



2010
MAKE PEACE HAPPEN

www.makepeacehappen.net

No. 14, September 2010

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Early Warning Issues for September	1	AU Post-Summit Analysis	14
Regional Security Analysis:		Country Analysis: Rwanda	16
Al Shabaab's rise as a regional and international security threat	2	Year of Peace and Security: The AU Advisory Council and Peace Ambassadors	21
PSC Retrospective – PSC and International Criminal Court (ICC)	9	Important Forthcoming Dates	23
Country Analysis: Burundi	11		

This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies. It is also available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org. All documents referred to in this Report can also be found on the ISS website.

Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early Warning Issues for September

The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of September is Equatorial Guinea. In the absence of a country's representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month.

Al Shabaab's rise as a regional and international security threat

The 7/11 bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala, targeting innocent civilians, has drawn conspicuous attention to the protracted conflict in Somalia. The tragic event highlighted the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and its expansion into the countries of the region. It is a clear signal that Al Shabaab is capable of and has begun taking its terrorist attacks beyond the borders of Somalia

into the Horn of Africa and Eastern African regions and beyond. With this, Al Shabaab marked yet another stage in its evolution from a mainly nationalist insurgency movement into a truly global jihadist group.

Burundi

The 24 May Communal elections were generally peaceful and witnessed the remarkably well-coordinated and active involvement of local civil society. However, during the announcement of the provisional results of these elections, various opposition parties, including the FNL and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), announced their rejection of the results, which pointed to a landslide victory for the incumbent ruling party. The prospect for the consolidation of peace and stability in Burundi very much depends on the course of action that the various opposition parties that remain outside the process choose to take to address their respective concerns.

Rwanda

The 9 August polling day was praised by most observers as generally peaceful and stable throughout the country. Specifically, the report of the AU observer mission declared that the electoral process in Rwanda was free and fair. Nevertheless, the election process, the atmosphere in which elections took place, and the eventual outcome of the elections, were criticised and contested by many of Kagame's opponents. Giving credence to these allegations, the months prior to the elections witnessed a series of attacks, including killings and arrests, on outspoken journalists and opposition figures.

Livingstone Formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – **PSC/PR/(CLX)**, 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

Al Shabaab's rise as a regional and international security threat

The 7/11 bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala, targeting innocent civilians, has drawn conspicuous attention to the protracted conflict in Somalia. The tragic event highlighted the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and its expansion into the countries of the region. It is a clear signal that Al Shabaab is capable of and has begun taking its terrorist attacks beyond the borders of Somalia into the Horn of Africa and Eastern African regions and beyond.

This vicious act of violence and the bigger threat that it represents, both to Somalia and the region, has prompted regional, continental and international condemnation. More importantly, it also provoked high-level discussions on the best possible measures that the AU and the sub-regional body IGAD may take in collaboration with members of the international community.

In a press statement issued on 12 July 2010, the AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, condemned the terrorist attacks in Kampala in the strongest terms. He also said that the tragic incident would give impetus to reinforce international coordination to counter terrorism and reinforce the collective resolve of African states against acts of terrorism. In a decision taken at the 15th Ordinary Summit, **Assembly/AU/Dec. 294 (XV). 2**, the AU Assembly similarly condemned 'the despicable terrorist attacks claimed by Al Shabaab, that were committed in Kampala, on 11 July 2010, against innocent civilians.' While calling on AU member states and the entire international community to isolate and take all necessary measures against individuals, entities and states engaged in terrorist acts, the Assembly considered such

actions as threats, not only to the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, but also to regional peace and international security.

Previously, in its communiqué of 18 February 2009, **PSC/PR/BR (CLXX)**, the PSC noted, albeit without naming Al Shabaab, that the acts of violence in Somalia 'undermine the peace process and stability in the region as a whole'.

Crisis escalation potential

On Sunday evening the 11th of July 2010, many people were gathered in the Ethiopian Village Restaurant and Kayandodo Rugby Club in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, to watch the concluding 2010 World Cup Match between Spain and the Netherlands. Minutes before the end of the match, three bombs exploded at the two venues. The first bomb detonated at the Ethiopian Restaurant among a crowd of Ugandans, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Europeans and Americans and the other two exploded at the Rugby club.

The picture that emerged was a disturbing scene of young civilians, killed while sitting peacefully in white plastic chairs to watch a sporting event, some with their bodies torn apart and others with their drinks still on their laps. In this deadliest attack in the history of Al Shabaab and the first such attack it had engineered outside Somalia, 76 innocent civilians lost their lives and many more suffered injuries, some of them life-changing.

Somalia's extremist group, Al Shabaab, which is fighting against the TFG and the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, claimed responsibility for the attacks. In a statement to reporters in Mogadishu, Al Shabaab's spokesperson, Ali Mohamoud Rage, declared that: 'We (Al Shabaab) are behind the attack because we are at war with them.' According to Rage, this was a retaliatory attack against Uganda, which is the major troop-

contributing country for the AU AMISOM. Accordingly, he warned that 'if they (Uganda and Burundi) do not take out their AMISOM troops from Somalia, (similar) blasts will continue.'

This act of terror came after repeated threats of an attack or attacks against the two countries. One week before the attack, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali, the spiritual leader and main spokesperson of Al Shabaab, called for attacks against Uganda and Burundi. Before the Sheikh's statement, Al Shabaab's media arm, al Kataib, Al Shabaab released an English-language video, directing '(the) Mujahideen to make the Ugandans their priority (for attacks)'.

The 7/11 bombings in Kampala showed Al Shabaab has the ability to launch a deadly attack, not only against countries contributing soldiers and military equipment to AMISOM but also the countries of the region, and indeed illustrated the susceptibility of these countries to such attacks. In future, Al Shabaab may employ a variety of tactics to mount its attacks in the region. First, it has the potential to radicalise Muslims, particularly Somalis, by exploiting their grievances and using them to launch further attacks in the region. It is also possible that the group may use desperate dissident groups or vulnerable individuals to perpetrate more attacks. One cannot also dismiss the possibility that Al Shabaab could send suicide bombers to the countries in the region.

Al Shabaab has since been expanding its jihadist campaign against the TFG and AMISOM and has called on businesses in Mogadishu, Afgooye and Baidoa to make huge financial and military contributions. Since the 7/11 bombings it has also intensified the fighting in Somalia. It was reported that 52 people died and 129 others were injured in the fighting that took place to the north of Mogadishu a week after the bombings.

>>page 3

On 24 August 2010, Al Shabaab carried out a deadly attack in the Capital, Mogadishu, against the TFG. Its fighters, disguised as government security forces, walked into the Huna Hotel in Mogadishu's Hamarweyne district and shot on people in the Hotel indiscriminately before they detonated suicide bombs blowing themselves up and the hotel. In the attacks, some 40 people lost their lives, including six members of the Somali Parliament and five TFG soldiers. The fact that Al Shabaab is able to execute such deadly attacks in an area generally considered to be safe and under the control of TFG is indicative of the laxity of the TFG and AMISOM security system. A day before this incident, Al Shabaab declared it would launch new attacks against the TFG and AMISOM. Acting on its threat, Al Shabaab conducted an offensive against the TFG for more than four consecutive days triggering further civilian deaths and displacement. On 30 August 2010, a mortar that Al Shabaab launched against the presidential palace killed four AMISOM soldiers from Uganda.

The regional dimension of Al Shabaab's fighting also seems to be intensifying. On the border with Kenya, Al Shabaab not only deployed additional fighters but also called the local population to embark on a jihad against Kenya. Unlike previous skirmishes, on 20 July 2010 significant fighting took place between Kenyan security forces and Al Shabaab forces following a gun-fight that wounded a Kenyan officer. Highlighting the increased vulnerability of the TFG and AMISOM forces, Ethiopia reportedly reinforced its military presence on the border with Somalia and some of its troops even crossed into Somalia in late August as Al Shabaab intensified its offensive against the TFG for a number of days.

Al Shabaab has the capability of acting on its threats. Consequently, there is high potential for the crisis to escalate, both within Somalia and in the region as a whole.

This risk is heightened due to the terror networks that Al-Shabaab has established and the effective radicalisation campaign that the organisation is executing in order to galvanise support among Somalis in the diaspora and within extremist groups.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Although the origin of Al Shabaab can be traced to the 1970s when militant Islamist groups emerged in opposition to Siad Barre's brutality against religious leaders in Somalia, its immediate emergence is associated with the rise to political prominence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006. When the ICU defeated US backed warlords in June 2006 and established its rule in southern and central Somalia in the following months, Al Shabaab served as the military wing of the ICU. It was in the aftermath of the defeat of the ICU by the TFG and Ethiopian forces in early 2007, in the course of the insurgency, that Al Shabaab emerged as a force distinct from the ICU. While the ICU leadership fled Somalia, Al Shabaab launched an insurgency against the TFG and Ethiopian troops and assumed the role of leading 'the struggle' to free Somalia from what it called 'occupying forces'.

From the first quarter of 2008, Al Shabaab's insurgency started to show results in dislodging the TFG from territories such as the Hiran, Middle and Lower Juba, Shebelle and Bay regions. On 22 August 2008, Al Shabaab took control of the strategic port city of Kismayo. In September 2008, consolidating their control, Al Shabaab forces established a Sharia-based administration in the Lower Juba region. In November 2008, Al Shabaab forces pushed further from Kismayo and captured Merka, which they used as a base to launch attacks on Mogadishu. In late November, Al Shabaab forces were in control of most strategic towns in Lower Shebelle and those suburbs in north-eastern Mogadishu.

