• To monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
  
  

• To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors;
  
  

• To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process;
  
  

• To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;
  
  

• To coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population.1

For the purpose of this monograph the military component of the ONUMOZ mandate is most relevant, which is directly related to disarmament, as failures in this component may represent a heavy legacy for the government of Mozambique .

During the fieldwork for the publication, most Mozambicans stated that they were happy with the results of the UN mission, and did not hesitate in mentioning the successful organization of the first democratic elections in 1994 to emphasize their point. Their acknowledgement of the support of ONUMOZ in the consolidation of peace in Mozambique was far more modest however and many remark that ONUMOZ simply tapped into an already deep commitment to peace of the Mozambican people.

“The population was the weakest party in the conflict.... Tired of the dying, the maiming, and the other deprivations of war, the people were prepared to accept anything... and the fear of going back to war led the civil population to take reconciliation measures even before the ceasefire was in place.”2

Another point of consensus was the military component of ONUMOZ, which Mozambicans did not hesitate in labelling a failure. They are not the only ones who have made this assessment.3 The fact that most UN documents on ONUMOZ include but a few paragraphs on the disarmament process, as opposed to extensive debates on other aspects of the mission, seems to indicate the dissatisfaction of the UN itself with this area of work.

In all fairness, one has to say that given the political circumstances at the time, the UN mission was confronted with tough choices, which required rapid decisions in an environment still pervaded by mutual suspicions between the two warring parties. For the sake of the ultimate goal – to bring peace to a country that had experienced conflict for over 30 years – compromises had to be made. Furthermore, some of the prevailing problems seem to have been more the doing of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) at the time than with a lack of will or capacity of the UN to solve them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when the UN withdrew in the end of 1994, the GoM inherited disgruntled armed forces, overstaffed paramilitary institutions, and the volatile combination of jobless demobilized soldiers and arms caches around the country in an economic environment offering few opportunities. Adding to this, weapons collected during the ONUMOZ period were handed over to the GoM, to arm an already over-armed army that had little capacity to manage the stockpiles under its supervision 4

The lack of an arms embargo on Mozambique during the ONUMOZ disarmament process also meant that new equipment may have been imported by both parties during that time.5 This meant that depleted arms caches could have been restocked, or relocated, with new equipment. Although there was no clear evidence that either party was importing weapons during ONUMOZ – the flow seemed to be moving out of Mozambique rather than into Mozambique – the collection of new weapons in some communities may support the claim that weapons were being imported while the ONUMOZ mission was ongoing.6

Estimates on the number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) distributed to the Mozambican population during the war are disparate and range from 1.5 to 6 million.7 This monograph does not speculate on these numbers; suffice to say that large numbers of weapons were distributed by both sides and that it is widely agreed that only a small portion of these weapons were handed over to ONUMOZ. According to one of the interviewees, currently in the armed forces, during the war soldiers and officers would receive more than one weapon. Whenever they were transferred to a new station, they would get a new weapon, or a set of weapons (e.g. one handgun and one rifle). Although they were supposed to leave the weapons received at the barracks of assignment before leaving to take up their new positions, most did not. This meant that soldiers could accumulate several unrecorded weapons. At the time of demobilization, having little trust in the future, many soldiers and officers handed over the number of weapons they wished to or only the ones that were defective.8

According to this same source, ONUMOZ collected about 200,000 SALW and handed them over to the GoM; 24,000 are recorded as destroyed.9 Although ONUMOZ showed interest in destroying a larger number of SALW, the GoM did not allow it.10 The huge gap between the number of weapons collected by ONUMOZ and the estimates of those distributed, even if the lowest ones are considered, provide a good picture of the problem left behind:

• over-equipped armed forces (the main losers in the peace process) with little capacity to manage the existing stockpiles
  

• over-staffed paramilitary institutions
  

• unrecorded arms caches from both sides, spread throughout the country
  

• an ‘army' of jobless demobilized soldiers with knowledge and access to hidden weapons
  

The need for further disarmament

If the impact of the problems afflicting both the armed forces and the paramilitary institutions were not immediately visible, the failure in collecting and destroying weapons used during the war soon became clear. As ONUMOZ was leaving the country whose security it was supposed to have guaranteed, crime rates in Mozambique, particularly in urban centres, soared. War was not a problem anymore, but the security of Mozambican citizens was again under threat. Furthermore, it was apparent that this threat was having spillover effects into neighbouring countries, mainly South Africa . Perhaps even more so than during the war, Mozambican insecurity was now taking on regional dimensions.

