Participants were asked to prepare presentations on the impact of illegal small arms proliferation on violence and security and explain, as far as possible, what caused or exacerbated such proliferation. While it is impossible to quantify the number of weapons circulating in one country, let alone a region or continent, some presenters were able to extrapolate rough estimates through known supplies or records on weapons collected during, for example, UN peacekeeping operations. However, any numbers reflected in this report should be taken as estimates, meant to illustrate the issue, not to count as precise quantities. In South Africa alone the estimated number of illegal weapons ranges from 500 000 to four million or more.

What appears below are short excerpts from a selection of the papers presented during the conference. In this section, they are clustered into regions: West, East, Central and Southern Africa and the islands of the Indian Ocean.

Central Africa

Richard Cornwell: The African State and the Control of the Illicit Arms Trade

The end of the Cold War did not see Africa become a more peaceful place. Indeed, as in some other parts of the world’s margins, the dissolution of the bipolar world order was also accompanied in some cases by the collapse of individual states. The phenomenon of state collapse goes farther than the overthrow of a regime: it reflects the disintegration of structure, legitimate authority, law and political order within the confines of the state. This, however, does not necessarily imply that anarchy reigns; often other actors move into the vacuum left by the collapse of the state. If of local origin these may be ethnic nationalists or warlords; if foreign they may take the form of international companies providing for their own security or that of others. A period in which various rivals vie with each other and resist attempts to re-establish central authority follows and during this period the state itself, as a legitimate functioning order, is gone.

In the early 1990s, for the first time since independence, domestic support became more important than foreign patrons, and African leaders had to confront the inherent weaknesses of their regimes and to consider sharing power with others. The early 1990s were uncomfortable times for Africa’s rulers and their clients, for all this happened at a time of deep and structural economic crisis. The most significant indicator of this was the continent’s growing debt burden. For various reasons, in their first thirty or so years of independent statehood, African governments were drawn into budgeting programmes that involved the running up of huge deficits, to finance, at best, increasingly expensive health and education programmes — or developmental white elephants.

Structural adjustment entailed a number of things: the reduction of public expenditure, balanced budgets, economic liberalisation and currency devaluation. The course advocated, enforced even, by the apostles of the free market was not without a certain inherent paradox, however, in that for African countries structural adjustment programmes involved a sharp decline in living standards for most and a steep rise in the price of food and social services, especially in the towns. But locally the democracy movement had been driven largely by popular demand for improved living standards. Politically-conscious, urbanised, professional and student bodies began to rail against the continued failure of their rulers to match rhetoric and promises to economic progress.

Increasingly, the men with the guns – and Africa was awash with them after the conflicts of the 1980s – became important players in the political arena. The reduction in ideological conflict reduced the political and military incentives for outside powers to intervene on the continent; and, contrary to some expectations, an Africa omitted from the calculations of external rivals did not become a more peaceful place. Local rivalries and antagonisms were given freer rein, being more remote from world centres of power and insignificant in terms of the global system. African states could no longer rely on outside assistance to end local wars that were no threat to vital foreign interests.

Into the void left by the crumbling state and the international community have stepped external non-state actors, sometimes as proxies, sometimes as independent agents, able by virtue of their wealth and command of expertise to influence events to their local and often short-term advantage. It is for all the world as if Africa has returned to the 1880s, and the age of the chartered companies, marking out their enclaves in an otherwise disorderly environment.

Nowhere is this more starkly illustrated than by the conflicts, actual or incipient, that describe an arc through East and Central Africa. Though these conflicts and their antecedents are generally treated on a state by state basis and though, indeed, many of their dynamics are principally internal to the political economies of the countries involved, it is also essential to consider them in a regional light. From Sudan, through Uganda to the Great Lakes and into the Democratic Republic of Congo, and then to the neighbouring states of Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic and Angola, civil war or the threat of conflict have become virtually endemic.

André Guichaoua: The Great Lakes Region

Instability in the Great Lakes region of Africa impacts on the entire African continent. If the Rift Valley, incorporating the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is seen as the spine of Africa, the Great Lakes region becomes the stomach. In response to the continued instability in the region, the French Ministry of Defence has undertaken an investigation into whether or not French companies or individuals were involved in the sale of weapons to countries in the Great Lakes. Other initiatives to encourage development and stability in the region have also been undertaken, including a meeting of the "Friends of Congo" in September 1997 in Brussels at which South Africa argued that a stable Congo is necessary for the stability of the region as a whole.

The conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have displaced hundreds of thousands of people and the lack of repatriation of these refugees is delaying the distribution of needed aid. A short review of each country in turn illustrates the obstacles facing lasting peace.

Burundi

Continued unrest in Burundi and the presence of more than 130 000 refugees from Burundi in Tanzania prompted an effort by former Tanzanian President Nyerere to mediate between the Burundian government and rebels in late 1997. However the meeting reached no resolution of the problem and the political and military embargo against Burundi remains.

