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CHAPTER 5

SWAZILAND

Simon Pillinger

Introduction

The Kingdom of Swaziland is a small, landlocked country, ruled by King Mswati III who exerts great influence in the running of the country. In 2000 it had an estimated population of just over a million, of whom a significant proportion are migrant workers. Swaziland is almost completely surrounded by the most powerful Southern African country, South Africa, and shares its eastern border with Mozambique. It is heavily dependent on South Africa for nearly all its imports and sends more than half of its exports to that neighbour. The economy is based on agriculture, which involves 60% of the population. The country has a surface area of some 17,360 km², the bulk of which is used for livestock with smaller areas devoted to arable agriculture and forestry.

Although Swaziland is a middle-income country with a per capita gross domestic product of US\$1,340, adult per capita consumption for the poorest 40% of its population is equivalent to US\$230. High unemployment, a high incidence of HIV/Aids and the continuing spread of poverty pose major challenges to economic growth and stability.

Its use for illicit purposes as a transit country between South Africa and Mozambique is an ongoing cause of concern. Among the security concerns that arise are the flow of illegal immigrants from Mozambique (many of them in transit to South Africa), the proliferation of light weapons (primarily from Mozambique) and the rise in violent crime, much of it trans-border in nature. Despite the fact that Swaziland is a relatively small country with an overwhelmingly rural population, organised crime has expanded. The police have described the increase as moderate.¹

Organised criminal groups

Because it is a transit country between Mozambique and South Africa, the criminal groups that are active in Swaziland are involved in both domestic as well as

transnational organised crime. They consist of indigenous Swazi nationals as well as individuals of various other nationalities. The foreign nationals appear to operate in groups made up primarily of individuals from their home country. They often have permanent residence rights in Swaziland but their criminal activities are not confined to that country. Six broad categories of organised criminal groups, based on their predominant nationality, have been identified² in Swaziland, namely indigenous Swazi groups and groups of Mozambicans, South Africans, Pakistanis, Nigerians and Taiwanese/Chinese.³

These groups all have contact and co-operate with much larger criminal groups based in South Africa and Mozambique. The activities of organised criminal groups in these two neighbouring states therefore have a direct influence on organised crime in Swaziland. The criminal markets that are being served are not so much in Swaziland itself but more often the lucrative South African market and, to a lesser extent, that of Mozambique.

Although some specialisation has taken place, none of the above organised criminal groups concentrate on one criminal activity only. They have all diversified and are all trying to benefit from the main illicit transit activities, namely the smuggling of stolen vehicles, mainly from South Africa to Mozambique, and the trafficking of narcotics and firearms from Mozambique through Swaziland to South Africa. The activities in which the various criminal groups are involved are set out below.

Swazi criminal groups

These groups, consisting mainly of Swazi nationals, are mainly involved in the trafficking of narcotics, dealing in stolen vehicles and exporting compressed *dagga* (marijuana). They frequently act as couriers in transporting narcotics. Swaziland has generally not had a history of high levels of violent crime. However, during the past two or three years there has been a growing tendency for serious violence involving firearms in bank heists, car hijackings and armed robberies.

Those involved in narcotics generally do not use weapons; couriers and dealers very seldom revert to shooting. Those involved in vehicle hijackings and vehicle theft are known to carry weapons. Many of the principal leaders have weapons, which they use if threatened.

Mozambican criminal groups

These groups, consisting of Mozambique citizens resident in Swaziland, focus on smuggling stolen vehicles, acting as couriers for transporting narcotics and smuggling arms from Mozambique to Swaziland and South Africa. Arms smuggling appears to have declined but a limited number of firearms are still purchased by Mozambiquan organised criminal groups within Mozambique and then sold in Swaziland or South Africa. Some of these weapons land up in the hands of other organised crime groups in those two countries.

South African criminal groups

South African criminal groups based in Swaziland are also involved in smuggling stolen vehicles, mainly from South Africa through Swaziland to Mozambique. Narcotics obtained in Maputo, Mozambique are smuggled in the opposite direction into South Africa. These groups are only involved in the smuggling of firearms to a limited extent.