The crime situation

The number of reported crimes in Mozambique increased from 30,579 in 1994 to 37,396 in 1995 and 42,967 in 1996, an increase of thirteen per cent. 11 As statistics are not disaggregated, it is hard to know how many of these incidents included the use of firearms, but given the perceived reluctance of Mozambicans in reporting crime to the authorities (see chapter 4)12 one can assume that a large percentage of these numbers represent violent crime. Different formal and informal sources seem to agree that violent crime peaked around 1996/1997 and has since decreased.13 Whatever the statistics say, the perception after 1994 was that violent crime was increasing in urban centres in Mozambique, as well as along main roads, thus constraining mobility, investment, and preventing the free flow of people and goods. In 1995 the GoM acknowledged that large quantities of illegal weapons were circulating in Mozambique , and announced a master plan to address the issue. The plan allowed for special rapid reaction units to be deployed to the main roads and areas most afflicted by crime, re-established police district commands, and provided for more cooperation with police forces in neighbouring countries.14

Regional impact

As the crime situation in Mozambique was worsening, the government of South Africa faced similar problems with increases in urban crime, while simultaneously struggling with internal conflict, including the taxi wars in KwaZulu-Natal . It was also clear that both violent urban crime and conflict were being fuelled with weapons flowing from Mozambique into South Africa . Countries in Southern Africa were still debating the institutionalization of regional police cooperation and hence there was no formal umbrella for such cooperation,15 but the governments of the two countries felt they could wait no longer for a wider framework. Social stability, development and democracy in both countries were under threat. A problem had been clearly identified: illegal SALW were flowing from Mozambique into South Africa , fuelling violent crime and conflict. The source of these weapons was also known: they were hidden remnants of the Mozambican war. A rapid strategy had to be developed. It was in this context that President Mandela and President Chissano agreed on a common approach to curb the transfer of illegal SALW from Mozambique to South Africa – the destruction of arms caches in Mozambique . This cooperation programme was to be called Operation Rachel and proved to be one of the most successful initiatives of its kind.

Operation Rachel

Although South Africa and Mozambique had different motivations, they shared a common goal: the destruction of arms caches containing remnants of the war and the curbing of criminal networks between the two countries. For the South African Police Service (SAPS), this programme fell within the broader fight against violent urban crime. Mozambique 's objective was the general disarmament of the country, mainly of the rural areas.

It was this common goal that enabled both countries to combine resources and overcome national boundaries: the SAPS had the means and the resources, which could be complemented with Mozambican knowledge of the field and the legitimacy for the intervention. The natural procedure would be to combine these resources into joint operations inside Mozambique and this is what was done – teams of Mozambican and South African police went into communities in order to destroy arms caches. That by doing so these teams were overcoming decades of mistrust between the two countries is equally remarkable and serves well to illustrate the capacity and the scope for regional cooperation.

The success of Operation Rachel, which started in 1995 and is still ongoing, is unquestionable – during the nine operations undertaken by mid-2003, over 600 arms caches have been discovered and several tons of weaponry and ammunition destroyed. Prior to Rachel operations the price of an AK-47 (the weapon most used during the Mozambican conflict) in Soweto was around R100 (USD 14); today, the same weapon costs R3,000 (USD 430),16 an impressive indicator. But the success of Operation Rachel seems to go beyond the direct impact of destroying SALW.

Overcoming historical constraints

Rachel operations are based on intelligence collected in Mozambican communities, thus contributing to the establishment of confidence between citizens and the police, and among security sector institutions; the information gathered is shared by the police of both countries and interventions are planned together, thus building capacity and ties between two countries that have mistrusted each other for decades. Communities that twenty years ago would have fled at the first sight of a South African uniform now welcome the South African and Mozambican police teams, whom they perceive as partners in their plight against the presence of SALW in their communities. The contribution of such initiatives to shifts in collective mentalities should not be underestimated.

Operation Rachel established the foundations for further cooperation between the two countries. The operations are evidence that historical resentments can be overcome; that joint-operations can be a strong vehicle for capacity building; that common goals can become an important motivator; that political will is paramount to overcoming certain constraints; and that like-minded people exist across borders. Clearly Rachel-type operations can make a strong contribution towards peace building in the region.

