Vigilantism has been explained as a collective response to high crime levels and a slow and inaccessible criminal justice system. There is much evidence that government has acknowledged these problems and is taking action. Within the criminal justice sector, many new pieces of legislation, policies and strategies have been developed since 1994. To illustrate this, the chapter reviews selected initiatives taken by the Departments of Safety and Security and Justice and Constitutional Development that could reduce levels of vigilante activity. These initiatives are discussed below in five categories:

As the concluding chapter in this monograph, it is argued that the threat of vigilantism can only be reduced by providing a formal justice system that works—and that is seen to work. To this end, a conscious effort must be made not only to improve the quality of policing and prosecution processes, but also to publicise and communicate convictions for serious crimes. These and other recommendations are explored at the end of the chapter.

Improving the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole

Initiatives aimed at improving the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole are important in the context of vigilantism, since supporters believe that the system is too slow and that it benefits the accused above the victims. Moreover, problems such as case dockets going missing and high withdrawal rates due to the inability to trace witnesses, complainants or evidence, encourage the public to question the point of participating in the formal criminal justice process. The Integrated Justice System project is government's most important attempt to improve the functioning of the system as a single unit.

Integrated Justice System (IJS)

As one of the key projects of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy, the IJS aims to transform the criminal justice system ''into a modern, efficient, effective and integrated system'' by removing blockages and managing the accused and his or her case, together with the evidence, through the system as quickly as possible.101 Begun in 1997, the project is managed by a board that represents the Departments of Safety and Security, Justice and Constitutional Development, Correctional Services, and Social Services and Population Development, with the assistance of a Business Against Crime project office that helps co-ordinate the inter-departmental project.

In its initial stages, the IJS identified many blockages that impeded the effective operation of the criminal justice system. These related to, among others, functional and business integration, policy alignment, timeous access to criminal record history, timely notification of events, imbalances in the level of automation of departments and incompatible information technology, and lack of quality information and information sharing.

In 1998 Cabinet approved a report of the IJS board that identified six systems as the minimum necessary components of an integrated criminal justice system:

Identification services, allowing for the identification of people within the system.



Criminal history information management, allowing for easy access to criminal record information by those components of the system that need it.



Docket management by the police and the prosecution service.



Event notification to reduce court delays and non-appearances of witnesses and complainants.



Business intelligence to support the entire system.



Information technology (IT) infrastructure to support the entire system.

Rather than overhauling the whole criminal justice system, the IJS is tackling different components of the system in an affordable and manageable approach. Some of the better-known projects are the awaiting trial prisoner project, inmate tracking system, Automated Fingerprint System (AFIS), and the criminal record and history information system.

The project has been criticised for taking too long to show tangible results and for being too IT oriented. However, the IJS is one of the few interdepartmental projects to secure a budget and start projects across different departments. Given the importance of making the criminal justice system operate as one rather than three distinct systems, this is a significant achievement. It is also likely that with improvements in its management system and more realistic budget projections, the IJS will deliver results more quickly in the coming years.

Improving the conviction rate

One of the main complaints of followers of groups like Mapogo, is that too many criminals are 'let off the hook' due to problems with police investigation and court procedure. Many of these perceptions may be based on a lack of understanding about the justice process. However, based on the statistics discussed in chapter 2, there is little doubt that conviction rates are low, particularly for serious violent crimes such as car hijacking and rape. The SAPS has attempted to improve the standard of investigations by creating special units dedicated to particular crime problems. A similar approach informed the creation of the Directorate of Special Operations (or Scorpions) in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The NPA has taken several other measures, including establishing special sexual offences courts, in an attempt to improve the conviction rate.

SAPS special investigation units

For decades the SAPS has followed the practice of creating special units to investigate particular types of crime. This resulted in the establishment of 503 specialised units by 2001 in a detective service consisting of approximately 21 797 detectives.102 Units focused on a wide range of crime problems such as murder and robbery, hijacking, firearms, organised crime, drugs, family violence and sexual offences.