Pakistani criminal groups

These are probably the best-organised criminal groups operating in Swaziland. Indications are that at least three such groups or syndicates operate from that country. Their activities focus mainly on the importation of narcotics (cocaine, heroin and mandrax). They also traffick in stolen vehicles by importing stolen vehicles from the Middle East, including some obtained in Dubai. These vehicles are then mainly sold in South Africa. Pakistani groups resident in Swaziland are also suspected of being involved in large-scale fraud, the manufacture of mandrax (methaqualone) and trafficking in persons. Some of the syndicates have established front companies in both Mozambique and Swaziland to facilitate their smuggling activities.

Nigerian criminal groups

Nigerian criminal groups focus on trafficking in narcotics. They buy *dagga* in Swaziland in large quantities and export it to Europe and the USA, using South Africa as the transit state. The proceeds are used to buy cocaine in South America for sale in South Africa or for onward trafficking to the USA. Most of the couriers that they employ to transport cocaine from South America to Swaziland are routed via other African countries, including Angola, Zambia and Mozambique.

Mozambique is a major access route for narcotics to Swaziland, probably because the poor state of policing in that country ensures a low-risk environment. Flights from South America connect with routes to Luanda (Angola), Lusaka (Zambia), Nairobi (Kenya) and on to Maputo in Mozambique.

The Swaziland-based Nigerian syndicates have become the principal players responsible for exporting *dagga* and importing cocaine. There appear to be three Nigerian networks operating in Swaziland. Each group consists of no more than four to five persons.⁴ They live in Manzini and their trafficking networks operate from Swaziland to Mozambique and South Africa. There is relatively little interaction between them and ordinary Swazi citizens or Swazi syndicates, except for those employed to courier narcotics and those who 'jockey' the vehicles for the Nigerian syndicates.

Methaqualone, the base chemical used in the manufacture of mandrax, is imported to Mozambique, then transported through Swaziland to South Africa by the various couriers working for Swaziland-based syndicates.

Some members of Nigerian networks formerly active in Swaziland are believed to have relocated to South America from where they act as the principal buyers for African-based Nigerian criminal groups. They rely on indigenous Swazi criminal groups to supply them with forged travel documents and many of them carry more than one passport.

Taiwanese/Chinese criminal groups

In the past these groups focused on trafficking in narcotics from the East but they have recently become involved in the trafficking of persons from mainland China via Mozambique and Swaziland to South Africa. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these groups are connected with the Triads, though some Swazi nationals feel the connection has been underestimated by the government. The close relationship between some Taiwanese and the King gives them a measure of protection.

Categories of organised criminal activities

The most prominent organised criminal activities in Swaziland are trafficking in narcotics, stolen vehicles and firearms. However, as Swaziland serves mainly as a conduit for these smuggled goods, not all of these activities impact to any

significant extent on Swazi society. The one organised criminal activity that does have a major impact is the illicit cultivation of and trafficking in *dagga*.

Trafficking in narcotics

There appear to be at least eight known organised groups or syndicates that are involved in trafficking in and through Swaziland.⁵ Two mainly consist of Swazi nationals, two each of Pakistanis and Nigerians, one of both Chinese and Taiwanese members and one of Taiwanese only.

Dagga

Swaziland has a climate and soil that is conducive to the growing of *dagga*. Most of it is grown in the north of the country, in a terrain that is steep and hilly and not easily accessible by road. This has limited the police's ability to effectively patrol and enforce the law in that region. Swazi-grown *dagga* is internationally known to be of a high quality and is a sought after commodity in South Africa, Europe and in the United Kingdom (UK). Taking into account that almost 40% of the Swazi population lives in relative poverty, it is not surprising that *dagga* is widely grown as a cash crop and that Swaziland constitutes one of the largest *dagga*-growing areas in the Southern African region.