When the Ethiopian troops left Somalia in early 2009, Al Shabaab expanded its territorial control to include Baidoa, where the TFG parliament was based and Jowhar, which was one of the TFG's strongholds. In 2009, Al Shabaab emerged as the strongest armed military group in Somalia and assumed control over much of southern and central Somalia and much of the capital, Mogadishu, including key locations such as the northern and north-eastern parts of the city, the main stadium, and Mogadishu's major market, the Bakara market.

Al Shabaab has deployed two ideologies as a basis for its legitimacy and for mobilising support for its armed rebellion. The first is Somali nationalism. The intervention of Ethiopian troops in Somalia triggered a wave of radical nationalist sentiment among Somalis. Al Shabaab appropriated the nationalist agenda to galvanise public support for its insurgent operations and advance its extremist agenda in Somalia and beyond.

The second ideology is political Islam. Al Shabaab claims to be a defendant and champion of genuine Islam and has advanced political Islam as the most viable alternative for establishing order and stability in Somalia. Accordingly, in the regions under its control, Al Shabaab introduced a strict version of Sharia associated with Salafi-wahhabism and a form of governance akin to that practiced by the Taliban. It prohibited various activities including movies, the watching of football, chewing of Khat, certain styles of dressing and so on. These prohibitions and other Sharia-based rules are enforced using draconian punishments including public floggings, head shavings, amputation and even stoning 'transgressors' to death.

Al Shabaab's tendency to enforce religious homogeneity in Somalia also displayed intolerance of, and

>>page 4

violence against, Sufism, Somalia's most dominant form of Sunni Islam that involves the establishment of religious sites for saints and revered religious leaders and the holding of periodic rituals. In 2008, Al Shabaab began a campaign of demolishing Sufi shrines and tombs of holy men as well as executing Sufi clerics in Kismayo, and since then it has expanded this campaign to other areas, including Mogadishu.

In early 2009, the twin developments of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the election of Sheikh Sharief Sheikh Ahmed, the leader of ICU in 2006, as the new president of the newly expanded TFG, dealt a serious blow to Al Shabaab's sources of legitimacy. With the Ethiopian troops gone, Al Shabaab lost the major target that inspired Somali nationalism, the source of its public support. When President Sharief introduced Sharia law, it presented further challenges to Al Shabaab's Islamic ideology and to the cohesion of the group.

In response Al Shabaab shifted its target to the TFG and its leadership as well as the AMISOM forces mandated to protect strategic locations and TFG institutions. It designated the TFG leadership as a puppet of western powers and their allies and AMISOM as an occupying force. Al Shabaab also discredited President Sharif's Islamic credentials and religious commitment, labelling him an 'apostate'.

The group also became more radicalised by entrenching its ultraconservative interpretation of Sharia and assuming a more global jihadist orientation. As it emerged, Al Shabaab's medium term political objective was to defeat the TFG and AMISOM forces and establish an Islamic state as a foundation for eventually establishing a single Islamic Caliphate. The rise of foreign fighters within the ranks of Al Shabaab and the subsequent assumption by foreign jihadists of key leadership roles further exacerbated Al Shabaab's

radicalisation and its global-jihadist tendencies. In the course of this process not only did Al Shabaab declare its ideological affinity with the global terrorist organisation, al-Qaeda, but it also moved to establish stronger links with the latter. Expanding on its rhetoric of links with international terrorism networks, Al Shabaab announced in February this year that it was forming an alliance with al-Qaeda.

This also affected the nature of Al Shabaab's insurgency and the means and method of warfare that it employs. Al Shabaab is responsible for the introduction of terror tactics to the conflict in Somalia, more particularly suicide and car bombings, acts that are frowned upon in Somali culture. Since the five suicide bombings in Northern Somalia in October 2008, the use of suicide bombers by Al Shabaab has increased. On 22 February 2009, Al Shabaab suicide bombers detonated bombs inside a Burundi contingent camp followed by mortar attacks. The incident claimed the lives of eleven AMISOM troops and injured fifteen others. In the deadliest suicide attacks against AMISOM thus far, on 17 September 2009, Al Shabaab used a UN vehicle to enter an AMISOM base in Mogadishu and killed seventeen AMISOM troops, including the deputy force commander and wounded twenty-nine others.

Mortar attacks and artillery shells have become most common as well as the use of anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) against armoured vehicles. Al Shabaab forces are also increasingly using sniper fire and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), reminiscent of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The 7/11 bombings in Kampala denoted another stage in the evolution of Al Shabaab from a mainly nationalist insurgency movement into a global jihadist group.

Al Shabaab, like Al Qaeda, is not a monolithic entity. It is rather a

patchwork of factions that control various parts of Somalia but operate under the Al Shabaab banner. Its forces include various elements such as opportunist fighters attracted by financial rewards, Somali nationalists, Islamic groups and global jihadists. Although it has increasingly become more organised and centralised, particularly since 2009, the exact number of Al Shabaab troops is unknown. The 2010 UN Monitoring Group Report estimated that Al Shabaab comprised no more than 2500 hardcore fighters and a large number of local armed militias affiliated to it. Apart from its force size, Al Shabaab's military capability includes assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, P-10 recoilless rifles, and light anti-aircraft weapons adapted for ground combat. The group also has a special operations unit consisting of an explosives brigade that sets up IED traps and an assassination brigade. The group also operates various training camps, including training for potential suicide-bombers.

The increased boldness of Al Shabaab in the course of 2009 and 2010, while the international community was watching, the intensification of its fighting against the TFG and AMISOM forces and notably the 7/11 bombings in Kampala, suggest that Al Shabaab is becoming more like Al Qaeda and that its force strength has increased and its reach has expanded. Al Shabaab has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters including veteran insurgents from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Initially, Al Shabaab benefited from significant public support for resisting Ethiopian troops and received support from Eritrea. Al Shabaab is also believed to receive support from the Middle East. Early in January 2010, the Somali Defense Minister, Sheikh Yusuf Mohammad Siad, reported that two boats originating from Yemen, carrying

>>page 5

military logistics equipment, light weapons, Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition, and hand grenades, had docked in the port of Kismayo, which Al Shabaab controls.

To sustain its fighting and consolidate its control over the territories under its administration, Al Shabaab recruits new fighters, both from within and from outside Somalia. Within Somalia, it uses a combination of financial rewards and intimidation to induce new fighters to join its ranks. The group also relies on the implementation of strict Sharia rules and the provision of community services as well as Somali nationalist and Islamic rhetoric. It uses local radio stations, newspapers and religious occasions to reach out to the public for the purpose of winning and maintaining public support.

One of the most significant support bases for Al Shabaab is the Somali Diaspora. It is estimated that two to three million Somalis live abroad, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, the UK, the US, Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. Al Shabaab penetrated the Somali Diaspora not only to raise funds but also to lure young ethnic Somalis from foreign countries to join its ranks. As the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported, over the course of 2008 and 2009 many young Somali men and women continue to be induced to join the rank and file of Al Shabaab. The group has deployed an effective media strategy, aggressively using the internet, CDs and video tapes. It has also used various Somali youth associations, Mosques and Somali religious leaders to indoctrinate young Somalis in the West and facilitate their travel to join its forces. Al Shabaab has also managed to attract non-Somali foreign fighters, not only from the Middle East and Asia but also from the West, including the United States.

They fund their operations through a variety of means. They collect taxes on imports from the

port in Kismayo, at roadblocks in the territories they control, and from businesses and NGOs distributing aid, as reported by the UN Sanctions Committee. They also divert aid from organisations such as the FAO. In addition, Al Shabaab benefits from remittances that the Somali Diaspora sends to the country. Funds are also raised directly from its supporters in the Diaspora and from foreign organizations with which it has close links.

Al Shabaab's control of Somali air space and some of the most important sea-ports as well as Somalia's porous borders with neighboring countries, facilitates all these activities and serves to ensure access to key supply routes.

The military strength and the public relations campaign of Al Shabaab, in many ways, stand in contrast to that of the TFG. The TFG not only commands an inadequate number of troops but its security forces are also not well equipped, well trained or well organised. According to the report of the UN Monitoring Group, the Somali security sector also suffers from a lack of proper organisation and has an inadequate chain of command. This is further compounded by a lack of the means and administrative capacity for sustaining newly recruited TFG forces. For its survival, the TFG continues to depend on the assistance that it receives from AMISOM.

TFG's public relations campaign and outreach strategy to mobilise support from Somalis within and outside Somalia has also not been sufficiently aggressive to be able to successfully counter Al Shabaab's message. With the early 2009 optimism long gone, TFG has not been able to transform itself into an all inclusive and cohesive government. The progress made to achieve reconciliation has been very modest. The much-publicised agreement signed with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) has

encountered serious challenges of implementation.