This embargo is tangible but inefficient and the Democratic Republic of Congo does not enforce it, permitting the transport of petrol into Burundi, undermining the embargo’s impact on the military and government at whom it is targeted. The governmental regime in Burundi is brutal, and the Hutu population is strictly monitored. Of a population of 6 million, 500 000 Hutus remain in camps in the country. The government maintains that a process of reconstruction is underway, and has undertaken to include business people and intellectuals in a process to discuss a way forward after the end of the mandate of the national assembly in June 1998. However, while there has been a lessening of guerrilla attacks, especially in the interior of the country, negotiations between the government and the rebel movement have not been successful in resolving outstanding issues.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, the situation is even more complex. The number of people who have disappeared, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the process of political transition are all affecting the stability of the system. The military strategy of the Rwandan government is to group populations, especially in towns and along roads. The guerrilla forces maintain a strong presence in the border areas, and these regions remain very unstable. The government undertakes periodic attacks on the rebels, but lacks direct control over sections of the country.

Weapons are known to be in the region, but have seemingly disappeared. Most of the killing done during the massacres was with knives and machetes. The military has made attempts at locating arms caches, but putting a stop to the on-going killing has remained a higher priority. The government is trying to secure more donor funding, but aid agencies and governments are concerned about the stability of the current government, its ability to control the country and the demobilisation of guerrillas, which remains a prerequisite for additional funding. No new funds have been made available to Rwanda in the past eighteen months.

The future situation in Rwanda, where civil war continues to a greater degree than in Burundi, remains unclear. In areas along the Congolese border there are reports of Congolese troops and new military equipment. In some areas the civilian population is under the control of the guerrillas. There are also countries who remain willing to sell arms to other countries in the region and a desire among countries in the Great Lakes to rebuild their military infrastructures. The situation is complicated by the fact that the political situation in Rwanda is increasingly ethnic-based, making it difficult for outside mediators to encourage the general population to support a "national government" that they see as foreign.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains uncertain. Regions of the country are scarcely under the control of the government, and what control there is in these areas rests on Rwandan forces who remain in the country. The prospect of another civil war remains, however it is difficult to comment on the situation from outside of the country.

It is known that the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s military has been purchasing weapons and equipment. Following the establishment of Kabila’s government there was a process of disarmament of forces loyal to Mobutu. However, as in Rwanda, a process of identity along ethnic lines has taken hold, and the governmental authorities are seen as strangers to many of the country’s population, undermining confidence in the government and probably leading to people retaining weapons in the face of an uncertain future.

Southern Africa

Patricio José: Sub-regional Perspectives – Mozambique

New thinking on security should be tackled from the perspective of post-war Southern Africa developments, namely the disarmament and demobilisation of warring parties, on one hand, and the process of structural adjustment programmes underway in the region, on the other. In Southern Africa the process of conflict resolution and pacification occurred at the same time as the introduction of these structural adjustment programmes. This fact worsened the social welfare of vulnerable groups, especially ex-combatants. They have been sent home to live under new conditions without the necessary psychological and material assistance. Their ‘social exclusion’ makes them a special threat to the community, since, under hardship, they could become easy targets of organised criminals, who recruit them. The threat is even more dangerous since, having served as securocrats, they know the mechanisms of arms trafficking, the ways in which to avoid official channels and the tactics to employ.

Thus we must reformulate the concept of security as not only dealing with the security of the state, but the safety of its citizens. The issue of small arms proliferation, which affects the security of individuals more than that of the state, will have to become a main topic of the debate on security.

Issues which led to the current proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa include:

Incomplete disarmament of warring parties;



Small arms becoming a commodity for sale and to provide individual security in the absence of state-provided security;


Small arms proliferation and its linkages to violent crime;



Small arms trafficking;



Small arms as a source of power, wealth and security between demobilised soldiers and marginal groups.

Suggestions for addressing the proliferation of weapons include:

System of firearm licensing



Municipal police services



Law enforcement and compliance monitoring



Good relationships between police and the community through, among others, community-based policing



A sub-committee within the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security dealing with the proliferation of small arms



Exchange of information between police services in the region



Reorientation of ex-combatants

Piko Mbambo and Etienne Hennops:
Sub-regional Perspectives – South Africa

The South African Police Service Firearms Investigation Unit (FIU) was created to deal with the problem of illegal firearms in South Africa. Its functions are twofold: information gathering, including gathering intelligence on smuggling routes and smugglers; and investigation, including compiling documentation and evidence for court cases.

At national level, the FIU is responsible for co-ordination among provincial units. In addition, it has been crucial to the success of the three Operation Rachels (1996-1997) – joint operations between South African and Mozambican defence and police agencies to find and destroy arms and ammunition caches in Mozambique left over from the civil war.