Close co-operation between the Royal Swazi Police and the South African Police Service has led to frequent attempts to curtail the cultivation of the crop by way of aerial spraying with the help of South African helicopters. Even with South African assistance, the joint operations appear not to have made much of an impact as the supply of seed for the crop remains high. The Commissioner of the Swazi Police has acknowledged that the repeated destruction of large fields of *dagga* plants has not produced any concrete results.⁶

Some of the Swazi *dagga* cultivators have established their own *dagga* association to provide greater protection for themselves and to combine resources in selling and marketing the product.⁷ In order to assist small-scale growers, the Association has been involved in negotiating the sale of *dagga* to large buyers from South Africa. The association has also assisted Swazi *dagga* growers to buy inputs, such as irrigation equipment and fertilizer, to enhance their production. Although the cultivation of *dagga* is illegal in Swaziland, there seems to have been a system in the past whereby some individuals obtained approval from the late King Sobhuza II to grow it for medicinal purposes.

Of the *dagga* that is harvested, the best quality is earmarked for compression into one or two kilogram blocks that are smuggled via South Africa and Mozambique to Europe and the UK. Farmers who cultivate and produce *dagga* sell their produce mostly to the organised crime syndicates resident in Swaziland, especially to Nigerian and South African groups. Some growers in Swaziland do their own compressing. During 2000, a compressed one kilogram block of *dagga* fetched about ZAR4,500 in Swaziland. Once the *dagga* has been compressed, it is vacuum-packed in plastic bags or sealed with paper wrap and bound with adhesive tape. Pepper and curry powder have been known to be sprinkled on the packages to prevent sniffer dogs from identifying the contraband. Middlemen linked to South African and South African-based Nigerian criminal networks are frequent visitors to Swaziland to negotiate transactions. The compressed *dagga* that is earmarked for export is first transported to Johannesburg, Durban or Maputo. Nigerian criminal networks, some of them based in Swaziland, have during the past few years moved into the dominant position in the Swazi *dagga* trade, and the proceeds of their sales in Europe are used to pay for cocaine purchased in South America. The cocaine is thereafter smuggled to South Africa and elsewhere.

Once the compressed *dagga* arrives in Johannesburg or Durban, it is stored in homes or warehouses from where it is distributed to couriers or loaded onto containers to be shipped or flown abroad. The containers often contain other 'legitimate' cargo, such as furniture, to conceal the compressed *dagga*. In the past three years the increased efficiency of the British customs and excise services has led to a greater caution among organised criminal groups about sending their compressed *dagga* in containers to the UK. Smuggling by way of ships has become more risky as significant volumes have been confiscated upon arrival in the UK. An increasing share of export *dagga* is therefore being sent through Johannesburg by way of couriers or air freight.

In 2000, three tonnes of compressed *dagga* were seized in the UK in a container emanating from Swaziland.⁸ In Swaziland the police seized 3.9 tonnes of compressed *dagga* during a raid in 2001. Two principal suspects, Martin and Todd Lemming, were in Swaziland arranging the packing and transportation of the latest consignment of compressed *dagga* to South Africa when the Swaziland Police made their seizure. Both evaded arrest and took refuge in South Africa, where they were later arrested.

The police are of the view that this *dagga*, and a similar quantity seized in 2000, was destined for export to the UK. Its street value in the UK would have

been in the region of £15.6 million. In 2001 the street value for compressed *dagga* in the UK was £2,000/kg.

Good quality uncompressed *dagga* is sold mainly within Swaziland and in South Africa. South African consumers still prefer to purchase black plastic bags full of dried, uncompressed *dagga* rather than compressed blocks. In Swaziland growers can get between ZAR1,800 to ZAR2,500 per bag of good quality *dagga* from the South African or Nigerian middlemen.⁹ South Africans who visit Swaziland to buy uncompressed *dagga* arrive from every corner of the country, including Cape Town. The bags of *dagga* are not always transported through the official border posts. Numerous unguarded linkage roads and routes exist between South Africa and Swaziland that are used for this purpose.

