Ezulwini Consensus on UN reform notes that intervention on the part of regional organisations should be under UN authorisation. However, the document also acknowledges that such approval could be granted “‘after the fact’ in circumstances requiring immediate action”.62 Yet, as discussed in more detail below, the AU’s recent experiences in Burundi suggest the emergence of a division of labour between the AU and UN, whereby the AU will deploy a military mission to respond to immediate crises and to create conditions sufficiently stable for the Security Council to authorise deployment. The AU may provide the security dimension of a broader humanitarian effort and political process with the UN and other international actors performing the civilian functions that typically form part of complex peace operations.

Although An Agenda for Peace and its 1995 supplement emphasise the need to delegate greater responsibility to regional organisations and mechanisms for peace and security within their immediate sphere of influence, they also stress that the UN and other members of the international community have an obligation to support regional efforts. Consistent with these guidelines, the UN has already offered considerable assistance to support the development of the peace and security apparatus of the AU.63 For example, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have assisted in establishing plans for the ASF and the Military Staff Committee. In February 2005 DPKO set up a liaison assistance cell to the AU in part to assist with the Darfur deployment. This may become a permanent UN structure at AU headquarters.64 SHIRBRIG65 also serves as a potential support mechanism for advancing the AU’s peace and security objectives and infrastructure, particularly through the African Standby Force, and has already participated in capacity-building in Africa, including at the level of the AU.66

The European Union and the African Union

Other key international actors have played and will continue to play a central role in shaping Africa ’s emerging peace and security regime. For example, the EU has provided the most significant support to the AU’s peace and security agenda and architecture. The EU established the African Peace Facility in March 2004 in response to requests made by African leaders at the AU’s 2003 Maputo Summit. The Peace Facility provides €250 million over three years to support peace support operations deployed by the AU or undertaken by regional organisations under the auspices of the AU and requiring a UN mandate.67 In addition, a portion of these funds (€35 million) have been allocated for capacity building, including helping the AU to develop its security policy, building planning capacity in the AU’s Peace and Security Department, and assisting the AU and regional organisations with planning and managing peacekeeping operations.68

The creation of the Peace Facility represents a shift in approach on the part of the EU inasmuch as it transfers funds earmarked for development to peace and security initiatives, although these funds cannot be used to finance the procurement of ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, salaries, military training or the deployment of European peacekeepers.69 The Peace Facility funds are drawn from the European Development Fund’s (EDF) Country B envelopes and unallocated reserves for long-term development. EU member states have agreed that the reallocation of EDF resources is a temporary measure but it was not clear at the time of writing what other pools of resources might be used to support such an initiative in the future.70

The G8 and the African Union

The G8 has offered direct support to building the peace and security infrastructure of the AU. At its summit in Kananaskis in 2002, the G8 adopted the Africa Action Plan (AAP) as a collective response to the NEPAD initiative. The AAP developed eight areas of engagement that correspond with the main priorities for sustainable development identified by the NEPAD initiative.71 NEPAD lists peace and security as a top priority and stresses the importance of building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.72 The G8 agreed to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the capacity of African countries and regional organisations to prevent and resolve violent conflict. The AAP also called on G8 member states to design a joint plan to develop African capacities to perform peace support operations, including at the regional level.

At the Evian Summit in 2003, G8 member states reinforced their commitments to promoting peace and security in Africa. However, Evian concentrated almost exclusively on building African capacities to undertake military operations, and largely dropped from the agenda the Kananaskis Summit’s focus on developing prevention and resolution capacities. Instead, the G8 announced a joint Africa/G8 plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations.73 Using the AU’s PSC Protocol as a point of departure and drawing on the AU’s May 2003 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force, the G8 agreed to work with African partners to establish, equip and train a single standby brigade by 2010. In addition to developing brigade capacities, G8 members agreed to enhance African capacities to support humanitarian, security and reconstruction efforts within the framework of complex peace support operations.