Among the units established were those aimed at arresting perpetrators of vigilante activities. The Tsolo-Qumbu Task Team was established in the Eastern Cape following the recommendations of the Kroon Commission into violence related to stock theft in the province.103 Similarly the Mapogo Unit was formed in the Northern Province to deal specifically with Mapogo-a-Mathamaga's activities, as was Gijima Tsotsi in Mpumalanga. In the Western Cape, the Peoples Crimes Against the State Unit formally known as the Pagad Task Team was established, drawing members from the SAPS murder and robbery unit.104

Although the success of anti-vigilante units has not been evaluated, announcements in January 2000 that about 7 000 detectives formerly based at the specialised units would be re-deployed to station level, are significant. According to SAPS management, the main motivation is to boost the capacity for crime investigation at station level. Although not stated explicitly, another important reason is no doubt the performance of the specialised units which appears to be less impressive than the station level detectives who investigate less serious crimes.105

If conducted appropriately, the rationalisation is likely to improve the standard of investigations particularly since two new units have been created—the Organised Crime Unit and the Serious and Violent Crime Unit. Given the degree of specialisation required, several units will remain unaffected by the restructuring announced thus far. These include the Commercial Branch and the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units. This is a positive step in the context of vigilantism, since these are the types of crime that often lead to vigilante acts against suspects. A potentially problematic development however, especially since corruption is a key concern for supporters of vigilantism, is that the former Anti-Corruption Units are to be absorbed into the Organised Crime Unit. It will be difficult for detectives in the new units to investigate their colleagues—particularly since organised crime more often than not operates with the assistance of corrupt police officers.106

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)

The South African Constitution required the establishment of a new prosecuting authority. In 1998, parliament passed the National Prosecuting Authority Act which spells out the details of a new prosecutorial system for the country.107 The priorities of the NPA are:

Improving the quality of performance by prosecutors, including delays and backlogs in the disposal of cases.



Fighting organised crime—the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) committed itself to bringing down at least five major crime syndicates in 2001, and the Assets Forfeiture Unit aimed to seize R250 million from criminals.



Developing a service culture in the NPA.108

The NPA has enthusiastically adopted a more business-like approach to its work and prioritised the development of management capacity and a long-term plan to attract and retain skilled personnel to the prosecution service.

It is too early to assess the success of the NPA, but the latest available statistics indicate that courts remain a bottleneck in the criminal justice process: the number of unsentenced prisoners continues to increase and the average period prisoners spend awaiting trial has increased. Moreover, convictions as a proportion of cases referred to court remain low, especially for serious violent crimes. This is however against the backdrop of an increased workload facing the courts. On the positive front, there has been a slight decrease in the number of outstanding cases that courts have to deal with, mainly because of increased court hours through the establishment of Additional and Saturday courts. In terms of fighting organised crime, the Assets Forfeiture Unit has since May 1999 seized more than R210 million, most of which was returned to the victims of the crime.109

Directorate of Special Operations (DSO)

The DSO (Scorpions) came into being in June 1999 when the President announced that a special adequately staffed and equipped unit would be established urgently with a mandate to investigate and prosecute national priority crimes, including police corruption.110 In October 2000 the national assembly amended the NPA act of 1998 to establish the Directorate of Special Operations as an investigating directorate of the NPA. The DSO is unique in that its functions include:

Investigating crime.



Gathering and analysing crime information.



Instituting criminal proceedings relating to offences or any criminal or unlawful activities that occur in an organised fashion, or such offences or categories of offences as determined by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The rationale behind the DSO is to integrate three functions which are traditionally separate: intelligence, investigations and prosecutions. Thus the DSO consists of special investigators, intelligence operatives and specialist prosecutors operating together in project teams.111 Although it is too early to establish the effectiveness of the approach, it is anticipated that the use of prosecution-driven and intelligence-led investigations will result in higher conviction rates for particular types of crime.