Mandrax

Swaziland is a conduit for mandrax produced in Maputo. Large quantities are also shipped from Pakistan, India and China for trans-shipment to South Africa, which consumes approximately 80% of the world's mandrax. Consignments from Pakistan are destined for Maputo (Mozambique) or Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) from where they are couriered to Swaziland by road.

Buyers linked to South African criminal groups travel to Swaziland to buy the drug. They know that there is no entrapment legislation in Swaziland, i.e. if they buy mandrax, they are unlikely to be buying it from a police trap. Upon their return to South Africa the mandrax is distributed to a wide range of criminal groups for street-level disposal.

The chemical components of mandrax are also smuggled through Swaziland to the various laboratories or mandrax 'factories'. There are indications that Swaziland may have its own laboratory, in which Indians from Durban, Pakistanis and some Portuguese from Mozambique are involved. There are a number of laboratories in South Africa.

According to a senior police officer, mandrax smuggling through Swaziland seems to have decreased slightly over the past few years. He ascribes this impression either to the more sophisticated methods used by smugglers to avoid detection, or to alternative smuggling routes into South Africa. Mandrax in Swaziland is mainly sold for cash but it has occasionally also been exchanged for motor vehicles stolen in South Africa.

Cocaine

In Swaziland cocaine dealing is mainly undertaken by Nigerian criminal networks. The cocaine is smuggled from Brazil and Colombia through various methods. The Nigerian criminal groups have the advantage of an international network of contacts with other Nigerians involved in cocaine smuggling, which is so extensive that it includes most major cities in the world, including South American cities. Swazi and South African couriers are used to bring the cocaine from South America and the drug has also been sent by mail and posted to Swazi nationals who co-operate with the Nigerians. Consignments are sometimes sent from South America to one or other Southern African state in packages mixed with legitimate items and are then routed to Swaziland by contacts of the Nigerian networks. Yachts are also used to land cocaine in Mozambique, from where some of it is transported to Swaziland.

Since the flights from Nairobi to Swaziland's international airport were stopped in 1999, Nigerian criminal networks now use Johannesburg International Airport as a transit point en route to Swaziland. In general, the baggage of a passenger who is in transit to another international airport is not searched, making it relatively easy to transport the drugs through the airport.

Cocaine is also brought into Swaziland from Mozambique. The Nigerian criminal groups are in charge and organise the transportation, but the actual cross-border transporting is done mainly by Mozambicans. They do not have a difficult task as the border post between Swaziland and Mozambique is open to local Mozambicans on two days a week to enable them to cross without papers to do their shopping in Swaziland. It is therefore a low-risk smuggling route. The cocaine arrives in Mozambique mainly by plane from Luanda, although those organising the cocaine transports change flight routes from time to time.

Cocaine can readily be bought in Swaziland in large quantities, i.e. for smuggling purposes. Local consumption is low and does not provide a lucrative market for criminal groups. Members of Nigerian criminal networks based in Swaziland arrange for couriers to transport the cocaine to South Africa, either for consumption or for onward trans-shipment.

The Swazi police concentrate their efforts against drug trafficking on the illicit cultivation of, and trade in, *dagga*. They appear to have limited intelligence about the activities of the organised groups responsible for trafficking in 'hard drugs' such as cocaine. The 'transit trade' appears not to be high on their

priority list. The Police Drug Squad is small and not able to be effective throughout the country.

Due to their limited efforts to police the trafficking in mandrax and cocaine, it is not unlikely that mandrax tablets are being manufactured in Swaziland. Large quantities of the chemical components for mandrax are brought into the country as there is no legislation prohibiting their importation and no control over chemical substances that are imported.

Heroin

Heroin is smuggled into and through Swaziland in the same way as mandrax is. Tanzania and Kenya are important source countries, from where heroin is either couriered directly to Swaziland or shipped to Maputo in Mozambique. Although this drug originates in the East, the Nigerian networks have managed to become the most prominent traffickers of heroin in Swaziland. Hardly any of it is consumed in Swaziland. Instead, it is forwarded to South Africa and further afield to the USA and Europe.