In South Africa the types of weapons found and their uses differ according to the region. For example, in the province of Kwazulu-Natal, weapons may be used by political parties fighting for power. Many of the weapons distributed to the various parties have never been recovered and are used in political killings and general crime. In the provinces of the Eastern and Western Cape, gangs have become increasingly well-armed, often with weapons obtained from outside South Africa. In Gauteng, the problem is largely with weapons being used for crime, including car hijackings, murder, sexual assault and armed robbery, including cash-in-transit heists.

South Africa has taken specific steps to address the problem of firearms availability. It has created three commissions of enquiry: the first into the Central Firearms Registry, which is responsible for the issuing of licences for civilian-owned weapons; the second into weapons owned by state security forces; and the third into the legislation governing weapons possession in the country. A governmental interdepartmental joint task force on firearms has been created which is working to address both legislative and technical issues for controlling weapons in the country. New legislation, to amend the existing Arms and Ammunition Act, is pending parliamentary approval.

In addition, the government through its National Crime Prevention Strategy — an integrated plan to prevent crime — has made firearms one of its priority areas. The NCPS recognises that crime is not the problem of the police alone and community involvement is necessary for the prevention of crime. The SAPS FIU has also adopted this approach, interacting with communities through community police forums and other initiatives and encouraging overall community involvement in crime prevention.

East Africa

As in Central and Southern Africa, Eastern Africa is also facing a problem relating to the uncontrolled proliferation of firearms. As in the other regions, these weapons are left over from earlier conflicts in other countries, and are being used for criminal activities, ranging from cattle rustling, banditry and violent crime to ethnic violence.

Jan Kamenju: Sub-regional Perspectives — East Africa
(Written submission)

Peace is a prerequisite for development. East Africa, defined as the area covered by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, therefore cannot develop without sustainable peace. In this region there is a problem with the proliferation of small arms, which have an impact on violence and security throughout.

Small arms are cheap, easy to maintain and conceal and are readily available in East Africa. This availability influences means of conflict resolution, making the use of force often more popular than a negotiated settlement. There are four main reasons for the presence of these weapons in the region:

Political: governments and individuals have distributed weapons to unofficial groups to further political interests. Neighbouring countries have covertly supported dissident groups.



Economic: trade in small arms can be lucrative.



Criminal: a weapon signifies power and may turn a simple thief into a hardened criminal. Weapons are used in car hijackings, armed robberies, poaching, cattle rustling, extortion and other activities.



Survival: communities obtain weapons to protect themselves. These are either purchased illegally or provided by the government. In this category there are hundreds (maybe thousands) of small arms legally acquired by people for self-protection. Only those with influence are granted licences for these arms and so the possession of a firearm becomes a status symbol.

Sources of weapons in East Africa include the following seven:

Demobilised forces. At the time of the fall of the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia in 1991, it was estimated that there were over 380 000 weapons within and outside the military. When the military collapsed, these weapons were unaccounted for and it is suspected that most of them have been shipped to new ‘hot spots’ in Africa. Similarly, when Siad Barre left Somalia, escaping into Kenya, a feature of the resulting anarchy was the presence of an estimated 75 000 small arms which remain unaccounted for. In Uganda, following the collapse of the government of Tito Okello and Museveni’s succession, weapons are said to have left Uganda and moved into Kenya where they are still.



Diversion. Weapons are diverted from documented end-users and illegally delivered elsewhere.



Government-to-government transfers. Weapons are transferred to support governments that may subsequently fall, the weapons then being used against the supplier/donor.



Government-to-dissident group transfers. Foreign governments supply weapons to destabilise dissident groups in neighbouring countries, for example Sudan’s alleged support of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda to counter Uganda’s support for the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army.



Security personnel. When security personnel are no longer employed or paid, they often sell their weapons for survival.



Islamic fundamentalists. Covert assistance is given to Islamic groups in East Africa in the form of weapons, among other things.



Home-made weapons.

Although there is no arms manufacturing capability in the region, Kenya and Uganda both have ammunition factories, while Tanzania is building one.

The impact of violence and the consequent insecurity of local populations results in the creation of refugees and displaced persons. Violence affects education and contributes to poverty.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos: The Proliferation of Light Weapons in Pastoral Northern Kenya

Northern Kenya, which is poorly administered by the state, is difficult to access and is surrounded by countries at war: Somalia, southern Sudan, Uganda and, more recently, Ethiopia. Trafficking of all types, particularly light weapons, passes easily through the country’s porous borders. Originally determined during colonisation, these have never prevented economic exchanges between states, nor pastoral communities from moving their herds across state boundaries. The pastoral communities, considered by some anthropologists as ‘warrior societies’, have literally been militarised by the rush of weapons which neighbouring rebellions have introduced. Traditional conflicts have become increasingly violent, sometimes with the surreptitious assistance of the state.