Sexual offences courts

In September 1999, the sexual offences and community affairs departments were established in the National Prosecuting Authority. The department aims to set up 20 sexual offences courts countrywide to deal with crimes against women and children, along with one-stop centers and charge offices at hospitals. The aim of the specialised courts is to improve the handling of victims and witnesses and, by developing specialist prosecutors, achieve more effective prosecutions and convictions.

The specialised court approach is not new in South Africa, with the first such court established in Wynberg in 1993. By the end of 2000, 15 more courts were up and running across the country and 375 police officers, social workers and prosecutors had been trained. A further 12 courts were due to open in 2001. The courts are considered a step in the right direction. However it remains to be seen whether they can achieve their aims given the high case load and apparent failure to learn from existing specialist courts. Specific problems in the running of the courts include insufficient space in the court buildings, and too few trained intermediaries, prosecutors and magistrates to staff the courts.112

Improving service delivery to the public

The police are often singled out as being responsible for shortcomings in the criminal justice process, such as when accused are 'unfairly' granted bail and released from custody. Supporters of vigilantism cite inadequate service from the police (more often than the courts) as one of the reasons why they take the law into their own hands. Some complaints, such as those relating to the bail process, are unjustified. However, the key to improving public understanding of the criminal justice process is to improve the front-line service to complainants and witnesses in police stations and courts. The SAPS has taken the lead in this regard as demonstrated by its Service Delivery Improvement Programme.

SAPS Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP)

The project was initiated by the South African Police Services in 1998 and is intended to provide a management tool to improve the quality of service to the public and the functioning of the police. The SDIP originates from the Department of Public Service Administration's White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele) and the subsequent Public Service Regulations of 1999. The latter came into operation in July 1999 and compel all government services to establish and sustain service delivery programmes:

Specifying the main services to be provided to the different types of actual and potential customers, as identified by the department.



Containing consultation arrangements with the department's actual and potential customers.



With due regard to the customers' means of access to the service and the barriers to the increased access thereof, specifying the mechanisms or strategies to be utilised progressively to remove the barriers so that access to services is increased.



Indicating standards for the main services to be provided.



Containing arrangements as to information about the department's services.



Stipulating a system or mechanism for complaints.113

Some difficulties have been noted in the implementation of the police's SDIP, including the slow progress in moving beyond training towards problem solving, and doubts among police officers about whether the resources and management support would be available in practice to solve the problems they identified at station level. Nevertheless, most police officers support the SDIP and survey results aimed at testing client perceptions of police service delivery were found to be generally positive.114

However, it is in the area directly relevant to the problem of vigilantism that service was the weakest. Police officers, both in the charge office and the detective service rarely provided complainants with information about what to expect from the criminal justice process or follow-up on the progress of their cases. As noted in chapter 2, this is a key complaint raised by supporters of vigilante activity and acknowledged by some SAPS members working in affected areas such as the Northern Province.

Improving service delivered by prosecutors

One of the National Prosecuting Authority's priorities for 2001 was developing a service culture which includes ensuring customer satisfaction, creating mechanisms that prevent secondary victimisation, ensuring that customers understand the services provided by the NPA, and ensuring that the NPA services are accessible to all who require them, particularly the previously disadvantaged.115 The establishment of sexual offences courts and special multi-disciplinary centers (reviewed above) are in line with the objective of developing a service culture. In addition, the NPA commissioned the ISS to conduct a survey in late 2001 of public perceptions of service in courts across the country. The intention is to use the data to improve service and to monitor service delivery over time.

Enacting laws that are 'tough on offenders'

Claims abound, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, that the current system of justice does not deter criminals, that the courts are too lenient and—implicit in the actions of Mapogo—that the courts do not mete out appropriate punishment for offenders. The views, common among supporters of vigilantism, that the country’s constitution is 'soft on criminals', that government has lost control of the situation and that existing laws do not take into account the constraints within which the police and courts operate, have no doubt influenced the passing of laws that are tough on offenders.