Disarmament as a corollary

However, Operation Rachel was not designed as a disarmament initiative for Mozambique but rather as a measure to prevent and control the transfer of SALW from Mozambique into South Africa . Disarmament seems to be a by-product of this strategy, rather than the main focus. Operation Rachel was considered to be one of the tools for crime prevention in South Africa , and the operations are principally funded from the budget of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Whereas the Mozambican police wished to cover the entire territory, the SAPS were initially more interested in the southern part of the country, as arms hidden there had a higher probability of ending up in South Africa .

In the early stages of Operation Rachel the common goal of destroying arms caches brought the institutions of both countries together. Later, different motivations began to surface and impact on the design of the operations – the further north the arms caches were, the more expensive the operation became, the more time was needed, and the more difficult the logistical arrangements. Mozambique did not have either capacity or resources to proceed alone and South Africa did not wish to invest funds in initiatives with little benefit for South Africa . The South African Police Service, however, was willing to carry on building the capacity of their Mozambican counterparts and contributing staff, means and time. The problem of resources was overcome when donors started to contribute a greater portion of the budget for Operation Rachel – in 2003, for the first time since they started, Rachel was extended to all but two provinces in Mozambique : Inhambane and Sofala. Both these provinces have already been covered in previous operations – Inhambane has had seven incursions and Sofala ten, out of a total of 19 operations.

The need for national disarmament initiatives

The sustainability of South African contributions to initiatives with little impact in South Africa may eventually be questioned. The trend seems to be for South African support to decrease and for Mozambique to take more of a leading role in national disarmament initiatives. Due to the scarce resources of the Mozambican government, it is likely that such disarmament initiatives will need the support of a donor, or even several donors. A previous attempt by a donor to provide direct funding to the Ministry of Interior within the framework of Operation Rachel, thus giving Mozambican police more autonomy to plan and execute specific disarmament interventions, faced insurmountable obstacles and the funding was ultimately channelled via South Africa .

Disarmament will probably remain necessary for several more years in Mozambique , requiring an integrated strategy that goes beyond the current Rachel operations. The police in Mozambique have undertaken some interventions to ‘deactivate' arms caches. The meaning of ‘deactivation' however was not clear to the research team. According to some interviewees the material is normally destroyed by the Mozambican armed forces; according to others, it is stored and later destroyed during the next Rachel operations, as Mozambique has no resources for destruction; finally, according to others still, this equipment is stored and later will be ‘sorted out'.

The assessment of the research team was that the three different statements are probably true and that the deactivation of such arms caches by the Mozambican police happens in an ad hoc manner due to the lack of a consolidated strategy. The presence of Rachel operations may so far have masked the need for an integrated approach to disarmament but the Ministry of Interior, as the lead institution within Mozambique , may consider the need to begin to develop strategies for continued, transparent and sustainable disarmament in Mozambique .

The TAE project

Parallel to government-led disarmament initiatives like Operation Rachel, Mozambican civil society is also contributing to this effort with the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) Tools for Arms (TAE) project. This project covers currently 26 per cent of the Mozambican territory and by August 2001 it had exchanged 795,856 zinc sheets, 1,808 bycicles, 674 sewing machines, 1 tractor, 2,969 hoes, 532 ploughs, 202 doors, 402 windows, 78 kitchen utensils, 68 machettes and 600 kg of different seeds for 200,000 weapons and ammunition.17 According to the same souce the project has benefited about 26,000 families.

Although TAE was originally aimed at individual weapon owners, it was soon realized that the weapons being traded in, were, in fact, coming from arms caches rather than private owners. This raised several problems that were not foreseen in the original design of the project: the occasional transport of large quantities of SALW from the caches to the TAE warehouse; the storage and control of stored SALW; and what to do with the information gathered on arms caches.

Through these adaptations, TAE today is viewed as a complementary project to Operation Rachel rather than as an autonomous programme. TAE is informed in advance about a Rachel operation, as they need the resources brought in by the South Africans to destroy the weapons that TAE has collected. TAE workers told the research team they rely on South African capacity to destroy large quantities of weapons, as the Mozambican police have no funds enabling such destruction. This poses a significant problem as TAE often has to store and control large quantities of SALW while waiting for the next Rachel operation. Handing this equipment over to the police does not seem an acceptable solution, due to the perceived lack of capacity of the Mozambican police to manage stockpiles under their supervision.