Although illicit weapons are sold in Kenya by unscrupulous policemen and soldiers, wars in Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia contribute significantly to arms trafficking. Kenya, a relatively stable country in the region, serves as a destination for fleeing soldiers as well as profit-making guerrillas.

Uganda appears to be an important supplier. During the violence of the 1992 elections in West Kenya, Kalenjin attackers, who are from the same ethnic group as that of President Moi, used weapons coming from Uganda. This trafficking originated in the long, devastating civil war of the 1970s, under the dictatorship of Amin Dada (1971-1979), as well as in the difficult years of transition during the Museveni regime (1980-1986). The break up of Amin Dada’s army helped supply weapons to various groups, such as the Karamojong, the Dodoth, the Jie, the Turkana and the Pokot, who regularly stole cattle from each other, on both sides of the border. This situation actually induced the Kenyan police to raid Pokot groups in 1984.

The Kenyan-Ugandan border is easily infiltrated and cuts across various ethnic groups, such as the Luo, the Japadhola, the Gisu, the Luhya and the Teso.

North-West Kenya is susceptible to weapons trafficking because of its geographic situation: it borders on Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. The Dasenech (called Mirele in Kenya) used to take refuge in Ethiopia after their raids.

A new rush of weapons into Kenya occurred when the Mengistu dictatorship was overthrown in 1991, in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian army was then the second most important in sub-Saharan Africa. While regular members of the army supplied themselves with goods plundered from towns as they retreated, conscript soldiers, mostly students recruited in militias, were not as well off. They thus sold their weapons for ridiculous amounts, often for less than one dollar each. From that time, the new Ethiopian army contributed further to the violence pervading Northern Kenya: soldiers did not hesitate to pursue into Kenya Oromo Liberation Front rebels, who had operated originally in southern Ethiopia. These soldiers then used the opportunity to steal cattle, in the process killing about 100 Gabbra peasants in Kokai, north of Marsabit. The Tabaka Ethiopian militias have also been accused of having stolen cattle in the Sololo region, 80 km south of Moyale.

In Kenya 1991 was an important year for the proliferation of weapons. While the Ethiopian Mengistu regime was collapsing, Somalia was entering a civil war for which it was well equipped. Between 1960 and 1977, the USSR had supplied half a billion dollars worth of weapons to Somalia. The US exceeded this amount, supplying US$ 550 million worth of weapons to Somalia between 1982 and 1989, making that country the third largest recipient of American aid, after Egypt and Israel.

Today, the three types of bandits found in north-east Kenya, on the Somalian border, epitomise the process of weapons traffic in the region. The professionals are often ex-secessionists (shifta). In the 1960s, they fought the Kenyan army for the region to be reattached to Somalia and, subsequently, obtained weapons in Somalia with the intention of joining Ogaden irredentist guerrillas in Ethiopia. These professionals often escort the panya, who traffic in Kenyan hallucinogen drugs (miraa), and export the substance into Somalia, across the north-east province. From the time of the civil war in 1991, these bandits were joined by Somalian militiamen who came to steal cars. To the list, one must add seasonal bandits, impoverished nomads who raid the herds of enemy clans (whose stolen animals are nevertheless easily recognisable by their tattoos and can be traced back to water points during the dry season).

The wars in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have had a significant effect on Northern Kenya, both in terms of human flows (i.e., refugees) and commercial flows (i.e., weapons smuggling, in particular). The marginal situation, economically and politically, of North Kenya promotes all forms of illegal traffic. Kenyan authorities are only a presence — and that for want of a more effective occupation. They are unable to enforce the law and, in particular, were unable to enforce an amendment to the Firearms Act of August 1988, which promoted stricter control on the carrying of firearms, including air-rifles, and which had set punitive sanctions against lawbreakers, including ten years imprisonment. In the province, police forces have no grip on illegal activities. For example, they only managed to confiscate an estimated 3 per cent of all contraband weapons and arrest 6 per cent of the traffickers.

Thus the proliferation of light weapons in the region is a problem that goes well beyond the simple control of borders and the efficiency of the Kenyan government’s security system. Weapons proliferation reveals a social and political dimension whose complexity embraces many circumstances. There is, first of all, the obvious militarisation of pastoral societies because of neighbouring wars. Whether one understands this as traditional violence at its most advanced or as resulting from the importation of new methods of conflict, the armaments used by these people are, in themselves, not sufficient to explain the violence. Further research should be undertaken into the use of weapons and how they have impacted on changing traditional methods of conflict resolution.