Bail legislation

The perception that criminals are too easily granted bail is one of the main causes of dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system. Several cases have been reported in which accused who have been released on bail are attacked by people from the community where the alleged crime was committed. In an attempt to address this problem, the bail legislation was amended in 1997.116 The amendment came into effect in August 1998 and places the onus on persons accused of serious violent crimes to show why they should be released on bail—thus making it harder for them to get bail than in the past when the onus was on the prosecution.

Ironically, while representing an attempt to get tough on crime, this move has increased prosecutors' workload and the number and length of time of formal bail applications. This is because the prosecution has to cross-examine the accused to show that the latter's reasons are not sufficient to warrant bail. Also, the prosecution is in most cases obliged to call witnesses in order to oppose bail successfully, which takes time. The impact has been felt most strongly in the regional courts because since the amendment came into effect, bail applications for those accused of committing serious violent crimes must be heard in the regional court unless special reasons apply.117

Those supporting tough measures against criminals are unlikely to be concerned about the consequences of these changes such as the dramatic increase in the number of unsentenced prisoners in the country's jails. But the delays and additional workload for prosecutors have a negative overall effect on the performance of the criminal justice system—which ultimately encourages people to take the law into their own hands instead of using the formal justice system.

Minimum sentencing legislation

In terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997, persons convicted of certain serious crimes must be given a mandatory minimum sentence unless the magistrate or judge imposing the sentence is "satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence".118 The Act, which came into effect on 1 May 1998, provides for the imposition of heavy sentences such as life imprisonment for murdering a police officer, for the rape of a woman under the age of 16 years, and for gang rape. The prescribed sentence for vehicle hijacking is 15 years imprisonment.

A study undertaken by the South African Law Commission on the implementation of the minimum sentencing legislation found that while sentences had increased since the passing of the Act, they were still generally below those prescribed as minimum sentences.119 The authors did note however that it might be too early to understand the full impact of the Act. Importantly in the context of vigilantism, the study noted that it remains difficult to conclude that tough sentences lead to a reduction of crime:

"The question of sentencing therefore remains irrelevant to the vast majority of people who committed those crimes. Until the conviction rate improves dramatically it is difficult to see how tough minimum sentences will be an effective deterrent to thousands of criminals who evidently do not get apprehended and successfully prosecuted." 120

These findings suggest that the minimum sentencing legislation is unlikely to have an impact on levels of vigilantism at this stage. This is because the sentences handed down are still relatively lenient (more so than those prescribed in the Act). In addition, the deterrence factor associated with tough sentencing relies on more than just the sentence: offenders must be apprehended, prosecuted and convicted expediently in order for the public to believe that the criminal justice system can offer them some protection.

Draft Anti-Terrorism Bill

The draft bill, released during 2000, is significant here because its development was encouraged by the ongoing violence and bombings allegedly committed by Pagad in the Western Cape. As such, it can be argued that the bill aims to clamp down not only on terrorism but also on vigilante activity which fit the definitions as laid out in the bill. The bill, which aims to address terrorism and a variety of related crimes in one piece of legislation, contains some controversial provisions such as proposals that suspects can be detained without charge or trial for up to 14 days, and a very broad definition of terrorism.

A terrorist act is defined as "any act which may cause damage to property and is intended to disrupt public service".121 The definition therefore includes law-breakers who in the normal meaning of the word would not be terrorists but who act in a way that disrupts public service and damages property. Apart from the very broad definition, the bill also reflects an attempt to 'get tough on offenders' in its prescription of a mandatory sentence—life imprisonment—for anyone convicted of a "terrorist act". The draft bill also proposes 14-day detention of anyone when there is reason to believe they possess or are withholding information about any offence in terms of the bill. Such a person can then be interrogated "until he or she has satisfactorily replied to all questions under interrogation".122 This would effectively lead to detention without trial and is in direct conflict with the constitutional right of a fair trial.