Many of the institutions of the TFG, including the Parliament, are barely functioning and hardly institutionalised. The current TFG also seems to have inherited all the disorders and failings of its predecessor. It lacks legitimacy and it also suffers from in-fighting and the leadership crisis that bedevilled Abdulahi Yusuf's tenure and his eventual departure. On 17 May 2010, a power struggle with the Prime Minister led to the resignation of the Speaker of Parliament. Although this prompted President Sheikh Sharief Ahmed to announce the dismissal of Prime Minister Sharmarke, who refused to resign, the president later withdrew his decision. In June 2010, four ministers resigned from Sharif's government, protesting against the election, on 28 May 2010, of former finance minister Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, as speaker of parliament.

These weaknesses and failures and the staunch defence that AMISOM provided for the TFG have doubtlessly given Al Shabaab the space and the motivation to plan and launch its first foreign attack against Uganda, the major troop-contributing country to AMISOM. Uganda also hosts the EU Training Mission that is responsible for training TFG security forces. The 7/11 bombings in Kampala are a clear signal by Al Shabaab to the countries in the region. The event brought into sharp relief the question of whether the threat posed by Al Shabaab has been treated with the seriousness it deserves. The bombings also exposed the limits of the largely military-oriented approach of the international community, involving military support to the TFG and attempts to weaken Al Shabaab.

>>page 6

Geo-political Dynamics

In the context of the 7/11 bombings, the conflict in Somalia dominated the agenda of the 15th ordinary session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Although the call of IGAD member states, led by Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, for a sweeping action against the terrorists, did not succeed, it was agreed that additional troops would be deployed and AMISOM would receive further support to enhance its capabilities. The pay rise for AMISOM troops, long advocated by the Force Commander, also received support with the announcement by Jean Ping and the SRSG Ambassador Mahiga, that the remuneration for AMISOM troops would be increased to the same levels as UN missions.

In its decision, **Assembly/AU/Dec. 294 (XV). 2**, the Assembly approved the IGAD 'initiative to enable AMISOM to achieve its mandated force strength of 8100 troops (and) mandated the AU Commission to initiate planning for the new phases of the deployment of AMISOM.' Acting on the request of IGAD, the Assembly also requested the AU Chairperson to appoint a high level personality to galvanise international support for, and focus attention on, Somalia and motivate the engagement of the Somali population in the processes of governance.

AU member states showed strong support for expanding AMISOM. Other than IGAD member states, Guinea also pledged to contribute troops to AMISOM. Some issues are still outstanding and the AU has indicated an interest in lifting the mandated force strength of AMISOM from its current 8100 troops and permitting countries bordering Somalia to contribute troops to AMISOM. One important challenge in this regard is the danger that such changes would further compromise the standing of AMISOM as a peacekeeping force.

IGAD has been at the forefront of efforts to resolve the conflict in Somalia, not least because member countries are directly affected by the conflict. On 5 July 2010, IGAD held the 15th extra-ordinary session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to consider the political and security situation in Somalia. In the communiqué issued at the end of the session, the IGAD Assembly expressed its serious concerns over the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and the escalating danger to Somalia and the sub-Region. The IGAD Assembly also decided to deploy the additional 2000 troops necessary to bring AMISOM to its mandated force size and to this end called on the AU to mobilise the necessary resources, logistics and equipment for the required deployment.

There is no doubt that reinforcing AMISOM has the potential of allowing it to expand its areas of operation and thereby create enhanced chances for stabilising wider areas of Somalia. As past experiences in Somalia repeatedly showed, a military approach, alone, is inadequate and usually counter productive. It cannot and should not be the primary approach. Military actions will only succeed in concert with efforts in national reconciliation, in the provision of basic services, in dealing with the humanitarian crisis, in building effective institutions and in reversing the radicalisation campaign of Al Shabaab and ultimately in neutralizing the radical terrorist elements within Al Shabaab.

The anticipated reinforcement of AMISOM with new troops and new rules of engagement, that allow for pre-emptive attacks, present serious dangers. Such approaches may deepen the perception that AMISOM is an occupying force and hence provoke resentment of the mission among Somalis. Along with increasing the number of AMISOM troops, there is a need to enhance its outreach and public image as well

as its ability to reduce the amount of collateral damage that its counter attacks against Al Shabaab have reportedly inflicted upon civilians. This is very critical. While AMISOM may use force pre-emptively, great care should be taken to secure the confidence of the local populace by maintaining an approach that is respectful of civilians and their property. Any force that intimidates the public may ultimately push the public further into the hands of Al Shabaab. Without the support of the Somali public, AMISOM is unlikely to succeed in defeating Al Shabaab forces, regardless of AMISOM's changed tactics or increased numbers. Reducing civilian casualties should therefore be a critical objective of AMISOM.

UN Dynamics

In a press statement it issued about the Kampala bombings on 12 July 2010, **SC/9980**, the UN Security Council condemned the attacks in the strongest terms and called on all states to assist in efforts to bring all the perpetrators of the attacks to justice. The Council also reiterated its determination to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the UN. Similarly, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, condemned what he called 'vicious' bombings and expressed his hopes that the perpetrators of the act would be brought to justice.

Another recent development with the potential to have a positive impact on developments in Somalia is the appointment of Ambassador Augustin Mahiga as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN. Since he assumed his responsibilities in late June, he has been active in drawing attention to the deteriorating security situation. Most importantly, he initiated a more determined discussion to relocate his office, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), from Nairobi to Mogadishu. This will have an important impact in terms

>>page 7

of enabling the TFG to achieve cohesion and in its collaboration with the operations of AMISOM.

When discussion on the expansion of the mandate of AMISOM arose during the 15th summit of the AU Assembly, Ambassador Mahiga was among those who argued that the current mandate of AMISOM was broad enough to allow AMISOM to undertake what was required. It was reported that the understanding that emerged was that new rules of engagement could be formulated in a way to allow AMISOM to take pre-emptive attacks against the insurgents where it received credible information that Al Shabaab was preparing to launch an attack. Ambassador Mahiga supported the decision to reinforce AMISOM with the deployment of additional forces. He expressed the view that the UN would provide logistical support and other requirements for putting additional troops on the ground.

It is yet to be seen whether or not the UNSC will respond to the call for increasing the current mandated size of AMISOM and for mandating the deployment of a UN mission that can take over from AMISOM.

Wider International Community Dynamics

The US has a strong interest in the conflict in Somalia. In April 2010, President Obama issued an Executive Order that imposed sanctions against Somali rebel groups and their supporters.. The Executive Order called for the freezing of the US-based financial assets of Somali insurgents, pirates and their supporters. In the aftermath of the 7/11 bombings, the US extended support to Uganda for the investigation of the bombings and sent FBI agents to Kampala. On 5 August 2010, the US Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced in a press conference that 14 people including a number of US citizens had been arrested for seeking to join or provide aid to Al Shabaab. According to Eric Holder, the

indictments would ‘shed further light on a deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters’ to Al Shabaab.

In the discussion on the call for expanding AMISOM’s mandate, the US was at the forefront of those who rejected any expansion of the existing mandate. The US nevertheless expressed its support for the decision to deploy further troops to AMISOM. The US also provides military support to the TFG. Since May 2009, it has supplied the TFG with at least 80 tons of arms, mostly small arms and ammunition.

The EU and the UK also expressed their support for additional troop deployment. The EU is currently running a mission in Uganda with a mandate to train Somali security forces. The Mission, composed of 140 military trainers, is set to train a total of 2000 recruits in a period of one year. The EU also provides funding for AMISOM. In the context of the discussion on pay rises for AMISOM troops, the EU indicated that it has the funding required to increase the pay of AU soldiers to the same level as UN troops. The EU also pledged to provide airlift support for the deployment of additional troops. Additionally, on 28 July the EU announced it would contribute 35 million Euros for humanitarian aid projects in Somalia. On the issue of raising the current limit on the mandated force size of AMISOM, the UK also reportedly expressed support in this regard.

Despite the attention the 7/11 bombings drew to the conflict in Somalia, from the international community, it is clear that this increased attention has not gone far enough to lead to substantive changes in the approach of the international community toward the conflict. There has thus been no debate at all about the possibility of replacing AMISOM with a more robust UN force.

Scenario Planning

In the context of the above developments, the following scenarios could unfold.

Scenario 1:

Al Shabaab is expected to intensify its fighting against the TFG and AMISOM. It will thus launch attacks not only to further weaken the TFG and AMISOM but also in an effort to win additional territory from the TFG and possibly overwhelm it before the arrival of AMISOM’s additional troop reinforcements.

Scenario 2:

In response to the recent decision to send additional troops to Somalia, Al Shabaab may expand its campaign to depict AMISOM as an occupying force and a tool for anti-Somali forces. This would be an attempt to awaken resentment of the mission among Somalis at home and within the Diaspora. Al Shabaab may also decide to urge Somalis and foreign jihadists to join its insurgency and to launch further attacks against countries in the region.

Scenario 3:

As the targets of the 7/11 bombings were innocent civilians rather than soldiers or government installations, the division within Al Shabaab and the opposition against it, most notably from the moderate Sufi group, Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASJW), which signed a power sharing agreement with the TFG in March 2010, may substantially expand. The domination of Al Shabaab’s command by foreign jihadists and Al Shabaab’s increasingly radical tendencies, involving indiscriminate attacks against innocent Somali civilians, may also lead to rising dissent within the group and attract further public opposition.

