The notion of paradigmatic change, in the words of Brown, "... has become one of the great clichés of contemporary academe, certainly among social scientists ..."1 Within the ambit of Political Science this observation is applicable to security in particular, in as much as it is generally contended that so-called `new security thinking' represents a definitive paradigm shift. Irrespective of the prevailing consensus, this is by no means an uncomplicated viewpoint that can be left unchallenged. Firstly, considering the large volume of seminal scholarly contributions on new strategic thinking on the one hand, and post-Cold War and post-apartheid security imperatives and subsequent policy responses of most countries including South Africa on the other as empirical referents, the notion of a paradigm shift is inadvertently (and perhaps erroneously) accepted as self-evident and an objective truth. Arguably, it is a case of stating what is presently salient and obvious, thereby ignoring the fact that what is purported to be `new' thinking in principle and often in reality since time immemorial has been a generic feature of security. What has changed is not so much the typical substance of security, but the context within which it becomes immanent and the level of salience of certain modalities. Even if the latter viewpoint is rejected, contemplate the fact that, although consensus on new security thinking applies in most cases, it is not universally accepted as a self-evident and applicable truth.

Secondly, considering the proliferation and abundance of contemporary writings on new security thinking, inclusive of the broadening and deepening of the concept and the setting of a new security agenda, the notion has become a virtual truism and has been repeated so often in academic and professional circles that it hardly bears repeating. Conceding to the fact that a paradigmatic shift has indeed occurred, new security thinking has constituted the cognitive framework for `normal' science (and policy-making) in most cases during the last decade, at least. Hence `new' thinking has in fact become a `traditional' or `old' way of thinking; the `new' paradigm has become the `traditional' paradigm. As such, the need for repeating an exercise juxtaposing `former/old' and `recent/new' thinking, can rightly be questioned. Perhaps a prospective approach would be more appropriate; one that specifically considers the direction of current trends and transition that challenge, modify and transcend the present paradigms. In this respect, `recent or new thinking' ought to become `recent or new directions', more specifically focusing on the need for and the development of (preferably indigenous and autonomous) security thinking of the South.

Thirdly, security has always been an ambiguous and highly contested concept. No universally accepted definition exists and it would be an exercise in futility to even consider the possibility of attempting to produce one. Although lexical and stipulative definitions of a divergent nature abound, real definitions pertaining to the essence of security can neither escape the confines of normative preferences and prescriptions as determined by ideology and, in the case of academics and researchers, by preferred scientific paradigms, nor the empirical constraints of the particular time framework, situational context and dominant actor (unit of analysis) involved. The exclusivity of the `old' concept of security, or for that matter its present inclusivity, has mostly been the product of exogenous factors rather than its intrinsic nature. Hence, recent changes in conceptualising security mirror changes in the strategic milieu to a far greater extent than they actually reflect changes in respect of the concept's intrinsic nature and real meaning.

The above by no means implies that the consideration of recent changes in thinking about security is without merit. Although not specifically framed as such, the overview at hand addresses three fundamental questions on thinking about security, namely `what', `why' and `how'. Without repeating what has been stated, the following is worth mentioning. In respect of the question, What is security?, it is quite rightly pointed out that what is purportedly `new', has in principle never been excluded from the notion of security. What does this point to? In a sense it is a case of `old wine in new bottles' but without, on the one hand, conceptualising recent changes in the dichotomous zero sum or `either/or' dynamics (either military or non-military), but rather viewing it in the context of positive sum or `more/less of' dynamics (more of the one, less of the other modality); and without, on the other hand, raising the conceptualisation to such a high level of abstraction that it becomes delinked from the reality or generalising it to such an extent that it becomes trite.

In respect of the question, Why the recent changes?, the interrelatedness of environmental change (operational and psychological) and security is emphasised. What is evident, is that this has less to do with the evolution of the security concept as such, and more with changes in the strategic milieu, more specifically changes in the post-Cold War, post-apartheid security environment. An extensive analysis of historical parallels provide ample proof that, in fact, very few `new' security issues can be correlated with `new thinking', perhaps even none at all. It is rather a case of a resurgence or a rise in the salience of `old' issues; moot cases in point being ethnicity (ethnic nationalism), religious fundamentalism, resource scarcity, etc. Also implied is the assumption that the recent changes in security thinking do not represent breakpoint or sea change as such, but rather incremental, evolutionary adaptation to parametric change in key systemic variables such as individual skills, orientations and expectations, authority relations, and the structural features of the international system.