The smuggling of stolen vehicles

There appear to be four or five organised networks in Swaziland that are involved with the trafficking of vehicles stolen in South Africa.¹⁰ The majority of stolen vehicles are destined for Mozambique and enter Swaziland through its porous border with South Africa. They are not necessarily driven through border posts but also arrive through what is known as '*deur die draad*', i.e. illegally through one of the many unpatrolled points where illegal crossings are possible without much risk. These entry points are normally located close to roads or tracks that run parallel to the border fence.

Those who select existing border posts to drive stolen vehicles into Swaziland rely on paying bribes to pass through the border unhindered. Corruption is rife at all border posts. Drivers of stolen vehicles have been caught carrying ZAR2,000 in cash, which they keep ready to pay out as bribes should they be stopped by authorities anywhere along the route.¹¹ A police officer referred to a case in 1999, which involved a South African arrested at the Komatipoort border post while on his fortieth trip driving stolen vehicles to Maputo from South Africa.

The main market for stolen South African vehicles lies in Mozambique, from where many are smuggled to other parts of Southern Africa. Swaziland, once

again, is the conduit for such vehicles. Once they cross the border into Swaziland from South Africa, they are hidden and stored for a day or two so that registration papers and certificates can be changed and regularised. Thereafter, with 'legitimate' ownership papers and registration forms, the vehicles are driven to Maputo for disposal. According to a senior police officer, more stolen vehicles are smuggled from South Africa through the Swaziland border than through any other South African border.¹²

In Mozambique, stolen vehicles are paid for mainly in cash but sometimes also by way of a barter transaction in exchange for mandrax or firearms. Mozambican criminal groups who specialise in trafficking in stolen vehicles often inform their Johannesburg contacts of the exact type and model of vehicle that they require. Such a vehicle will then be identified in Johannesburg by a local criminal group and thereafter stolen or highjacked and brought to Mozambique via Swaziland. Only a small number of vehicles are stolen within Swaziland and then smuggled to Mozambique or South Africa.

The organised criminal groups that facilitate the trafficking within Swaziland consist mainly of Mozambicans but Swazi nationals are involved as well. These criminal groups in effect act as agents for the larger groups based in South Africa and Mozambique. Their main responsibility is to facilitate the transit of the stolen vehicles through Swaziland.

However, there are criminal groups based in Swaziland that are directly involved in the theft of vehicles elsewhere, and their transport to and disposal through Swaziland. Some of these groups consist of Swazi nationals who have built up a considerable network of collaborators in South Africa and Mozambique. Although the size, composition and *modus operandi* of these groups vary, a typical Swazi-based syndicate involved in the theft and trafficking in vehicles in South Africa would operate as follows:

- The group tends to consist of a leader or principal, and five or six individuals who can loosely be described as field workers, responsible for stealing vehicles. These are often Swazi nationals resident in South Africa who are therefore familiar with the terrain in that country. Their function is to obtain the vehicles, on the instructions of their principal, either by hijacking or theft.
- The principal phones his field workers to place an order, providing details of the type and make of vehicles required and an approximate date when the vehicle is required in Swaziland.

- Once a vehicle has been stolen in South Africa, it is driven to Swaziland by either the person who stole it or by a driver ('jockey'), again normally a Swazi national who has been sent from Swaziland to undertake that task.
- The syndicate leader co-ordinates border crossings, arrangements for drivers, documentation such as forged passports or vehicle ownership documents, and the payment of bribes to traffic officers, border control personnel or police officers.
- Once the stolen vehicle arrives in Swaziland, it is driven to a 'safe area', or alternatively, if the vehicle is particularly 'hot', for example if it was obtained by way of a violent hijacking which resulted in police or private pursuit, it is either immediately stripped and the parts sold to garages working in collaboration with the syndicates or the engine and all other identification numbers are removed or replaced.
- Occasionally a 'hot' vehicle will be parked in a garage or container that is situated at a safe location, or at a homestead in a remote area until the 'heat' is off.
- If the stolen vehicles are not taken to Mozambique within a few days of their arrival in Swaziland, false documentation and 'blue books' are either bought from corrupt licensing officials or false (forged) documents are arranged to facilitate the onward transport to Mozambique for disposal to criminal networks with whom the Swazi group collaborates.