Complementarity and risks

According to a TAE worker, the complementarity of approach between the two initiatives is re-inforced by the fact that both TAE and Operation Rachel use the same network of informants, with TAE providing Operation Rachel with information gathered in areas less accessible to, or more suspicious of the police. The inclusion of a civil society organization within the framework of a government-led initiative has so far worked very well and is commendable, but it entails a sizeable risk – a too close association between TAE and the government initiatives may raise concerns both within local communities and among donors. Communities seem to be more at ease passing sensitive information on arms caches to TAE than to the police. If they perceive too close an association between TAE and the police, this confidence may be damaged or lost. Likewise, some donors choose to fund civil society organizations if they are unable or unwilling to fund certain government agencies, and this could also be compromised.

But the close association of TAE to Operation Rachel also has a very positive side – it provides TAE with leverage when the destruction of arms caches has to be negotiated with their owners. According to TAE workers most current arms caches belong to the ‘big bosses' (sic) of the country. They stated that often they have to go to the parliament to talk to the owners of SALW still hidden in Mozambique – and try to convince them to allow the removal of those caches.

“Civic education is being done in parliament these days rather than in the communities” jokes one of the TAE staff members. “The weapons belong to the political parties. We have collected large quantities of SALW in Tete and Sofala, with permission of the owners of those caches. Currently we know of another big arms cache in northern Mozambique . This cache is being protected by three shifts of guards. We were able to convince one of the shift-teams to hand over some of the weapons. They have been doing so and SALW have been handed over to us without the other shifts knowing. This is necessarily a very slow procedure, as suspicions cannot be raised. At the same time we are trying to convince the owner to allow the destruction of the whole cache. There is another one, which is still surrounded by landmines. We are also working with some officials in order to gain access to this cache. It is in Inhambane province.”18

Project design and reality

The challenge for the TAE project is the gap between the design of the project and the reality of its implementation. While TAE interventions and incentives seem adequate for individual gun-owners, the project did not forsee dealing with arms caches. Faced with the reality of arms caches however, TAE staff have taken on the challenge and devised innovative approaches. It may be that destruction of arms caches is necessary in Mozambique in order to build the confidence of individual weapon owners to hand over their guns. If so, maybe TAE's original approach was ahead of its time. This seems plausible as now that arms caches are decreasing in the areas where TAE operates more individual owners are coming forward to exchange their weapons for tools.

TAE's work with communities on arms caches is important and should be incorporated into its project initiatives and incentives, making them relevant to the reality on the ground. TAE is in a unique position at the community level.

The signficance of arms caches

The statement by TAE workers that most arms caches are currently owned by political parties in Mozambique may shed some light on changing perceptions and should be considered when designing any disarmament strategy. This is particularly so when TAE workers also state that:

“... these owners are usually open to talk to us. The only resistance we have encountered so far has been in terms of precaution, in terms of collaboration and never outright resistance. These officers and political parties do not want to be associated to these caches, because their best political chances come when they talk about peace and not revenge”.19

In his monograph on the status of arms flows in Mozambique, Martinho Chachiua considers three sources of SALW in Mozambique: a) caches belonging to both warring parties; b) caches belonging to demobilized soldiers or soldiers still with the armed forces; and c) weapons retained by individual citizens.20

Mozambique had the first democratic elections, both for parliament and for the presidency, in 1994, two years after the signing of the GPA. The experience of the first UN-supervised Angolan elections was still too recent to be easily overlooked and as much as Mozambicans wished peace, both warring parties were still distrustful of each other. And so, they held on to their arms caches, which gave them leverage should the electoral process go wrong. As it turned out, the first Mozambican elections were a tremendous success with more than 85% voter turnout, giving the ruling party Frelimo 129 seats in parliament and 112 to Renamo. Frelimo's candidate for president, Joaquim Chissano, got 53.3% of the votes, while Renamo's candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, received 33.7%.

But confidence building is slow and the electoral process was tarnished by a day-long boycott by Renamo. In addition, at a time of emerging political stability, insecurity was rising. Crime rates were soaring and travelling on Mozambican main roads was becoming unsafe again. It is thus conceivable that in the period following the first elections, both Renamo and Frelimo would still maintain arms caches – Renamo in order to keep some political leverage, Frelimo in order to guarantee military supremacy. Given the political importance that these caches still had at the time, one can assume that the guards keeping them would be paid their salaries, thus alleviating the temptation to sell the weapons to third parties or to trade in information on their whereabouts.