In respect of the question, How are the recent changes operationalised?, the problem of bureaucratic politics and the importance of comprehensive, collective, multidimensional approaches to, and the institutionalised, non-coercive use of military means and other pacific instruments for the management of threats and insecurity, are emphasised. What this points to is the fact that recent changes in security thinking are not only cognitive responses to a turbulent and variable strategic milieu, but that they also represent assertive attempts to put ideas and ideals into practice. Hence, the interrelatedness of and the reciprocal interaction between theory and practice, ideals and policy, and the academic analyst and the professional, receive adequate recognition. What is in effect implied, is that the actual significance lies in the challenge levelled by these changes predominantly at the level of the policy-maker and the policy-making process.

Although the approach to and the substance of this overview are not really to be faulted, these have to be taken further in future discourses. This advance pertains to two levels of thinking. Firstly, it relates to the level of abstraction and generalisation: what is held to be universally true in respect of security thinking, ought to find expression in a more specific and particular context that relates to the South and to South Africa. If the particular eventually runs contrary to the universal, and justifiably so, the inverse applies and new directions in the universal ought to be reconsidered. Secondly, it relates to the operationalisation of what is conceptualised as new security thinking. Although this has been pointed out in the overview, the policy dimensions ought to be reconsidered with the purposive inclusion of lateral and innovative ideas. Hence, it is argued that the policy dimensions and expressions of new security thinking in Africa, Southern Africa and South Africa, represent an exportation and transplantation of Western-centric notions. Although the Western concept of security is regarded as useful in explaining the security problems faced by the developing world,2 an assertive attempt at providing it with an indigenous content and even its `Africanisation', could be considered.

How should new directions in alternative security thinking be approached? In other words, what should recent changes in South African security thinking reflect? It is by no means propagated that an antithesis is required to what is traditionally regarded as new security thinking, but rather that a synthesis of exogenous and indigenous thinking must be developed in response to local security imperatives. Admittedly, present security policies at a continental, regional, subregional and local level represent an attempt at this (as has been indicated in the overview), but the question as to whether this process can be advanced, remains unanswered. What is proposed, focusing on the fact that South Africa is an African state and a member of the South in the first instance, is a search for key variables. Based on ideas propounded by Ayoob,3 and using South Africa in its Southern African and African context as a point of reference, a different set of questions is proposed (although some of these aspects, admittedly, have been included in the overview). With reference to security, these questions relate to `whose', `from whom', `what' and `why'.

In respect of the question, Whose security?, the unit(s) of security should firstly be adequately identified, since this has a distinct bearing on different conceptual interpretations. The units include the individual, subgroups (ethnic, interest or marginalised), the nation, the state (including or excluding the government), the region and the world as a whole. Although this poses no real problem, the major problem lies in determining the primacy of a particular unit or units. Considering the imperative of state-making and nation-building facing most of the countries of the South, including South Africa, the primacy of the state prevails. This, of course, enhances the prevalence of everything that is traditionally associated with `old' security thinking. The imperatives of justice and development force the primacy issue in the opposite direction. Furthermore, the focus of security modalities and commonalties should first and foremost be directed at South Africa, Southern Africa and Africa as the immediate security environment, without excluding interdependence with the non-regional environment, albeit as a more geostrategic system.

In respect of the question, Security from whom (or what?), the approach that is firstly required is to shift the emphasis from the idealistic, positive notion of security to the pragmatic, negative concept of insecurity, since the latter explicitly addresses sources of and threats to security, as well as the insecurity dilemma facing the unit(s) of security. As an ideal condition or situation, security represents a normative end-goal; as a pragmatic imperative, insecurity represents an empirical challenge. In several works on developing world security, the emphasis has already shifted to insecurity.4 This approach does not shed so much light on the `newness' or the `originality' of the sources of and threats to insecurity, as on its situational context and on the particular characteristics of the security of the South.5 Emanating from the latter, the range of issues and dimensions of insecurity can be identified and categorised according to their internal, regional and extra-regional nature and scope, as well as to their functional (political, military, social, etc.) nature and scope. The variable (non-hierarchical, non-fixed) nature of the agenda, the cross-cutting nature of issues and their multidimensional impact, however, should not be ignored.