Assisting the police and courts through crime prevention partnerships

A lack of community involvement is rarely mentioned by supporters of vigilantism as a shortcoming in the crime reduction effort. However, responsibility for preventing crime is shared between government and civil society. The police rely on members of the public to report crime, provide information about cases, supplement police capacity by assisting with patrols, or reinforce the social controls that deter family or peers from committing crime. And once cases are brought to court, members of the public are required to act as witnesses in order to secure a conviction. Achieving safety and security—and an effective justice system—thus requires that the public and the relevant officials work together. This has been recognised by government, and is expressed in the community policing policy and efforts to formalise community based dispute resolution structures.

Community policing

Community policing aims, through the establishment of broadly representative Community Police Forums (CPFs), to set up active partnerships between the police and the community through which crime, service delivery and police-community relations challenges can jointly be analysed and resolved. The policy was first articulated in the 1997 Community Policing Policy Framework and Guidelines. Since then, the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security affirmed community policing as the approach to policing in South Africa, but directed the CPFs to begin working with local government to ensure social crime prevention and community mobilisation against crime.123

Despite support at the policy level, within the line functions of the SAPS, and even from the President in his opening address to Parliament in June 1999, eight years after establishing the CPFs, clear direction or meaningful government support to these structures remains a problem.124 The result has been that few CPFs have been able to fulfil their intended functions. This was confirmed by a recent survey conducted by the ISS for the SAPS among 17 231 respondents living in 45 of the police's 219 priority station areas. The research indicated that CPFs have generally been unable to tap support from community-based organisations, or to mobilise participatory community crime reduction initiatives.125

Sector Four in Alexandra

One community policing project that has had some success in terms of developing effective local projects is Sector Four in Alexandra, a suburb of Johannesburg. Sector Four was started in August 1999 as part of the SAPS' sector policing initiative which saw Alexandra being divided into six sectors.126 The local SAPS station commissioner approached community leaders in each sector to develop ways of working together to combat crime. However, only the fourth sector took up the challenge.

Sector Four is comprised of at least 10 executive members with over 200 community members participating in patrols. The aim of the group is to work with the police to reduce crime. The secretary of the group is a SAPS member whose role it is to ensure that Sector Four does not operate outside the law and that relations between the police and the group remain strong. The success of this approach is evident in that when making an arrest, the group immediately phones the secretary and requests police backup.

Sector Four has been successful in confiscating at least 100 unlicensed firearms, reducing robberies especially over weekend nights and breaking down some gang activity since their establishment in 1999.127 Initially the group operated only within sector four in Alexandra. However, at the beginning of 2001 they were invited to extend their operations to other parts of the township as a result of their achievements. An important element of their success has been the willingness of certain members of Sector Four to testify in court as witnesses, thereby reducing the rate of case withdrawals and increasing the chances of securing a conviction.

Nevertheless, the group faces a number of difficulties:

The SAPS often responds slowly when Sector Four requests backup.



The lack of uniforms and means of identification which makes people resistant to searches and seizure.



Physical danger—in late 2001, three of their members were shot dead while on patrol.



The lack of equipment such as two way radios and transportation.



Many members are unemployed and the lack of funding for petrol to transport alleged criminals, for example, hampers much of their work.128



Despite these setbacks, Sector Four is made up of dedicated residents who have managed to lobby community support and take action against crime using non-violent, legal methods. Sector Four epitomises a successful initiative in which community members work in close partnership with the local police and thus have no need to resort to vigilante action. Of course such an initiative can only succeed if the police are willing to work with people in their area.

Community dispute resolution structures

In 1996 the South African Law Commission (SALC) began an investigation into alternative dispute resolution which culminated in a discussion paper on community dispute resolution structures.129 The paper (which explicitly excluded vigilantism from its discussion), identified the following factors as some of the reasons why people support alternative forms of justice:

The perception that the legal system was illegitimate as it was associated with the apartheid government.



The formal justice system was repressive.



The formal system is expensive and thus prohibits justice.