>>page 8

Early Response Options

In the light of the above potential scenarios the following options or combination of them are conceivable for early response:

Option 1:

The PSC could call for the speedy deployment of the additional AMISOM troops to Somalia and could request AU partners to support the AU Commission in its efforts to facilitate the deployment. Alongside this, the PSC could also decide that AMISOM should develop and implement a robust and effective public relations and outreach campaign for which AMISOM Headquarters would need to move from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

Option 2:

The PSC could lift the cap on the AMISOM force level and request the UNSC to approve an increase of the mandated troop level of AMISOM. In tandem with this approach, the PSC could call on AU member states to contribute additional troops and resources and could request the Commission to approach potential troop-contributing countries and countries with air and naval capabilities and develop a strategy to encourage those countries to make their troops and resources available.

Option 3:

In collaboration with other actors, the Council could also call on AMISOM to play a more active role in supporting TFG reconciliation efforts for winning the support of the public as well as providing much needed services in this regard. The PSC may also call for the full implementation of the agreement between the TFG and ASWJ and identify required support for achieving this end.

Option 4:

The PSC could also repeat its call to the UN Security Council for the imposition of an air and sea blockade in order to disrupt Al Shabaab's use of Somalia's air space and sea-ports for its supplies. While raising the mandated force level of AMISOM, the PSC could also expand the mandate of AMISOM to include the protection of civilians and play a more active role in reaching out to the public in terms of civilian security and support against Al Shabaab.

Documentation:

Relevant AU Documents

Assembly/AU/Dec. 294 (XV) 2. Decision of the 15th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa,

AU Commission Press Release of 12 July 2010 on the Kampala Bombings

AU Commission Press Statement of 15 March 2010 on the Signing of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement Between Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ)

PSC/PR/BR.(CCXVII) (25 February 2010) Press Statement of the 217th Meeting of the PSC

PSC/PR/Comm(CCXIV) (8 January 2010) Communiqué of the 214th Meeting of the PSC

PSC/PR/2 (CCXIV) (8 January 2010) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia

Statement of the Consultative Meeting of the African Union Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AMISOM and International Partners on Somalia, Addis Ababa, 2 November 2009.

PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CLXXIX) (15 June 2009) Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Situation in Somalia

PSC/PR/Comm.(CXC) (22 May 2009) Communiqué of the PSC on the outcome of the Thirty-third Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on Somalia

PSC/PR/2(CLXXVII) (11 March 2009) Report of the Chairperson on the situation in Somalia

PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXVII) (11 March 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Somalia

PSC/PR/BR(CLXVII) (21 January 2009) Statement on the situation in Somalia

PSC/MIN/4(CLXIII) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia

PSC/MIN/Comm.4 (CLXIII) (22 December 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Somalia

REC Documents:

Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (5 July 2010) Communiqué of the 15th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Communiqué of the thirty-third

>>page 9

Extra-Ordinary Session (Extra-ordinary No.3) of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the Security and Political Situation in the Sub-region, in particular Somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 10th July 2009.

UN Documents

SC/9980, (12 July 2010) Security Council Press Statement on the Kampala Bombings

SC/Res/1916 (19 March 2010) Resolution on the Report of the Sanctions Committee

S/2010/91 (10 March 2010) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)

SC/Res/1910 (14 January 2010) Resolution on AMISOM

SC/Res 1907 (23 December 2009) Resolution Imposing Sanctions on Eritrea

S/2009/503 (2 October 2009) Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1872 (2009)

S/RES/1872 (26 May 2009) Renewed authorization of AMISOM until 31 January 2010

S/PRST/2009 (15 May 2009) Presidential Statement condemning the renewed fighting by Al-Shabaab and other extremists

S/2009/210 (16 April 2009) Secretary-General's Report requested by resolution 1863 on a possible UN peacekeeping deployment in Somalia

S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) Renewed authorisation of AMISOM for six months to June 2009

Useful Additional Resources:

Paula Roque, 'Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab', Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 3 June 2009.

Solomon Dersso, 'The Somalia Conflict Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Efforts', ISS Paper 198, September 2009.

PSC Retrospective – The PSC and the ICC

Since the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, indicted Sudanese President Omar Hassan El-Bashir for ICC crimes, disagreement has emerged, particularly between the AU and the Peace and Security Council on the one hand and the ICC and the UNSC on the other. Various AU organs, from the Assembly to the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, have called for the suspension of the ICC process against El-Bashir in order to avoid undermining the peace and reconciliation process in the Sudan. The PSC, in particular, not only called for the application of Article 16 of the Rome Statute with the result of suspending a decision by the Court on the application of the Prosecutor to indict El-Bashir. As a manifestation of its 'unflinching commitment to combating impunity', the PSC

also decided on the establishment of an AU High Level Panel with the mandate 'to examine the situation in Darfur in depth and submit recommendations ... on how best the issues of accountability and combating impunity, on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing on the other, could be effectively and comprehensively addressed'.

On Monday 12 July 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Sudan's president El-Bashir for the crime of genocide. This is in addition to the arrest warrant that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued against the Sudanese President in March 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The new arrest warrant for the crime of genocide is a result of the successful appeal by the Prosecutor to the Appeals Chamber against the decision of the Pre-Trial

Chamber that rejected the charge of genocide against El-Bashir.

A few days later, the AU showed the first sign of opposition to the new arrest warrant for the crime of genocide. In a communiqué issued on 16 July 2010, the AU Commission expressed 'its conviction that this new and untimely decision by the ICC and its action in general on Sudan are counter productive, and will complicate the ongoing efforts and increase the risks of instability, with far-reaching consequences for Sudan, the region and Africa as a whole.' The 'ongoing efforts' cited in the communiqué include (a) 'the democratic transformation in Sudan' in the context of the April 2010 historic elections; (b) 'the renewed efforts towards the completion of the implementation

>>page 10

PSC Retrospective – The PSC and the ICC (continued)

of the CPA, including the holding of the self-determination referendum in South Sudan and the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements'; (c) the renewed efforts towards the search for a lasting and inclusive political solution to the crisis in Darfur; and (d) the ongoing consultations for implementing the recommendations of the AU High Level Panel on issues of justice, reconciliation and healing.

Following its 237th Meeting in Kampala Uganda in the lead-up to the 15th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, the Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué on the situation in Darfur, **PSC/PR/COMM-1 (CXCVII)**. In Paragraph 8 of the communiqué, the PSC expressed its 'concern at the counter-productive consequences of the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC' by issuing a second warrant and urged the UNSC to 'heed the call for the deferral of the process initiated by the ICC against El-Bashir' in the interest of peace, justice and reconciliation'.

Expectedly, the new arrest warrant featured in the discussions of the AU Heads of State and Government during the 15th ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held on 25-27 July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. In its decision, **Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV)**, the AU Assembly expressed 'its disappointment that the United Nations Security Council has not acted upon the request by the African Union to defer the proceedings ... in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute' and reiterated its request again'. Additionally, the Assembly also reiterated its earlier decision, **Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII)**, of the 13th Summit that 'AU member states shall not cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender' of the Sudanese president to the ICC.

While there are countries that have reservation on this specific decision, the first test for this decision came when El-Bashir made his first trip to an ICC member country, Chad, to attend a regional summit. This happened a few days after the 12 July arrest warrant against El-Bashir for the crime of genocide. Defying the arrest warrant and indeed their obligations under the Rome Statute, Chadian authorities accorded him a presidential treatment with huge security protection. Together with others in the Summit, Chad also extended support to El-Bashir and Chadian President Idris Deby called on the regional leaders present in the summit to support the peace process in Sudan and help solve the crisis.

As further evidence of adherence to the AU's decision on non-cooperation with the ICC, after Chad El-Bashir also travelled to another ICC member country, Kenya, upon invitation, to attend the official launch of Kenya's new Constitution on 27 August 2010. In this instance, however, the ICC referred Kenya to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for failing to comply with the arrest warrant and hence drew the UNSC into the centre of the controversy. The UNSC's response, which would be keenly followed, may offer an amicable way out of the stalemate between the AU and the ICC.

In Kampala, going a step further, the Assembly, reflecting some frustration with the UNSC, pushed for a common African position for the proposed amendment of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, a move which would allow the more democratic UN General Assembly to take over the power of the UNSC to defer cases for one year where the UNSC has failed to take a decision within a specified timeframe.

The Summit also decided 'to reject for now, the request of the ICC to open a Liaison Office to the AU in Addis Ababa'. Earlier, a communiqué of the AU Commission that was issued on 16 July 2010, after a meeting between the President of the ICC, Sang-Hyun Song, and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, stated that 'the Chairperson expressed readiness to explore the possibility of establishing an ICC Liaison Office to the AU in Addis Ababa'.

It is clear from the foregoing that the 12 July arrest warrant for genocide has further deepened the ICC-AU controversy and has made their relationship more complex. This development has the potential to negatively affect the situation in Sudan. On the part of the AU, there are some questions that its position raises, the most important being whether or not it is motivated by a perceived need to protect African leadership.

