Maxi van Aardt's application of the `new security agenda' to the Southern African situation makes a number of important explicit points. However, in making these points, at least two very important implicit points are made as well. These should be highlighted and the implications investigated further. This short article will attempt to do so.

Van Aardt observes the interaction between theory and practice and the importance of what academics do for the world of practitioners. Some academic work is, of course, aimed very directly at influencing the `real' world and the policies which shape it. However, much academic work does not have the specific aim of impacting directly on practitioners. Nevertheless, "... ideas have consequences and thus the contemplation of ideas is an intensely practical undertaking." Of course, practitioners often realise this, and those who want complete control of this world - often because they believe that they already have the complete answer - will not welcome true intellectual activity, as this may well have unwelcome consequences. With the opening up of South African society in the early 1990s and the emphasis on transparency and consultation, the reverse seems to be the case, at least for the time being. Much contact and real interaction between practitioners and academics are taking place, often at the instigation of practitioners or policy-makers,2 and underlying this seems to be a real desire to stimulate intellectual activity in the search for solutions to problems or just for clearer thinking about them. The point to be made is this: these are welcome and positive developments, not only for academics who may feel flattered by the attention, but for society as a whole which will derive benefit from it. It is also a wonderful `window of opportunity' which must be actively utilised to develop a habit of open intellectual debate in narrow academic circles as well as in broader context, in South Africa and eventually in the region as well. The `window' can easily close again as practitioners become disillusioned by the contribution made by academics or, much worse, because they fear the `unwelcome consequences of the contemplation of ideas'. Such an occurrence should be actively guarded against, and one of the ways of doing so may be to openly articulate the danger of its happening.

There is another implication of the foregoing: much emphasis is currently being placed on the natural sciences in the transformation and redirection of research and tertiary education in South Africa. Though not necessarily openly acknowledged, the implication is a down-scaling of the social sciences and the humanities. Few would deny the need for better schooling in mathematics and science and more trained natural scientists in South Africa. However, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that South and Southern Africa can do with fewer competent and optimally functioning social scientists, or without an active non-academic intellectual community trained in the social sciences or the humanities. There is a great danger in becoming too focused and `technocratic': society will pay a very dear price if it does not retain and further develop a creative component able to `pull the strings together' at the social and political level. Without such a component, South and Southern Africa will either stagnate or deteriorate at the socio-political level or be the mere recipients of `recipes' devised elsewhere. In order to become masters of our own destiny, we need the will, as well as the creative ability and the training to deal with highly complex socio-economic and political problems. We do not want to be completely reliant on `technology transfers' from elsewhere, least of all in the realm of social construction - or the search for security.

The second point which is implicit in Van Aardt's application of the new security agenda to the Southern African situation, is the need to visualise security as part of a complex of issues which go to the very core of the way we perceive and deal with socio-economic and political problems. As is clear from her exploration of sovereignty, as well as the referents and agents of security, the problem we are interested in does not manifest as a zero-sum situation where more sovereignty (or security) for one means less for the other: the problem is much more complex and therefore challenging. What is also striking about the discussion, in particular of the referents of security, is how globalisation is now impacting on political thinking: the same realisations which came in an earlier era of democratisation in the Western world of how national societies should be conceptualised and structured, seem to have entered the thinking on political matters at the regional and even international level. Democracy (security) is government (the provision of security) by the people for the people, or as Van Aardt puts it "... security ... is not a passive condition; the referents participate actively in the provision and maintenance of security and, by implication, in defining the content of security." In the Southern African context, an added problem is that providing security, in many cases, has to be attained at the national, regional and more inclusive levels all at the same time. The situation facing us on our subcontinent is truly one which can only be dealt with by way of an integrated approach to security and development.

What is meant by an integrated approach to security and development? Simply that development and security should not be regarded as divorced or separate concerns.3 This both implies and flows from such realisations as that structural economic and social development cannot be actualised without a relatively secure environment, and that security implies the absence of certain `threats', including socio-economic `threats' to the state/nation and to people, i.e. that which is implied by the `new security agenda' or the horizontal and vertical widening of the concept of security. The idea of an integrated approach to development and security is therefore already implied in the extended concept of security. When one runs through the typical list of `new' security issues in Southern Africa and in the `post-conflict' 1990s, the interconnectedness and the need for an integrated approach in dealing with these, become abundantly clear:

rapid population growth;


AIDS and other diseases;


water, food and environmental security issues;


landmines;


the proliferation of light weapons;


crime;


illegal drugs;


poaching and cattle theft;


mass migration;


unemployment;


insufficient economic growth;


a culture of violence;


a culture of civil disobedience;


ethnocentric nationalism(s); and


instability due to processes of democratisation.

The idea of thinking of development and security as two sides of the same coin is neither a radical nor a new one; it is implied in the broad range of functions entrusted to the state as an institution as well as to the United Nations. It is also recognised in other institutions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), through the potentially broad range of functions and organs they provide. However, the implications are often not clearly spelt out.