Information could not be obtained about the approximate number of stolen and hijacked vehicles that are smuggled into and through Swaziland on an annual basis. South African crime statistics indicate that in 2000 the total number of vehicles and motorcycles stolen amounted to 100,647, while the number of carjackings was 14,999.¹³ A conservative estimate of the percentage smuggled across South African borders into neighbouring states, including Swaziland, would be about 35%, i.e., approximately 35,500 stolen and hijacked motor vehicles were smuggled across South Africa's borders in 2000. This statistic can only be regarded as a rough guide. It is, for example, a known fact that among the reported cases of motor vehicle theft, a significant number of vehicles were actually not stolen but merely reported as such for false insurance claim purposes. An estimate of the number of stolen vehicles crossing the border from South Africa to Swaziland is therefore not possible.

In 2001 there were in excess of 600 vehicles impounded by police in Swaziland, of which the majority originated from South Africa. The original South African

owners of the vehicles are often unwilling to travel to Swaziland to identify the vehicles or to attend court hearings, apparently because many have already been paid out by insurance companies for the loss of their vehicles. For the Swazi police it is a source of frustration to devote resources to combating the trafficking of stolen vehicles when original owners are not prepared to identify them or suspects are let off because of a refusal by South Africans to travel to Swaziland to testify in court.

The impact of organised crime on Swazi society

Even though organised crime appears to be increasing in Swaziland, very few of the transit-related organised criminal activities seem to be regarded as a serious threat to Swazi society. The country is considered more of a 'safe haven' for criminals than a country in which the major crime groups exploit the local population. Except *dagga*, most illicit commodities, which constitute part of the illicit trade involving organised criminal groups, are either in transit through Swaziland or are being 'warehoused' before being moved out of the country to their end destinations. Not many Swazi citizens are therefore directly affected by organised crime and the general population does not regard most organised criminal networks as a threat. This is partly due to the impression that corruption levels in Swaziland have nowhere near reached the levels that appear to be prevalent in, for example, Mozambique and South Africa.

Organised crime-linked corruption, although it clearly exists, has not reached levels that have caused a public reaction. The fact that Swaziland is largely run by a monarchy and that families close to the royal family play a prominent role, may make it more difficult for organised networks to penetrate state structures.

The Police and Defence Forces are perceived to have low levels of corruption, although both are plagued by nepotism. The Director of the Anti-Corruption unit is a respected former senior police officer with a clean track record. Most businessmen appear confident that he is effective in his position.

The detrimental impact of organised crime on the economy of Swaziland appears to be marginal. Trafficking in stolen vehicles barely affects the legitimate trade in light motor vehicles. Although vehicle franchise holders have on occasion claimed that the availability of cheap stolen vehicles has reduced the demand for their second hand vehicles, these claims have not been evaluated.

Corruption and fraud

Corruption plays a role with some of the lower levels of state employees, specifically those stationed at the official border crossings, as it is here that temptation is greatest, particularly for officials who receive relatively low remuneration.

The Anti-Corruption Unit attempts to deal with most of the reported corruption cases, but it has a limited staff component and thus in practice it tends to deal with only the larger cases.

Fraud is mainly committed in respect of the production of 'blue books' and vehicle clearance certificates. There are many reports of false regional travel documents. However, there are very few arrests and convictions for possession of such documents.

A number of potential immigrants (from various African states) attempting to enter South Africa from Swaziland have been found in possession of false documentation bought in Swaziland.