Authors writing on SALW in Mozambique establish the link between the weapons being used in crime in 1994/1995 and demobilized soldiers. Vines, who worked extensively with demobilized soldiers, presents this link through interviews with Mozambican arms smugglers.21

Impact of disarmament initiatives on perceptions

Perhaps the best indicator of the success of both of these programmes – Operation Rachel and TAE – is the shifting in the perceptions of the origin of the weapons being used in crime. Whereas in 1994/1995 no one would hesitate in attributing weapons being used in crime to arms caches stocked with remnants of the war, and provision or use of those weapons by demobilized soldiers, perceptions on this issue today seem to have shifted. The general perception of the link between demobilized soldiers and crime was disputed by several people during the field work, although it still seems to prevail.

According to an official in the Ministry of Interior,

“ Arms are occasionally used to commit crime but not always. Most criminals are middle aged, demobilized soldiers and unemployed. For instance the murderer of Siba Siba22 was a former soldier with Casa Militar , trained by the Chinese. The guns used are mainly AKM and Makarov pistols – remains from the war, because some criminals are connected to people who, during the war, were assigned to arms caches. Other guns are leased from people, who own them legally or have been purchased from the people guarding an arms cache... In Maputo there are two types of crime – organized crime and petty crime for economic reasons. They tend to use the same types of guns, only some organized crime use other tactics, mainly when the criminals are former soldiers (for instance, the case of Siba Siba). – The former soldiers of Casa Militar, who guarantee security to the government, are known to organized crime bosses... Some demobilized soldiers prefer to say that they are unemployed rather than former Casa Militar. ”23

Members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with demobilized soldiers refute the perception that demobilized soldiers are more prone to crime than any other group. During the survey carried out in Chimoio, none of the respondents mentioned demobilized soldiers in connection to crime. Without going too far into this debate, it is possible that this dual perception may be linked to the existence of arms caches and to the impact of disarmament initiatives still ongoing in Mozambique . It is possible that demobilized soldiers are not more prone to crime than other groups, but given the economic hardship in which most of them live and given the access they may have had to hidden weapons it is hard to believe that some would not be tempted in selling these weapons to those looking for them, including criminal networks. This may well have been the case immediately after 1994, but as more arms caches are being destroyed this type of supply may be decreasing and thus dispelling the perceived linkages of demobilized soldiers to crime. Every dismantled arms cache is one less source of weapons, regardless of the nature of the market.

Both government officials and NGO workers have often stated that the weapons seized currently in relation to crime seem to be new and not remnants of the war. According to a community-based worker, “When we go to the communities, we are able to collect weapons that are brand new. Where do they come from? And why are they bringing them to us, instead of handing them over for destruction?”24 The obvious answer seems to be that they may not trust government institutions to manage those weapons.

One can only speculate on the origin of these new weapons: if they come from arms caches, then the suspicion of ONUMOZ that both warring parties were importing armaments at the time seems to have been substantiated. But there is another possible source of these weapons and that is the stockpiles under government supervision. This seems to be the most common perception these days in Mozambique – that crime is being committed with weapons sold or rented out to criminals by policemen or soldiers. The survey carried out in Chimoio seems to confirm this general perception.

In his address to parliament in February 2003, the Attorney General of Mozambique substantiates this perception by specifically mentioning what he considers to be two types of military crimes currently being committed in Mozambique : 1) the theft of military equipment for sale, and 2) the lending or renting of war armament to criminals:

“... However, one has to admit there are military crimes that did not disappear with the end of the war. Some examples are:

• -Situations such as the one in Beira where, due to manifest irresponsibility some officers used war armaments against the police, attacking a police station;
  
  

• -the theft of military equipment and subsequent sale of this equipment;
  
  

• -the lending or the renting of armament to criminals for their criminal activities;
  
  

• -the failure of those chosen for the Mandatory Military Service in reporting for service and other infractions not directly related to a war situation but which should be prevented with special measures”25

This problem serves to highlight the need to address the wider security sector in Mozambique , as part of any strategy aiming the prevention and control of SALW and the curbing of crime in the region. Ten years after the GPA it seems timely for both the GoM and donors to look into this sector with the aim of its integration into the broader objectives of development and poverty erradication.