While the motivation of the AU and its implications for international criminal justice is important for people in Africa and the credibility of the AU, on a more substantive issue it is also important to ask whether the AU's concern about the potential impact of the ICC process on the peace processes in Sudan has merit that deserves a hearing. At the heart of this debate is whether the situation in Sudan raises the issue of how justice (combating impunity) can or should be pursued alongside peace and reconciliation processes. More accurately, the issue is whether now is the right time to prosecute Sudanese President El-Bashir. In this regard, the specific questions that deserve serious consideration

>>page 11

PSC Retrospective – The PSC and the ICC (continued)

include: Does the prosecution of President El-Bashir at this juncture advance or undermine peace and reconciliation and the quest for full justice in Darfur? Is he the key interlocutor for the government in the ongoing efforts to achieve a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Darfur and the fragile North-South peace process? Will it be in the interest of peace and justice and to the benefit of the victims of crimes in Darfur if the recommendations of the AU High Level Panel are implemented? Can the prosecution of El-Bashir by the ICC continue without undermining the quest for peace in Sudan? Is his prosecution capable of leading to the full pursuit of justice in Darfur?

In the context of the work of the PSC, an important and indeed a

very positive outcome of the ICC process is that it prompted the PSC to engage and address the issues that the ICC indictment raised. The outcome of this process resulted in the valuable recommendations of the AU High Level Panel, otherwise known as the Mbeki Panel, which has been generally welcomed by the international community.

While the report offered an important opportunity to address the issues of justice and peace in Sudan comprehensively, it proved to be inadequate for convincing many to give a hearing to the AU's position on the ICC process in Sudan. Seemingly, it is only by aggressively pursuing and showing concrete progress in the implementation of these recommendations that the PSC, and more generally the AU, can

credibly defend its position vis-à-vis the ICC. Consequently, the PSC should prioritise the implementation of the Mbeki Panel Recommendations. Crucially, the speed with which these recommendations are duly implemented, and the extent to which they are applied, should determine whether or not the PSC, in collaboration with all concerned, is able to make substantive progress on the issues of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur.

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Burundi

Previous PSC Communiqués and Recommendations:

At its 230th meeting, (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXX)), the PSC considered the Report of the Multidisciplinary Mission for the Evaluation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Needs in the DRC and Burundi (PSC/PR/2 (CCXXX)). The Multidisciplinary Mission visited both countries at the beginning of the year within the framework of the implementation of the decisions taken by the PSC at its 163rd and 199th meetings. Based on the Report, the PSC recommended that a Conference of African Solidarity be organised by the end of 2010 as well as intensification of advocacy efforts to have international partners contribute more to the ongoing process of post-conflict reconstruction and development

in the DRC and Burundi. The PSC further decided to establish a PSC Sub-Committee to elaborate and put in place, in consultation with the DRC and Burundi, a support programme for governance, reconstruction and consolidation of peace.

On 24 June 2010, the AU issued a communiqué in which the Chairperson of the Commission indicated his preoccupation with the recent political developments in Burundi following the announcement of the provisional results, which were contested by various political parties. The Chairperson urged political parties that are part of the newly formed coalition, Alliance of Democrats for Change (ADC), to resort to legal means only to resolve the conflicts related to the communal elections of 24 May.

Crisis Escalation Potential:

In response to the contesting of results by numerous opposition

parties, several meetings were arranged to try and address the concerns of the parties, albeit without success. Several opposition parties, organised around the coalition ADC, continued their boycott and did not participate in the presidential (28 June) and legislative (23 July) elections. Insecurity, especially in the capital, increased as a result of numerous grenade and arson attacks and assassinations, mostly targeting the ruling party, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Tensions especially increased in the run-up to the presidential poll. The ADC announced it would not recognise the President to be elected in, what they termed, the 'anti-constitutional' presidential poll of 28 June. The government responded with various arrests and restrictions against opposition parties. The Union for National Progress (UPRONA), which did not contest the presidency in

>>page 12

the poll on 28 June, rejoined the process by filling the communal council seats it won in the communal elections and submitting lists of candidates for the legislative elections of 23 July.

The leader of the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) that garnered the second biggest number of votes, Agathon Rwaswa, went into hiding following rumours of his imminent arrest. He is said to have fled to the eastern DRC whereas other reports claim he is still in the country. Meanwhile, the government has recognised Emmanuel Miburo as the new president of the FNL. Léonard Nyangoma, the spokesperson for the coalition of opposition parties, the ADC, went into hiding following rumours that he would be stripped of the immunity he received as an MP in the National Assembly. The anticipated action against him was in response to the 11 July communiqué by the ADC in which it accused the government of having committed massacres constituting crimes against humanity that, in certain respects, resembled acts of genocide.

In light of the above, chances of a renewed rebellion are often cited in discussions about the way forward in Burundi. While it is true that the political parties of the ADC have limited options to engage the incoming administration, it is unlikely that elements of these parties will make a serious attempt to violently oppose the status quo. In addition, it is widely acknowledged that popular support for a rebellion would be extremely weak, given the fact that the challenges in Burundi today are different from the circumstances under which great parts of the population supported the armed opposition against the governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, given the size of Burundi and the number of small arms that remain in circulation, it would not be difficult to create chaos in the country, especially in the capital, and hinder ongoing, very much needed, sustainable developmental efforts.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:

Optimism prevailed amongst various international stakeholders in the run-up to Burundi's first poll this year, the communal election that was initially scheduled for 21 May and then postponed to 24 May. The newly appointed UN Envoy, Mr. Charles Petrie, was quoted as saying that 'despite challenges, Burundi can give a lesson in democracy to others.'

The 24 May elections were generally peaceful and witnessed the remarkably well-coordinated and active involvement of local civil society. However, during the announcement of the provisional results of these elections, various opposition parties, including the FNL and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), announced their rejection of the results, which pointed to a landslide victory for the incumbent ruling party. In the declaration issued on 25 May, they claimed to possess irrefutable evidence of massive fraud and irregularities. The eight signatories of the declaration demanded that the CENI (electoral commission of Burundi) annul the results and re-organise the communal elections on the same day of the presidential poll on 28 June. Several days later, most international and national observer missions issued their preliminary declarations generally indicating that, despite certain challenges, the election had taken place in a free and fair manner and in line with international standards. The presidential poll was organised without major problems with incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD running as the only candidate. The legislative election of 23 July was contested by four or more parties, depending on which provinces were targeted by the participating parties. The CNDD-FDD won 81 out of the 106 seats in the National Assembly, whereas UPRONA won 17 seats. On 28 July, members of the Senate were elected in an indirect poll. UPRONA won two seats with 32

seats filled by the CNDD-FDD. The final poll will be held on 7 September 2010.

Various factors have been identified to explain the decision of numerous opposition parties first to reject the communal election results and subsequently to boycott other levels of elections. Some opposition parties may have had unrealistic expectations and as such were tremendously disappointed with the results of the communal elections. Nonetheless, arguably for newcomers FNL and Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD), a percentage of almost 15 and four per cent respectively was quite commendable. The generally weak state of political parties in Burundi may have resulted in a failure by various parties to design a 'defeat strategy'. The lack of financial means may have also played a role, with several opposition parties reportedly not being able to pay the fairly high amounts required when submitting lists of candidates. Burundi, one of the world's least urbanised countries, also appears to have taught the lesson that sentiments in the capital are in no way reflective of views in the rural areas. The importance of the rural electorate is something that the ruling party has been very much aware of since it came to power in 2005. Furthermore, the arguably uncompromising way in which the ruling party has governed Burundi over the past five years is likely to have contributed to the opposition parties' loss of faith in the possibility that democratic competition could proceed in a free and fair manner.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Pan-African and RECs Dynamics:

The AU, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) as well as the East African Community (EAC) deployed election observers to Burundi and led efforts to facilitate dialogue

>>page 13

between the relevant parties following the opposition's rejection of the communal election results.

UN Dynamics:

The new head of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), Mr. Charles Petrie, took up his position after it had been vacant for several months due to the government's request to the UN to recall the previous Executive Representative, Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, at the end of 2009. A visit to Burundi by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 10 June focused attention on the situation in Burundi and provided him with an opportunity to emphasise the importance of an inclusive democratic process.

International Community Dynamics:

The international community generally dismissed the concerns of the opposition parties and indicated continued support for the CENI, despite the few mistakes it had committed. Some argue that the international community generally 'observed for stability' and preferred to maintain the status quo, despite their unhappiness with the ruling party at times. The fact that certain elements amongst the international community came out 'too soon' in support of the integrity of the communal election and too easily 'ridiculed' the opposition, is said to have contributed to the hardening of the opposition's stance.

Civil Society Dynamics:

Civil society in Burundi is arguably the biggest success of the post-conflict reconstruction process thus far. Various civil society organisations formed coalitions, such as the Civil Society Coalition for Electoral Monitoring (COSOME) and the Amatora mu Mahoro Project, to contribute to various phases of the elections. The highly regarded 'Media Synergie' ensured extensive media coverage of the electoral marathon and despite

heightened tensions remained impartial and free of provocative broadcast commentary.

Scenario Planning:

Scenario 1:

As the incoming administration decides on the composition of the various governance institutions, the situation in Burundi remains calm and is characterised by anticipation for the immediate future. High expectations among the population prevail, with emphasis on the fight against corruption and impunity and the promotion of dialogue to avoid recurring strikes in the public sector.

Scenario 2:

Tensions rise as a result of numerous violent acts, mostly attributed to elements within the opposition parties. The government responds in a restrained manner and armed opposition gradually declines.

Early Response Options:

The following are possible options for the PSC to consider

Option 1:

The PSC in tandem with the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) the East African Community (EAC) and other international actors could start talks between the opposing groups in Burundi to prevent the withdrawal of political actors and their subsequent possible transformation into military movements.