The 2004 Sea Island Summit maintained this orientation and the G8 agreed to an Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, an initiative which builds on the Bush administration’s proposed five-year US$660 million Global Peace Operations Initiative. Sea Island did help to sustain the focus on Africa established in Kananaskis and Evian, not least because the Bush administration invited five African leaders to attend the summit, including President Bouteflika of Algeria, President Kufuor of Ghana, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Wade of Senegal, and President Mbeki of South Africa. However, the Sea Island proposal concentrates exclusively on building peace support operations capabilities in Africa and globally. It commits member states to train and equip peacekeeping troops, to develop peace support capabilities in regions that are capable of deploying in Africa, to establish transportation and logistics arrangements, and to train gendarme-like forces for peace support operations in Africa.74 It makes no explicit mention of the Kananaskis proposal to enhance African conflict prevention capacities or the Evian commitments to support longer-term reconstruction efforts in the context of peace support operations. It is hoped that the upcoming Gleneagles Summit will reintroduce these priorities.

Canada ’s contributions to the G8 Africa Action Plan and other support for the African Union

Building on the NEPAD initiative and the G8 Africa Action Plan, Canada ’s Kananaskis commitments included a pledge of C$6 billion over five years in new and existing resources for development in Africa. This involved the creation of a C$500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA) to be used between 2002 and 2007. Approximately C$19 million of the CFA has been allocated to building peace and security capacity in Africa. All funds have been committed and the CFA will terminate on 31 March 2007.

As part of this fund, Canada allocated approximately C$15 million to the development of the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI) to support ECOWAS and its member states.

The CFA also provided C$4 million over four years (2004-2007) to enhance the AU’s peace and security capacity. Specific distribution priorities were decided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in close collaboration with the AU and 75% of these funds are unearmarked allocations. The components of the CFA’s contributions to the AU include:

• A contribution of C$2 million to assist in the development of a rapid response mechanism. These funds are intended to enhance the Peace and Security Council’s capacity to respond quickly and effectively to emerging crises through the deployment of unarmed military observer missions. Recent interventions include AU military observer missions to Burundi, the Comoros and Darfur.
  
  

• A contribution of C$1 million over five years for the development of a rapid response mechanism for civil/non-military peace and security activities. Funds have been used for non-military peace support missions and political mediation in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Darfur.
  
  

• A contribution of C$500,000 as part of a US$6.4 million multi-donor initiative managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for institutional capacity-building in the AU. Canada is the only donor to channel its funds directly to the AU rather than through the UNDP Trust Fund.
  
  

• A total of C$500,000 to the Political and Humanitarian Affairs Department of the AU Commission to create an AU Special Representative for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.75 The Special Representative’s mandate is to advocate for and promote, at the highest levels, the protection of civilians in armed conflict across Africa.

Since 1996 CIDA has also provided a total of C$7.4 million in support for the African Union through the Pan-Africa Programme.76 Between 2000 and 2005 the Pan-Africa Programme contributed C$4.9 million to two phases of a Restructuring and Renewal Project to assist the OAU/AU with restructuring, management and transition activities. The programme expects to provide additional long-term support based on the AU’s own work plans and strategic priorities. The size and duration of this contribution had not been announced at the time of writing.

Canada also contributed C$20 million to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. If Budget 2005 is passed, these funds will come from the new Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), an annual contribution of C$100 million for five years in new resources. On 12 May 2005 Canada announced that it would provide an additional C$170 million over two years to support an expanded AMIS.77

Canada ’s current and planned commitments to developing the AU and regional capacities are significant. However, it is helpful to situate these in relation to Canada ’s support for the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The graph below demonstrates that Canada’s contributions to the African peace and security regime is minimal in comparison to its investments in the UN and NATO over the past five years, specifically the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Indeed, by investing in UN missions, Canada is also contributing to peace and security in Africa, since the majority of current UN operations take place in Africa. Moreover, support for NATO is critical for geo-strategic and security reasons. Critically, Canada is a member of the UN and NATO but is clearly not a member of the African Union. However, these spending discrepancies raise profound questions about how to reconcile concentrating Canadian support on NATO and the UN with the emerging tendency to devolve responsibility for peace and security in Africa to African regional organisations.