Apart from the issues and dimensions of security normally associated with new strategic thinking, more consideration can be given

at an internal level to the problems emanating from state-making and nation-building such as legitimacy, capacity to govern, social compacts between different groups in society, democratic necessity, and the problem of political succession;



at a regional level, to the problems emanating from concurrent state-making and nation-building by contiguous and proximate states, such as overlapping territorial and demographic claims, disjuncture and fundamental contradictions between (competing) state ideologies, the favourable balance of power in the region, the role of pivotal power(s) in the region, security regime-building and scenarios relating to regional restabilisation, break-up or peripheralisation; and



at an extra-regional level, to the problems generated by the policies of major powers, by the overlap and reciprocal interaction of the different levels, in as much as they constitute a `boundary' problem, by increasing globalisation, by intervention, by marginalisation, and by the impact of continuous parametric change in the international system.

The significance of these issues and dimensions is that they emphasise the continued relevance and primacy of the state in world politics and of enduring modalities normally associated with so-called `old' security thinking.

In respect of the question, What strategies and measures must be followed to ensure the security of what one is trying to secure?, the major approaches and means have been indicated in the overview. What can be considered is the indigenisation of transferred security thinking, as well as the enhancement of the present salience of multilateral peace-oriented responses to insecurity, that is matched responses to the problems created by threats to and breaches of security in the form of peacebuilding, peace maintenance, peace restoration and peace enforcement strategies. These strategies and their corresponding instruments do not stand apart from, but form part of the new directions in security thinking.

In respect of the question, Why the need for a discourse on security?, the answer lies in both the normative and the empirical domains. Whereas the latter is usually emphasised as a matter of course with reference to the use of the concept of security as a political tool in respect of the well-known features, processes and outcomes of security policy-making as such (which require no repeating) the former is often ignored or underemphasised. More debate should occur on and more attention should be paid to the normative modalities of new directions in security thinking, with the inclusion of aspects such as ethical concerns, nascent norms, and the normative assessment of policy prescriptions and outcomes. The impression often exists that these matters stand apart from security thinking. Hence, their inclusion ought to be reiterated with particular reference to competing perspectives of order, justice and change.

In as much as the above questions relate to practice in particular, it suffices to conclude with the following general comments on the theoretical utility, thus on the practical use of the concept of security. Firstly, in rethinking security and in generating a (re)vision of the security of the South, the descriptive, explanatory and predictive value of the concept should be carefully considered for its applicability to theory-building, and hypothesis formulation and testing. Secondly, the problem of competing perspectives or paradigms (e.g. realism, pluralism, globalism or structuralism, feminism etc.) should preferably be bridged or accommodated. This in itself presents a value choice denoting particular ideological or political preferences. Hence, the dominant security discourse not only pertains to the policy predicaments as exemplified by recent changes in security thinking, but also to several academic challenges levelled at scholars, researchers and analysts alike. Where the academic fraternity is involved, the demands of science and the search for scientific knowledge will constitute an inseparable part of the security debate. In this respect, academic pursuits should not only reflect practice, but should also direct, guide and even transform and change it.

It would be short-sighted to reflect only upon the state of recent changes in security thinking. To quote Klare and Thomas, "... we must change how we think about the nature and the pursuit of security ..."6 Perhaps, this is where the eventual value of the overview resides. Similar to collectivities, individuals do matter in world politics. It is thus imperative to give cognisance to the way in which individuals think about security. In conclusion, in the context of the South and South Africa in particular, new directions in thinking about security should also include the notion of meaningful development if it is to contribute to order and justice in a society amidst change.

ENDNOTES

N Brown, The Strategic Revolution: Thoughts for the Twenty-first Century, Brassey's, London, 1992, p. 5.



M Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p. 7.



M Ayoob, Security of South Asia: Searching for Key Variables, Newsletter, 3(4), Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, October 1997, pp. 2-8; and Ayoob, op. cit., in particular the chapter on Concepts and Definitions: "Third World" and "Security", pp. 1-19.



See, among others: A Bandarage, Global Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era: A Third World Perspective, in M T Klare (ed.), Peace and World Security Studies: A Curriculum Guide, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994, pp. 29 ff; E J Keller, Introduction: Towards a New African Political Order, p. 3 and D Venter, Regional Security in Southern Africa, p. 135 in E J Keller & D Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996; and C Thomas, Third World Security, in R Carey & T C Salmon (eds.), International Security in the Modern World, St Martin's Press, New York, 1992, pp. 93-96.



For a discussion of these aspects, see among others: Thomas, op. cit., pp. 94 - 96.



M T Klare & D C Thomas, Introduction: Thinking about World Security, in M T Klare & D C Thomas (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994, p. 1.