Option 2:

The PSC could establish an international contact group on Burundi to closely monitor developments in the country to make timely and relevant decisions and coordinate and harmonise international support for the democratisation and reconstruction processes.

Documentation:

Relevant AU Documents:

PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXX)
Communiqué of the 230th meeting of the PSC on 27 May 2010.

PSC/PR/2 (CCXXX) Major Conclusions and Recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Mission for Evaluation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Needs in DRC (21 January - 13 February 2010) and Burundi (13-22 February 2010).

Communiqué on the situation in Burundi, Addis Ababa, 24 June 2010.

UN Documents:

Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi. Susanna P. Campbell with Leonard Kayobera and Justine Nkurunziza. March 2010.

S/RES/1902 (2009) Resolution 1902 adopted by the Security Council at its 6245th meeting on 17 December 2009.

S/2009/611 (30 November 2009) Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi.

Useful Additional Resources:

Burundi: Elections without competition and no peace without participation: Where might it go from here? Henri Boshoff and Ralph Ellermann. Institute for Security Studies. Policy Brief Nr 19, August 2010. www.issafrica.org

Another Crossroad for Burundi: From the FNL to Peaceful Elections in 2010. Jamila El Abdellaoui. Institute for Security Studies. Situation Report, 19 November 2009. www.issafrica.org

The African Union has held its 15th Ordinary Session from 19 to 27 July 2010 in Uganda, Kampala. On 19 and 20 July 2010, the pre-assembly activity was launched with the meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), followed on 22 and 23 July 2010 by the Executive Council of Ministers convention which set the tone of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which met from 25 to 27 July 2010. Although the official theme of this year's summit was 'Maternal, Infant and Child Health and Development in Africa', as expected, issues relating to peace and security featured prominently on the agenda of the meeting. The spirit of the summit was highly influenced and oriented by the response to the 11 July bombings in the Ugandan capital, Kampala that killed more than 80 civilians. The summit, which was held in the year declared by the AU as 'the Year of Peace and Security in Africa', discussed and passed decisions on a range of peace and security issues.

On Crisis Situations across the Continent:

The various ongoing conflicts in Africa, post-conflict areas and early warning issues, were all featured on the summit agenda. The Somalia conflict, which has at times proved to be the most complex of peace and security issues, hijacked the theme of the summit, triggered by the ever weakening TFG (Transitional Federal Government), ongoing fighting in Mogadishu and the Kampala terrorist attack just two weeks before the summit. As usual, the AU expressed its strong support for the TFG and strongly condemned the Kampala attacks and other acts of violence by Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups hostile to the TFG and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Angered by the Kampala attacks, Uganda, which contributed most of the AMISOM troops, has primarily pushed for more troop deployment and enhancement of the mandate for the mission. The Assembly allowed the deployment of 2000 more troops to bring AMISOM force level to the level mandated by the AU. The Assembly also requested the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint a 'High Level Personality' to draw and enhance global support and attention for Somalia. The Assembly also repeated its call for the transformation of AMISOM into a United Nations Peace Mission to enhance the effectiveness and capacity of the mission.

Sudan was also a focus of the assembly as security deteriorated in Darfur and tensions increased between the North and South ahead of the January 2011 referendum due to hesitation from some elements in the leadership of the north about holding the referendum as scheduled. The summit urged the National Congress Party of the north and the Southern People's Liberation Movement to address these problems in accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) particularly on the fate of the disputed oil rich area of Abyei and the completion of the demarcation of the North-South border. The Assembly expressed its concern at the recent deterioration of the security situation in Darfur, and called for the continuation of the Doha process led by the AU-UN Chief Mediator former Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso Djibril Yipènè Bassolé. The AU has also extended the mandate of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) for a further period of 12 months and requested the Security Council to follow suit.

Regarding the Central African Republic (CAR), the AU called for the holding of elections in October and December 2010, as agreed by

the parties.

The Assembly also urged proper implementation of the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement to create an enabling environment for the speedy holding of elections in Cote d'Ivoire, where issues surrounding the voter identification process and lack of progress in the implementation of the DDR exacerbated disagreements between the President and opposition groups.

Guinea and Niger also featured on the agenda and the Assembly called for a speedy and smooth transition to constitutional order. On Mauritania, decisions called for the resumption of political dialogue in accordance with the Dakar Framework Agreement. The Assembly strongly condemned the interference of the army in the politics of Guinea Bissau and on Madagascar encouraged the SADC Mediator, former President Joachim Chissano, to continue efforts to resolve the Madagascar Crisis. With respect to inter-state tensions the Assembly noted the improved relations between Chad and Sudan while it expressed its concern at the continued impasse in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea and reaffirmed its readiness to assist the two countries to overcome the current deadlock through dialogue in order to normalise their relations.

The Year of Peace and Security in Africa:

Following the decision of the August 2009 AU Summit for 2010 to be a year of peace, on 9 January 2010 the AU Commission launched the official festivities of the Year of Peace and Security. The Kampala Summit reviewed the

>>page 15

AU POST-SUMMIT ANALYSIS (continued)

progress made in implementing the Year of Peace. The relevant decision primarily urged Member States to sign and ratify relevant AU instruments, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

African Peace and Security Architecture:

The Assembly expressed satisfaction at the level of operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and ratified the membership of the Panel of the Wise by reappointing Ahmed Ben Bella and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim for a further and final mandate of three years from December 2010 and by appointing former Zambian president, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, Mrs. Marie Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy and Mary Chinery Hesse, for a mandate of three years from December 2010. On the African Standby Force (ASF) the Assembly decided that the continental force would reinforce AMISOM once operational.

Justice and Accountability and Universal Jurisdiction:

The summit urged member states to respect International Law and particularly the immunity of state officials when applying the principle of universal jurisdiction while reaffirming its previous decision that AU Member States

should not cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the arrest of the Sudanese President El-Bashir. The AU has also rejected for the time being the request by the ICC to open a Liaison Office to the AU in Addis Ababa. While reiterating its commitment to fight impunity and its conviction that there has been blatant abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Assembly called for the establishment of a body that will review claims of abuse of the principle. The Assembly also called on the AU Commission to finalise the study on implications of empowering the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to have criminal jurisdiction over international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On the Union Government

On the ongoing discussion on continental integration and the transformation of the African Union Commission (AUC) into the African Union Authority (AUA), the Assembly did not pass any significant decision other than affirming the previously held stance of gradually transforming the AUC into the African Union Authority (AUA).

Additional Summit Decisions:

On the reform of the United Nations Security Council, the Assembly

reaffirmed the common position of the continent in accordance with the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council. The assembly also called for a stronger stance at continental level and international cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism and fighting piracy in Africa and further requested the Commission to submit regular reports on the status of cooperation in fighting terrorism in Africa.

The 16th ordinary Summit of the AU will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2011 under the theme, 'Shared Values'. The summit has also determined the venue and theme of the 17th ordinary Summit of the AU, which will take place in July 2011 in Libreville, Gabon, under the theme 'Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development'.

Rwanda

Previous AU Documents and Recommendations:

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), Jean Ping, sent an Election Observer Mission on 4 August 2010 to monitor the presidential election that took place on August 9, 2010 in Rwanda. The mission, which was composed of Pan-African parliamentarians, members of national parliaments, high-level officials of election management bodies, prominent individuals and members of civil society from various African countries, was led by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mauritius, Anil K. Gayan. The mission was mandated to observe the presidential election process in accordance with AU guidelines on election observation and monitoring and was guided by the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.

In its preliminary statement, the team noted that competing political parties were able to conduct their campaign without any problems. The observer mission was therefore generally satisfied with the conduct of the electoral process. Opposition parties approached by the mission had confirmed that they had been granted equal access to state media and had therefore been afforded freedom to promote their respective ideas. The report by the observer team further applauded the Rwandan public for the high voter turnout of 97.5%. The team recognised the political maturity of the Rwandan electorate and commended the country's National Electoral Commission for the way in which the elections had been organised and supervised.

The report of the observer mission declared that the electoral process was free and fair. However the team also expressed its concern

over the absence of party agents in many polling stations, apart from those of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), as well as the scarcity of representatives of Rwandan civil society. The report concluded that Rwanda proved that it was fully capable of holding free, transparent and fair elections in accordance with generally recognised AU and international democratic norms and referred to the August 9 election as a manifestation of the consolidation of democracy in Rwanda.

Crisis Escalation Potential:

The run up to the presidential polls in Rwanda was characterised by a spate of attacks on government critics. The months prior to the elections witnessed a series of attacks, including killings and arrests, on out-spoken journalists and opposition figures. The attempted assassination of the exiled former army chief, Lt Gen Kayumba Nyamwasa, on 19 June in Johannesburg, was the first in a number of high profile incidents followed by the killing in Kigali, on 24 June, of Jean-Léonard Rugambage, deputy editor of an independent newspaper critical of President Kagame. The first Vice President of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, Andre Kagwa Rwisereka, was also found brutally murdered on July 14, 2010. In addition, opposition presidential candidate, Ntanganda, was arrested on 24 June and charged with 'divisionism' and the attempted murder of a former party member. The arrest of the controversial Hutu opposition leader, Victoire Ingabire, who is barred from running in presidential elections due to her alleged denial of the Rwandan genocide, a criminal offense, further exacerbated political and ethnic tensions in the country. Rwanda's capital, Kigali also witnessed a number of grenade attacks in the six months preceding the elections.