Canadian Contributions to UN, NATO and African Peace and Security Capacity-Building, 2000-2005

Source: Stephen Baranyi, Canada and the peace and security pillar of the Millennium Declaration, Canadian Development Report 2005, The North-South Institute, forthcoming.

Conclusions

The EU is providing important support to Africa ’s emerging peace and security regime. The EU’s assistance to the AU has been critical in helping to build the AU’s capacity and push forward its peace and security agenda. Yet, the Peace Facility does not actually signal a higher level of financial commitment on the part of the EU member states inasmuch as funds for the Peace Facility are drawn from resources already earmarked for development. Security is clearly a necessary condition for development. However, the fact that the Peace Facility draws on development funding raises important questions about how to balance spending for security with the provision of long-term development assistance to address the root causes of instability and insecurity.

The G8 may also make a significant contribution to building peace and security in Africa through regional organisations and the AU. However, the dynamics of the G8’s increasingly narrow concentration on developing military capability over conflict prevention and resolution capacities risks building a security architecture exclusively focused on mounting military responses to crises. It is important to note that, unlike the ASF, the AU has not charted out a clear course for delivering on a conflict prevention agenda. However, the AU has identified support for operational conflict prevention mechanisms like the CEWS, the PSC and the Panel of the Wise as a central priority in its 2005 Budget and its Priority Plan of Action. The AU also envisions playing a more robust role in post-conflict reconstruction.78 There is a need for the G8 and other donors to respond meaningfully to these priorities and to provide assistance for developing a range of operational and structural conflict prevention capacities.

For its part, Canada has been a central player in placing and keeping Africa on the G8’s agenda and has taken the novel approach of providing unearmarked funding for the AU. This makes Canada one of the first donors to assume a more partnership-oriented rather than paternalistic approach to supporting the AU.79 Furthermore, Canada has responded to broader peace, security and development priorities in Africa; indeed, the Canada Fund for Africa corresponds directly to the objectives identified in the NEPAD initiative. However, Canadian contributions to peace and security capacity building for the AU and regional organisations is limited in comparison to resources provided to NATO and the UN. This imbalance is potentially problematic as African leaders, the UN and donors assign the AU and regional organisations an increasingly prominent role in maintaining peace and security in Africa. In addition, existing Canadian support for Africa’s peace and security regime tends to favour developing West African capacities over funding for the AU. Consider, for example, that Canadian support to West Africa through the PSI was greater than combined CFA and Pan-Africa Programme contributions to the AU from 2002 onwards. While contributing to peace and security in West Africa is important, Canada needs to ensure that its regionally oriented support reinforces rather than undermines the continental security architecture envisioned by the AU Commission and member states.

As the CFA sunsets, Canada – like other G8 nations – may risk channelling its resources for development in Africa toward a narrower PSO capacity-building agenda. The fact that senior bureaucrats are not clear if funds for peace and security will be considered ODA-able may leave space for the diversion of development assistance to fund peace and security initiatives. Similarly, Canada’s contribution of a total of C$190 million over three years to AMIS is an important and timely contribution that exceeds Canadian support delivered through the PSI, and through the CFA and Pan-Africa Programme. Yet, it may also signal a worrying trend whereby Canada provides substantial support for crisis response in Africa that is not also matched with meaningful and sustained political, financial and material assistance to a broader peace and security agenda. These emerging trends beg critical questions about how Canada can reconcile the urgent need to build PSO capacity and support crisis response on the one hand, with the equally pressing need to provide sufficient resources for operational and structural conflict prevention, on the other.