West Africa

While Southern Africa has taken bilateral steps to addressing weapons proliferation, West Africa, and especially the country of Mali, is the first region which is working with the UN and its agencies, not only to address the proliferation of weapons in the region, but also to discover means of dealing with the underlying security concerns that cause people to arm themselves for self-defence. Mali has, moreover, encouraged its neighbours in the subregion, and exporting countries in other regions, to work with the government to institute a moratorium on the import and export of weapons in the region. West Africa is demonstrating, as are the other regions, the effects weapons can have in impairing post-conflict peacebuilding processes, as well as the long life which light weapons have.

Stephen Ellis: Regional Dimensions of Proliferation of Weapons in West Africa

Sierra Leone and Liberia have both experienced harrowing civil wars since the beginning of the 1990s. In both cases, the wars have been closely connected with economic and political contests of wider regional importance, and thus the spread of weapons cannot satisfactorily be examined in isolation, on a country-by-country basis only; it must be considered in a regional context.

There are few reliable sources on the weapons trade in West Africa as a whole. However, in 1993 the President of Mali requested the Secretary-General of the UN to assist in controlling the proliferation of weapons in that country. The result was two fact-finding missions, the first to Mali, and the second to Mali and neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The broader mission concluded that the proliferation of small arms in the countries visited was linked to developments in other countries in the region, including Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The report of the missions concluded that in all the countries visited, the proliferation of illicit light weapons presented a serious threat to stability. The weapons were traded over such distances that the proliferation of illicit light weapons could not be restricted to a single country or a specific region, but needed to be seen in an Africa-wide perspective. The report therefore recommended a regional approach to any solution.

There is also no doubt that the weapons trade in the region is connected with the production, transport and marketing of high-value, low-bulk goods in general, including drugs.

The development of a regional arms market in West Africa is a rather recent development and is closely associated with the growing inability of states in the region to enforce a monopoly of violence or to regulate trade effectively. Although the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 produced a glut of small arms in Nigeria, there is reason to suppose that, thirty years on, these weapons have been withdrawn from circulation and are no longer functional. Similarly, the liberation war in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau does not seem to have resulted in large quantities of weapons spreading across borders, although it is likely that some weapons used in Guinea-Bissau may have moved into the Casamance region of Senegal. The UN advisory mission came to the conclusion that the current spread of light weapons throughout the region could most accurately be dated to the Burkina Faso government of 1983-1987. The UN team found that the Sankara government had distributed numbers of automatic weapons without maintaining any record of their precise destination. When the Burkinabe government later made attempts to recover these weapons, they could not be traced.

This does not suggest, however, that the majority of weapons currently circulating in West Africa originated in Burkina Faso. Rather it helps to define chronologically the proliferation of light weapons in West Africa: namely the early 1980s. The same period saw a wider emergence in West Africa of civilian political movements dedicated to strategies of armed struggle, notably in Senegal, Mali, Niger, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all of which have sought to procure weapons and which have been occasional beneficiaries of large imported shipments. On occasion large supplies of new weapons have entered the region, in addition to the recirculation of existing stocks. Included are the arming of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (the movement of Charles Taylor) during 1990 and 1991, when it was receiving weapons from Libya, France and Burkina Faso, generally via Côte d’Ivoire; the early 1990s when Libya was also arming various Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali; the period 1992-3, when various factions in Liberia were receiving weapons from at least some elements of the Nigerian peacekeeping force (ECOMOG); and the mid-1990s, when various international actors were distributing weapons to the Kamajor militia in Sierra Leone.

Michel Ben Arrous: Weapons Traffic in West Africa

To estimate the number of weapons circulating in any region is extremely difficult. Only governments and inter-governmental organisations possess the means and structures necessary to collect and verify such data. While ECOMOG, the Cease-Fire Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), proceeded to disarm Liberian factions, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) built a large database whose content seems to question the presumed proliferation and abundance of weapons in the sub-region: as a ratio, less than one weapon was shared by two fighters. In the process, UNOMIL also gathered information on weapons types and age.

From 22 November 1996 to 8 February 1997, Liberian factions were disarmed. During that time, UNOMIL was able to build a database unequalled in West Africa. The make, type and serial number of each weapon handed in was catalogued and each fighter was questioned about his pre-war activities, in which conditions he was mobilised, as well as how and where his unit operated. Although only a small part of the database is obtainable, it allows one to reconsider certain accepted notions, such as the correlation between levels of violence and quantities of weapons.

UNOMIL witnessed the demobilisation of 20 251 fighters who held 7 792 weapons and 1 218 300 pieces of ammunition. In addition, 3 783 weapons were collected by ECOMOG outside the official disarmament sites. Thus, the 11 575 weapons totalled would, according to different sources, make up 50 to 80 per cent of the complete weaponry, which could then range from 15 000 to 25 000. These figures are, nevertheless, four to five times less than what was considered a reasonable estimate during times of war, i.e., 80 000 to 100 000.

The concept of well armed fighters, each with at least one weapon, must be reconsidered. The ratio between fighters and weapons is 2.2 to 1. This ratio increases to 2.6 if functioning weapons only are taken into consideration. Of all the weapons catalogued, UNOMIL classified 18.7 per cent as non-functioning, or one out of five weapons.