The polling day was praised by most observers as generally peaceful and stable throughout the

country. Nonetheless, two days after the incumbent, President Paul Kagame, was re-elected in a landslide that saw him win 95% of the votes, several people, including two children, were wounded in a grenade attack in Kigali. The grenade attack was one of a series of violent incidents that had taken place in the capital during February, March and May 2010. Although nobody had claimed responsibility for the attacks; the Rwandan army declared that it had unearthed a network behind the attacks. It did not name the alleged perpetrators.

The political unrest, coupled with the series of arrests, violent attacks and killings, as well as dissent in the ranks of the ruling RPF, tended to escalate the crisis in Rwanda, a country where the wounds of its traumatic genocide have not yet fully healed. Whereas the country is widely perceived to be stable, recording considerable socio-economic development in recent years, critics have been wary of the lack of democratic pluralism and political freedom in Rwanda's public spheres. Although the government has made some progress in legally and institutionally challenging the existence and politicisation of ethnicity in the country, recent developments have shown that ethnicity remains ever present in Rwanda. The ongoing unrest and instability in the neighboring states of the great lakes region, specifically the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is an additional factor contributing to potential insecurity in Rwanda.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:

Rwanda has a very complex socio-economic and political make-up and it is quite normal to observe divergent and extreme viewpoints on the developments in post-Genocide Rwanda. Many, including prominent international and regional individuals and institutions, hold

>>page 17

strongly refuted any involvement in these murders and has pledged to investigate the cases independently. Critics claim there is a long history of murders and disappearances of political opponents in Rwanda.

The other major factor destabilising the political landscape of Rwanda includes rifts within the ruling RPF leadership elites. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former RPF fighter and former chief of staff of the Rwandese armed forces, was publicly accused by Rwanda's chief prosecutor of being behind recent grenade attacks. A number of other senior military figures have also been arrested in past months, including Brigadier-General Jean Bosco Kazura, the head of the country's football federation, who was taken into custody for making an unauthorised trip to South Africa. Kazura was accused of traveling to South Africa to meet prominent Rwandan exiles living there. Nyamwasa, who accused the president of corruption and fled to South Africa in February 2010 was shot in Johannesburg on July 19 in a failed assassination attempt. His wife, and the opposition leader, Victoire Ingabire, subsequently accused President Paul Kagame of orchestrating the operation. The Rwandan government has dismissed the allegation. The Rwandan government has linked Nyamwasa to three grenade attacks in Kigali, Rwanda's capital, on February 19, which killed one person and injured at least 30 others. The authorities accused Nyamwasa of trying to destabilise Rwanda while he was in the country, and also while he was in India, where he served as Rwanda's ambassador. South African police said earlier this year, they had not arrested Nyamwasa because they do not have an extradition treaty with Rwanda. In a move further manifesting problems at the top, Kagame replaced defence minister Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi with army Chief Gen. James Kabarebe in April 2010. Two RPF veterans, Gen. Emmanuel Karenzi Karake and Gen. Charles Muhire, were also arrested the same month, accused

of immoral conduct and corruption, respectively.

Many regard the August 9 elections as having lacked a real opposition. Kagame actually faced opponents who were his allies in the last elections in 2003. More vocal opponents of Kagame were prevented from standing for election and complained about intimidation. Jean-Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, the presidential candidate of Rwanda's main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), said that his party's policies were a continuation of those of the RPF's and conceded defeat. Ntawukuriryayo, who is also deputy-chairman of the House of Parliament and a former health minister, came second with 3.1% of the votes. Other candidates in the election, Prosper Higiro of the Liberal Party (PL), who also heads a team of Rwandan MPs in the Pan-African parliament, received 1.1% of the vote and Mrs Alvera Mukabaramba, a former pediatrician and the only woman in the race for the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC), drew 0.2 % of electoral support.

The 2003 Constitution states that the President and the Prime Minister cannot belong to the same party. Other parties and social groups must be represented in posts such as the speakers in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and their respective deputies. Accordingly, on August 22, Paul Kagame offered to form a government of national unity with opposition candidates and those parties that lost to him during the August 2010 presidential elections. Kagame said he was willing to continue working with the three opposition parties, the Liberal Party (PL), the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC). Many think that the PSD presidential candidate, Dr. Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, would be the next Prime Minister. However, this offer would also mean the PSD president, Dr Vincent Biruta, who is the current president of the senate, would lose his powerful

and influential position. The unity government move failed to impress many as the absence of any real opposition remains a fundamental concern in the consolidation of democracy in Rwanda.

Kagame refutes the criticism from international human rights observers and news media organisations that have been very critical of his government in the past few months. He argues that no country has moved from genocide to confrontational politics overnight and that his country is on the right track and progressing at an acceptable pace in a journey towards cohesion, democracy, stability and prosperity. John Rwigombwa, the minister of finance and economic planning, recently stated that Rwandan society was still fragile and that the government could not allow total freedom of expression while some politicians and parts of Rwandan society remained ready to exploit ethnicity to achieve power.

Kagame's government has a strong stance on the elimination of the specifically Hutu and Tutsi identities, and claims to prefer designating everyone as Rwandan. Fifteen years after the brutal genocide and following commendable efforts in favour of transitional justice and reconciliation, Tutsis remain bitter toward the perpetrators of the genocide. However, Hutus like the opposition leader Victoire Ingabire believe it is time to address the killings carried out against the Hutus during the civil war by members of the then rebel group, the RPF. Analysts say that the compromise on democratic rights and civil liberties, for the sake of peace and stability in Rwanda, is no longer acceptable as development cannot be sustained without democracy. There are also fears that the restriction on free speech could result in accumulated grievances that might easily escalate into violence. Rwanda's undeniable economic successes seem to have not produced the

>>page 19

required momentum to be able to overcome the unresolved questions of Rwanda's troubled past. Many acknowledge that relations between Hutus and Tutsis are slowly improving, but it is difficult to gauge the value of such improvement as long as discussion of the genocide and ethnicity remain taboo topics for debate.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Pan-African and RECs Dynamics:

The AU, which also observed the Rwandan elections, had a positive assessment of the electoral process and it now appears that the active role of the country in AU affairs will resume. Rwanda is also part of the East African Community (EAC), a regional block that includes Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The EAC also sent observers to the elections, which they subsequently declared free and fair.

In a strong move, indicating official disapproval short of severing diplomatic relations, South Africa recalled its ambassador from Kigali for consultations on August 6 2010, following a diplomatic row caused by the shooting of General, Kayumba Nyamwasa in Johannesburg. Nyamwasa insists the action was an assassination attempt initiated by Paul Kagame. Rwanda had been demanding his extradition and has denied involvement in the shooting. The relations between the two countries have further deteriorated following Rwandan President Paul Kagame's claim that Nyamwasa passed some confidential information to members of the South African government.

Rwanda's most notable improvement in diplomatic relations has been with the DRC. Before agreeing to cease hostilities and boost security and economic ties on August 2009, the two neighbors had severed diplomatic relations for more than a decade. The two countries had also been accusing each other of supporting hostile militias on their

territories and Rwanda accused the Congolese army of aiding Hutu rebels in the Eastern region of the DRC.

UN Dynamics:

Following the series of killings, the United Nations demanded a full investigation into allegations of politically motivated killings of opposition figures in Rwanda in the run-up to the presidential election. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon encouraged the Rwandan authorities to take immediate action, including a thorough investigation into the latest incidents, and to bring the perpetrators to justice to ease political tensions. The United Nations also condemned the assassination of Jean-Léonard Rugambage, the editor of the bi-monthly *Umuwugizi*, on 24 June. The UN furthermore expressed its strong disapproval of the arrest of international lawyer, Peter Erlinder, in May 2010. Ban Ki-Moon said that the arrest subverted orderly reconciliation and undermined the mission of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, which had been making fundamental contributions to international peace and justice and consequently requested his immediate release.

Wider International Community Dynamics:

Foreign observers did not report any major irregularities during polling. However, they noted that the Rwandan election was marked by a significant lack of critical opposition. The Chairperson of the Commonwealth Observer Group and former Secretary General of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, described the election as impressive and commended the National Elections Commission (NEC) of Rwanda for holding the election in an effective manner. Nonetheless, the assessment report by the group noted obvious shortcomings and called for more space for open, but responsible, debate among

politicians in order to create a pluralistic democracy. The report also stated that whereas many freedoms and rights are guaranteed in Rwanda, their implementation and practice has been deficient. Dr. Salim added that as four candidates in the presidential election were from the governing coalition, it was clear that the lack of critical opposition voices in Rwanda was cause for concern.

In May 2010, The European Union announced that that it would not deploy electoral observers to Rwanda because of budgetary constraints. The EU subsequently congratulated Rwanda for the calm atmosphere prevailing on polling day and for the high voter turnout. The EU expressed the view that the election marked a new stage in Rwanda's democratic process and development. However, the EU also remains concerned about the high level of pre-election incidents and has called for swift and transparent investigations. Prior to the elections, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, John Carson, said the United States was worried about the crackdown on Rwanda's opposition. The United States is a close ally of Rwanda and has provided a total of about \$1 billion aid to Rwanda during the past decade.