Concluding comments

The most common response by police officers to suggestions that more should be done to combat organised cross-border crime is that Swaziland's border with both South Africa and Mozambique is too long to be effectively patrolled by Swazi authorities. This, and their limited manpower resources and shortage of trained personnel, are the main reasons given. Even with the assistance of the Swaziland Defence Force in patrolling the borders, the risk to criminal groups in crossing illicitly has not increased. The operating methods of criminal groups have become more sophisticated while the training levels of the Swazi police have lagged behind.

Another common complaint by the enforcement agencies is the lack of legislation to address the levels of organised criminality. Some of the legislation that the police have to enforce is outdated, for example the Drug Act (dated 1923) and the Pharmacy Act (dated 1929).

There is a need to harmonise (effective) legislation within all the Southern African Development Community countries, as this would assist in preventing syndicates from operating legally in one country and illegally in a neighbouring country.

The United Nations has, in the recent past, assisted the Swaziland government in preparing new legislation, but it has not been taken to Parliament or to the King for acceptance. There seems to be limited political commitment to have changes made to existing legislation or to have new legislation adopted by Parliament. In some quarters of the government it is considered that only the King (as guided by his 'traditional' advisors), has the right to decide on changes to the laws.

A number of legislative proposals are left for the King to decree. An example is the Non Bail-able Offences Act, invoked in cases involving murder, poaching, serious theft, political intolerance and the use of weapons in robberies. This particular Act has been acclaimed in certain quarters but is not popular with the judiciary; however, they are not in a position to challenge it as the King decreed the Act and he may not be challenged.

Specifically referring to the illicit trafficking in narcotics, legislation should be implemented which would allow for specialised members of the Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) to run 'controlled deliveries', as this could net a number of the syndicate operatives.

There is a recommendation for educational programmes to be aired on radio and television, explaining the negative effects of growing, dealing and trafficking in narcotics.

The Matsapha International Airport has adequate X-ray equipment available for scanning packages, luggage and parcels. However, the RSP have not been adequately trained to use this equipment, with the result that it is not being effectively used.

Neighbouring countries with specialised police, army and customs units need to co-operate more closely with their counterparts in Swaziland.

These are some of the issues that the Swazi government will have to address if it wishes to curb the increase in the trafficking of illicit goods and proceeds of crime across its territory. If the risk for organised criminal networks does not increase, Swazis will become mere onlookers to the increasingly sophisticated illicit activities within and across their borders.

Notes

- 1 Response by RSP to a survey, reported in Peter Gastrow, *Organised crime in the SADC region: Police perceptions*, ISS Monograph No 60, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2001, p 65.
- 2 By the South African Police Service (SAPS) Organised Crime Unit, the RSP and the SAPS representative to the South African High Commission in Swaziland.
- 3 It is difficult to establish whether there are one or two groups, i.e. those originating from the Chinese mainland and/or a separate group from the Republic of Taiwan. They are not very pronounced and do not seem to have much influence, though those from Taiwan have a higher profile than those from mainland China.
- 4 According to a senior police officer in the RSP's Organised Crime Unit.
- 5 See note 2 above.
- 6 BBC Monitoring Service Africa, 21 March 2000, Police Commissioner urges UN to assist in fight against drugs. The Commissioner is reported to have told Radio Swaziland on 18 March that "...the country is experiencing problems with *dagga* [cannabis] cultivation and trafficking, and the UN has not done enough to assist in curbing the problem... [the country has] a problem of marijuana cultivation, and it is a known fact that the drug is being made a cash crop".
- 7 Gastrow, *op cit*, interview with a senior South African police officer who has worked in Swaziland over many years, 8 May 2000.
- 8 Sources in the SAPS and RSP, concerning a joint SAPS/RSP operation.
- 9 These were the prices during May 2000.
- 10 Sources in the SAPS and RSP.
- 11 Gastrow, *op cit*.
- 12 *Ibid*.
- 13 SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre, Provincial crime: Specific statistics for the period January to December, 1994 to 2000, www.saps.org.za/8_crimeinfo/bulletin/942000/index.htm. 3 July 2002.