Up to now, the circulation of weapons had been observed mostly in the Sahel. One could attempt to explain this in two different ways. The first, which highlights the increase in conflicts since the drought of the 1970s, alludes to the collapse of the regulating mechanisms of agro-pastoral societies, due to the combined effects of desertification and civil wars, which cause mass exodus, increase weapons trafficking, create new conflicts and intensify desertification.

The second explanation, which focuses attention on the relative brevity of violence in the subregion, focuses on the importance of voluntary migrations as part of a survival strategy in fragile ecosystems and the subsequent need for Sahelian societies to maintain good neighbourly relations: they compromise more easily and more quickly, and thus sell their weapons. But such concessions may only be temporary and weapons can be bought back.

In the course of time, the state’s ability to safeguard persons and properties has decreased and well armed urban security companies and rural militias are developing rapidly. At the end of the 1980s it would have been unthinkable to see security guards in uniforms, carrying weapons (other than bludgeons) in public places. West African police forces were not well armed and, due to frequent fuel shortages, would visit the scene of the crime only if provided with fuel or a lift. From the time of independence the main function of the police, carried out by the army, was to ‘pacify’. The fact that most West African societies were considered rural contributed to urban police forces being marginalised.

In addition to the advent of private security, in West Africa there has been the emergence of sobels, soldiers who become rebels by night. In Guinea, for example, soldiers and policemen rent out their weapons, as well as their uniforms, which they collect again in the morning with a share of their client’s loot; in Guinea-Bissau, only weapons are rented out, but for as long as a week.

In such a context, there is a fine line between legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate: the Ghanda Koye movement, founded by an ex-air force officer in Mali to oppose the Tuaregs, is probably the best known rural militia. It is tolerated, if not supported, by the army and part of the government. Many other movements have developed in Mali, including the Lafia and Bellah Alert movements.

In Sierra Leone, where one finds the Kamajoi militias, Captain Valentine Strasser, then head of state, introduced a further step in the privatisation of violence by hiring mercenaries from Executive Outcomes and Gurkha Security Group. These companies were asked to fight Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in return for shares in local diamond mining companies.

In addition to the rise of security companies and the weapons they bring with them, criminal trading across borders has grown and trafficking in drugs and minerals, and links with the Mafia through the globalisation process are now evident. Violence linked to traditional trading occurred mostly along borders, where customs officers could confront traffickers. But now it is starting to spread inland, to the areas where commodities are extracted, produced or transformed. As extra-territories are included, traffic routes are being modified and extended.

Outside the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases, it seems inaccurate to generalise about the criminalisation of the state. Everywhere else in West Africa, the straddling of political and economic positions of power tends to be relaxing. The extent, as well as the uncertainty of contemporary transformations, is better evaluated by considering both the weakening of the clientele system and the emergence of a new sub-regional capitalism, possibly immersed in criminal activity but removed from the state.

Colonel Moussa Diabaté: National Commission to Combat Light Weapons Proliferation — Mali

With the withdrawal of French troops from Mali in 1961, weapons were left behind. These were used for hunting and have perhaps been employed in insurrection movements. Indiscriminate use of these weapons has destroyed the flora and fauna of the country and caused severe environmental damage.

A second wave of weapons moved into the country following the drought in the Sahel between 1970-80. Young people migrated to Libya and were recruited into the Islamic Legion. They fought for Libya in Chad and the Western Sahara (Mauritania) and returned to Mali with their weapons which were used in the second Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. Weapons from the conflicts in Mauritania and Burkina Faso have also added to the number of weapons in the region.

Mali has experienced an escalation in violence, as former combatants use their weapons for violent purposes, including crime. This has resulted in a greater feeling of insecurity among the general population, which has led to an increase in the demand for weapons. Often in the subregion weapons proliferation is exacerbated by poor regulation allowing for the trafficking of weapons which may foster wars and allow insurgent groups to oppose the government. Often the state is no longer the centre of power but in competition with other factions.

Experiencing these negative effects of weapons proliferation, Mali found that attempts at post-conflict peacebuilding and development were collapsing into a situation of insecurity and instability. For this reason, the president of the country requested the assistance of the UN Secretary-General. Discussions were also undertaken with L’ANAD (Accord de Non-agression et d’Assistance en matière de Défense/Agreement on Non-aggresssion, Assistance and Mutual Defence).

In 1994 and 1995 the UN sent two advisory missions to the region, the first of which visited only Mali, while the second, having recognised the need for a subregional approach to the issue of arms proliferation, visited other countries in the subregion (see p. 17 above). Through the UN and its agencies, aid has been given to Mali for preventive diplomacy. Mali has also been at the forefront of a drive to establish a moratorium on the import and export of weapons in the region. The moratorium is not a legal obligation, but a sign of political commitment to addressing means of preventing the spread of weapons in the subregion and the concomitant management of conflict and violence. This was the reason for the symbolic destruction of weapons collected from ex-combatants in March 1997 and the flame of peace ceremony enacted around the destruction.