Certainly, the `security forces' have a role to play in addressing some aspects of these issues and Van Aardt makes a valid point in warning against incapacitating the military on the grounds that there are no more military threats. Indeed, the military have often been the carriers of those skills and qualities which are essential for dealing with many of the `new security threats'. Qualities such as discipline and self-sacrifice are normally associated with a well-trained military, and would be equally valuable if inculcated in the rest of society. The question, therefore, is not whether the roles and functions of defence forces should be rethought vis-à-vis states' internal situations and conditions. Clearly, it will have to be, as the resources invested in the military are simply too valuable not to use to their utmost in dealing with security in all its aspects. The critical question is how the negative aspects associated with the military can be eliminated or substantially minimised for it must not be forgotten that the primary distinguishing characteristic of the military is their training to kill. Can the baby be retained without keeping the dirty bathwater as well?

A second implication is that the inseparability of development and security should be even more clearly articulated in the context of development assistance or foreign aid than is at present the case. Furthermore, the `donor community' should recognise the necessity of using a percentage of development aid budgets for dealing with problems which have not traditionally been termed `developmental' in nature. The clearing of landmines in areas that could be used for agricultural or other productive purposes would be an excellent example. Strategies to combat lawlessness would also qualify for development funds, as these would be redressing situations that impair secure environments and therefore socio-economic development.

Thirdly, security is in essence about equality or, put differently, insecurity is about inequality. What this implies is that in the real world neither security nor equality is ever absolute, but relative and interconnected: for example, people do not regard themselves as insecure because they will eventually die that is regarded as a fact of life but only when they perceive that they are more likely to die younger or less naturally than others, is insecurity experienced. Deprivation, as such, is also not regarded as a security threat, but relative deprivation is. Security comes into play where people are markedly unequal, where they are differently effected by disease, insufficient food or water, environmental degradation, or unemployment. The essence of insecurity is therefore being relatively less secure than others. Perhaps this is why the new, expanded security agenda came to be generally accepted at a time when the world was becoming significantly `smaller' and, according to many, inequalities more pronounced. Globalisation will, among others, facilitate the dissemination of knowledge about the circumstances of life of other people and would therefore contribute to insecurity across a broader front, both for the less `secure' and the more `secure'. As soon as substantial inequalities are perceived (or inequalities between substantial numbers of people), insecurity results in both directions: not only do the unemployed feel insecure, but the employed also do because they immediately realise what the effect on their opposite number will be. However, it is important to note that it is not what people have in absolute terms that makes them secure, but as De Gaay Fortman puts it, "... it is in their positions in entitlement systems that people find socio-economic security."4 What is meant by this is that inequality in a socio-economic sense goes far beyond inequality in income and this is apparently recognised by the literature on the topic.5 This also implies that security is better served by some `entitlement systems' than by others: as `subsidiary entitlement' (compensation for marginalisation) may be easily affected by the socio-political culture as expressed in the spirit of the time, while people's `primary entitlement' in the sense of having access to resources and rights to goods and services on the basis of their reintegration into the community.6 Much the same reasoning could apply in the political sphere.

Both the use of the military and foreign aid, as has been pointed out, can contribute in addressing security issues. However, such use would still not go to the heart of socio-economic or political insecurity. Foreign aid, in particular, implies providing for `subsidiary entitlement' and is therefore less `reliable' than other ways of `accessing' security. Use of the military has always proved less `permanent' or `sustainable' than other forms of security. Neither is `equal deprivation' at the level of the lowest common denominator a solution to the security problem. To try and keep everyone at the level of those least inclined (or able) to try and improve their circumstances, is no solution. If successful, such an equalisation attempt would mean that mankind as a whole would be less well off than it could be and redistribution in accordance with a `culture of entitlement' would certainly not encourage productive activities as was shown by the collapse of the command economies in Central and Eastern Europe. De Gaay Fortman may well be pointing us in the right direction when he argues that, what went wrong with economic reforms in Russia and led to a frightful trend of reverse development, was that people were unprepared for them, that they were imposed from above, that they lacked subtlety and graduality and that there was no integrated approach to the economic, political, legal, social and cultural aspects of the transition.7 In essence, he concludes that deregulation does not mean the absence of legal intervention, but in effect unprecedented re-regulation of society by the mechanisms of private law. If this is true in that context, it could be equally true in a broader context as well. It would also bring us back full circle to the idea of security as complex, non-zero-sum, and something which should be provided by people for people.

The implication of this conceptualisation of security is that Van Aardt's conclusion about the importance of having institutional developments in Southern Africa keep pace with regional problems, is both valid and insufficient: only if the structures which are developed go to the heart of the security issue, will it turn out to be really relevant and important.

ENDNOTES

G Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983, p. 17, as quoted in B B Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997, p. 62.



In the context of foreign policy, various workshops held to discuss, among others, the Foreign Policy Discussion Document, SADC restructuring and South African participation in peacekeeping operations may be cited as examples.



M Muller, An Integrated Approach to Development and Security in Southern Africa, commissioned paper read at the 47th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Lillehammer, Norway, 1-7 August 1997, p. 1; the remainder of the exposition of this approach is taken from this source.



B de Gaay Fortman, Beyond Income Distribution: An Entitlement Systems Approach to the Acquirement Problem, Working Paper, 249, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1997, p. 2.



Ibid., pp. 3-6.



Ibid., p. 2.



Ibid., p. 32.