The formal system superimposes foreign, dominant and a Western legal system on an intuitive, indigenous legal system.



The formal system fails to deal with problems faced by people in their daily lives.

While the paper addresses the need for community-based structures, it focuses on less serious disputes that could be handled through ‘community forums’ which are not courts but dispute resolution and peace-making structures.130 Although the proposals are worthwhile, the community forums are not intended to deal with the serious crimes that often lead to people taking the law into their own hands. As such, community forums could enhance crime prevention partnerships, but would not necessarily reduce vigilante activity.

Recommendations

This monograph has argued that the main reason why people support vigilantism today relates to weaknesses in the criminal justice system and particularly the long period of time taken to deal with criminal cases. The review of policies and strategies above shows that there are many government initiatives in place to deal with these problems. Certain factors may however limit the impact of these approaches. These factors are presented below within the context of four recommendations which are listed in italics at the start of each discussion.

Publicise, on an ongoing basis, the convictions of perpetrators of serious and violent crimes, and corruption

The main factor limiting the impact of the initiatives described above on vigilantism is that many are likely to show positive results only in the medium to long term. Examples include the IJS project, the Sexual Offences Courts, DSO (Scorpions) and Assets Forfeiture Unit. As a result, these initiatives are unlikely to change the fact that many vigilante acts are committed because people have no faith in the criminal justice process. To make matters worse, the media focuses largely on acts of criminality and the failings of the system. To offset this, communication strategies should be developed that publicise the successes of criminal justice initiatives. In particular, the public should be notified when perpetrators of serious offences, violent crime and corruption are convicted.

Prosecute those guilty of vigilante activity

Another limiting factor is that despite several efforts by the police to investigate vigilantism, government has yet to send out an unequivocal message that these activities will not be tolerated. In some cases, government initially turned a blind eye to acts of vigilantism. Given the already high levels of public support for vigilante activity, the lack of sanction encourages the problem and further undermines the rule of law.

A targeted and visible approach that focuses on prosecuting those who commit vigilante acts, and the public condemnation of vigilantism by safety and security leaders, is required.

Improve the information provision aspect as outlined in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery

Another limitation of the initiatives outlined above relates to the implementation of service delivery policy. Although some aspects of service delivery are improving (in the police at any rate), the key weakness remains the provision of information to the public about the criminal justice process.

Analysis has shown that one of the reasons why people support vigilantism is the lack of information about proceedings in the criminal justice system. People are unsure about what to expect when reporting a crime and how the system will work once they do—especially in terms of bail. One of the major complaints is the lack of feedback about the progress of cases and outcomes of court proceedings. This is compounded by the inaccessibility of courts and the alienating environment that many complainants and witnesses have to contend with.

More attention should be paid to the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele) which stipulates that all government departments should improve service delivery to their clients. This includes not only dealing with complaints and cases brought by the public, but also providing information about how each service works, what people can expect from the service provider, and instituting mechanisms for lodging complaints. By improving this aspect of service delivery, officials in the police and courts could, in the process of their day to day activities, quite easily meet the frequently cited need for public education on the functioning of the criminal justice system.

Encourage community crime prevention partnerships

Despite policy on community policing and high level political support, functional partnerships between members of the public and agencies of the criminal justice system remain limited. In the case of community policing, they are limited by the lack of clarity about roles and how to co-operate effectively.

As the case of Sector Four shows, effective community-police partnerships can reduce the chances that people will resort to vigilantism. They can also assist the police by conducting patrols and arresting alleged criminals, and help victims by providing information about cases and support during court proceedings. As such, Sector Four provides an avenue for constructive and legal participation in crime fighting efforts. Such focused partnerships, where roles and responsibilities are clear, should be encouraged to help reduce vigilantism.


Another limitation in the development of partnerships is that they have focused mainly on the police. Initiatives should be extended to court and prison processes that, for example, encourage people to testify in court, participate in community corrections, parole decisions and supervision and support of offenders released on parole.