Mastering weapons will be one of the major security challenges for the end of the twentieth century. If efforts are not made, the international community will be unable to regulate conflicts and encourage democracy.

Islands of the Indian Ocean

The islands of the Indian Ocean experience much less of a problem with weapons and arms trafficking than their continental neighbours. In part this illustrates the impact contiguous borders have on arms proliferation. While not perhaps the recipients of weapons and arms-related crime and violence, off-shore banking has made the Seychelles seemingly popular with arms brokers, and the leftover weapons in Madagascar and the Comoros pose problems for stability. Presentations made by representatives of the French Army and the Customs and Excise Department in Reunion, and the broader issue of weapons proliferation among countries in the Indian Ocean region are presented below. The role of the Indian Ocean Commission is discussed in Section Two.

Bernard Legras: The Proliferation of Illicit Arms and Their Impact on Violence and Security on Réunion

Under French law, which governs Réunion, the categorisation of arms makes provision for eight classes of arms, ranging from war matériel to civilian-owned firearms, collector’s weapons and knives, and even rocks. There have been efforts made to standardise legislation around the various classes of weapons, and ownership is restricted by age. Weapons are regulated in relation to their manufacture, sale, use and transfer. The definition of categories becomes less important when weapons are used for criminal purposes, and under criminal law there is little distinction between types of weapons.

In 1996, 208 weapons were confiscated on Réunion, while 175 were seized in 1997. Thirteen percent of the weapons confiscated were those which require some type of licensing for purchase or use. There is little in the way of arms trafficking on the island, given that there is only one airport and one seaport, as is the case also with drug trafficking.

However, Réunion has experienced an overall increase in crime, with an average of fifty cases of violent crime between 1989-1997 for an island population of 687 200 (in January 1998). On Réunion 77 per cent of murders are committed with firearms. For other categories of crime (for example, robbery, burglary and sexual assault) the use of firearms decreases. Crime in general has risen by 120 per cent, while sexual assault has risen over 260 per cent since 1995. On Réunion 74 per cent of all prisoners are held for sexual assault-related crimes.

Alain Guillaumey: La Réunion and France

On Réunion weapons trafficking does not present a problem. In France, there is also little problem with trafficking, as controls are effective and detection is efficient. In 1997, 1 400 weapons were seized in France. These were both of French manufacture and from other countries, including the USA, United Kingdom and Israel.

It is important to recognise the similarities between arms trafficking and other types of smuggling. To hide the origin of goods, many borders are crossed. Inter-European transit is only controlled at the country of first entry. If illicit goods are not caught at that stage, it is possible for them to move freely through or out of Europe. To combat this, information sharing has become critically important for identifying cargoes and suspects. The World Customs Organisation has also played an important role. With more than 150 member countries, agreements have been signed between members to encourage common regulations and training standards. However, it must be recognised that while methods of improved detection have assisted developed countries which have the financial and technical resources to implement these, developing countries, which are more likely to be targeted by smugglers anyway, do not have access to this technology.

Colonel Jacques Gardien: Weapons Trafficking among Islands in the Indian Ocean

Seychelles

Extensive private offshore banking may open the way for arms trafficking, especially as the Seychelles are the financial hub of Africa. Weapons destined for Zaire were seized in the Seychelles, a matter taken up by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Arms to Rwanda with local officials. Investigation showed that there was no government involvement in the shipment, however, which was arranged by individuals. It is still not clear who supplied the end-user certificates, in which some trade is developing. Some weapons which have transited the island have stayed there and are being used in the perpetration of crime.

Madagascar

Following the civil war on the island, light tanks, helicopters and armoured vehicles have remained outside of state control. Entire regions of the country are beyond the control of the army, and the state is unable to ensure the security of its inhabitants against bandits. There are instances of the military lending arms to criminal groups, and the potential for the resumption of conflict remains high.

Comoros

The weapons being used by the Anjouanais against the government’s military are those that were left behind when the military left Anjouan. Private militias, led by French mercenaries, were created and armed with these left-over weapons, which included mortars and rocket launchers in addition to firearms. However, there is little or no inflow of new weapons and ammunition is scarce on the local market.

Mauritius

Like Réunion, there is little evidence of arms trafficking. Rivalries between communities are assumed to be armed, but there is no armed conflict per se.

Jérôme Lauseig: Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean

The concept of security has changed considerably from the state-centric definition most commonly used during the Cold War. That concept of security focused primarily on policy at three levels: security problems arising from actions of other states; public security interests as parallel to state security; and national responses to threats to security, mainly those of a military nature.