The issue of the ‘new weapons' being found, as mentioned by several of the interviewees remained unclear for the research team. People connected both to Operation Rachel and to the TAE project mentioned often that some weapons in caches seem to have never been used and also that most of the equipment is in good working condition. Some of the NGO workers were quite adamant that such ‘new' weapons could not have been in caches, but were not able to substantiate their statements.

This case seems to be a good example to illustrate the need for a marking system for the weapons being used by the police and military in Mozambique . In the absence of such marking, speculation on the origin of weapons being used in crime will be difficult to curb. It is in the interest of the GoM to implement such markings, thus enabling a more accurate picture of the relationship between legal and ilegal weapon owners in Mozambique

Notes

1. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozM.htm> (April 2003).
   
   

2. M Chachiua & M Malan, “Anomalies and acquiescence: the Mozambican peace process revisited”, African Security Revue 7 (4), 1998, <http://www.issafrica.org /Pubs/ASR/7No4/Anomalies/html> (October 2003).
   
   

3. In an email from a NYU student to Ambassador Kamal dated November 6, 2000 on ONUMOZ, the mission is considered as having had three failures: disarmament, the re-integration of former combatants, and few weapons destroyed. Document available at <http://www.geocities.com/decharles24/assignement7 .html> (April 2003).
   
   

4. A Vines, “The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique ”, Basic Papers, April 1998, Number 25, 1998, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/ Papers/BP25.htm> (June 2003). It is not clear where Vines got the data enabling him to make such a statement but if the FADM were not overarmed before ONUMOZ, they surely became overarmed after ONUMOZ. In 1994 when ONUMOZ left, the army had a total of about 12,000 soldiers and officers and ONUMOZ handed over around 200,000 SALW to this force.
   
   

5. BASIC, Africa: the challenge of light weapons destruction during peacekeeping missions, Basic Papers, December 1997, Number 23, <http://www.basicint.org/ pubs/Papers/BP23.htm> (October 2003).
   
   

6. Personal interview with NGO worker in May 2003. The same statement was made by civil society representatives during the workshop in September.
   
   

7. Vines, op.cit.
   
   

8. Personal interview in August 2003.
   
   

9. This number seems to be in agreement with quantities cited by M Chachiua, “ The status of arms flows in Mozambique ”, ISS, Monograph 34, 1999, <http://www. issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No34/TheStatus.html> (October 2003).
   
   

10. A Vines, op.cit.
    
    
    

11. M Chachiua, “Internal security in Mozambique : Concerns versus policies”, African Security Review 9 (1), 2000, <http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/9No1/ %20Security Mozambique.html>, (October 2003).
    
    

12. This reluctance in reporting crime has been noted by most authors writing on criminal issues in Mozambique .
    
    

13. Personal interviews with both government officials and citizens during the field research.
    
    

14. A Vines, op.cit.
    
    

15. N Stott, Learning from practice: Weapons collection in Southern Africa , an assessment of Operation Rachel, Institute for Security Studies, forthcoming.
    
    

16. 16. N Stott, op.cit.
    
    

17. Greeting Speech by the Secretary General of the CCM, Rev. Lucas Amosse, during the National Conference on the Proliferation of Illicit SALW, Maputo , August 29-31, 2001 . Available at <http://www.armas.tropical.co.mz/(docs)sgccm.htm>. The figure of 200,000 weapons includes ammunition. A more recent, still unpublished, BICC evaluation of the project states that TAE has collected more than 7,000 firearms and more than 200,000 rounds of ammunition since the beginning of the project.
    
    

18. Personal interview in July 2003.
    
    

19. Personal interview in June 2003.
    
    

20. M Chachiua, “ The status of arms flows in Mozambique ”,op.cit.
    
    

21. A Vines, op.cit.
    
    

22. Siba Siba Macuácua was a young Mozambican economist auditing the accounts of Bank Austral, whose funds were apparently depleted by corruption in the higher ranks of the Frelimo party. Carlos Cardoso was investigating a similar case in another bank, the BCM, at the time of his death. Siba Siba “fell” from the 7 th floor of the building and his death was firstly attibuted to accident or suicide. Later a demobilized soldier was arrested as his murderer. His family is currently seeking to bring Siba Siba's murder to justice.
    
    

23. Personal interview in April 2003.
    
    

24. Personal interview with a peace promoter working with a Mozambican NGO.
    
    

25. Speech by the Attorney General – Dr. Joaquim Madeira – to the Parliament on Feb.20, 2003. Available at <http://www.govmoz.gov.mz/>.