The international view and perception towards Rwanda and its leader Paul Kagame is mixed and divergent. The past decade has witnessed the rise of Rwanda from the ashes of the era of genocide. Leaders like Britain's former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, have described Kagame as a visionary leader whereas former US President, Bill Clinton, awarded him with a global citizenship award for 'freeing his people's minds'. In 2009 Time Magazine also included Paul Kagame in its annual TIME 100 issue, reflecting the world's most influential leaders. Kagame also portrayed as the face

>>page 20

of an emerging African leadership because of his reconciliation strategy, his management model, the empowerment of women in leadership in Rwanda, and his insistence on self-reliance as a plan of action for transforming a failed state into one with a bright future. Time Magazine also hailed him as one of very few leaders who have successfully managed the transition from soldier to statesman. Rwanda's acceptance into the Commonwealth as a country with no colonial ties to England was yet another diplomatic success. In addition, the country was able to forge strong relations with China, which has made tremendous infrastructural investments in Rwanda. In a report dated August 2010, the international anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International, designated Rwanda as the least corrupt country in East Africa, a claim treated less positively by critics who argue corruption is low because Rwanda is effectively a police state. Some critics also contest the wide popularity of Kagame, arguing that such adulation stems from the guilt the international community feels for not having prevented the 1994 genocide.

Civil Society Dynamics:

On August 12, the Rwandan Civil Society Election Observation Mission (CSEOM) reported that the August 9 presidential election was conducted in a transparent and peaceful atmosphere. The coalition of civil society organisations commended the National Electoral Commission (NEC) for the success of the elections which, in their view, demonstrated a high level of organisation and adherence to deadlines throughout the election season, including the establishment of numerous polling stations which enhanced accessibility for voters. However, there are many who still doubt the existence of an independent and vibrant civil society movement in Rwanda, claiming that most of the civil society organisations are tied into, or legitimised by, the Rwandan government. Umuseso and

Umuvugizi, two Rwandan tabloids critical of the government, have been banned since April 2010 for 'inciting public disorder'. As demonstrated by the June 2010 murder of Leonard Rugambage, editor of Umuvugizi, the Rwandan media are not entirely free.

The international human rights watchdog, Amnesty International, has on more than one occasion called on Rwanda to take steps to reverse a climate of fear and stated that the Rwandan government must ensure that investigations take place into political killings and the continuing suppression of civil and political rights, particularly restrictions on free speech.

Scenario Planning:

The situation in Rwanda could take a number of courses based on the actions taken by the various parties to the crisis. These are the possible scenarios:

Scenario 1:

Ongoing grievances and political killings, coupled with the potential rift within the RPF could lead to enhanced political instability and insecurity in Rwanda.

Scenario 2:

Liberalising the political and public space and nurturing the ideals for a vibrant pluralistic democracy could consolidate existing democratic and economic gains.

Scenario 3:

Political and ethnic groups whom many regard as marginalised may continue to express dissent and opposition against the government if their grievances are not addressed.

Early Response Options:

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be

considered by the PSC in order to consolidate peace, stability and democracy in Rwanda

Option 1:

The PSC could work in tandem with the office of the special envoy of the UN to the Great Lakes region to start talks between the opposing groups in Rwanda and urge the government to increasingly liberalise its internal political environment and adopt an open-door policy toward exiled and banned political parties, provided that they reject all links with armed groups.

Option 2:

The PSC, in partnership with the AU Political Affairs Office, could encourage moves toward pluralism in Rwanda as well as greater political freedom of action and expression.

Documentation

Relevant AU Documents:

Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the Presidential Election in Rwanda, 9th August 2010

The AU Year of Peace: The AU Advisory Council and the Peace Ambassadors

On 16 July 2010, the African Union announced appointments of 14 peace ambassadors and 12 advisory council members under the auspices of the year of peace, with the slogan 'Make Peace Happen'. The peace ambassadors and council members were appointed for the purpose of supporting the African Union Commission's conflict resolution and peace building efforts. In addition, they are expected to advocate the ratification and implementation of various AU instruments and commitments, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the mobilisation of resources, the generation of popular support and awareness, the implementation of specific activities developed by the Commission, such as encouraging businesses to sign the Make Peace Happen Industry Charter, and the encouragement of schools to use the Make Peace Happen Lesson Plan.

At a Special Session held on 31st August 2009, in Tripoli, Libya, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), in Paragraph 9 of the Tripoli Declaration **SP/Assembly/PS/Decl.(1)**, designated the year 2010 as the Year of Peace and Security on the continent. The declaration emphasised the continued peace and security challenges facing Africa.

"We are determined to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflicts and violence on our continent, acknowledging our shortcomings and errors, committing our resources and our best people, and missing no opportunity to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction. We, as leaders, simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans".

Against this background, the Year of Peace and Security will be an opportunity for Africans, as well as African Civil Society Organisations and their leaders, to evaluate current efforts being made to bring about and sustain peace and security on the continent, with a view to strengthening them and launching new peace and security initiatives.

On 22nd June 2010, the African Union began the countdown to September 21, a day of envisaged non-violence and peace across Africa entitled "90 days to Peace Day in Africa". A successful Peace Day will also demonstrate the commitment and capability of African leadership, in successfully mobilising for peace in the sincere belief that if peace can be attained on Peace Day it would be possible to achieve permanent peace, as noted in the AU official press release, dated 22nd June. The AU in the same press release quoted the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, who urged African civil society and the private sector to join hands with the AU in making peace happen in 2010 and beyond. The chairperson went on to say that in order to achieve peace between nations, non-violence needed everyone's involvement. He also challenged every African to take a leap of faith and do something to support the year of peace and security, "for none of us is too small to make a difference".

The September 21 Peace Day is under way in terms of preparation. Scheduled activities include cessations of hostilities in all conflict areas and areas that are still experiencing varying levels of violence; and where the distribution of humanitarian supplies and material to communities in conflict areas, as well as non conflict areas, are in critical need of the presence of medical and relief services.

Other planned activities for Peace Day, September 21, include: One minute of silence for peace across Africa at a pre-agreed time; relevant developmental work and community support by members of the armed and security forces in Africa, such as building bridges, repairing schools and community facilities, and providing humanitarian assistance; One Day One Goal football games, which are football or soccer games to be played across Africa to bring communities together around the common goal of peace; and the implementation of the Make Peace Happen Lesson Plan which entails the utilisation of a special lesson plan about peace and Africa's aspirations to be free from want and fear, to be taught by schools and colleges throughout Africa. The objective of the Peace Day event includes drawing world attention to Africa's various conflict situations and mobilising support for efforts to resolve them and more specifically to show solidarity with those affected by such conflicts by providing assistance where possible.

The 26 peace ambassadors and advisory council members are prominent Africans drawn from various sectors of society: political, business, sports, arts, culture and music. For the Advisory Council, all African Nobel Laureates and other eminent Africans were approached. Twelve Council members have accepted the position to date, including Emeritus Anglican Bishop and South African activist Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the last State President of apartheid-era South Africa F.W. de Klerk, former Secretary General of the OAU Salim A. Salim, former Chairperson of the African Union Alpha Oumar Konaré, renowned international advocate for women's and children's

>>page 22

The AU Year of Peace: The AU Advisory Council and the Peace Ambassadors

rights Graça Machel, mobile communications entrepreneur and champion of good governance in Africa Mo Ibrahim, and the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Prof. Wangari Maathai. Notable African personalities in the areas of sports, culture, music and the arts were also approached to be Peace Ambassadors. They include Cameroonian saxophonist and vibraphone player Manu Dibango, Grammy Award-winning Musical Artist and activist Angélique Kidjo, Author

Paulina Chiziane, Ghanaian footballer Michael Essien, Somali model, author, actress and human rights activist Waris Dirie, former Ghanaian International football player and captain Abedi Pele, track and field athlete Maria Mutola, Senegalese singer and percussionist Youssou N'Dour, and Afro-pop singer-songwriter Salif Keita.

Consequently, the overarching message for all the planned Peace Day activities as well as the appointment of the advisory board

members and peace ambassadors is, quite simply, **“Make Peace Happen”**.

Important Forthcoming Dates

9 September 2010: African Union Day

21 September 2010: International Day of Peace and Day of African Year of Peace and Security

25 September 2010: Pan African Women's Day

September 2010: Millennium Development Goals conference

October 2010: Exercise AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise (CPX) to test effectiveness of African Standby Force

1 December 2010: World AIDS Day

10 December 2010: International Human Rights Day

Country	Election	Date
Chad	National Assembly	28 November 2010
Egypt	People's Assembly Shura Council (half of the members)	November 2010
Equatorial Guinea	Presidential	December 2010

Contributors to this Volume:

ISS PSC Report Programme: Dr. Duke Kent-Brown, Dr. Solomon Dersso, Hallelujah Lulie, Eden Yohannes Yoseph

ISS African Conflict Prevention Programme, Addis Ababa: Jamila Abdellaoui

Donors:

This Report is published through the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Denmark, the Foundation Open Society Institute, and the Humanity United Foundation. In addition, the Institute for Security Studies receives core support from the Governments of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.

© 2010, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

Contact

Programme Head
Peace and Security Council Report Programme
Institute for Security Studies
P.O. Box 2329
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Tel: +251-11-372-11-54
Fax: +251-11-372-59-54
Email: addisababa@issafrica.org

website: www.issafrica.org