However the end of the Cold War and changes internationally have occasioned a shift in thinking about security. Increasingly, the concept of security in current discourse focuses on threats which go beyond national boundaries and which are multi-faceted. These new threats are no longer necessarily aimed at the state, and it may be difficult for a government to predict what they are or who is the intended target. The range of new challenges to contemporary security include population movements, black markets, illicit trafficking in commodities, including drugs, weapons and gemstones, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, violation of human rights and environmental and social degradation. This increase in the threats to security also increases the way in which they may be manifested. No longer are inter-state wars the prime mechanism of conflict. Now armed insurrections and civil wars account for the majority of current conflicts. The way in which security threats are evolving for countries which border the Indian Ocean are explored below.

Decrease in intensity of inter-state and ideological confrontations

Globally, the end of the Cold War has decreased classic military confrontations around the Indian Ocean. Wars no longer result from imbalance and contests of power between states, but rather from the consequence of their weakness. A review of the crises and conflicts involving countries from the East African coast seems to confirm this statement. Only old international disputes persist: France and Mauritius over Tromelin Island; with Madagascar over the Eparses Islands in the Mozambique Channel, and the Comoros and Mayotte Island; and the United Kingdom with Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago.

Increasingly current conflicts are internal, as may be seen in parts of East Africa including the implosion of Somalia and the de facto creation of Somaliland; claims against Tanzania by Zanzibar; and the attempt at secession by Anjouan and Moheli in the Comoros. Low intensity conflicts also affect countries in the east of the Indian Ocean: Indonesia and the Liberation Front in East Timor and the secessionist rebellion in Sri Lanka. However confrontations between countries along the Indian Ocean still continue, including between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands.

New threats - putting states at centre-stage

If it is accepted that the state remains the originator of security policy, the way in which these policies are manifested will vary by country and situation. Situations in which the state may become at risk of losing its ability to govern include the weakness of the state, in which a lack of state control brings about behaviour comparable to that found in countries at war - the absence of government, the rise of private security companies, organised gangs, the spread of weapons and unpunished acts of violence.

Another emerging threat to states is the increasing internationalisation and criminalisation of international trade. The freeing of trade, through easing of tariffs and common market areas also increase the opportunities for the smuggling of illicit goods, including arms and drug trafficking.

Drug trafficking, and the laundering of drug money, constitute the largest amount of illicit trade in the Indian Ocean region. Heroin from India, the United Arab Emirates, Thailand and Burma are transported across African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia among others) to end users elsewhere. Other drugs, including dagga (marijuana) and mandrax are also traded across the Indian Ocean.

While not as extensive, the trade in illicit weapons is also ongoing in the region. Suppliers change but the recipients are frequently countries which are under United Nations arms embargoes. In addition, stocks of surplus weapons have accumulated in African countries after the termination of conflicts (for example in Somalia, Angola and Mozambique) and themselves constitute supplies for other incipient or current conflicts across the continent.

However these threats do not pose the only challenge to stability within countries, others include:

Corruption - Through various levels of state and civil society, corruption has taken hold in some African countries.



Crime syndicates - These syndicates clearly demonstrate the multiplicity and interpenetration of crime and violence into societies. They often combine all the manifestations of violence (drugs, weapons, corruption, prostitution, etc.) and affect both countries and individuals.

Actions taken to counter current security threats

The inability of a country to protect its population has given rise to the prominence of private security companies performing the functions that would, under other circumstances, often be undertaken by the government’s security forces. Two types of security companies are found: those which perform duties around protecting individuals’ security and those which are engaged in the privatisation of war. In some countries both operate while in other countries only one or the other is found.

The proliferation of organisations, of criminal trade and of private security companies forces countries to find concrete solutions to prevent their being removed from the role of security provider. Such actions may be taken by an individual country alone, through, for example, improving border controls, improving or creating an effective judiciary and improving police training, or by a region. In the latter case, and lacking a regional leader or hegemon to drive such a process forward, co-operation between countries often becomes the way in which to address these new security risks. In the Indian Ocean region there are currently two co-operative initiatives - the Non-Aligned Movement, which encompasses many more countries than those which make up the Indian Ocean region, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (the IOR-ARC). Both of these mechanisms however have so far focused not on the identification and response to new security threats but largely on economic and development issues.

In the absence of regional security mechanisms, sub-regional structures may perhaps have a function. In Southern Africa the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its related committees have begun to take up issues around the security threats discussed above. However even with the existence of these structures continued effort at the regional and international level must occur.

The Indian Ocean region, including those countries along the rim, could play a more important role in the future: mutual exchanges of information, including a customs information network which is in progress could be important in combating the illicit trade in goods. The Indian Ocean Criminal Police Organisation may also increase its functions if its structure is reinforced and its areas of investigation broadened.